0c0b7e1e1f
This makes custom private keys and EVP_PKEYs symmetric again. There is no longer a requirement that the caller pre-filter the configured signing prefs. Also switch EVP_PKEY_RSA to NID_rsaEncryption. These are identical, but if some key types are to be NIDs, we should make them all NIDs. Change-Id: I82ea41c27a3c57f4c4401ffe1ccad406783e4c64 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8785 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
780 lines
24 KiB
C
780 lines
24 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <openssl/ec.h>
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#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/type_check.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x509);
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static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
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static int is_key_type_supported(int key_type) {
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return key_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || key_type == EVP_PKEY_EC;
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}
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int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) {
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if (x == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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return ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert, x);
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}
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int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len) {
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if (der_len > LONG_MAX) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return 0;
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}
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const uint8_t *p = der;
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X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
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if (x509 == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
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X509_free(x509);
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return 0;
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}
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int ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509);
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X509_free(x509);
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return ret;
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}
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int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa) {
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EVP_PKEY *pkey;
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int ret;
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if (rsa == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
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if (pkey == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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RSA_up_ref(rsa);
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EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
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ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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return ret;
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}
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static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
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if (!is_key_type_supported(pkey->type)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (c->x509 != NULL) {
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/* Sanity-check that the private key and the certificate match, unless the
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* key is opaque (in case of, say, a smartcard). */
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if (!EVP_PKEY_is_opaque(pkey) &&
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!X509_check_private_key(c->x509, pkey)) {
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X509_free(c->x509);
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c->x509 = NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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}
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EVP_PKEY_free(c->privatekey);
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EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey);
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c->privatekey = pkey;
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return 1;
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}
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int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len) {
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RSA *rsa = RSA_private_key_from_bytes(der, der_len);
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if (rsa == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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int ret = SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl, rsa);
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RSA_free(rsa);
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return ret;
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}
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int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
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int ret;
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if (pkey == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
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return ret;
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}
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int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der,
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size_t der_len) {
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if (der_len > LONG_MAX) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return 0;
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}
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const uint8_t *p = der;
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EVP_PKEY *pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
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if (pkey == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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return 0;
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}
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int ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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return ret;
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}
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int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
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if (x == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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return ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, x);
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}
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static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) {
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EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
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if (pkey == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_X509_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!is_key_type_supported(pkey->type)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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return 0;
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}
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if (c->privatekey != NULL) {
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/* Sanity-check that the private key and the certificate match, unless the
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* key is opaque (in case of, say, a smartcard). */
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if (!EVP_PKEY_is_opaque(c->privatekey) &&
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!X509_check_private_key(x, c->privatekey)) {
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/* don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private key
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* (when switching to a different cert & key, first this function should
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* be used, then ssl_set_pkey */
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EVP_PKEY_free(c->privatekey);
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c->privatekey = NULL;
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/* clear error queue */
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ERR_clear_error();
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}
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}
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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X509_free(c->x509);
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c->x509 = X509_up_ref(x);
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return 1;
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}
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int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t der_len,
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const uint8_t *der) {
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if (der_len > LONG_MAX) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return 0;
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}
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const uint8_t *p = der;
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X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
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if (x509 == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
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X509_free(x509);
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return 0;
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}
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int ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509);
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X509_free(x509);
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return ret;
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}
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int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa) {
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int ret;
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EVP_PKEY *pkey;
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if (rsa == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
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if (pkey == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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RSA_up_ref(rsa);
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EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
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ret = ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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return ret;
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}
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int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *der,
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size_t der_len) {
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RSA *rsa = RSA_private_key_from_bytes(der, der_len);
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if (rsa == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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int ret = SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx, rsa);
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RSA_free(rsa);
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return ret;
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}
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int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
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if (pkey == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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return ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
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}
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int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *der,
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size_t der_len) {
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if (der_len > LONG_MAX) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return 0;
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}
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const uint8_t *p = der;
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EVP_PKEY *pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
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if (pkey == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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return 0;
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}
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int ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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return ret;
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}
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void SSL_set_private_key_method(SSL *ssl,
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const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method) {
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ssl->cert->key_method = key_method;
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}
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void SSL_CTX_set_private_key_method(SSL_CTX *ctx,
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const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method) {
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ctx->cert->key_method = key_method;
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}
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int SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL *ssl, const uint16_t *prefs,
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size_t prefs_len) {
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ssl->cert->sigalgs_len = 0;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs = BUF_memdup(prefs, prefs_len * sizeof(prefs[0]));
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if (ssl->cert->sigalgs == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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ssl->cert->sigalgs_len = prefs_len;
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return 1;
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}
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OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(int) >= 2 * sizeof(uint16_t),
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digest_list_conversion_cannot_overflow);
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int SSL_set_private_key_digest_prefs(SSL *ssl, const int *digest_nids,
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size_t num_digests) {
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OPENSSL_free(ssl->cert->sigalgs);
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ssl->cert->sigalgs_len = 0;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * 2 * num_digests);
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if (ssl->cert->sigalgs == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Convert the digest list to a signature algorithms list.
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*
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* TODO(davidben): Replace this API with one that can express RSA-PSS, etc. */
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for (size_t i = 0; i < num_digests; i++) {
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switch (digest_nids[i]) {
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case NID_sha1:
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len + 1] = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs_len += 2;
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break;
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case NID_sha256:
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len + 1] =
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs_len += 2;
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break;
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case NID_sha384:
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len + 1] =
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs_len += 2;
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break;
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case NID_sha512:
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len + 1] =
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs_len += 2;
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break;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int ssl_has_private_key(const SSL *ssl) {
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return ssl->cert->privatekey != NULL || ssl->cert->key_method != NULL;
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}
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int ssl_is_ecdsa_key_type(int type) {
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switch (type) {
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/* TODO(davidben): Remove support for |EVP_PKEY_EC| key types. */
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case EVP_PKEY_EC:
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case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
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case NID_secp384r1:
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case NID_secp521r1:
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return 1;
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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int ssl_private_key_type(SSL *ssl) {
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if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) {
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return ssl->cert->key_method->type(ssl);
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}
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switch (EVP_PKEY_id(ssl->cert->privatekey)) {
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case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
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return NID_rsaEncryption;
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case EVP_PKEY_EC:
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return EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(
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EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ssl->cert->privatekey)));
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default:
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return NID_undef;
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}
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}
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size_t ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(SSL *ssl) {
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if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) {
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return ssl->cert->key_method->max_signature_len(ssl);
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}
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return EVP_PKEY_size(ssl->cert->privatekey);
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}
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/* TODO(davidben): Forbid RSA-PKCS1 in TLS 1.3. For now we allow it because NSS
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* has yet to start doing RSA-PSS, so enforcing it would complicate interop
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* testing. */
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static int is_rsa_pkcs1(const EVP_MD **out_md, uint16_t sigalg) {
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switch (sigalg) {
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case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1:
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*out_md = EVP_md5_sha1();
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return 1;
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case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1:
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*out_md = EVP_sha1();
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return 1;
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case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256:
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*out_md = EVP_sha256();
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return 1;
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case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384:
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*out_md = EVP_sha384();
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return 1;
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case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512:
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*out_md = EVP_sha512();
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return 1;
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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static int ssl_sign_rsa_pkcs1(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
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size_t max_out, const EVP_MD *md,
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
*out_len = max_out;
|
|
int ret = EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, ssl->cert->privatekey) &&
|
|
EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, in, in_len) &&
|
|
EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, out_len);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_verify_rsa_pkcs1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *signature,
|
|
size_t signature_len, const EVP_MD *md,
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t *in,
|
|
size_t in_len) {
|
|
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
int ret = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) &&
|
|
EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, in, in_len) &&
|
|
EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, signature, signature_len);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int is_ecdsa(int *out_curve, const EVP_MD **out_md, uint16_t sigalg) {
|
|
switch (sigalg) {
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1:
|
|
*out_curve = NID_undef;
|
|
*out_md = EVP_sha1();
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
|
|
*out_curve = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
|
|
*out_md = EVP_sha256();
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
|
|
*out_curve = NID_secp384r1;
|
|
*out_md = EVP_sha384();
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
|
|
*out_curve = NID_secp521r1;
|
|
*out_md = EVP_sha512();
|
|
return 1;
|
|
default:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_sign_ecdsa(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
|
|
size_t max_out, int curve, const EVP_MD *md,
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ssl->cert->privatekey);
|
|
if (ec_key == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* In TLS 1.3, the curve is also specified by the signature algorithm. */
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
|
|
(curve == NID_undef ||
|
|
EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) != curve)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
*out_len = max_out;
|
|
int ret = EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, ssl->cert->privatekey) &&
|
|
EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, in, in_len) &&
|
|
EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, out_len);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_verify_ecdsa(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *signature,
|
|
size_t signature_len, int curve, const EVP_MD *md,
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
|
|
if (ec_key == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* In TLS 1.3, the curve is also specified by the signature algorithm. */
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
|
|
(curve == NID_undef ||
|
|
EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) != curve)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
int ret = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) &&
|
|
EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, in, in_len) &&
|
|
EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, signature, signature_len);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int is_rsa_pss(const EVP_MD **out_md, uint16_t sigalg) {
|
|
switch (sigalg) {
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256:
|
|
*out_md = EVP_sha256();
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384:
|
|
*out_md = EVP_sha384();
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512:
|
|
*out_md = EVP_sha512();
|
|
return 1;
|
|
default:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_sign_rsa_pss(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
|
|
size_t max_out, const EVP_MD *md,
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
*out_len = max_out;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
|
|
int ret =
|
|
EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, ssl->cert->privatekey) &&
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) &&
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1 /* salt len = hash len */) &&
|
|
EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, in, in_len) &&
|
|
EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, out_len);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_verify_rsa_pss(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *signature,
|
|
size_t signature_len, const EVP_MD *md,
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t *in,
|
|
size_t in_len) {
|
|
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
|
|
int ret =
|
|
EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) &&
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) &&
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1 /* salt len = hash len */) &&
|
|
EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, in, in_len) &&
|
|
EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, signature, signature_len);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_sign(
|
|
SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
|
|
uint16_t signature_algorithm, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) {
|
|
/* For now, custom private keys can only handle pre-TLS-1.3 signature
|
|
* algorithms.
|
|
*
|
|
* TODO(davidben): Switch SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD to message-based APIs. */
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
int curve;
|
|
if (!is_rsa_pkcs1(&md, signature_algorithm) &&
|
|
!is_ecdsa(&curve, &md, signature_algorithm)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FOR_CUSTOM_KEY);
|
|
return ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned hash_len;
|
|
if (!EVP_Digest(in, in_len, hash, &hash_len, md, NULL)) {
|
|
return ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ssl->cert->key_method->sign(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, md, hash,
|
|
hash_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
if (is_rsa_pkcs1(&md, signature_algorithm)) {
|
|
return ssl_sign_rsa_pkcs1(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, md, in, in_len)
|
|
? ssl_private_key_success
|
|
: ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int curve;
|
|
if (is_ecdsa(&curve, &md, signature_algorithm)) {
|
|
return ssl_sign_ecdsa(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, curve, md, in, in_len)
|
|
? ssl_private_key_success
|
|
: ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_rsa_pss(&md, signature_algorithm) &&
|
|
ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return ssl_sign_rsa_pss(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, md, in, in_len)
|
|
? ssl_private_key_success
|
|
: ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
return ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_sign_complete(
|
|
SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out) {
|
|
/* Only custom keys may be asynchronous. */
|
|
return ssl->cert->key_method->sign_complete(ssl, out, out_len, max_out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_public_key_verify(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *signature,
|
|
size_t signature_len, uint16_t signature_algorithm,
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
if (is_rsa_pkcs1(&md, signature_algorithm)) {
|
|
return ssl_verify_rsa_pkcs1(ssl, signature, signature_len, md, pkey, in,
|
|
in_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int curve;
|
|
if (is_ecdsa(&curve, &md, signature_algorithm)) {
|
|
return ssl_verify_ecdsa(ssl, signature, signature_len, curve, md, pkey, in,
|
|
in_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_rsa_pss(&md, signature_algorithm) &&
|
|
ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return ssl_verify_rsa_pss(ssl, signature, signature_len, md, pkey, in,
|
|
in_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_decrypt(
|
|
SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) {
|
|
return ssl->cert->key_method->decrypt(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, in,
|
|
in_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ssl->cert->privatekey);
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
/* Decrypt operations are only supported for RSA keys. */
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part
|
|
* of the timing-sensitive code by the caller. */
|
|
if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
|
|
return ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
return ssl_private_key_success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_decrypt_complete(
|
|
SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out) {
|
|
/* Only custom keys may be asynchronous. */
|
|
return ssl->cert->key_method->decrypt_complete(ssl, out, out_len, max_out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_private_key_supports_signature_algorithm(SSL *ssl,
|
|
uint16_t signature_algorithm) {
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
if (is_rsa_pkcs1(&md, signature_algorithm)) {
|
|
return ssl_private_key_type(ssl) == NID_rsaEncryption;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int curve;
|
|
if (is_ecdsa(&curve, &md, signature_algorithm)) {
|
|
int type = ssl_private_key_type(ssl);
|
|
if (!ssl_is_ecdsa_key_type(type)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Prior to TLS 1.3, ECDSA curves did not match the signature algorithm. */
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TODO(davidben): Remove support for EVP_PKEY_EC keys. */
|
|
return curve != NID_undef && (type == EVP_PKEY_EC || type == curve);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_rsa_pss(&md, signature_algorithm)) {
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION ||
|
|
ssl_private_key_type(ssl) != NID_rsaEncryption) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure the RSA key is large enough for the hash. RSASSA-PSS requires that
|
|
* emLen be at least hLen + sLen + 2. Both hLen and sLen are the size of the
|
|
* hash in TLS. Reasonable RSA key sizes are large enough for the largest
|
|
* defined RSASSA-PSS algorithm, but 1024-bit RSA is slightly too large for
|
|
* SHA-512. 1024-bit RSA is sometimes used for test credentials, so check
|
|
* the size to fall back to another algorithm. */
|
|
if (ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl) < 2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|