0fc37ef082
peer_sigalgs should live on SSL_HANDSHAKE. This both releases a little bit of memory after the handshake is over and also avoids the bug where the sigalgs get dropped if SSL_set_SSL_CTX is called at a bad time. See also upstream's 14e14bf6964965d02ce89805d9de867f000095aa. This only affects consumers using the old SNI callback and not select_certificate_cb. Add a test that the SNI callback works as expected. In doing so, add an SSL_CTX version of the signing preferences API. This is a property of the cert/key pair (really just the key) and should be tied to that. This makes it a bit easier to have the regression test work with TLS 1.2 too. I thought we'd fixed this already, but apparently not... :-/ BUG=95 Change-Id: I75b02fad4059e6aa46c3b05183a07d72880711b3 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10445 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
3187 lines
91 KiB
C
3187 lines
91 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
|
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
|
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
|
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*
|
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
|
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
|
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
|
|
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
|
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
|
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
|
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
|
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
|
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
|
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*
|
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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|
* are met:
|
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
|
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
|
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
|
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
|
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
|
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
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* distribution.
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*
|
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
|
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
|
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
|
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
|
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
|
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
|
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
|
|
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
|
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* acknowledgment:
|
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
|
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
|
|
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
|
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
|
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
|
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
|
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
|
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
|
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
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* ====================================================================
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*
|
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
|
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
|
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/nid.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/type_check.h>
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|
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl);
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static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *ssl);
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static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
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uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t *)p1);
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uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t *)p2);
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if (u1 < u2) {
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return -1;
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} else if (u1 > u2) {
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return 1;
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} else {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
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* more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
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* This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
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* out. */
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static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs) {
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CBS extensions = *cbs;
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size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
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uint16_t *extension_types = NULL;
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int ret = 0;
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/* First pass: count the extensions. */
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while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) {
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uint16_t type;
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CBS extension;
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if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
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!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
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goto done;
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}
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num_extensions++;
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}
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if (num_extensions == 0) {
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return 1;
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}
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extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_extensions);
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if (extension_types == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto done;
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}
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/* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
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extensions = *cbs;
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for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
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CBS extension;
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if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
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!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
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/* This should not happen. */
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goto done;
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}
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}
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assert(CBS_len(&extensions) == 0);
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/* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
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qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(uint16_t), compare_uint16_t);
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for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
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if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i]) {
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goto done;
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}
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}
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ret = 1;
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done:
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OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
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return ret;
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}
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int ssl_early_callback_init(SSL *ssl, struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
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memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
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ctx->ssl = ssl;
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ctx->client_hello = in;
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ctx->client_hello_len = in_len;
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CBS client_hello, random, session_id;
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CBS_init(&client_hello, ctx->client_hello, ctx->client_hello_len);
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if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &ctx->version) ||
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!CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
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!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
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CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
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return 0;
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}
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ctx->random = CBS_data(&random);
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ctx->random_len = CBS_len(&random);
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ctx->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id);
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ctx->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id);
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|
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/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
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if (SSL_is_dtls(ctx->ssl)) {
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CBS cookie;
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if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) ||
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CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
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return 0;
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}
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}
|
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CBS cipher_suites, compression_methods;
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if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
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CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 || (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0 ||
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!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
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CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1) {
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return 0;
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}
|
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ctx->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites);
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ctx->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites);
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ctx->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods);
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ctx->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods);
|
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|
|
/* If the ClientHello ends here then it's valid, but doesn't have any
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* extensions. (E.g. SSLv3.) */
|
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if (CBS_len(&client_hello) == 0) {
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ctx->extensions = NULL;
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|
ctx->extensions_len = 0;
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return 1;
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|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Extract extensions and check it is valid. */
|
|
CBS extensions;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) ||
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!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) ||
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CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) {
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return 0;
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}
|
|
|
|
ctx->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions);
|
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ctx->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions);
|
|
|
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return 1;
|
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}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_early_callback_get_extension(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
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CBS *out, uint16_t extension_type) {
|
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CBS extensions;
|
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CBS_init(&extensions, ctx->extensions, ctx->extensions_len);
|
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while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
|
|
/* Decode the next extension. */
|
|
uint16_t type;
|
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CBS extension;
|
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if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
|
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!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
|
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return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type == extension_type) {
|
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*out = extension;
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return 1;
|
|
}
|
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}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(
|
|
const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx, uint16_t extension_type,
|
|
const uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len) {
|
|
CBS cbs;
|
|
if (!ssl_early_callback_get_extension(ctx, &cbs, extension_type)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_data = CBS_data(&cbs);
|
|
*out_len = CBS_len(&cbs);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const uint16_t kDefaultGroups[] = {
|
|
SSL_CURVE_X25519,
|
|
SSL_CURVE_SECP256R1,
|
|
SSL_CURVE_SECP384R1,
|
|
#if defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
|
|
SSL_CURVE_SECP521R1,
|
|
#endif
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
void tls1_get_grouplist(SSL *ssl, int get_peer_groups,
|
|
const uint16_t **out_group_ids,
|
|
size_t *out_group_ids_len) {
|
|
if (get_peer_groups) {
|
|
/* Only clients send a supported group list, so this function is only
|
|
* called on the server. */
|
|
assert(ssl->server);
|
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*out_group_ids = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list;
|
|
*out_group_ids_len = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list_len;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_group_ids = ssl->supported_group_list;
|
|
*out_group_ids_len = ssl->supported_group_list_len;
|
|
if (!*out_group_ids) {
|
|
*out_group_ids = kDefaultGroups;
|
|
*out_group_ids_len = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kDefaultGroups);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_get_shared_group(SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out_group_id) {
|
|
const uint16_t *groups, *peer_groups, *pref, *supp;
|
|
size_t groups_len, peer_groups_len, pref_len, supp_len, i, j;
|
|
|
|
/* Can't do anything on client side */
|
|
if (ssl->server == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, 0 /* local groups */, &groups, &groups_len);
|
|
tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, 1 /* peer groups */, &peer_groups, &peer_groups_len);
|
|
|
|
if (peer_groups_len == 0) {
|
|
/* Clients are not required to send a supported_groups extension. In this
|
|
* case, the server is free to pick any group it likes. See RFC 4492,
|
|
* section 4, paragraph 3.
|
|
*
|
|
* However, in the interests of compatibility, we will skip ECDH if the
|
|
* client didn't send an extension because we can't be sure that they'll
|
|
* support our favoured group. */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
|
|
pref = groups;
|
|
pref_len = groups_len;
|
|
supp = peer_groups;
|
|
supp_len = peer_groups_len;
|
|
} else {
|
|
pref = peer_groups;
|
|
pref_len = peer_groups_len;
|
|
supp = groups;
|
|
supp_len = groups_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < pref_len; i++) {
|
|
for (j = 0; j < supp_len; j++) {
|
|
if (pref[i] == supp[j]) {
|
|
*out_group_id = pref[i];
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_group_ids, size_t *out_group_ids_len,
|
|
const int *curves, size_t ncurves) {
|
|
uint16_t *group_ids;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
group_ids = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t));
|
|
if (group_ids == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) {
|
|
if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id(&group_ids[i], curves[i])) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(group_ids);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(*out_group_ids);
|
|
*out_group_ids = group_ids;
|
|
*out_group_ids_len = ncurves;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key sets |*out_group_id| and |*out_comp_id| to the
|
|
* TLS group ID and point format, respectively, for |ec|. It returns one on
|
|
* success and zero on failure. */
|
|
static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_group_id,
|
|
uint8_t *out_comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) {
|
|
int nid;
|
|
uint16_t id;
|
|
const EC_GROUP *grp;
|
|
|
|
if (ec == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
|
|
if (grp == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Determine group ID */
|
|
nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
|
|
if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id(&id, nid)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set the named group ID. Arbitrary explicit groups are not supported. */
|
|
*out_group_id = id;
|
|
|
|
if (out_comp_id) {
|
|
if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
|
|
*out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls1_check_group_id returns one if |group_id| is consistent with both our
|
|
* and the peer's group preferences. Note: if called as the client, only our
|
|
* preferences are checked; the peer (the server) does not send preferences. */
|
|
int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *ssl, uint16_t group_id) {
|
|
const uint16_t *groups;
|
|
size_t groups_len, i, get_peer_groups;
|
|
|
|
/* Check against our list, then the peer's list. */
|
|
for (get_peer_groups = 0; get_peer_groups <= 1; get_peer_groups++) {
|
|
if (get_peer_groups && !ssl->server) {
|
|
/* Servers do not present a preference list so, if we are a client, only
|
|
* check our list. */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, get_peer_groups, &groups, &groups_len);
|
|
if (get_peer_groups && groups_len == 0) {
|
|
/* Clients are not required to send a supported_groups extension. In this
|
|
* case, the server is free to pick any group it likes. See RFC 4492,
|
|
* section 4, paragraph 3. */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < groups_len; i++) {
|
|
if (groups[i] == group_id) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i == groups_len) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_check_ec_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) {
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
/* In TLS 1.3, the ECDSA curve is negotiated via signature algorithms. */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
|
|
if (pkey == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
uint16_t group_id;
|
|
uint8_t comp_id;
|
|
EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
|
|
if (ec_key == NULL ||
|
|
!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&group_id, &comp_id, ec_key) ||
|
|
!tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id) ||
|
|
comp_id != TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
|
|
* customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. */
|
|
|
|
static const uint16_t kDefaultSignatureAlgorithms[] = {
|
|
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
|
|
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
|
|
|
|
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
|
|
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
|
|
|
|
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
|
|
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
|
|
|
|
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
|
|
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const uint16_t kDefaultTLS13SignatureAlgorithms[] = {
|
|
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512,
|
|
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
|
|
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
|
|
|
|
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384,
|
|
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
|
|
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
|
|
|
|
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256,
|
|
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
|
|
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
|
|
|
|
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
|
|
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *ssl, const uint16_t **psigs) {
|
|
uint16_t min_version, max_version;
|
|
if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
|
|
assert(0); /* This should never happen. */
|
|
|
|
/* Return an empty list. */
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
*psigs = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TODO(davidben): Once TLS 1.3 has finalized, probably just advertise the
|
|
* same algorithm list regardless, as long as no fallback is needed. Note this
|
|
* may require care due to lingering NSS servers affected by
|
|
* https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1119983 */
|
|
if (max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
*psigs = kDefaultTLS13SignatureAlgorithms;
|
|
return OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kDefaultTLS13SignatureAlgorithms);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*psigs = kDefaultSignatureAlgorithms;
|
|
return OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kDefaultSignatureAlgorithms);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *ssl, int *out_alert, uint16_t sigalg) {
|
|
const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
|
|
size_t sent_sigslen, i;
|
|
|
|
/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
|
|
sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sent_sigs);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++) {
|
|
if (sigalg == sent_sigs[i]) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i == sent_sigslen) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
|
|
* supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
|
|
* ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
|
|
* settings. */
|
|
void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
CERT *c = ssl->cert;
|
|
int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
|
|
c->mask_a = 0;
|
|
c->mask_k = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for RSA,
|
|
* DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. */
|
|
const uint16_t *sigalgs;
|
|
size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
|
|
switch (sigalgs[i]) {
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512:
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384:
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256:
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512:
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384:
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256:
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1:
|
|
have_rsa = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
|
|
case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1:
|
|
have_ecdsa = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Disable auth if we don't include any appropriate signature algorithms. */
|
|
if (!have_rsa) {
|
|
c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!have_ecdsa) {
|
|
c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
|
|
if (!ssl->psk_client_callback) {
|
|
c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
|
|
c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls_extension represents a TLS extension that is handled internally. The
|
|
* |init| function is called for each handshake, before any other functions of
|
|
* the extension. Then the add and parse callbacks are called as needed.
|
|
*
|
|
* The parse callbacks receive a |CBS| that contains the contents of the
|
|
* extension (i.e. not including the type and length bytes). If an extension is
|
|
* not received then the parse callbacks will be called with a NULL CBS so that
|
|
* they can do any processing needed to handle the absence of an extension.
|
|
*
|
|
* The add callbacks receive a |CBB| to which the extension can be appended but
|
|
* the function is responsible for appending the type and length bytes too.
|
|
*
|
|
* All callbacks return one for success and zero for error. If a parse function
|
|
* returns zero then a fatal alert with value |*out_alert| will be sent. If
|
|
* |*out_alert| isn't set, then a |decode_error| alert will be sent. */
|
|
struct tls_extension {
|
|
uint16_t value;
|
|
void (*init)(SSL *ssl);
|
|
|
|
int (*add_clienthello)(SSL *ssl, CBB *out);
|
|
int (*parse_serverhello)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents);
|
|
|
|
int (*parse_clienthello)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents);
|
|
int (*add_serverhello)(SSL *ssl, CBB *out);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int forbid_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents != NULL) {
|
|
/* Servers MUST NOT send this extension. */
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ignore_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
|
|
/* This extension from the client is handled elsewhere. */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dont_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Server name indication (SNI).
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3. */
|
|
|
|
static void ext_sni_init(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_sni_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (ssl->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, server_name_list, name;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &server_name_list) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&server_name_list, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &name) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&name, (const uint8_t *)ssl->tlsext_hostname,
|
|
strlen(ssl->tlsext_hostname)) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_sni_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(ssl->tlsext_hostname != NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->session == NULL) {
|
|
assert(ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
|
|
ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(ssl->tlsext_hostname);
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_sni_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS server_name_list, host_name;
|
|
uint8_t name_type;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &server_name_list) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type) ||
|
|
/* Although the server_name extension was intended to be extensible to
|
|
* new name types and multiple names, OpenSSL 1.0.x had a bug which meant
|
|
* different name types will cause an error. Further, RFC 4366 originally
|
|
* defined syntax inextensibly. RFC 6066 corrected this mistake, but
|
|
* adding new name types is no longer feasible.
|
|
*
|
|
* Act as if the extensibility does not exist to simplify parsing. */
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&server_name_list) != 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name ||
|
|
CBS_len(&host_name) == 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
|
|
CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TODO(davidben): SNI should be resolved before resumption. We have the
|
|
* early callback as a replacement, but we should fix the current callback
|
|
* and avoid the need for |SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context|. */
|
|
if (ssl->session == NULL) {
|
|
assert(ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the hostname as a string. */
|
|
if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_sni_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (ssl->session != NULL ||
|
|
!ssl->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni ||
|
|
ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Renegotiation indication.
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746 */
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ri_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
uint16_t min_version, max_version;
|
|
if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Renegotiation indication is not necessary in TLS 1.3. */
|
|
if (min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, prev_finished;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &prev_finished) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&prev_finished, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ri_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents != NULL && ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Servers may not switch between omitting the extension and supporting it.
|
|
* See RFC 5746, sections 3.5 and 4.2. */
|
|
if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
|
|
(contents != NULL) != ssl->s3->send_connection_binding) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
/* Strictly speaking, if we want to avoid an attack we should *always* see
|
|
* RI even on initial ServerHello because the client doesn't see any
|
|
* renegotiation during an attack. However this would mean we could not
|
|
* connect to any server which doesn't support RI.
|
|
*
|
|
* OpenSSL has |SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT| to control this, but in
|
|
* practical terms every client sets it so it's just assumed here. */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const size_t expected_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len +
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Check for logic errors */
|
|
assert(!expected_len || ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
|
|
assert(!expected_len || ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
|
|
|
|
/* Parse out the extension contents. */
|
|
CBS renegotiated_connection;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &renegotiated_connection) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the extension matches. */
|
|
if (CBS_len(&renegotiated_connection) != expected_len) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *d = CBS_data(&renegotiated_connection);
|
|
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(d, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
d += ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
|
|
|
|
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(d, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished,
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ri_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
/* Renegotiation isn't supported as a server so this function should never be
|
|
* called after the initial handshake. */
|
|
assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS renegotiated_connection;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &renegotiated_connection) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the extension matches */
|
|
if (!CBS_mem_equal(&renegotiated_connection,
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ri_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, prev_finished;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &prev_finished) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&prev_finished, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&prev_finished, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished,
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Extended Master Secret.
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7627 */
|
|
|
|
static void ext_ems_init(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ems_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
uint16_t min_version, max_version;
|
|
if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Extended master secret is not necessary in TLS 1.3. */
|
|
if (min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION || max_version <= SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ems_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
|
|
ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ems_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
|
|
ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ems_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Session tickets.
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077 */
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ticket_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
uint16_t min_version, max_version;
|
|
if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TLS 1.3 uses a different ticket extension. */
|
|
if (min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
|
|
SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *ticket_data = NULL;
|
|
int ticket_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Renegotiation does not participate in session resumption. However, still
|
|
* advertise the extension to avoid potentially breaking servers which carry
|
|
* over the state from the previous handshake, such as OpenSSL servers
|
|
* without upstream's 3c3f0259238594d77264a78944d409f2127642c4. */
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
|
|
ssl->session != NULL &&
|
|
ssl->session->tlsext_tick != NULL &&
|
|
/* Don't send TLS 1.3 session tickets in the ticket extension. */
|
|
ssl->method->version_from_wire(ssl->session->ssl_version) <
|
|
TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
ticket_data = ssl->session->tlsext_tick;
|
|
ticket_len = ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB ticket;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &ticket) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, ticket_data, ticket_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ticket_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET| is set then no extension will have been sent and
|
|
* this function should never be called, even if the server tries to send the
|
|
* extension. */
|
|
assert((SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0);
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ticket_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET| is set, |tlsext_ticket_expected| should never be
|
|
* true. */
|
|
assert((SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0);
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Signature Algorithms.
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
|
|
|
|
static int ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (ssl->method->version_from_wire(ssl->client_version) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint16_t *sigalgs;
|
|
const size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, sigalgs_cbb;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &sigalgs_cbb)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(&sigalgs_cbb, sigalgs[i])) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->hs->peer_sigalgs);
|
|
ssl->s3->hs->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
|
|
ssl->s3->hs->num_peer_sigalgs = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 ||
|
|
!tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(ssl, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* OCSP Stapling.
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-8 */
|
|
|
|
static void ext_ocsp_init(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
|
|
ssl->tlsext_status_type = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ocsp_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&contents, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* empty responder ID list */) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* empty request extensions */) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->tlsext_status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ocsp_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* OCSP stapling is forbidden on a non-certificate cipher. */
|
|
if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t status_type;
|
|
CBS ocsp_response;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8(contents, &status_type) ||
|
|
status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(contents, &ocsp_response) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &ssl->s3->new_session->ocsp_response,
|
|
&ssl->s3->new_session->ocsp_response_length)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ocsp_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t status_type;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8(contents, &status_type)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We cannot decide whether OCSP stapling will occur yet because the correct
|
|
* SSL_CTX might not have been selected. */
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.ocsp_stapling_requested = status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ocsp_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->tmp.ocsp_stapling_requested ||
|
|
ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length == 0 ||
|
|
!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
/* The extension shouldn't be sent when resuming sessions. */
|
|
if (ssl->session != NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
|
|
|
|
return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) &&
|
|
CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB body, ocsp_response;
|
|
return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) &&
|
|
CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &body) &&
|
|
CBB_add_u8(&body, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) &&
|
|
CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &ocsp_response) &&
|
|
CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->ocsp_response,
|
|
ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length) &&
|
|
CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Next protocol negotiation.
|
|
*
|
|
* https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/agl/technotes/blob/master/nextprotoneg.html */
|
|
|
|
static void ext_npn_init(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_npn_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
|
|
ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL ||
|
|
(ssl->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_NPN) ||
|
|
SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_npn_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If any of these are false then we should never have sent the NPN
|
|
* extension in the ClientHello and thus this function should never have been
|
|
* called. */
|
|
assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
|
|
assert(!SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
|
|
assert(ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb != NULL);
|
|
assert(!(ssl->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_NPN));
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
|
|
/* NPN and ALPN may not be negotiated in the same connection. */
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *const orig_contents = CBS_data(contents);
|
|
const size_t orig_len = CBS_len(contents);
|
|
|
|
while (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
CBS proto;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &proto) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&proto) == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *selected;
|
|
uint8_t selected_len;
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(
|
|
ssl, &selected, &selected_len, orig_contents, orig_len,
|
|
ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated);
|
|
ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
|
|
if (ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
|
|
ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_npn_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (contents != NULL && CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (contents == NULL ||
|
|
ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
|
|
/* If the ALPN extension is seen before NPN, ignore it. (If ALPN is seen
|
|
* afterwards, parsing the ALPN extension will clear
|
|
* |next_proto_neg_seen|. */
|
|
ssl->s3->alpn_selected != NULL ||
|
|
ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb == NULL ||
|
|
SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_npn_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
/* |next_proto_neg_seen| might have been cleared when an ALPN extension was
|
|
* parsed. */
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *npa;
|
|
unsigned npa_len;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(
|
|
ssl, &npa, &npa_len, ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg) !=
|
|
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
|
|
ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&contents, npa, npa_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Signed certificate timestamps.
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3.1 */
|
|
|
|
static int ext_sct_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_sct_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If this is false then we should never have sent the SCT extension in the
|
|
* ClientHello and thus this function should never have been called. */
|
|
assert(ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled);
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) == 0) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Session resumption uses the original session information. */
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->session_reused &&
|
|
!CBS_stow(
|
|
contents,
|
|
&ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
|
|
&ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_sct_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
return contents == NULL || CBS_len(contents) == 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_sct_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
/* The extension shouldn't be sent when resuming sessions. */
|
|
if (ssl->s3->session_reused ||
|
|
ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length == 0) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents;
|
|
return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) &&
|
|
CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) &&
|
|
CBB_add_bytes(&contents, ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list,
|
|
ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length) &&
|
|
CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Application-level Protocol Negotiation.
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301 */
|
|
|
|
static void ext_alpn_init(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->alpn_selected);
|
|
ssl->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_alpn_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL ||
|
|
ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, proto_list;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &proto_list) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&proto_list, ssl->alpn_client_proto_list,
|
|
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_alpn_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
|
|
assert(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
|
|
/* NPN and ALPN may not be negotiated in the same connection. */
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList which must have
|
|
* exactly one ProtocolName. Each of these is length-prefixed. */
|
|
CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &protocol_name_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) ||
|
|
/* Empty protocol names are forbidden. */
|
|
CBS_len(&protocol_name) == 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the protcol name is one of the ones we advertised. */
|
|
int protocol_ok = 0;
|
|
CBS client_protocol_name_list, client_protocol_name;
|
|
CBS_init(&client_protocol_name_list, ssl->alpn_client_proto_list,
|
|
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
|
|
while (CBS_len(&client_protocol_name_list) > 0) {
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_protocol_name_list,
|
|
&client_protocol_name)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(&client_protocol_name) == CBS_len(&protocol_name) &&
|
|
memcmp(CBS_data(&client_protocol_name), CBS_data(&protocol_name),
|
|
CBS_len(&protocol_name)) == 0) {
|
|
protocol_ok = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!protocol_ok) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_ALPN_PROTOCOL);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name, &ssl->s3->alpn_selected,
|
|
&ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_alpn_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL ||
|
|
ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
|
|
ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
|
|
|
CBS protocol_name_list;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &protocol_name_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Validate the protocol list. */
|
|
CBS protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list;
|
|
while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0) {
|
|
CBS protocol_name;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name) ||
|
|
/* Empty protocol names are forbidden. */
|
|
CBS_len(&protocol_name) == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *selected;
|
|
uint8_t selected_len;
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb(
|
|
ssl, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&protocol_name_list),
|
|
CBS_len(&protocol_name_list),
|
|
ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg) == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->alpn_selected);
|
|
ssl->s3->alpn_selected = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
|
|
if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_alpn_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, proto_list, proto;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &proto_list) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&proto_list, &proto) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&proto, ssl->s3->alpn_selected,
|
|
ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Channel ID.
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01 */
|
|
|
|
static void ext_channel_id_init(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_channel_id_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled ||
|
|
SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_channel_id_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(!SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
|
|
assert(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled);
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL ||
|
|
!ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled ||
|
|
SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_channel_id_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) extension.
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764 */
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ext_srtp_init(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->srtp_profile = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_srtp_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
|
|
if (profiles == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
const size_t num_profiles = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(profiles);
|
|
if (num_profiles == 0) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, profile_ids;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &profile_ids)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_profiles; i++) {
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(&profile_ids,
|
|
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(profiles, i)->id)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0 /* empty use_mki value */) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_srtp_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The extension consists of a u16-prefixed profile ID list containing a
|
|
* single uint16_t profile ID, then followed by a u8-prefixed srtp_mki field.
|
|
*
|
|
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764#section-4.1.1 */
|
|
CBS profile_ids, srtp_mki;
|
|
uint16_t profile_id;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &profile_ids) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16(&profile_ids, &profile_id) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&profile_ids) != 0 ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &srtp_mki) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(&srtp_mki) != 0) {
|
|
/* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one. */
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
|
|
|
|
/* Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and presumably
|
|
* offered). */
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(profiles); i++) {
|
|
const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *profile =
|
|
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(profiles, i);
|
|
|
|
if (profile->id == profile_id) {
|
|
ssl->srtp_profile = profile;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_srtp_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS profile_ids, srtp_mki;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &profile_ids) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&profile_ids) < 2 ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &srtp_mki) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Discard the MKI value for now. */
|
|
|
|
const STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *server_profiles =
|
|
SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
|
|
|
|
/* Pick the server's most preferred profile. */
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(server_profiles); i++) {
|
|
const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *server_profile =
|
|
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(server_profiles, i);
|
|
|
|
CBS profile_ids_tmp;
|
|
CBS_init(&profile_ids_tmp, CBS_data(&profile_ids), CBS_len(&profile_ids));
|
|
|
|
while (CBS_len(&profile_ids_tmp) > 0) {
|
|
uint16_t profile_id;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&profile_ids_tmp, &profile_id)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (server_profile->id == profile_id) {
|
|
ssl->srtp_profile = server_profile;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_srtp_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (ssl->srtp_profile == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, profile_ids;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &profile_ids) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&profile_ids, ssl->srtp_profile->id) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0 /* empty MKI */) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* EC point formats.
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2 */
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl->version < TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
|
|
|
|
const uint32_t alg_k = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
const uint32_t alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ec_point_add_extension(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
CBB contents, formats;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &formats) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&formats, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ec_point_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(ssl)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ext_ec_point_add_extension(ssl, out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS ec_point_format_list;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &ec_point_format_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the uncompressed
|
|
* point format. */
|
|
if (memchr(CBS_data(&ec_point_format_list), TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
|
|
CBS_len(&ec_point_format_list)) == NULL) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ec_point_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(ssl, out_alert, contents);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_ec_point_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
const uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
const int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
|
|
|
|
if (!using_ecc) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ext_ec_point_add_extension(ssl, out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Draft Version Extension */
|
|
|
|
static int ext_draft_version_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
uint16_t min_version, max_version;
|
|
if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version) ||
|
|
max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_draft_version) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&contents, TLS1_3_DRAFT_VERSION)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Pre Shared Key
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-14 */
|
|
|
|
static int ext_pre_shared_key_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
uint16_t min_version, max_version;
|
|
if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION || ssl->session == NULL ||
|
|
ssl->method->version_from_wire(ssl->session->ssl_version) <
|
|
TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, identities, identity;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &identities) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&identities, &identity) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&identity, ssl->session->tlsext_tick,
|
|
ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
uint16_t psk_id;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &psk_id) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (psk_id != 0) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl,
|
|
SSL_SESSION **out_session,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
CBS identities, identity;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &identities) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&identities, &identity) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TLS 1.3 session tickets are renewed separately as part of the
|
|
* NewSessionTicket. */
|
|
int renew;
|
|
return tls_process_ticket(ssl, out_session, &renew, CBS_data(&identity),
|
|
CBS_len(&identity), NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
/* We only consider the first identity for resumption */
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Key Share
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-12 */
|
|
|
|
static int ext_key_share_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
uint16_t min_version, max_version;
|
|
if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION || !ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(ssl)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, kse_bytes;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &kse_bytes)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint16_t *groups;
|
|
size_t groups_len;
|
|
if (ssl->s3->hs->retry_group) {
|
|
/* Append the new key share to the old list. */
|
|
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&kse_bytes, ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes,
|
|
ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes_len)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes);
|
|
ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes = NULL;
|
|
|
|
groups = &ssl->s3->hs->retry_group;
|
|
groups_len = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, 0 /* local groups */, &groups, &groups_len);
|
|
/* Only send the top two preferred key shares. */
|
|
if (groups_len > 2) {
|
|
groups_len = 2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->hs->groups = OPENSSL_malloc(groups_len * sizeof(SSL_ECDH_CTX));
|
|
if (ssl->s3->hs->groups == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
memset(ssl->s3->hs->groups, 0, groups_len * sizeof(SSL_ECDH_CTX));
|
|
ssl->s3->hs->groups_len = groups_len;
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < groups_len; i++) {
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, groups[i])) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB key_exchange;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&kse_bytes, &key_exchange) ||
|
|
!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->hs->groups[i], groups[i]) ||
|
|
!SSL_ECDH_CTX_offer(&ssl->s3->hs->groups[i], &key_exchange) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(&kse_bytes)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->hs->retry_group) {
|
|
/* Save the contents of the extension to repeat it in the second
|
|
* ClientHello. */
|
|
ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes_len = CBB_len(&kse_bytes);
|
|
ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes = BUF_memdup(CBB_data(&kse_bytes),
|
|
CBB_len(&kse_bytes));
|
|
if (ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_ext_key_share_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out_secret,
|
|
size_t *out_secret_len,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
|
|
CBS peer_key;
|
|
uint16_t group_id;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &group_id) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &peer_key) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_ECDH_CTX *group_ctx = NULL;
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < ssl->s3->hs->groups_len; i++) {
|
|
if (SSL_ECDH_CTX_get_id(&ssl->s3->hs->groups[i]) == group_id) {
|
|
group_ctx = &ssl->s3->hs->groups[i];
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (group_ctx == NULL) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_finish(group_ctx, out_secret, out_secret_len, out_alert,
|
|
CBS_data(&peer_key), CBS_len(&peer_key))) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->new_session->key_exchange_info = group_id;
|
|
ssl_handshake_clear_groups(ssl->s3->hs);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_ext_key_share_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, int *out_found,
|
|
uint8_t **out_secret,
|
|
size_t *out_secret_len,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
|
|
uint16_t group_id;
|
|
CBS key_shares;
|
|
if (!tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &group_id) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &key_shares) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_found = 0;
|
|
while (CBS_len(&key_shares) > 0) {
|
|
uint16_t id;
|
|
CBS peer_key;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&key_shares, &id) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&key_shares, &peer_key)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (id != group_id || *out_found) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_ECDH_CTX group;
|
|
memset(&group, 0, sizeof(SSL_ECDH_CTX));
|
|
CBB public_key;
|
|
if (!CBB_init(&public_key, 0) ||
|
|
!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&group, group_id) ||
|
|
!SSL_ECDH_CTX_accept(&group, &public_key, out_secret, out_secret_len,
|
|
out_alert, CBS_data(&peer_key),
|
|
CBS_len(&peer_key)) ||
|
|
!CBB_finish(&public_key, &ssl->s3->hs->public_key,
|
|
&ssl->s3->hs->public_key_len)) {
|
|
SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&group);
|
|
CBB_cleanup(&public_key);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&group);
|
|
|
|
*out_found = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_ext_key_share_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kECDHE) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint16_t group_id;
|
|
CBB kse_bytes, public_key;
|
|
if (!tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &group_id) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &kse_bytes) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, group_id) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&kse_bytes, &public_key) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&public_key, ssl->s3->hs->public_key,
|
|
ssl->s3->hs->public_key_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->new_session->key_exchange_info = group_id;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Negotiated Groups
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-12#section-6.3.2.2 */
|
|
|
|
static void ext_supported_groups_init(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list);
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list = NULL;
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_supported_groups_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(ssl)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, groups_bytes;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &groups_bytes)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint16_t *groups;
|
|
size_t groups_len;
|
|
tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, 0, &groups, &groups_len);
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < groups_len; i++) {
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(&groups_bytes, groups[i])) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_supported_groups_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
/* This extension is not expected to be echoed by servers in TLS 1.2, but some
|
|
* BigIP servers send it nonetheless, so do not enforce this. */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_supported_groups_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS supported_group_list;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &supported_group_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&supported_group_list) == 0 ||
|
|
(CBS_len(&supported_group_list) & 1) != 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list = OPENSSL_malloc(
|
|
CBS_len(&supported_group_list));
|
|
if (ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list == NULL) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const size_t num_groups = CBS_len(&supported_group_list) / 2;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&supported_group_list,
|
|
&ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list[i])) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(CBS_len(&supported_group_list) == 0);
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list_len = num_groups;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list);
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_supported_group_list = NULL;
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ext_supported_groups_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
/* Servers don't echo this extension. */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* kExtensions contains all the supported extensions. */
|
|
static const struct tls_extension kExtensions[] = {
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_ri_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ri_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_ri_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ri_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,
|
|
ext_sni_init,
|
|
ext_sni_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_sni_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_sni_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_sni_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
|
|
ext_ems_init,
|
|
ext_ems_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ems_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_ems_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ems_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_ticket_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ticket_parse_serverhello,
|
|
/* Ticket extension client parsing is handled in ssl_session.c */
|
|
ignore_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ticket_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello,
|
|
forbid_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello,
|
|
dont_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,
|
|
ext_ocsp_init,
|
|
ext_ocsp_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ocsp_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_ocsp_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ocsp_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,
|
|
ext_npn_init,
|
|
ext_npn_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_npn_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_npn_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_npn_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_sct_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_sct_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_sct_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_sct_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,
|
|
ext_alpn_init,
|
|
ext_alpn_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_alpn_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_alpn_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_alpn_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,
|
|
ext_channel_id_init,
|
|
ext_channel_id_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_channel_id_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_channel_id_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp,
|
|
ext_srtp_init,
|
|
ext_srtp_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_srtp_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_srtp_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_srtp_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_ec_point_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_ec_point_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ec_point_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_draft_version,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_draft_version_add_clienthello,
|
|
forbid_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ignore_parse_clienthello,
|
|
dont_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_key_share_add_clienthello,
|
|
forbid_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ignore_parse_clienthello,
|
|
dont_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_pre_shared_key_add_clienthello,
|
|
forbid_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ignore_parse_clienthello,
|
|
dont_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
/* The final extension must be non-empty. WebSphere Application Server 7.0 is
|
|
* intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. See
|
|
* https://crbug.com/363583. */
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups,
|
|
ext_supported_groups_init,
|
|
ext_supported_groups_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_supported_groups_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_supported_groups_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_supported_groups_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#define kNumExtensions (sizeof(kExtensions) / sizeof(struct tls_extension))
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(kNumExtensions <=
|
|
sizeof(((SSL *)NULL)->s3->tmp.extensions.sent) * 8,
|
|
too_many_extensions_for_sent_bitset);
|
|
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(kNumExtensions <=
|
|
sizeof(((SSL *)NULL)->s3->tmp.extensions.received) *
|
|
8,
|
|
too_many_extensions_for_received_bitset);
|
|
|
|
static const struct tls_extension *tls_extension_find(uint32_t *out_index,
|
|
uint16_t value) {
|
|
unsigned i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
if (kExtensions[i].value == value) {
|
|
*out_index = i;
|
|
return &kExtensions[i];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned extension_value) {
|
|
uint32_t index;
|
|
return extension_value == TLSEXT_TYPE_padding ||
|
|
tls_extension_find(&index, extension_value) != NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBB *out, size_t header_len) {
|
|
/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
|
|
if (ssl->client_version == SSL3_VERSION &&
|
|
!ssl->s3->send_connection_binding) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB extensions;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &extensions)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.sent = 0;
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.sent = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) {
|
|
kExtensions[i].init(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
const size_t len_before = CBB_len(&extensions);
|
|
if (!kExtensions[i].add_clienthello(ssl, &extensions)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBB_len(&extensions) != len_before) {
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.sent |= (1u << i);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!custom_ext_add_clienthello(ssl, &extensions)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
header_len += 2 + CBB_len(&extensions);
|
|
if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200) {
|
|
/* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC 7685.
|
|
*
|
|
* NB: because this code works out the length of all existing extensions
|
|
* it MUST always appear last. */
|
|
size_t padding_len = 0x200 - header_len;
|
|
/* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include at least
|
|
* one byte of data if including the extension. WebSphere Application
|
|
* Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. See
|
|
* https://crbug.com/363583. */
|
|
if (padding_len >= 4 + 1) {
|
|
padding_len -= 4;
|
|
} else {
|
|
padding_len = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *padding_bytes;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, padding_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_space(&extensions, &padding_bytes, padding_len)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(padding_bytes, 0, padding_len);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Discard empty extensions blocks. */
|
|
if (CBB_len(&extensions) == 0) {
|
|
CBB_discard_child(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CBB_flush(out);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
|
|
CBB extensions;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &extensions)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
if (!(ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received & (1u << i))) {
|
|
/* Don't send extensions that were not received. */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!kExtensions[i].add_serverhello(ssl, &extensions)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!custom_ext_add_serverhello(ssl, &extensions)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Discard empty extensions blocks before TLS 1.3. */
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION &&
|
|
CBB_len(&extensions) == 0) {
|
|
CBB_discard_child(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CBB_flush(out);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(
|
|
SSL *ssl, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello,
|
|
int *out_alert) {
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) {
|
|
kExtensions[i].init(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received = 0;
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.received = 0;
|
|
|
|
CBS extensions;
|
|
CBS_init(&extensions, client_hello->extensions, client_hello->extensions_len);
|
|
while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
|
|
uint16_t type;
|
|
CBS extension;
|
|
|
|
/* Decode the next extension. */
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5746 made the existence of extensions in SSL 3.0 somewhat
|
|
* ambiguous. Ignore all but the renegotiation_info extension. */
|
|
if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned ext_index;
|
|
const struct tls_extension *const ext =
|
|
tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type);
|
|
|
|
if (ext == NULL) {
|
|
if (!custom_ext_parse_clienthello(ssl, out_alert, type, &extension)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received |= (1u << ext_index);
|
|
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
if (!ext->parse_clienthello(ssl, &alert, &extension)) {
|
|
*out_alert = alert;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)type);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received & (1u << i)) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS *contents = NULL, fake_contents;
|
|
static const uint8_t kFakeRenegotiateExtension[] = {0};
|
|
if (kExtensions[i].value == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate &&
|
|
ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(client_hello,
|
|
SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
|
|
/* The renegotiation SCSV was received so pretend that we received a
|
|
* renegotiation extension. */
|
|
CBS_init(&fake_contents, kFakeRenegotiateExtension,
|
|
sizeof(kFakeRenegotiateExtension));
|
|
contents = &fake_contents;
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received |= (1u << i);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL
|
|
* parameter. */
|
|
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
if (!kExtensions[i].parse_clienthello(ssl, &alert, contents)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
|
|
*out_alert = alert;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(
|
|
SSL *ssl, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello) {
|
|
int alert = -1;
|
|
if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(ssl, client_hello, &alert) <= 0) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(ssl) <= 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(kNumExtensions <= sizeof(uint32_t) * 8, too_many_bits);
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
|
|
/* Before TLS 1.3, ServerHello extensions blocks may be omitted if empty. */
|
|
if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0 && ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
|
|
CBS extensions;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
|
|
!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t received = 0;
|
|
while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
|
|
uint16_t type;
|
|
CBS extension;
|
|
|
|
/* Decode the next extension. */
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned ext_index;
|
|
const struct tls_extension *const ext =
|
|
tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type);
|
|
|
|
if (ext == NULL) {
|
|
if (!custom_ext_parse_serverhello(ssl, out_alert, type, &extension)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.sent & (1u << ext_index)) &&
|
|
type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
|
|
/* If the extension was never sent then it is illegal, except for the
|
|
* renegotiation extension which, in SSL 3.0, is signaled via SCSV. */
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension :%u", (unsigned)type);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
received |= (1u << ext_index);
|
|
|
|
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
if (!ext->parse_serverhello(ssl, &alert, &extension)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)type);
|
|
*out_alert = alert;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
if (!(received & (1u << i))) {
|
|
/* Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL
|
|
* parameter. */
|
|
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
if (!kExtensions[i].parse_serverhello(ssl, &alert, NULL)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
|
|
*out_alert = alert;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
|
|
ret = ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(ssl, &al,
|
|
ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
|
} else if (ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
|
|
ret = ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(
|
|
ssl, &al, ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni = 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
|
|
ret = ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(ssl, &al,
|
|
ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
|
} else if (ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
|
|
ret = ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(
|
|
ssl, &al, ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBS *cbs) {
|
|
int alert = -1;
|
|
if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(ssl, cbs, &alert) <= 0) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(ssl) <= 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_process_ticket(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session,
|
|
int *out_renew_ticket, const uint8_t *ticket,
|
|
size_t ticket_len, const uint8_t *session_id,
|
|
size_t session_id_len) {
|
|
int ret = 1; /* Most errors are non-fatal. */
|
|
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
|
|
uint8_t *plaintext = NULL;
|
|
|
|
HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
|
|
HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac_ctx);
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cipher_ctx);
|
|
|
|
*out_renew_ticket = 0;
|
|
*out_session = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) {
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure there is room for the key name and the largest IV
|
|
* |tlsext_ticket_key_cb| may try to consume. The real limit may be lower, but
|
|
* the maximum IV length should be well under the minimum size for the
|
|
* session material and HMAC. */
|
|
if (ticket_len < SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
const uint8_t *iv = ticket + SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
|
|
int cb_ret = ssl_ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(
|
|
ssl, (uint8_t *)ticket /* name */, (uint8_t *)iv, &cipher_ctx,
|
|
&hmac_ctx, 0 /* decrypt */);
|
|
if (cb_ret < 0) {
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (cb_ret == 0) {
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (cb_ret == 2) {
|
|
*out_renew_ticket = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Check the key name matches. */
|
|
if (memcmp(ticket, ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
|
|
SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) != 0) {
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac_ctx, ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
|
|
sizeof(ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), tlsext_tick_md(),
|
|
NULL) ||
|
|
!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&cipher_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
|
|
ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) {
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
size_t iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cipher_ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* Check the MAC at the end of the ticket. */
|
|
uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
size_t mac_len = HMAC_size(&hmac_ctx);
|
|
if (ticket_len < SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + iv_len + 1 + mac_len) {
|
|
/* The ticket must be large enough for key name, IV, data, and MAC. */
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ticket, ticket_len - mac_len);
|
|
HMAC_Final(&hmac_ctx, mac, NULL);
|
|
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ticket + (ticket_len - mac_len), mac_len) != 0) {
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decrypt the session data. */
|
|
const uint8_t *ciphertext = ticket + SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + iv_len;
|
|
size_t ciphertext_len = ticket_len - SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN - iv_len -
|
|
mac_len;
|
|
plaintext = OPENSSL_malloc(ciphertext_len);
|
|
if (plaintext == NULL) {
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ciphertext_len >= INT_MAX) {
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
int len1, len2;
|
|
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cipher_ctx, plaintext, &len1, ciphertext,
|
|
(int)ciphertext_len) ||
|
|
!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cipher_ctx, plaintext + len1, &len2)) {
|
|
ERR_clear_error(); /* Don't leave an error on the queue. */
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decode the session. */
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(plaintext, len1 + len2);
|
|
if (session == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_clear_error(); /* Don't leave an error on the queue. */
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the client's session ID into the new session, to denote the ticket has
|
|
* been accepted. */
|
|
memcpy(session->session_id, session_id, session_id_len);
|
|
session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_session_is_context_valid(ssl, session) ||
|
|
!ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session)) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
|
|
session = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_session = session;
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(plaintext);
|
|
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx);
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const CBS *in_sigalgs) {
|
|
/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_sigalgs);
|
|
hs->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
|
|
hs->num_peer_sigalgs = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t num_sigalgs = CBS_len(in_sigalgs);
|
|
if (num_sigalgs % 2 != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
num_sigalgs /= 2;
|
|
|
|
/* supported_signature_algorithms in the certificate request is
|
|
* allowed to be empty. */
|
|
if (num_sigalgs == 0) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This multiplication doesn't overflow because sizeof(uint16_t) is two
|
|
* and we just divided |num_sigalgs| by two. */
|
|
hs->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(num_sigalgs * sizeof(uint16_t));
|
|
if (hs->peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
hs->num_peer_sigalgs = num_sigalgs;
|
|
|
|
CBS sigalgs;
|
|
CBS_init(&sigalgs, CBS_data(in_sigalgs), CBS_len(in_sigalgs));
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&sigalgs, &hs->peer_sigalgs[i])) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out) {
|
|
CERT *cert = ssl->cert;
|
|
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
|
|
|
|
/* Before TLS 1.2, the signature algorithm isn't negotiated as part of the
|
|
* handshake. It is fixed at MD5-SHA1 for RSA and SHA1 for ECDSA. */
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
int type = ssl_private_key_type(ssl);
|
|
if (type == NID_rsaEncryption) {
|
|
*out = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_is_ecdsa_key_type(type)) {
|
|
*out = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint16_t *sigalgs;
|
|
size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
|
|
if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) {
|
|
sigalgs = cert->sigalgs;
|
|
num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint16_t *peer_sigalgs = hs->peer_sigalgs;
|
|
size_t num_peer_sigalgs = hs->num_peer_sigalgs;
|
|
if (num_peer_sigalgs == 0 && ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
/* If the client didn't specify any signature_algorithms extension then
|
|
* we can assume that it supports SHA1. See
|
|
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
|
|
static const uint16_t kDefaultPeerAlgorithms[] = {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
|
|
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1};
|
|
peer_sigalgs = kDefaultPeerAlgorithms;
|
|
num_peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kDefaultPeerAlgorithms);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
|
|
uint16_t sigalg = sigalgs[i];
|
|
/* SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 is an internal value and should never be
|
|
* negotiated. */
|
|
if (sigalg == SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 ||
|
|
!ssl_private_key_supports_signature_algorithm(ssl, sigalgs[i])) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (size_t j = 0; j < num_peer_sigalgs; j++) {
|
|
if (sigalg == peer_sigalgs[j]) {
|
|
*out = sigalg;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_channel_id_hash(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) {
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->session != NULL) {
|
|
static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kResumptionMagic, sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
|
|
if (ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl->session->original_handshake_hash,
|
|
ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t handshake_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
int handshake_hash_len = tls1_handshake_digest(ssl, handshake_hash,
|
|
sizeof(handshake_hash));
|
|
if (handshake_hash_len < 0) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, handshake_hash, (size_t)handshake_hash_len);
|
|
unsigned len_u;
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &len_u);
|
|
*out_len = len_u;
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
|
|
* hashes in |ssl->s3->new_session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that
|
|
* data. */
|
|
int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
int digest_len;
|
|
/* This function should never be called for a resumed session because the
|
|
* handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original, full
|
|
* handshake. */
|
|
if (ssl->session != NULL) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
digest_len =
|
|
tls1_handshake_digest(
|
|
ssl, ssl->s3->new_session->original_handshake_hash,
|
|
sizeof(ssl->s3->new_session->original_handshake_hash));
|
|
if (digest_len < 0) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->new_session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|