HTTP/2 places requirements on the cipher suite. So that servers can
decline HTTP/2 when these requirements aren't met, defer ALPN
negotiation.
See also b/32553041.
Change-Id: Idbcf049f9c8bda06a8be52a0154fe76e84607268
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11982
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BUG=chromium:659593
Change-Id: I73a4751609b85df7cd40f0f60dc3f3046a490940
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11861
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On the client we'll leave it off by default until the change has made it
through Chrome's release process. For TLS 1.3, there is no existing
breakage risk, so always do it. This saves us the trouble of having to
manually turn it on in servers.
See [0] for a data point of someone getting it wrong.
[0] https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/9dbc21b1c3cc
Change-Id: I74daad9e7efd2040e9d66d72d558b31f145e6c4c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11680
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Channel ID for TLS 1.3 uses the same digest construction as
CertificateVerify. This message is signed with the Channel ID key and
put in the same handshake message (with the same format) as in TLS 1.2.
BUG=103
Change-Id: Ia5b2dffe5a39c39db0cecb0aa6bdc328e53accc2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11420
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{sha1, ecdsa} is virtually nonexistent. {sha512, ecdsa} is pointless
when we only accept P-256 and P-384. See Chromium Intent thread here:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/kWwLfeIQIBM/9chGZ40TCQAJ
This tweaks the signature algorithm logic slightly so that sign and
verify preferences are separate.
BUG=chromium:655318
Change-Id: I1097332600dcaa38e62e4dffa0194fb734c6df3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11621
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We'll never send cookies, but we'll echo them on request. Implement it
in runner as well and test.
BUG=98
Change-Id: Idd3799f1eaccd52ac42f5e2e5ae07c209318c270
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11565
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This doesn't currently honor the required KeyUpdate response. That will
be done in a follow-up.
BUG=74
Change-Id: I750fc41278736cb24230303815e839c6f6967b6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11412
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This releases memory associated with them after the handshake. Note this
changes the behavior of |SSL_get0_certificate_types| and
|SSL_get_client_CA_list| slightly. Both functions now return NULL
outside of the handshake. But they were already documented to return
something undefined when not called at the CertificateRequest.
A survey of callers finds none that would care. (Note
SSL_get_client_CA_list is used both as a getter for the corresponding
server config setter and to report client handshake properties. Only the
latter is affected.) It's also pretty difficult to imagine why a caller
would wish to query this stuff at any other time, and there are clear
benefits to dropping the CA list after the handshake (some servers send
ABSURDLY large lists).
Change-Id: I3ac3b601ff0cfa601881ce77ae33d99bb5327004
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11521
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I5d4fc0d3204744e93d71a36923469035c19a5b10
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11560
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BUG=77
Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10840
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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BUG=77
Change-Id: Id8c45e98c4c22cdd437cbba1e9375239e123b261
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10763
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Found by libFuzzer and then one more mistake caught by valgrind. Add a
test for this case.
Change-Id: I92773bc1231bafe5fc069e8568d93ac0df4c8acb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11129
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
access_denied is only used to indicate client cert errors and Chrome
maps it to ERR_SSL_BAD_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT accordingly:
access_denied
A valid certificate was received, but when access control was
applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation. This
message is always fatal.
We don't appear to be the cause of Chrome's recent
ERR_SSL_BAD_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT spike, but we should send these correctly
nonetheless.
If the early callback fails, handshake_failure seems the most
appropriate ("I was unable to find suitable parameters"). There isn't
really an alert that matches DoS, but internal_error seems okay?
internal_error
An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the
protocol (such as a memory allocation failure) makes it impossible
to continue. This message is always fatal.
There's nothing wrong, per se, with your ClientHello, but I just can't
deal with it right now. Please go away.
Change-Id: Icd1c998c09dc42daa4b309c1a4a0f136b85eb69d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11084
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Reason for revert: Right now in TLS 1.3, certificate_auth is exactly
the same as whether we're doing resumption. With the weird reauth
stuff punted to later in the spec, having extra state is just more
room for bugs to creep in.
Original issue's description:
> Determining certificate_auth and key_exchange based on SSL.
>
> This allows us to switch TLS 1.3 to use non-cipher based negotiation
> without needing to use separate functions between 1.3 and below.
>
> BUG=77
>
> Change-Id: I9207e7a6793cb69e8300e2c15afe3548cbf82af2
> Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10803
> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
>
Change-Id: I240e3ee959ffd1f2481a06eabece3af554d20ffa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11008
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This allows us to switch TLS 1.3 to use non-cipher based negotiation
without needing to use separate functions between 1.3 and below.
BUG=77
Change-Id: I9207e7a6793cb69e8300e2c15afe3548cbf82af2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10803
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peer_sigalgs should live on SSL_HANDSHAKE. This both releases a little
bit of memory after the handshake is over and also avoids the bug where
the sigalgs get dropped if SSL_set_SSL_CTX is called at a bad time. See
also upstream's 14e14bf6964965d02ce89805d9de867f000095aa.
This only affects consumers using the old SNI callback and not
select_certificate_cb.
Add a test that the SNI callback works as expected. In doing so, add an
SSL_CTX version of the signing preferences API. This is a property of
the cert/key pair (really just the key) and should be tied to that. This
makes it a bit easier to have the regression test work with TLS 1.2 too.
I thought we'd fixed this already, but apparently not... :-/
BUG=95
Change-Id: I75b02fad4059e6aa46c3b05183a07d72880711b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10445
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Having two copies of this is confusing. This field is inherently tied to
the certificate chain, which lives on SSL_SESSION, so this should live
there too. This also wasn't getting reset correctly on SSL_clear, but
this is now resolved.
Change-Id: I22b1734a93320bb0bf0dc31faa74d77a8e1de906
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10283
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Per Piotr, all caps is the proper rendering.
Change-Id: I783016a6ed7e29f49369fabbcfa49b66910e4954
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10486
Reviewed-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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9498e74 changed the default value of verify_result to an error. This
tripped up NGINX, which depends on a bug[1] in OpenSSL. netty-tcnative
also uses this behavior, though it currently isn't tripped up by 9498e74
because it calls |SSL_set_verify_result|. However, we would like to
remove |SSL_set_verify_result| and with two data points, it seems this
is behavior we must preserve.
This change sets |verify_result| to |X509_V_OK| when a) no client
certificate is requested or b) none is given and it's optional.
[1] See BUGS in https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/ssl/SSL_get_verify_result.html
Change-Id: Ibd33660ae409bfe272963a8c39b7e9aa83c3d635
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9067
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BUG=75
Change-Id: Ied864cfccbc0e68d71c55c5ab563da27b7253463
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9043
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If cert_cb runs asynchronously, we end up repeating a large part of very
stateful ClientHello processing. This seems to be mostly fine and there
are few users of server-side cert_cb (it's a new API in 1.0.2), but it's
a little scary.
This is also visible to external consumers because some callbacks get
called multiple times. We especially should try to avoid that as there
is no guarantee that these callbacks are idempotent and give the same
answer each time.
Change-Id: I212b2325eae2cfca0fb423dace101e466c5e5d4e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10224
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Now that ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list is uninteresting, it can be an
implementation detail of ssl3_choose_cipher. This removes a tiny amount
of duplicated TLS 1.2 / TLS 1.3 code.
Change-Id: I116a6bb08bbc43da573d4b7b5626c556e1a7452d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10221
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It's odd that a function like ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list secretly has side
effects all over the place. This removes the need for the TLS 1.3 code
to re-query the version range, and it removes the requirement that the
RI extension be first.
Change-Id: Ic9af549db3aaa8880f3c591b8a13ba9ae91d6a46
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10220
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Between TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3, and the early callback, we've got a lot of
ClientHello parsers. Unify everything on the early callback's parser. As
a side effect, this means we can parse a ClientHello fairly succinctly
from any function which will let us split up ClientHello states where
appropriate.
Change-Id: I2359b75f80926cc7d827570cf33f93029b39e525
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10184
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It was renamed to ticket_liftetime_hint in
1e6f11a7ff, which breaks Qt.
Change-Id: I9c6d3097fe96e669f06a4e0880bd4d7d82b03ba8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10181
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tls13_process_certificate can take a boolean for whether anonymous is
allowed. This does change the error on the client slightly, but I think
this is correct anyway. It is not a syntax error for the server to send
no certificates in so far as the Certificate message allows it. It's
just illegal.
Change-Id: I1af80dacf23f50aad0b1fbd884bc068a40714399
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9072
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Save a little bit of typing at the call site.
Change-Id: I818535409b57a694e5e0ea0e9741d89f2be89375
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9090
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We will now send tickets as a server and accept them as a
client. Correctly offering and resuming them in the handshake will be
implemented in a follow-up.
Now that we're actually processing draft 14 tickets, bump the draft
version.
Change-Id: I304320a29c4ffe564fa9c00642a4ace96ff8d871
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8982
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Change-Id: Id6a7443246479c62cbe0024e2131a2013959e21e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9078
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Where we can move uncommon logic to the caller, we probably ought to.
Change-Id: I54a09fffffc20290be05295137ccb605d562cad0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9069
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To prevent configuration/established session confusion, the handshake
session state is separated into the configured session (ssl->session)
and the newly created session (ssl->s3->new_session). Upon conclusion of
the handshake, the finalized session is stored
in (ssl->s3->established_session). During the handshake, any requests
for the session (SSL_get_session) return a non-resumable session, to
prevent resumption of a partially filled session. Sessions should only
be cached upon the completion of the full handshake, using the resulting
established_session. The semantics of accessors on the session are
maintained mid-renego.
Change-Id: I4358aecb71fce4fe14a6746c5af1416a69935078
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8612
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This doesn't do anything since they're for DTLS, but we ought to satisfy
the API nonetheless. expect_flight is easy with
ssl_hs_flush_and_read_message. received_flight I think basically needs
to get sprinkled into the state machine.
Change-Id: I406c7f776ad8e5e3cbcafcac6b26a688c6d3caf1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8883
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It really should take a few more parameters and save a bit of
long-winded initialization work.
Change-Id: I2823f0aa82be39914a156323f6f32b470b6d6a3b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8876
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[Tests added by davidben.]
Change-Id: I0d54a4f8b8fe91b348ff22658d95340cdb48b089
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8850
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Every flush but the last is always immediately followed by a read. Add a
combined wait mode to make things simpler. Unfortunately, both flights
we have (the state machine doesn't write the first ClientHello) are
followed immediately by a state change, which means we still need some
state in between because we must run code after write_message but before
read_message.
(This way to fix that is to get rid of the buffer BIO, change
write_message to write_flight, and allow things like init_message /
finish_message / init_message / finish_message / set_write_state /
init_message / finish_message / write_flight.)
Change-Id: Iebaa388ccbe7fcad48c1b2256e1c0d3a7c9c8a2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8828
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This adds the machinery for doing TLS 1.3 1RTT.
Change-Id: I736921ffe9dc6f6e64a08a836df6bb166d20f504
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8720
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