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00f48c8273
boringssl/ssl/ssl_lib.cc
David Benjamin 00f48c8273 Rename and move a few more ssl3_ functions around. 
I think that's the last of the ssl3_ prefix being used for common
functions.

Change-Id: Id83e6f2065c3765931250bd074f6ebf1fc251696
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21347
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
2017-10-12 16:25:54 +00:00

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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE. */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../crypto/internal.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
#include <sys/timeb.h>
#else
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
namespace bssl {
// |SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL| is no longer emitted, but continue to define it
// to avoid downstream churn.
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL)
// The following errors are no longer emitted, but are used in nginx without
// #ifdefs.
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG)
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED)
// Some error codes are special. Ensure the make_errors.go script never
// regresses this.
static_assert(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION ==
SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION + SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET,
"alert reason code mismatch");
// kMaxHandshakeSize is the maximum size, in bytes, of a handshake message.
static const size_t kMaxHandshakeSize = (1u << 24) - 1;
static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl =
CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx =
CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
bool CBBFinishArray(CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out) {
uint8_t *ptr;
size_t len;
if (!CBB_finish(cbb, &ptr, &len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return false;
}
out->Reset(ptr, len);
return true;
}
void ssl_reset_error_state(SSL *ssl) {
// Functions which use |SSL_get_error| must reset I/O and error state on
// entry.
ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
ERR_clear_error();
ERR_clear_system_error();
}
int ssl_can_write(const SSL *ssl) {
return !SSL_in_init(ssl) || ssl->s3->hs->can_early_write;
}
int ssl_can_read(const SSL *ssl) {
return !SSL_in_init(ssl) || ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read;
}
void ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(
struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list) {
if (cipher_list == NULL) {
return;
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list->ciphers);
OPENSSL_free(cipher_list->in_group_flags);
OPENSSL_free(cipher_list);
}
void ssl_update_cache(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int mode) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
SSL_CTX *ctx = ssl->session_ctx;
// Never cache sessions with empty session IDs.
if (ssl->s3->established_session->session_id_length == 0 ||
ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable ||
(ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) != mode) {
return;
}
// Clients never use the internal session cache.
int use_internal_cache = ssl->server && !(ctx->session_cache_mode &
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE);
// A client may see new sessions on abbreviated handshakes if the server
// decides to renew the ticket. Once the handshake is completed, it should be
// inserted into the cache.
if (ssl->s3->established_session != ssl->session ||
(!ssl->server && hs->ticket_expected)) {
if (use_internal_cache) {
SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx, ssl->s3->established_session);
}
if (ctx->new_session_cb != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->s3->established_session);
if (!ctx->new_session_cb(ssl, ssl->s3->established_session)) {
// |new_session_cb|'s return value signals whether it took ownership.
SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session);
}
}
}
if (use_internal_cache &&
!(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) {
// Automatically flush the internal session cache every 255 connections.
int flush_cache = 0;
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush++;
if (ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush >= 255) {
flush_cache = 1;
ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush = 0;
}
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
if (flush_cache) {
struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, now.tv_sec);
}
}
}
static int cbb_add_hex(CBB *cbb, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef";
uint8_t *out;
if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &out, in_len * 2)) {
return 0;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
*(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] >> 4];
*(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] & 0xf];
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_log_secret(const SSL *ssl, const char *label, const uint8_t *secret,
size_t secret_len) {
if (ssl->ctx->keylog_callback == NULL) {
return 1;
}
ScopedCBB cbb;
uint8_t *out;
size_t out_len;
if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), strlen(label) + 1 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2 + 1 +
secret_len * 2 + 1) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), (const uint8_t *)label, strlen(label)) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) ||
!cbb_add_hex(cbb.get(), ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) ||
!cbb_add_hex(cbb.get(), secret, secret_len) ||
!CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), 0 /* NUL */) ||
!CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &out, &out_len)) {
return 0;
}
ssl->ctx->keylog_callback(ssl, (const char *)out);
OPENSSL_free(out);
return 1;
}
void ssl_do_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) {
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL;
if (ssl->info_callback != NULL) {
cb = ssl->info_callback;
} else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
}
if (cb != NULL) {
cb(ssl, type, value);
}
}
void ssl_do_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, int is_write, int content_type,
Span<const uint8_t> in) {
if (ssl->msg_callback == NULL) {
return;
}
// |version| is zero when calling for |SSL3_RT_HEADER| and |SSL2_VERSION| for
// a V2ClientHello.
int version;
switch (content_type) {
case 0:
// V2ClientHello
version = SSL2_VERSION;
break;
case SSL3_RT_HEADER:
version = 0;
break;
default:
version = SSL_version(ssl);
}
ssl->msg_callback(is_write, version, content_type, in.data(), in.size(), ssl,
ssl->msg_callback_arg);
}
void ssl_get_current_time(const SSL *ssl, struct OPENSSL_timeval *out_clock) {
// TODO(martinkr): Change callers to |ssl_ctx_get_current_time| and drop the
// |ssl| arg from |current_time_cb| if possible.
ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl->ctx, out_clock);
}
void ssl_ctx_get_current_time(const SSL_CTX *ctx,
struct OPENSSL_timeval *out_clock) {
if (ctx->current_time_cb != NULL) {
// TODO(davidben): Update current_time_cb to use OPENSSL_timeval. See
// https://crbug.com/boringssl/155.
struct timeval clock;
ctx->current_time_cb(nullptr /* ssl */, &clock);
if (clock.tv_sec < 0) {
assert(0);
out_clock->tv_sec = 0;
out_clock->tv_usec = 0;
} else {
out_clock->tv_sec = (uint64_t)clock.tv_sec;
out_clock->tv_usec = (uint32_t)clock.tv_usec;
}
return;
}
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE)
out_clock->tv_sec = 1234;
out_clock->tv_usec = 1234;
#elif defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
struct _timeb time;
_ftime(&time);
if (time.time < 0) {
assert(0);
out_clock->tv_sec = 0;
out_clock->tv_usec = 0;
} else {
out_clock->tv_sec = time.time;
out_clock->tv_usec = time.millitm * 1000;
}
#else
struct timeval clock;
gettimeofday(&clock, NULL);
if (clock.tv_sec < 0) {
assert(0);
out_clock->tv_sec = 0;
out_clock->tv_usec = 0;
} else {
out_clock->tv_sec = (uint64_t)clock.tv_sec;
out_clock->tv_usec = (uint32_t)clock.tv_usec;
}
#endif
}
} // namespace bssl
using namespace bssl;
int SSL_library_init(void) {
CRYPTO_library_init();
return 1;
}
int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings) {
CRYPTO_library_init();
return 1;
}
static uint32_t ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *sess) {
const uint8_t *session_id = sess->session_id;
uint8_t tmp_storage[sizeof(uint32_t)];
if (sess->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) {
OPENSSL_memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage));
OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp_storage, sess->session_id, sess->session_id_length);
session_id = tmp_storage;
}
uint32_t hash =
((uint32_t)session_id[0]) |
((uint32_t)session_id[1] << 8) |
((uint32_t)session_id[2] << 16) |
((uint32_t)session_id[3] << 24);
return hash;
}
// NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
// coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
// SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
// able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
// with a matching session ID.
static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) {
if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) {
return 1;
}
if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) {
return 1;
}
return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length);
}
SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method) {
SSL_CTX *ret = NULL;
if (method == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
return NULL;
}
ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
if (ret == NULL) {
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX));
ret->method = method->method;
ret->x509_method = method->x509_method;
CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock);
ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
ret->session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
ret->session_psk_dhe_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_PSK_DHE_TIMEOUT;
ret->references = 1;
ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
ret->cert = ssl_cert_new(method->x509_method);
if (ret->cert == NULL) {
goto err;
}
ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp);
if (ret->sessions == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (!ret->x509_method->ssl_ctx_new(ret)) {
goto err;
}
if (!SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list(ret, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST)) {
goto err2;
}
ret->client_CA = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
if (ret->client_CA == NULL) {
goto err;
}
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data);
ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
// Disable the auto-chaining feature by default. Once this has stuck without
// problems, the feature will be removed entirely.
ret->mode = SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN;
// Lock the SSL_CTX to the specified version, for compatibility with legacy
// uses of SSL_METHOD, but we do not set the minimum version for
// |SSLv3_method|.
if (!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ret, method->version) ||
!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ret, method->version == SSL3_VERSION
? 0 // default
: method->version)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err2;
}
return ret;
err:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err2:
SSL_CTX_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references);
return 1;
}
void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
if (ctx == NULL ||
!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&ctx->references)) {
return;
}
// Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference the
// ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed after the
// sessions were flushed. As the ex_data handling routines might also touch
// the session cache, the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the
// cache, then free ex_data, then finally free the cache. (See ticket
// [openssl.org #212].)
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, 0);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&ctx->lock);
lh_SSL_SESSION_free(ctx->sessions);
ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list);
ssl_cert_free(ctx->cert);
sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->client_custom_extensions,
SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free);
sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->server_custom_extensions,
SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free);
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ctx->client_CA, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
ctx->x509_method->ssl_ctx_free(ctx);
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ctx->srtp_profiles);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->supported_group_list);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->verify_sigalgs);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
if (ctx == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
return NULL;
}
if (ctx->method == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
return NULL;
}
SSL *ssl = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
if (ssl == NULL) {
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_memset(ssl, 0, sizeof(SSL));
ssl->conf_min_version = ctx->conf_min_version;
ssl->conf_max_version = ctx->conf_max_version;
ssl->tls13_variant = ctx->tls13_variant;
// RFC 6347 states that implementations SHOULD use an initial timer value of
// 1 second.
ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms = 1000;
ssl->options = ctx->options;
ssl->mode = ctx->mode;
ssl->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
if (ssl->cert == NULL) {
goto err;
}
ssl->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback;
ssl->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg;
ssl->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode;
ssl->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
ssl->custom_verify_callback = ctx->custom_verify_callback;
ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs =
ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs;
ssl->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
ssl->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
ssl->ctx = ctx;
SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
ssl->session_ctx = ctx;
if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_new(ssl)) {
goto err;
}
if (ctx->supported_group_list) {
ssl->supported_group_list = (uint16_t *)BUF_memdup(
ctx->supported_group_list, ctx->supported_group_list_len * 2);
if (!ssl->supported_group_list) {
goto err;
}
ssl->supported_group_list_len = ctx->supported_group_list_len;
}
if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) {
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(
ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
goto err;
}
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
}
ssl->method = ctx->method;
if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) {
goto err;
}
ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data);
ssl->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint) {
ssl->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
if (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
ssl->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback;
ssl->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback;
ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled;
if (ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private) {
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private = ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private;
}
ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled;
ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled;
return ssl;
err:
SSL_free(ssl);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
void SSL_free(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl == NULL) {
return;
}
if (ssl->ctx != NULL) {
ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_free(ssl);
}
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, ssl, &ssl->ex_data);
BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio);
BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio);
BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf);
// add extra stuff
ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ssl->cipher_list);
SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session);
ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname);
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->session_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ssl->supported_group_list);
OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private);
OPENSSL_free(ssl->psk_identity_hint);
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ssl->client_CA, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ssl->srtp_profiles);
if (ssl->method != NULL) {
ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl);
}
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ssl);
}
void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *ssl) {
ssl->server = false;
ssl->do_handshake = ssl_client_handshake;
}
void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *ssl) {
ssl->server = true;
ssl->do_handshake = ssl_server_handshake;
}
void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio) {
BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio);
ssl->rbio = rbio;
}
void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *wbio) {
BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio);
ssl->wbio = wbio;
}
void SSL_set_bio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) {
// For historical reasons, this function has many different cases in ownership
// handling.
// If nothing has changed, do nothing
if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(ssl) && wbio == SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) {
return;
}
// If the two arguments are equal, one fewer reference is granted than
// taken.
if (rbio != NULL && rbio == wbio) {
BIO_up_ref(rbio);
}
// If only the wbio is changed, adopt only one reference.
if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(ssl)) {
SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, wbio);
return;
}
// There is an asymmetry here for historical reasons. If only the rbio is
// changed AND the rbio and wbio were originally different, then we only adopt
// one reference.
if (wbio == SSL_get_wbio(ssl) && SSL_get_rbio(ssl) != SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) {
SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, rbio);
return;
}
// Otherwise, adopt both references.
SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, rbio);
SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, wbio);
}
BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->rbio; }
BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->wbio; }
int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *ssl) {
ssl_reset_error_state(ssl);
if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
return -1;
}
if (!SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
return 1;
}
// Run the handshake.
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
bool early_return = false;
int ret = ssl_run_handshake(hs, &early_return);
ssl_do_info_callback(
ssl, ssl->server ? SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT : SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
// Destroy the handshake object if the handshake has completely finished.
if (!early_return) {
ssl_handshake_free(ssl->s3->hs);
ssl->s3->hs = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
// Not properly initialized yet
SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
}
return SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
}
int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
// Not properly initialized yet
SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
}
return SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
}
static int ssl_do_post_handshake(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) {
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
return tls13_post_handshake(ssl, msg);
}
// We do not accept renegotiations as a server or SSL 3.0. SSL 3.0 will be
// removed entirely in the future and requires retaining more data for
// renegotiation_info.
if (ssl->server || ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
goto no_renegotiation;
}
if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST || CBS_len(&msg.body) != 0) {
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
return 0;
}
switch (ssl->renegotiate_mode) {
case ssl_renegotiate_ignore:
// Ignore the HelloRequest.
return 1;
case ssl_renegotiate_once:
if (ssl->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) {
goto no_renegotiation;
}
break;
case ssl_renegotiate_never:
goto no_renegotiation;
case ssl_renegotiate_freely:
break;
}
// Renegotiation is only supported at quiescent points in the application
// protocol, namely in HTTPS, just before reading the HTTP response. Require
// the record-layer be idle and avoid complexities of sending a handshake
// record while an application_data record is being written.
if (ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(ssl)) {
goto no_renegotiation;
}
// Begin a new handshake.
if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
ssl->s3->hs = ssl_handshake_new(ssl);
if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
return 0;
}
ssl->s3->total_renegotiations++;
return 1;
no_renegotiation:
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
return 0;
}
static int ssl_read_impl(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num, int peek) {
ssl_reset_error_state(ssl);
if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
for (;;) {
// Complete the current handshake, if any. False Start will cause
// |SSL_do_handshake| to return mid-handshake, so this may require multiple
// iterations.
while (!ssl_can_read(ssl)) {
int ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
if (ret == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
}
bool got_handshake = false;
int ret = ssl->method->read_app_data(ssl, &got_handshake, (uint8_t *)buf,
num, peek);
if (ret > 0 || !got_handshake) {
ssl->s3->key_update_count = 0;
return ret;
}
// If we received an interrupt in early read (the end_of_early_data alert),
// loop again for the handshake to process it.
if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
continue;
}
SSLMessage msg;
while (ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
// Handle the post-handshake message and try again.
if (!ssl_do_post_handshake(ssl, msg)) {
return -1;
}
ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
}
}
}
int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) {
return ssl_read_impl(ssl, buf, num, 0 /* consume bytes */);
}
int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) {
return ssl_read_impl(ssl, buf, num, 1 /* peek */);
}
int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num) {
ssl_reset_error_state(ssl);
if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
return -1;
}
int ret = 0;
bool needs_handshake = false;
do {
// If necessary, complete the handshake implicitly.
if (!ssl_can_write(ssl)) {
ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
if (ret == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
}
ret = ssl->method->write_app_data(ssl, &needs_handshake,
(const uint8_t *)buf, num);
} while (needs_handshake);
return ret;
}
int SSL_shutdown(SSL *ssl) {
ssl_reset_error_state(ssl);
if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
// If we are in the middle of a handshake, silently succeed. Consumers often
// call this function before |SSL_free|, whether the handshake succeeded or
// not. We assume the caller has already handled failed handshakes.
if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
return 1;
}
if (ssl->quiet_shutdown) {
// Do nothing if configured not to send a close_notify.
ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
return 1;
}
// This function completes in two stages. It sends a close_notify and then it
// waits for a close_notify to come in. Perform exactly one action and return
// whether or not it succeeds.
if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
// Send a close_notify.
if (ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) <= 0) {
return -1;
}
} else if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) {
// Finish sending the close_notify.
if (ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl) <= 0) {
return -1;
}
} else if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
// Wait for the peer's close_notify.
ssl->method->read_close_notify(ssl);
if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
return -1;
}
}
// Return 0 for unidirectional shutdown and 1 for bidirectional shutdown.
return ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
}
int SSL_send_fatal_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t alert) {
if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) {
if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] != SSL3_AL_FATAL ||
ssl->s3->send_alert[1] != alert) {
// We are already attempting to write a different alert.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
return -1;
}
return ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl);
}
return ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_early_data_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
ctx->cert->enable_early_data = !!enabled;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(SSL_CTX *ctx, enum tls13_variant_t variant) {
ctx->tls13_variant = variant;
}
void SSL_set_tls13_variant(SSL *ssl, enum tls13_variant_t variant) {
ssl->tls13_variant = variant;
}
void SSL_set_early_data_enabled(SSL *ssl, int enabled) {
ssl->cert->enable_early_data = !!enabled;
}
int SSL_in_early_data(const SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return ssl->s3->hs->in_early_data;
}
int SSL_early_data_accepted(const SSL *ssl) {
return ssl->early_data_accepted;
}
void SSL_reset_early_data_reject(SSL *ssl) {
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
if (hs == NULL ||
hs->wait != ssl_hs_early_data_rejected) {
abort();
}
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
hs->in_early_data = false;
hs->early_session.reset();
// Discard any unfinished writes from the perspective of |SSL_write|'s
// retry. The handshake will transparently flush out the pending record
// (discarded by the server) to keep the framing correct.
ssl->s3->wpend_pending = false;
}
static int bio_retry_reason_to_error(int reason) {
switch (reason) {
case BIO_RR_CONNECT:
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT;
case BIO_RR_ACCEPT:
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT;
default:
return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
}
}
int SSL_get_error(const SSL *ssl, int ret_code) {
if (ret_code > 0) {
return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
}
// Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc,
// where we do encode the error
uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
if (err != 0) {
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SYS) {
return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
}
return SSL_ERROR_SSL;
}
if (ret_code == 0) {
if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
return SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN;
}
// An EOF was observed which violates the protocol, and the underlying
// transport does not participate in the error queue. Bubble up to the
// caller.
return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
}
switch (ssl->rwstate) {
case SSL_PENDING_SESSION:
return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION;
case SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING:
return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE;
case SSL_READING: {
BIO *bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
if (BIO_should_read(bio)) {
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
}
if (BIO_should_write(bio)) {
// TODO(davidben): OpenSSL historically checked for writes on the read
// BIO. Can this be removed?
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
}
if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
return bio_retry_reason_to_error(BIO_get_retry_reason(bio));
}
break;
}
case SSL_WRITING: {
BIO *bio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl);
if (BIO_should_write(bio)) {
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
}
if (BIO_should_read(bio)) {
// TODO(davidben): OpenSSL historically checked for reads on the write
// BIO. Can this be removed?
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
}
if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
return bio_retry_reason_to_error(BIO_get_retry_reason(bio));
}
break;
}
case SSL_X509_LOOKUP:
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP;
case SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP:
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
case SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION:
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
case SSL_PENDING_TICKET:
return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_TICKET;
case SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED:
return SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
case SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
}
return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
}
uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) {
ctx->options |= options;
return ctx->options;
}
uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) {
ctx->options &= ~options;
return ctx->options;
}
uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->options; }
uint32_t SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) {
ssl->options |= options;
return ssl->options;
}
uint32_t SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) {
ssl->options &= ~options;
return ssl->options;
}
uint32_t SSL_get_options(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->options; }
uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) {
ctx->mode |= mode;
return ctx->mode;
}
uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) {
ctx->mode &= ~mode;
return ctx->mode;
}
uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->mode; }
uint32_t SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) {
ssl->mode |= mode;
return ssl->mode;
}
uint32_t SSL_clear_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) {
ssl->mode &= ~mode;
return ssl->mode;
}
uint32_t SSL_get_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->mode; }
void SSL_CTX_set0_buffer_pool(SSL_CTX *ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
ctx->pool = pool;
}
int SSL_get_tls_unique(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out) {
*out_len = 0;
OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, max_out);
// tls-unique is not defined for SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.3.
if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_VERSION ||
ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
return 0;
}
// The tls-unique value is the first Finished message in the handshake, which
// is the client's in a full handshake and the server's for a resumption. See
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-3.1.
const uint8_t *finished = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished;
size_t finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
if (ssl->session != NULL) {
// tls-unique is broken for resumed sessions unless EMS is used.
if (!ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
return 0;
}
finished = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished;
finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
}
*out_len = finished_len;
if (finished_len > max_out) {
*out_len = max_out;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, finished, *out_len);
return 1;
}
static int set_session_id_context(CERT *cert, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
size_t sid_ctx_len) {
if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(cert->sid_ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
static_assert(sizeof(cert->sid_ctx) < 256, "sid_ctx too large");
cert->sid_ctx_length = (uint8_t)sid_ctx_len;
OPENSSL_memcpy(cert->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
size_t sid_ctx_len) {
return set_session_id_context(ctx->cert, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
}
int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
size_t sid_ctx_len) {
return set_session_id_context(ssl->cert, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
}
const uint8_t *SSL_get0_session_id_context(const SSL *ssl, size_t *out_len) {
*out_len = ssl->cert->sid_ctx_length;
return ssl->cert->sid_ctx;
}
void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *ssl) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(ssl->cert); }
int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *ssl) { return SSL_get_rfd(ssl); }
int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *ssl) {
int ret = -1;
BIO *b = BIO_find_type(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
if (b != NULL) {
BIO_get_fd(b, &ret);
}
return ret;
}
int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *ssl) {
int ret = -1;
BIO *b = BIO_find_type(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
if (b != NULL) {
BIO_get_fd(b, &ret);
}
return ret;
}
int SSL_set_fd(SSL *ssl, int fd) {
BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set_bio(ssl, bio, bio);
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *ssl, int fd) {
BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
if (rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET ||
BIO_get_fd(rbio, NULL) != fd) {
BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, bio);
} else {
// Copy the rbio over to the wbio.
BIO_up_ref(rbio);
SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, rbio);
}
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *ssl, int fd) {
BIO *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl);
if (wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET ||
BIO_get_fd(wbio, NULL) != fd) {
BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, bio);
} else {
// Copy the wbio over to the rbio.
BIO_up_ref(wbio);
SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, wbio);
}
return 1;
}
static size_t copy_finished(void *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *in,
size_t in_len) {
if (out_len > in_len) {
out_len = in_len;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, in, out_len);
return in_len;
}
size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, size_t count) {
if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_VERSION ||
ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
return 0;
}
if (ssl->server) {
return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished,
ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
}
return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
}
size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, size_t count) {
if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_VERSION ||
ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
return 0;
}
if (ssl->server) {
return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
}
return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished,
ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
}
int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->verify_mode; }
int SSL_get_extms_support(const SSL *ssl) {
// TLS 1.3 does not require extended master secret and always reports as
// supporting it.
if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
return 0;
}
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
return 1;
}
// If the initial handshake completed, query the established session.
if (ssl->s3->established_session != NULL) {
return ssl->s3->established_session->extended_master_secret;
}
// Otherwise, query the in-progress handshake.
if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL) {
return ssl->s3->hs->extended_master_secret;
}
assert(0);
return 0;
}
int SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *ssl) { return 0; }
void SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx, int yes) { }
void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *ssl, int yes) { }
int SSL_pending(const SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->s3->rrec.type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
return 0;
}
return ssl->s3->rrec.length;
}
// Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options
int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
return ssl_cert_check_private_key(ctx->cert, ctx->cert->privatekey);
}
// Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter
int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) {
return ssl_cert_check_private_key(ssl->cert, ssl->cert->privatekey);
}
long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *ssl) {
return SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
}
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *ssl) {
// Caller-initiated renegotiation is not supported.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *ssl) {
return SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete;
}
int SSL_total_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl) {
return ssl->s3->total_renegotiations;
}
size_t SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->max_cert_list;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_cert_list) {
if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) {
max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize;
}
ctx->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list;
}
size_t SSL_get_max_cert_list(const SSL *ssl) {
return ssl->max_cert_list;
}
void SSL_set_max_cert_list(SSL *ssl, size_t max_cert_list) {
if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) {
max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize;
}
ssl->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_send_fragment) {
if (max_send_fragment < 512) {
max_send_fragment = 512;
}
if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
}
ctx->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment;
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_max_send_fragment(SSL *ssl, size_t max_send_fragment) {
if (max_send_fragment < 512) {
max_send_fragment = 512;
}
if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
}
ssl->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment;
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_mtu(SSL *ssl, unsigned mtu) {
if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()) {
return 0;
}
ssl->d1->mtu = mtu;
return 1;
}
int SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(const SSL *ssl) {
if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
return 0;
}
return ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
ssl->s3->send_connection_binding;
}
size_t SSL_CTX_sess_number(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
MutexReadLock lock(const_cast<CRYPTO_MUTEX *>(&ctx->lock));
return lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions);
}
unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long size) {
unsigned long ret = ctx->session_cache_size;
ctx->session_cache_size = size;
return ret;
}
unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->session_cache_size;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) {
int ret = ctx->session_cache_mode;
ctx->session_cache_mode = mode;
return ret;
}
int SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->session_cache_mode;
}
int SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *out, size_t len) {
if (out == NULL) {
return 48;
}
if (len != 48) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
// The default ticket keys are initialized lazily. Trigger a key
// rotation to initialize them.
if (!ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(ctx)) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t *out_bytes = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(out);
MutexReadLock lock(&ctx->lock);
OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->name, 16);
OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes + 16, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->hmac_key, 16);
OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes + 32, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->aes_key, 16);
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t len) {
if (in == NULL) {
return 48;
}
if (len != 48) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if (!ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current) {
ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current =
(tlsext_ticket_key *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(tlsext_ticket_key));
if (!ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current) {
return 0;
}
}
OPENSSL_memset(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current, 0, sizeof(tlsext_ticket_key));
const uint8_t *in_bytes = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(in);
OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->name, in_bytes, 16);
OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->hmac_key, in_bytes + 16, 16);
OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->aes_key, in_bytes + 32, 16);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev);
ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev = nullptr;
// Disable automatic key rotation.
ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec = 0;
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(
SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *key_name, uint8_t *iv,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx,
int encrypt)) {
ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb = callback;
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set1_curves(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *curves, size_t curves_len) {
return tls1_set_curves(&ctx->supported_group_list,
&ctx->supported_group_list_len, curves,
curves_len);
}
int SSL_set1_curves(SSL *ssl, const int *curves, size_t curves_len) {
return tls1_set_curves(&ssl->supported_group_list,
&ssl->supported_group_list_len, curves,
curves_len);
}
int SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *curves) {
return tls1_set_curves_list(&ctx->supported_group_list,
&ctx->supported_group_list_len, curves);
}
int SSL_set1_curves_list(SSL *ssl, const char *curves) {
return tls1_set_curves_list(&ssl->supported_group_list,
&ssl->supported_group_list_len, curves);
}
uint16_t SSL_get_curve_id(const SSL *ssl) {
// TODO(davidben): This checks the wrong session if there is a renegotiation
// in progress.
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
if (session == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return session->group_id;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const DH *dh) {
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, const DH *dh) {
return 1;
}
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->cipher_list->ciphers;
}
int SSL_CTX_cipher_in_group(const SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t i) {
if (i >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ctx->cipher_list->ciphers)) {
return 0;
}
return ctx->cipher_list->in_group_flags[i];
}
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
const struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *prefs =
ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl);
if (prefs == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return prefs->ciphers;
}
const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl, int n) {
if (ssl == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
if (sk == NULL || n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk)) {
return NULL;
}
const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n);
if (c == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return c->name;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) {
return ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, str,
false /* not strict */);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) {
return ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, str,
true /* strict */);
}
int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str) {
return ssl_create_cipher_list(ssl->ctx->method, &ssl->cipher_list, str,
false /* not strict */);
}
int SSL_set_strict_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str) {
return ssl_create_cipher_list(ssl->ctx->method, &ssl->cipher_list, str,
true /* strict */);
}
const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *ssl, const int type) {
if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
return NULL;
}
// Historically, |SSL_get_servername| was also the configuration getter
// corresponding to |SSL_set_tlsext_host_name|.
if (ssl->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
return ssl->tlsext_hostname;
}
return ssl->s3->hostname;
}
int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *ssl) {
if (SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) == NULL) {
return -1;
}
return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify(
SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
enum ssl_verify_result_t (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert)) {
ctx->verify_mode = mode;
ctx->custom_verify_callback = callback;
}
void SSL_set_custom_verify(
SSL *ssl, int mode,
enum ssl_verify_result_t (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert)) {
ssl->verify_mode = mode;
ssl->custom_verify_callback = callback;
}
void SSL_CTX_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = true;
}
void SSL_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL *ssl) {
ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = true;
}
void SSL_CTX_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled = true;
}
void SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL *ssl) {
ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = true;
}
void SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
size_t *out_len) {
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
if (ssl->server || !session || !session->signed_cert_timestamp_list) {
*out_len = 0;
*out = NULL;
return;
}
*out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
*out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
}
void SSL_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
size_t *out_len) {
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
if (ssl->server || !session || !session->ocsp_response) {
*out_len = 0;
*out = NULL;
return;
}
*out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->ocsp_response);
*out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->ocsp_response);
}
int SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(SSL *ssl, const char *name) {
OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname);
ssl->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
if (name == NULL) {
return 1;
}
size_t len = strlen(name);
if (len == 0 || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME);
return 0;
}
ssl->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(name);
if (ssl->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(
SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, int *out_alert, void *arg)) {
ctx->tlsext_servername_callback = callback;
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
ctx->tlsext_servername_arg = arg;
return 1;
}
int SSL_select_next_proto(uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len, const uint8_t *peer,
unsigned peer_len, const uint8_t *supported,
unsigned supported_len) {
const uint8_t *result;
int status;
// For each protocol in peer preference order, see if we support it.
for (unsigned i = 0; i < peer_len;) {
for (unsigned j = 0; j < supported_len;) {
if (peer[i] == supported[j] &&
OPENSSL_memcmp(&peer[i + 1], &supported[j + 1], peer[i]) == 0) {
// We found a match
result = &peer[i];
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
goto found;
}
j += supported[j];
j++;
}
i += peer[i];
i++;
}
// There's no overlap between our protocols and the peer's list.
result = supported;
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
found:
*out = (uint8_t *)result + 1;
*out_len = result[0];
return status;
}
void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data,
unsigned *out_len) {
*out_data = ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated;
*out_len = ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(
SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, unsigned *out_len, void *arg),
void *arg) {
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(
SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, void *arg),
void *arg) {
ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *protos,
unsigned protos_len) {
OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len);
if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) {
return 1;
}
ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
return 0;
}
int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *protos, unsigned protos_len) {
OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len);
if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) {
return 1;
}
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
return 0;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
uint8_t *out_len, const uint8_t *in,
unsigned in_len, void *arg),
void *arg) {
ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb;
ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg;
}
void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data,
unsigned *out_len) {
if (SSL_in_early_data(ssl) && !ssl->server) {
*out_data = ssl->s3->hs->early_session->early_alpn;
*out_len = ssl->s3->hs->early_session->early_alpn_len;
} else {
*out_data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected;
*out_len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len;
}
}
void SSL_CTX_set_allow_unknown_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
ctx->allow_unknown_alpn_protos = !!enabled;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = !!enabled;
}
int SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(ctx, 1);
return 1;
}
void SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(SSL *ssl, int enabled) {
ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = !!enabled;
}
int SSL_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl) {
SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(ssl, 1);
return 1;
}
static int is_p256_key(EVP_PKEY *private_key) {
const EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(private_key);
return ec_key != NULL &&
EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) ==
NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *private_key) {
if (!is_p256_key(private_key)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(private_key);
ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private = private_key;
ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = true;
return 1;
}
int SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *private_key) {
if (!is_p256_key(private_key)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private);
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(private_key);
ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private = private_key;
ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = true;
return 1;
}
size_t SSL_get_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) {
if (!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id,
(max_out < 64) ? max_out : 64);
return 64;
}
size_t SSL_get0_certificate_types(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_types) {
if (ssl->server || ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
*out_types = NULL;
return 0;
}
*out_types = ssl->s3->hs->certificate_types.data();
return ssl->s3->hs->certificate_types.size();
}
EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->cert != NULL) {
return ssl->cert->privatekey;
}
return NULL;
}
EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
return ctx->cert->privatekey;
}
return NULL;
}
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *ssl) {
return ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher();
}
int SSL_session_reused(const SSL *ssl) {
return ssl->s3->session_reused || SSL_in_early_data(ssl);
}
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *ssl) { return NULL; }
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *ssl) { return NULL; }
int *SSL_get_server_tmp_key(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **out_key) { return 0; }
void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) {
ctx->quiet_shutdown = (mode != 0);
}
int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->quiet_shutdown;
}
void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode) {
ssl->quiet_shutdown = (mode != 0);
}
int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->quiet_shutdown; }
void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode) {
// It is an error to clear any bits that have already been set. (We can't try
// to get a second close_notify or send two.)
assert((SSL_get_shutdown(ssl) & mode) == SSL_get_shutdown(ssl));
if (mode & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN &&
ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) {
ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
}
if (mode & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN &&
ssl->s3->write_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) {
ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
}
}
int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl) {
int ret = 0;
if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
// Historically, OpenSSL set |SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN| on both close_notify
// and fatal alert.
ret |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
}
if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
// Historically, OpenSSL set |SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN| on only close_notify.
ret |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN;
}
return ret;
}
SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->ctx; }
SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) {
if (ssl->ctx == ctx) {
return ssl->ctx;
}
// One cannot change the X.509 callbacks during a connection.
if (ssl->ctx->x509_method != ctx->x509_method) {
assert(0);
return NULL;
}
if (ctx == NULL) {
ctx = ssl->session_ctx;
}
ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx);
ssl->ctx = ctx;
return ssl->ctx;
}
void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value)) {
ssl->info_callback = cb;
}
void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl, int type,
int value) {
return ssl->info_callback;
}
int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) {
return SSL_in_init(ssl) ? SSL_ST_INIT : SSL_ST_OK;
}
void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) { }
char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int len) {
if (len <= 0) {
return NULL;
}
buf[0] = '\0';
return buf;
}
int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
int index;
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, &index, argl, argp,
free_func)) {
return -1;
}
return index;
}
int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *data) {
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx, data);
}
void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx) {
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx);
}
int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
int index;
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, &index, argl, argp,
free_func)) {
return -1;
}
return index;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) {
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
}
void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx) {
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
}
int SSL_want(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->rwstate; }
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength)) {}
void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength)) {}
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
DH *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength)) {}
void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength)) {}
static int use_psk_identity_hint(char **out, const char *identity_hint) {
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
// Clear currently configured hint, if any.
OPENSSL_free(*out);
*out = NULL;
// Treat the empty hint as not supplying one. Plain PSK makes it possible to
// send either no hint (omit ServerKeyExchange) or an empty hint, while
// ECDHE_PSK can only spell empty hint. Having different capabilities is odd,
// so we interpret empty and missing as identical.
if (identity_hint != NULL && identity_hint[0] != '\0') {
*out = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
if (*out == NULL) {
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) {
return use_psk_identity_hint(&ctx->psk_identity_hint, identity_hint);
}
int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *ssl, const char *identity_hint) {
return use_psk_identity_hint(&ssl->psk_identity_hint, identity_hint);
}
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return ssl->psk_identity_hint;
}
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
if (session == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return session->psk_identity;
}
void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(
SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk,
unsigned max_psk_len)) {
ssl->psk_client_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(
SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk,
unsigned max_psk_len)) {
ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(
SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk,
unsigned max_psk_len)) {
ssl->psk_server_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(
SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
uint8_t *psk, unsigned max_psk_len)) {
ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
void (*cb)(int write_p, int version,
int content_type, const void *buf,
size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) {
ctx->msg_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
ctx->msg_callback_arg = arg;
}
void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
void *arg)) {
ssl->msg_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg) {
ssl->msg_callback_arg = arg;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)) {
ctx->keylog_callback = cb;
}
void (*SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl,
const char *line) {
return ctx->keylog_callback;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,
struct timeval *out_clock)) {
ctx->current_time_cb = cb;
}
int SSL_is_init_finished(const SSL *ssl) {
return !SSL_in_init(ssl);
}
int SSL_in_init(const SSL *ssl) {
// This returns false once all the handshake state has been finalized, to
// allow callbacks and getters based on SSL_in_init to return the correct
// values.
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
return hs != nullptr && !hs->handshake_finalized;
}
int SSL_in_false_start(const SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return ssl->s3->hs->in_false_start;
}
int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *ssl) {
return SSL_in_false_start(ssl);
}
void SSL_get_structure_sizes(size_t *ssl_size, size_t *ssl_ctx_size,
size_t *ssl_session_size) {
*ssl_size = sizeof(SSL);
*ssl_ctx_size = sizeof(SSL_CTX);
*ssl_session_size = sizeof(SSL_SESSION);
}
int SSL_is_server(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->server; }
int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->method->is_dtls; }
void SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb(
SSL_CTX *ctx,
enum ssl_select_cert_result_t (*cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *)) {
ctx->select_certificate_cb = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_dos_protection_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *)) {
ctx->dos_protection_cb = cb;
}
void SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_renegotiate_mode_t mode) {
ssl->renegotiate_mode = mode;
}
int SSL_get_ivs(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_read_iv,
const uint8_t **out_write_iv, size_t *out_iv_len) {
size_t write_iv_len;
if (!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->GetIV(out_read_iv, out_iv_len) ||
!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->GetIV(out_write_iv, &write_iv_len) ||
*out_iv_len != write_iv_len) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static uint64_t be_to_u64(const uint8_t in[8]) {
return (((uint64_t)in[0]) << 56) | (((uint64_t)in[1]) << 48) |
(((uint64_t)in[2]) << 40) | (((uint64_t)in[3]) << 32) |
(((uint64_t)in[4]) << 24) | (((uint64_t)in[5]) << 16) |
(((uint64_t)in[6]) << 8) | ((uint64_t)in[7]);
}
uint64_t SSL_get_read_sequence(const SSL *ssl) {
// TODO(davidben): Internally represent sequence numbers as uint64_t.
if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
// max_seq_num already includes the epoch.
assert(ssl->d1->r_epoch == (ssl->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num >> 48));
return ssl->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num;
}
return be_to_u64(ssl->s3->read_sequence);
}
uint64_t SSL_get_write_sequence(const SSL *ssl) {
uint64_t ret = be_to_u64(ssl->s3->write_sequence);
if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
assert((ret >> 48) == 0);
ret |= ((uint64_t)ssl->d1->w_epoch) << 48;
}
return ret;
}
uint16_t SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm(const SSL *ssl) {
// TODO(davidben): This checks the wrong session if there is a renegotiation
// in progress.
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
if (session == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return session->peer_signature_algorithm;
}
size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) {
if (max_out == 0) {
return sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random);
}
if (max_out > sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random)) {
max_out = sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random);
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->client_random, max_out);
return max_out;
}
size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) {
if (max_out == 0) {
return sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random);
}
if (max_out > sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random)) {
max_out = sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random);
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->server_random, max_out);
return max_out;
}
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_pending_cipher(const SSL *ssl) {
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
if (hs == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return hs->new_cipher;
}
void SSL_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs(SSL *ssl, int enabled) {
ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs = !!enabled;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs = !!enabled;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_grease_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
ctx->grease_enabled = !!enabled;
}
int32_t SSL_get_ticket_age_skew(const SSL *ssl) {
return ssl->s3->ticket_age_skew;
}
int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl) {
// In OpenSSL, reusing a client |SSL| with |SSL_clear| causes the previously
// established session to be offered the next time around. wpa_supplicant
// depends on this behavior, so emulate it.
SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
if (!ssl->server && ssl->s3->established_session != NULL) {
session = ssl->s3->established_session;
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
}
// TODO(davidben): Some state on |ssl| is reset both in |SSL_new| and
// |SSL_clear| because it is per-connection state rather than configuration
// state. Per-connection state should be on |ssl->s3| and |ssl->d1| so it is
// naturally reset at the right points between |SSL_new|, |SSL_clear|, and
// |ssl3_new|.
ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf);
ssl->init_buf = NULL;
// The ssl->d1->mtu is simultaneously configuration (preserved across
// clear) and connection-specific state (gets reset).
//
// TODO(davidben): Avoid this.
unsigned mtu = 0;
if (ssl->d1 != NULL) {
mtu = ssl->d1->mtu;
}
ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl);
if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) {
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
return 0;
}
if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl) && (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
ssl->d1->mtu = mtu;
}
if (session != NULL) {
SSL_set_session(ssl, session);
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
}
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_sess_connect(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_CTX_sess_accept(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_CTX_sess_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_CTX_sess_misses(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_num_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl) {
return SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl);
}
int SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL *ssl) { return 0; }
int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(SSL_CTX *ctx, const RSA *rsa) { return 1; }
int SSL_set_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl, const RSA *rsa) { return 1; }
void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void) {}
void SSL_load_error_strings(void) {}
int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *ssl) { return SSL_session_reused(ssl); }
int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *ec_key) {
if (ec_key == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key));
return SSL_CTX_set1_curves(ctx, &nid, 1);
}
int SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL *ssl, const EC_KEY *ec_key) {
if (ec_key == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key));
return SSL_set1_curves(ssl, &nid, 1);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_ticket_aead_method(SSL_CTX *ctx,
const SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD *aead_method) {
ctx->ticket_aead_method = aead_method;
}
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