61672818ef
This is the equivalent of FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSuite for DTLS. It is possible for us to, while receiving pre-CCS handshake messages, to buffer up a message with sequence number meant for a post-CCS Finished. When we then get to the new epoch and attempt to read the Finished, we will process the buffered Finished although it was sent with the wrong encryption. Move ssl_set_{read,write}_state to SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD hooks as this is a property of the transport. Notably, read_state may fail. In DTLS check the handshake buffer size. We could place this check in read_change_cipher_spec, but TLS 1.3 has no ChangeCipherSpec message, so we will need to implement this at the cipher change point anyway. (For now, there is only an assert on the TLS side. This will be replaced with a proper check in TLS 1.3.) Change-Id: Ia52b0b81e7db53e9ed2d4f6d334a1cce13e93297 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8790 Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
538 lines
19 KiB
C
538 lines
19 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE. */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/nid.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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/* tls1_P_hash computes the TLS P_<hash> function as described in RFC 5246,
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* section 5. It XORs |out_len| bytes to |out|, using |md| as the hash and
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* |secret| as the secret. |seed1| through |seed3| are concatenated to form the
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* seed parameter. It returns one on success and zero on failure. */
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static int tls1_P_hash(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const EVP_MD *md,
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const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len,
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const uint8_t *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
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const uint8_t *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
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const uint8_t *seed3, size_t seed3_len) {
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HMAC_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init;
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uint8_t A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned A1_len;
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int ret = 0;
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size_t chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
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HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
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HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
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HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_init);
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if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_init, secret, secret_len, md, NULL) ||
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!HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init) ||
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!HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len) ||
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!HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len) ||
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!HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len) ||
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!HMAC_Final(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) {
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goto err;
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}
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for (;;) {
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unsigned len;
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uint8_t hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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if (!HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init) ||
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!HMAC_Update(&ctx, A1, A1_len) ||
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/* Save a copy of |ctx| to compute the next A1 value below. */
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(out_len > chunk && !HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, &ctx)) ||
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!HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len) ||
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!HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len) ||
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!HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len) ||
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!HMAC_Final(&ctx, hmac, &len)) {
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goto err;
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}
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assert(len == chunk);
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/* XOR the result into |out|. */
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if (len > out_len) {
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len = out_len;
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}
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unsigned i;
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for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
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out[i] ^= hmac[i];
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}
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out += len;
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out_len -= len;
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if (out_len == 0) {
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break;
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}
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/* Calculate the next A1 value. */
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if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
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HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
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return ret;
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}
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static int tls1_prf(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
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const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, const char *label,
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size_t label_len, const uint8_t *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
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const uint8_t *seed2, size_t seed2_len) {
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if (out_len == 0) {
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return 1;
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}
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memset(out, 0, out_len);
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uint32_t algorithm_prf = ssl_get_algorithm_prf(ssl);
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if (algorithm_prf == SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT) {
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/* If using the MD5/SHA1 PRF, |secret| is partitioned between SHA-1 and
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* MD5, MD5 first. */
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size_t secret_half = secret_len - (secret_len / 2);
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if (!tls1_P_hash(out, out_len, EVP_md5(), secret, secret_half,
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(const uint8_t *)label, label_len, seed1, seed1_len, seed2,
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seed2_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* Note that, if |secret_len| is odd, the two halves share a byte. */
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secret = secret + (secret_len - secret_half);
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secret_len = secret_half;
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}
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if (!tls1_P_hash(out, out_len, ssl_get_handshake_digest(algorithm_prf),
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secret, secret_len, (const uint8_t *)label, label_len,
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seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *ssl, int which) {
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/* Ensure the key block is set up. */
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if (!tls1_setup_key_block(ssl)) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message - i.e. we
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* need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have just written one. */
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const char is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0;
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/* use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client write"
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* direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a ChangeCipherSpec,
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* or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. */
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const char use_client_keys = which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE ||
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which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
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size_t mac_secret_len = ssl->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len;
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size_t key_len = ssl->s3->tmp.new_key_len;
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size_t iv_len = ssl->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len;
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assert((mac_secret_len + key_len + iv_len) * 2 ==
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ssl->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
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const uint8_t *key_data = ssl->s3->tmp.key_block;
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const uint8_t *client_write_mac_secret = key_data;
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key_data += mac_secret_len;
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const uint8_t *server_write_mac_secret = key_data;
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key_data += mac_secret_len;
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const uint8_t *client_write_key = key_data;
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key_data += key_len;
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const uint8_t *server_write_key = key_data;
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key_data += key_len;
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const uint8_t *client_write_iv = key_data;
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key_data += iv_len;
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const uint8_t *server_write_iv = key_data;
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key_data += iv_len;
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const uint8_t *mac_secret, *key, *iv;
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if (use_client_keys) {
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mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret;
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key = client_write_key;
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iv = client_write_iv;
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} else {
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mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret;
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key = server_write_key;
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iv = server_write_iv;
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}
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SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx =
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SSL_AEAD_CTX_new(is_read ? evp_aead_open : evp_aead_seal,
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ssl3_protocol_version(ssl), ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher, key,
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key_len, mac_secret, mac_secret_len, iv, iv_len);
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if (aead_ctx == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (is_read) {
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return ssl->method->set_read_state(ssl, aead_ctx);
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}
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return ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, aead_ctx);
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}
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size_t SSL_get_key_block_len(const SSL *ssl) {
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return 2 * ((size_t)ssl->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len +
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(size_t)ssl->s3->tmp.new_key_len +
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(size_t)ssl->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len);
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}
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int SSL_generate_key_block(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
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return ssl->s3->enc_method->prf(
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ssl, out, out_len, ssl->session->master_key,
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ssl->session->master_key_length, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
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TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
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ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
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}
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int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *ssl) {
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if (ssl->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) {
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return 1;
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}
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const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL;
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size_t mac_secret_len, fixed_iv_len;
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if (ssl->session->cipher == NULL ||
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!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &mac_secret_len, &fixed_iv_len,
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ssl->session->cipher,
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ssl3_protocol_version(ssl))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
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return 0;
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}
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size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
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if (mac_secret_len > 0) {
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/* For "stateful" AEADs (i.e. compatibility with pre-AEAD cipher suites) the
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* key length reported by |EVP_AEAD_key_length| will include the MAC key
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* bytes and initial implicit IV. */
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if (key_len < mac_secret_len + fixed_iv_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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key_len -= mac_secret_len + fixed_iv_len;
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}
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assert(mac_secret_len < 256);
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assert(key_len < 256);
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assert(fixed_iv_len < 256);
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ssl->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len = (uint8_t)mac_secret_len;
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ssl->s3->tmp.new_key_len = (uint8_t)key_len;
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ssl->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len = (uint8_t)fixed_iv_len;
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size_t key_block_len = SSL_get_key_block_len(ssl);
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ssl3_cleanup_key_block(ssl);
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uint8_t *keyblock = OPENSSL_malloc(key_block_len);
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if (keyblock == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!SSL_generate_key_block(ssl, keyblock, key_block_len)) {
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OPENSSL_free(keyblock);
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return 0;
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}
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assert(key_block_len < 256);
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ssl->s3->tmp.key_block_length = (uint8_t)key_block_len;
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ssl->s3->tmp.key_block = keyblock;
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return 1;
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}
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static int append_digest(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
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size_t max_out) {
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int ret = 0;
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EVP_MD_CTX ctx_copy;
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_copy);
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if (EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) > max_out) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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goto err;
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}
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unsigned len;
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if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_copy, ctx) ||
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!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx_copy, out, &len)) {
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goto err;
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}
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assert(len == EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx));
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*out_len = len;
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ret = 1;
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err:
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_copy);
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return ret;
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}
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/* tls1_handshake_digest calculates the current handshake hash and writes it to
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* |out|, which has space for |out_len| bytes. It returns the number of bytes
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* written or -1 in the event of an error. This function works on a copy of the
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* underlying digests so can be called multiple times and prior to the final
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* update etc. */
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int tls1_handshake_digest(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
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size_t md5_len = 0;
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if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ssl->s3->handshake_md5) != NULL &&
|
|
!append_digest(&ssl->s3->handshake_md5, out, &md5_len, out_len)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
if (!append_digest(&ssl->s3->handshake_hash, out + md5_len, &len,
|
|
out_len - md5_len)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (int)(md5_len + len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *ssl, int from_server, uint8_t *out) {
|
|
/* At this point, the handshake should have released the handshake buffer on
|
|
* its own. */
|
|
assert(ssl->s3->handshake_buffer == NULL);
|
|
|
|
const char *label = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST;
|
|
size_t label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE;
|
|
if (from_server) {
|
|
label = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST;
|
|
label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
int digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(ssl, buf, sizeof(buf));
|
|
if (digests_len < 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const size_t kFinishedLen = 12;
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->enc_method->prf(ssl, out, kFinishedLen,
|
|
ssl->session->master_key,
|
|
ssl->session->master_key_length, label,
|
|
label_len, buf, digests_len, NULL, 0)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (int)kFinishedLen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out,
|
|
const uint8_t *premaster,
|
|
size_t premaster_len) {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
|
|
uint8_t digests[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
int digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(ssl, digests, sizeof(digests));
|
|
if (digests_len == -1) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->enc_method->prf(ssl, out, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, premaster,
|
|
premaster_len,
|
|
TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
|
|
TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
|
|
digests, digests_len, NULL, 0)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->enc_method->prf(ssl, out, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, premaster,
|
|
premaster_len, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
|
|
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
|
|
ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
|
|
const char *label, size_t label_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
|
|
int use_context) {
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->have_version || ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t seed_len = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
if (use_context) {
|
|
if (context_len >= 1u << 16) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
seed_len += 2 + context_len;
|
|
}
|
|
uint8_t *seed = OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len);
|
|
if (seed == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(seed, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
memcpy(seed + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
if (use_context) {
|
|
seed[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = (uint8_t)(context_len >> 8);
|
|
seed[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
|
|
memcpy(seed + 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 2, context, context_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ret =
|
|
ssl->s3->enc_method->prf(ssl, out, out_len, ssl->session->master_key,
|
|
ssl->session->master_key_length, label,
|
|
label_len, seed, seed_len, NULL, 0);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(seed);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
|
|
tls1_prf,
|
|
tls1_final_finish_mac,
|
|
};
|