boringssl/crypto/evp/p_ec.c
Adam Langley 5129e2d695 Align EVP return values with BoringSSL convention.
Where possible, functions should return one for success and zero for
error. The use of additional negative values to indicate an error is,
itself, error prone.

This change fixes many EVP functions to remove the possibility of
negative return values. Existing code that is testing for <= 0 will
continue to function, although there is the possibility that some code
was differentiating between negative values (error) and zero (invalid
signature) for the verify functions and will now show the wrong error
message.

Change-Id: I982512596bb18a82df65861394dbd7487783bd3d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1333
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-07-29 21:47:51 +00:00

422 lines
11 KiB
C

/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
* project 2006.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../ec/internal.h"
typedef struct {
/* Key and paramgen group */
EC_GROUP *gen_group;
/* message digest */
const EVP_MD *md;
/* Duplicate key if custom cofactor needed */
EC_KEY *co_key;
/* Cofactor mode */
signed char cofactor_mode;
/* KDF (if any) to use for ECDH */
char kdf_type;
/* Message digest to use for key derivation */
const EVP_MD *kdf_md;
/* User key material */
unsigned char *kdf_ukm;
size_t kdf_ukmlen;
/* KDF output length */
size_t kdf_outlen;
} EC_PKEY_CTX;
static int pkey_ec_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx;
dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_PKEY_CTX));
if (!dctx) {
return 0;
}
memset(dctx, 0, sizeof(EC_PKEY_CTX));
dctx->cofactor_mode = -1;
dctx->kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE;
ctx->data = dctx;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_ec_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) {
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
if (!pkey_ec_init(dst)) {
return 0;
}
sctx = src->data;
dctx = dst->data;
if (sctx->gen_group) {
dctx->gen_group = EC_GROUP_dup(sctx->gen_group);
if (!dctx->gen_group) {
return 0;
}
}
dctx->md = sctx->md;
if (sctx->co_key) {
dctx->co_key = EC_KEY_dup(sctx->co_key);
if (!dctx->co_key) {
return 0;
}
}
dctx->kdf_type = sctx->kdf_type;
dctx->kdf_md = sctx->kdf_md;
dctx->kdf_outlen = sctx->kdf_outlen;
if (sctx->kdf_ukm) {
dctx->kdf_ukm = BUF_memdup(sctx->kdf_ukm, sctx->kdf_ukmlen);
if (!dctx->kdf_ukm) {
return 0;
}
} else {
dctx->kdf_ukm = NULL;
}
dctx->kdf_ukmlen = sctx->kdf_ukmlen;
return 1;
}
static void pkey_ec_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
if (!dctx) {
return;
}
if (dctx->gen_group) {
EC_GROUP_free(dctx->gen_group);
}
if (dctx->co_key) {
EC_KEY_free(dctx->co_key);
}
if (dctx->kdf_ukm) {
OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm);
}
OPENSSL_free(dctx);
}
static int pkey_ec_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
const uint8_t *tbs, size_t tbslen) {
int type;
unsigned int sltmp;
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
if (!sig) {
*siglen = ECDSA_size(ec);
return 1;
} else if (*siglen < (size_t)ECDSA_size(ec)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_ec_sign, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
type = NID_sha1;
if (dctx->md) {
type = EVP_MD_type(dctx->md);
}
if (!ECDSA_sign(type, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, ec)) {
return 0;
}
*siglen = (size_t)sltmp;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_ec_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
const uint8_t *tbs, size_t tbslen) {
int type;
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
type = NID_sha1;
if (dctx->md) {
type = EVP_MD_type(dctx->md);
}
return ECDSA_verify(type, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, ec);
}
static int pkey_ec_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *key,
size_t *keylen) {
int ret;
size_t outlen;
const EC_POINT *pubkey = NULL;
EC_KEY *eckey;
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
if (!ctx->pkey || !ctx->peerkey) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_ec_derive, EVP_R_KEYS_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
eckey = dctx->co_key ? dctx->co_key : ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
if (!key) {
const EC_GROUP *group;
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
*keylen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
return 1;
}
pubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ctx->peerkey->pkey.ec);
/* NB: unlike PKCS#3 DH, if *outlen is less than maximum size this is
* not an error, the result is truncated. */
outlen = *keylen;
ret = ECDH_compute_key(key, outlen, pubkey, eckey, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
return 0;
}
*keylen = ret;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_ec_kdf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *key,
size_t *keylen) {
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
uint8_t *ktmp = NULL;
size_t ktmplen;
int rv = 0;
if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE) {
return pkey_ec_derive(ctx, key, keylen);
}
if (!key) {
*keylen = dctx->kdf_outlen;
return 1;
}
if (*keylen != dctx->kdf_outlen ||
!pkey_ec_derive(ctx, NULL, &ktmplen)) {
return 0;
}
ktmp = OPENSSL_malloc(ktmplen);
if (!ktmp) {
return 0;
}
if (!pkey_ec_derive(ctx, ktmp, &ktmplen)) {
goto err;
}
if (!ECDH_KDF_X9_62(key, *keylen, ktmp, ktmplen, dctx->kdf_ukm,
dctx->kdf_ukmlen, dctx->kdf_md)) {
goto err;
}
rv = 1;
err:
if (ktmp) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(ktmp, ktmplen);
OPENSSL_free(ktmp);
}
return rv;
}
static int pkey_ec_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) {
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
EC_GROUP *group;
switch (type) {
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID:
group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(p1);
if (group == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_ec_ctrl, EVP_R_INVALID_CURVE);
return 0;
}
if (dctx->gen_group)
EC_GROUP_free(dctx->gen_group);
dctx->gen_group = group;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE:
if (p1 == -2)
return dctx->kdf_type;
if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE && p1 != EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62)
return -2;
dctx->kdf_type = p1;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_MD:
dctx->kdf_md = p2;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_MD:
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->kdf_md;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_OUTLEN:
if (p1 <= 0)
return -2;
dctx->kdf_outlen = (size_t)p1;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_OUTLEN:
*(int *)p2 = dctx->kdf_outlen;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_UKM:
if (dctx->kdf_ukm)
OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm);
dctx->kdf_ukm = p2;
if (p2)
dctx->kdf_ukmlen = p1;
else
dctx->kdf_ukmlen = 0;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_UKM:
*(unsigned char **)p2 = dctx->kdf_ukm;
return dctx->kdf_ukmlen;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha1 &&
EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1 &&
EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha224 &&
EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha256 &&
EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha384 &&
EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha512) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_ec_ctrl, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
return 0;
}
dctx->md = p2;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->md;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
/* Default behaviour is OK */
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
return 1;
default:
return -2;
}
}
static int pkey_ec_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
int ret = 0;
if (dctx->gen_group == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_ec_paramgen, EVP_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
return 0;
}
ec = EC_KEY_new();
if (!ec) {
return 0;
}
ret = EC_KEY_set_group(ec, dctx->gen_group);
if (ret) {
EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec);
} else {
EC_KEY_free(ec);
}
return ret;
}
static int pkey_ec_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
if (ctx->pkey == NULL && dctx->gen_group == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_ec_keygen, EVP_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
return 0;
}
ec = EC_KEY_new();
if (!ec) {
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec);
if (ctx->pkey) {
/* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */
if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey)) {
return 0;
}
} else {
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(ec, dctx->gen_group)) {
return 0;
}
}
return EC_KEY_generate_key(pkey->pkey.ec);
}
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ec_pkey_meth = {
EVP_PKEY_EC, 0 /* flags */, pkey_ec_init,
pkey_ec_copy, pkey_ec_cleanup, 0 /* paramgen_init */,
pkey_ec_paramgen, 0 /* keygen_init */, pkey_ec_keygen,
0 /* sign_init */, pkey_ec_sign, 0 /* verify_init */,
pkey_ec_verify, 0 /* signctx_init */, 0 /* signctx */,
0 /* verifyctx_init */, 0 /* verifyctx */, 0 /* encrypt_init */,
0 /* encrypt */, 0 /* decrypt_init */, 0 /* decrypt */,
0 /* derive_init */, pkey_ec_kdf_derive, pkey_ec_ctrl,
};