Most importantly, this version of delocate works for ppc64le. It should
also work for x86-64, but will need significant testing to make sure
that it covers all the cases that the previous delocate.go covered.
It's less stringtastic than the old code, however the parser isn't as
nice as I would have liked. I thought that the reason we put up with
AT&T syntax with Intel is so that assembly syntax could be somewhat
consistent across platforms. At least for ppc64le, that does not appear
to be the case.
Change-Id: Ic7e3c6acc3803d19f2c3ff5620c5e39703d74212
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16464
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Windows Clang needs this in the stack case too, but it doesn't define
__GNUC__ since it's emulating MSVC.
Change-Id: I646550ca95240e80822adddc2b53c3b58c2ec4a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16644
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The only place it is used is EC_KEY_{dup,copy} and no one calls that
function on an EC_KEY with ex_data. This aligns with functions like
RSAPublicKey_dup which do not copy ex_data. The logic is also somewhat
subtle in the face of malloc errors (upstream's PR 3323).
In fact, we'd even changed the function pointer signature from upstream,
so BoringSSL-only code is needed to pass this pointer in anyway. (I
haven't switched it to CRYPTO_EX_unused because there are some callers
which pass in an implementation anyway.)
Note, in upstream, the dup hook is also used for SSL_SESSIONs when those
are duplicated (for TLS 1.2 ticket renewal or TLS 1.3 resumption). Our
interpretation is that callers should treat those SSL_SESSIONs
equivalently to newly-established ones. This avoids every consumer
providing a dup hook and simplifies the interface.
(I've gone ahead and removed the TODO(fork). I don't think we'll be able
to change this API. Maybe introduce a new one, but it may not be worth
it? Then again, this API is atrocious... I've never seen anyone use argl
and argp even.)
BUG=21
Change-Id: I6c9e9d5a02347cb229d4c084c1e85125bd741d2b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16344
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Instead of a script which generates macros, emit static inlines in
individual header (or C files). This solves a few issues with the
original setup:
- The documentation was off. We match the documentation now.
- The stack macros did not check constness; see some of the fixes in
crypto/x509.
- Type errors did not look like usual type errors.
- Any type which participated in STACK_OF had to be made partially
public. This allows stack types to be defined an internal header or
even an individual file.
- One could not pass sk_FOO_free into something which expects a function
pointer.
Thanks to upstream's 411abf2dd37974a5baa54859c1abcd287b3c1181 for the
idea.
Change-Id: Ie5431390ccad761c17596b0e93941b0d7a68f904
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16087
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We returned the wrong type, but with a typedef which made it void*. In
C++, void* to T* doesn't implicitly convert, so it doesn't quite work
right. Notably, Node passes it into sk_SSL_COMP_zero. The sk_* macros
only weakly typecheck right now, but a pending CL converts them to
proper functions.
Change-Id: I635d1e39e4f4f11b2b7bf350115a7f1b1be30e4f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16447
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Saves having it in several places.
Change-Id: I329e1bf4dd4a7f51396e36e2604280fcca32b58c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16026
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I7d8f9098038a82b29ab0eff8a3258975d8804a68
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16264
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It's about time we got rid of this. As a first step, introduce a flag,
so that some consumers may stage this change in appropriately.
BUG=chromium:534766,chromium:532048
Change-Id: Id53f0bacf5bdbf85dd71d1262d9f3a9ce3c4111f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16104
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I think I've finally cleared this out. Everything should be using
upstream's longer 'proto' names now.
Change-Id: I6ab283dca845fdc184f3764223d027acba59ca91
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16086
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EVP_AEAD_CTX is otherwise a pain to use from C++ when you need to keep
it around.
Change-Id: I1dff926b33a3246680be21b89b69dfb336d25cd5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15965
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FIPS 186-4 wants d = e^-1 (mod lcm(p-1, q-1)), not (p-1)*(q-1).
Note this means the size of d might reveal information about p-1 and
q-1. However, we do operations with Chinese Remainder Theorem, so we
only use d (mod p-1) and d (mod q-1) as exponents. Using a minimal
totient does not affect those two values.
This removes RSA_recover_crt_params. Using a minimal d breaks (or rather
reveals an existing bug in) the function.
While I'm here, rename those ridiculous variable names.
Change-Id: Iaf623271d49cd664ba0eca24aa25a393f5666fac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15944
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Nothing is using them. For encrypt, there's generally no need to swap
out public key operations. keygen seems especially pointless as one
could just as easily call the other function directly.
The one behavior change is RSA_encrypt now gracefully detects if called
on an empty RSA, to match the other un-RSA_METHOD-ed functions which had
similar treatments. (Conscrypt was filling in the encrypt function
purely to provide a non-crashing no-op function. They leave the public
bits blank and pass their custom keys through sufficiently many layers
of Java crypto goo that it's not obvious whether this is reachable.)
We still can't take the function pointers out, but once
96bbe03dfd
trickles back into everything, we can finally prune RSA_METHOD.
Bump BORINGSSL_API_VERSION as a convenience so I can land the
corresponding removal in Conscrypt immediately.
Change-Id: Ia2ef4780a5dfcb869b224e1ff632daab8d378b2e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15864
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This allows us to implement RSA-PSS in the FIPS module without pulling
in EVP_PKEY. It also allows people to use RSA-PSS on an RSA*.
Empirically folks seem to use the low-level padding functions a lot,
which is unfortunate.
This allows us to remove a now redundant length check in p_rsa.c.
Change-Id: I5270e01c6999d462d378865db2b858103c335485
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15825
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thanks to Alex Gaynor for catching this.
Change-Id: I00e86f90a6ecb845393c0f4f9f8177a053645e70
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15784
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OPENSSL_ia32cap_addr avoids any relocations within the module, at the
cost of a runtime TEXTREL, which causes problems in some cases.
(Notably, if someone links us into a binary which uses the GCC "ifunc"
attribute, the loader crashes.)
Fix C references of OPENSSL_ia32cap_addr with a function. This is
analogous to the BSS getters. A follow-up commit will fix perlasm with a
different scheme which avoids calling into a function (clobbering
registers and complicating unwind directives.)
Change-Id: I09d6cda4cec35b693e16b5387611167da8c7a6de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15525
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We only ever compute it for odd (actually, prime) modulus as part of
BN_mod_sqrt.
If we cared, we could probably drop this from most binaries. This is
used to when modular square root needs Tonelli-Shanks. Modular square
root is only used for compressed coordinates. Of our supported curves
(I'm handwaiving away EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp here[*]), only P-224 needs
the full Tonelli-Shanks algorithm (p is 1 mod 8). That computes the
Legendre symbol a bunch to find a non-square mod p. But p is known at
compile-time, so we can just hard-code a sample non-square.
Sadly, BN_mod_sqrt has some callers outside of crypto/ec, so there's
also that. Anyway, it's also not that large of a function.
[*] Glancing through SEC 2 and Brainpool, secp224r1 is the only curve
listed in either document whose prime is not either 3 mod 4 or 5 mod 8.
Even 5 mod 8 is rare: only secp224k1. It's unlikely anyone would notice
if we broke annoying primes. Though OpenSSL does support "WTLS" curves
which has an additional 1 mod 8 case.
Change-Id: If36aa78c0d41253ec024f2d90692949515356cd1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15425
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also fully deprecate ERR_error_string. Even when passing an external
buffer, passing the length explicitly is better.
Change-Id: Id2eb5723410f4564ef5e27c54ba79672133368e7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15424
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These modes do internal random IV generation and are unsuitable for
non-testing purposes.
Change-Id: I14b98af8f6cf43b4fc835a2b04a9b0425b7651b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15244
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thanks to Rob Sloan for clearing out Android's uses of these functions.
I forgot we can hide these now.
BUG=97
Change-Id: I9bc7bf5ca379d3345743151e606f3e911367b4ed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15364
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sloan <varomodt@google.com>
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This is a version of PKCS7_get_certificates but does not require
crypto/x509.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I20152a8d1f3ed866d47e41fe576ea9f442490224
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15129
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A follow-up change will add a CRYPTO_BUFFER variant. This makes the
naming match the header and doesn't require including x509.h. (Though
like ssl.h and pkcs8.h, some of the functions are implemented with code
that depends on crypto/x509.)
Change-Id: I5a7de209f4f775fe0027893f711326d89699ca1f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15128
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BUG=76
Change-Id: I8b754ba17b3e0beee425929e4b53785b2e95f0ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15164
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This also fixes TestGetUint to actually test CBS_get_last_u8's behavior.
Right now it can't distinguish CBS_get_last_u8 and CBS_get_u8.
BUG=129
Change-Id: Ie431bb1a828f1c6877938ba7e75c82305b54cf13
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15007
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When writing tests and BoGo isn't available, it is useful to be able to
configure the set of signature algorithms accepted on the verify side.
Add an API for this.
Change-Id: Ic873189da7f8853e412acd68614df9d9a872a0c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15125
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This isn't actually used yet, but implements CTR-DRBG from SP 800-90Ar1.
Specifically, it always uses AES-256 and no derivation function.
Change-Id: Ie82b829590226addd7c165eac410a5d584858bfd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14891
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Since only the consumers knows whether an EC key will be used for
ECDSA or ECDHE, it is part of the FIPS policy for the consumer to
check the validity of the generated key before signing with it.
Change-Id: Ie250f655c8fcb6a59cc7210def1e87eb958e9349
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14745
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FIPS is not compatible with multiprime RSA. Any multiprime RSA private
keys will fail to parse after this change.
Change-Id: I8d969d668bf0be4f66c66a30e56f0e7f6795f3e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14984
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In some cases, consumers may include a BoringSSL header without setting
up include paths. This risks pulling in system OpenSSL headers instead.
For almost every BoringSSL header, the first #include is base.h, which
does not exist upstream, thus the mistake will be caught.
The exception is base.h itself which naturally does not include itself.
Have it include an empty is_boringssl.h header to catch this mistake.
Change-Id: Ia96586ecc627ff46867d8af8b68138185866f074
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14949
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This follows up on cedc6f18 by removing support for the
-DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_DHE_TLS compile flag, and the code needed to
support it.
Change-Id: I53b6aa7a0eddd23ace8b770edb2a31b18ba2ce26
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14886
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Change-Id: I9f7f1dd609c38d1f4be536daff94a4ba002582d0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14888
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Later CLs will unwind the rest of multiprime RSA support. Start with key
generation.
Change-Id: Id20473fd55cf32c27ea4a57f2d2ea11daaffedeb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14870
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As a precursor to removing the code entirely later, disable the protocol
by default. Callers must use SSL_CTX_set_min_version to enable it.
This change also makes SSLv3_method *not* enable SSL 3.0. Normally
version-specific methods set the minimum and maximum version to their
version. SSLv3_method leaves the minimum at the default, so we will
treat it as all versions disabled. To help debugging, the error code is
switched from WRONG_SSL_VERSION to a new NO_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_ENABLED.
This also defines OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 and OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD to kick in
any no-ssl3 build paths in consumers which should provide a convenient
hook for any upstreaming changes that may be needed. (OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
existed in older versions of OpenSSL, so in principle one may encounter
an OpenSSL with the same settings.)
Change-Id: I96a8f2f568eb77b2537b3a774b2f7108bd67dd0c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14031
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This only works at TLS 1.2 and above as, before TLS 1.2, there is no way
to advertise support for Ed25519 or negotiate the correct signature
algorithm. Add tests for this accordingly.
For now, this is disabled by default on the verifying side but may be
enabled per SSL_CTX. Notably, projects like Chromium which use an
external verifier may need changes elsewhere before they can enable it.
(On the signing side, we can assume that if the caller gave us an
Ed25519 certificate, they mean for us to use it.)
BUG=187
Change-Id: Id25b0a677dcbe205ddd26d8dbba11c04bb520756
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BUG=187
Change-Id: I5775ce0886041b0c12174a7d665f3af1e8bce511
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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It's amazing how short p_ed25519.c is.
BUG=187
Change-Id: Ib2a5fa7a4acf2087ece954506f81e91a1ed483e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14449
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The resulting EVP_PKEYs do not do anything useful yet, but we are able
to parse them. Teaching them to sign will be done in a follow-up.
Creating these from in-memory keys is also slightly different from other
types. We don't have or need a public ED25519_KEY struct in
curve25519.h, so I've added tighter constructor functions which should
hopefully be easier to use anyway.
BUG=187
Change-Id: I0bbeea37350d4fdca05b6c6c0f152c15e6ade5bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14446
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Instead, extract it from the certificate, which is what everyone was
doing anyway. A follow-up change will take advantage of this cleanup to
deduplicate code between signing and verifying for which keys are good
for which signature algorithms.
BUG=188
Change-Id: Ic3f83a6477e8fa53e5e7233f4545f4d2c4b58d01
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14565
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Right now this is just a wrapper over EVP_Digest and EVP_PKEY_sign. A
later change will introduce a sign_message hook to EVP_PKEY_METHOD which
Ed25519 and other single-shot-only algorithms can implement.
(EVP_PKEY_sign does not quite work for this purpose as all the other key
types believe EVP_PKEY_sign acts on a pre-hashed input.)
BUG=187
Change-Id: Ia4bbf61b25cc4a0d64bcb4364805fe9b5a6e829c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14447
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We received an external request to add an option to undo the check added
in 3e51757de2.
Change-Id: Ifdd4b07705f2fa3d781d775d5cd139ea72d36734
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(Thanks to Sam Panzer for the patch.)
At least some linkers will drop constructor functions if no symbols from
that translation unit are used elsewhere in the program. On POWER, since
the cached capability value isn't a global in crypto.o (like other
platforms), the constructor function is getting discarded.
The C++11 spec says (3.6.2, paragraph 4):
It is implementation-defined whether the dynamic initialization of a
non-local variable with static storage duration is done before the
first statement of main. If the initialization is deferred to some
point in time after the first statement of main, it shall occur
before the first odr-use (3.2) of any function or variable defined
in the same translation unit as the variable to be initialized.
Compilers appear to interpret that to mean they are allowed to drop
(i.e. indefinitely defer) constructors that occur in translation units
that are never used, so they can avoid initializing some part of a
library if it's dropped on the floor.
This change makes the hardware capability value for POWER a global in
crypto.c, which should prevent the constructor function from being
ignored.
Change-Id: I43ebe492d0ac1491f6f6c2097971a277f923dd3e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14664
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This moves the early data switch to CERT to make this
|SSL_set_SSL_CTX|-proof.
Change-Id: Icca96e76636d87578deb24b2d507cabee7e46a4a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14545
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There are a few test vectors which were not imported from djb's. Mirror
those. Also as RFC 8032 uses a slightly different private key
representation, document this in curve25519.h.
BUG=187
Change-Id: I119381168ba1af9b332365fd8f974fba41759d57
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14445
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
