33f456b8b0
RAND_bytes rarely uses large enough inputs for bsaes to be worth it. https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/33589 includes some rough benchmarks of various bits here. Some observations: - 8 blocks of bsaes costs roughly 6.5 blocks of vpaes. Note the comparison isn't quite accurate because I'm measuring bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks against vpaes_encrypt and vpaes in CTR mode today must make do with a C loop. Even assuming a cutoff of 6 rather than 7 blocks, it's rare to ask for 96 bytes of entropy at a time. - CTR-DRBG performs some stray block operations (ctr_drbg_update), which bsaes is bad at without extra work to fold them into the CTR loop (not really worth it). - CTR-DRBG calculates a couple new key schedules every RAND_bytes call. We don't currently have a constant-time bsaes key schedule. Unfortunately, even plain vpaes loses to the current aes_nohw used by bsaes, but it's not constant-time. Also taking CTR-DRBG out of the bsaes equation - Machines without AES hardware (clients) are not going to be RNG-bound. It's mostly servers pushing way too many CBC IVs that care. This means bsaes's current side channel tradeoffs make even less sense here. I'm not sure yet what we should do for the rest of the bsaes mess, but it seems clear that we want to stick with vpaes for the RNG. Bug: 256 Change-Id: Iec8f13af232794afd007cb1065913e8117eeee24 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/34744 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
284 lines
9.9 KiB
C
284 lines
9.9 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2017, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#include <openssl/aead.h>
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#include <openssl/cipher.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/sha.h>
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#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
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#define EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_TAG_LEN SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
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#define EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_NONCE_LEN 12
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struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx {
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union {
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double align;
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AES_KEY ks;
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} ks;
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ctr128_f ctr;
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block128_f block;
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SHA256_CTX inner_init_state;
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SHA256_CTX outer_init_state;
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};
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OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
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sizeof(struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx),
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"AEAD state is too small");
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#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
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OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
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alignof(struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx),
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"AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
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#endif
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static void hmac_init(SHA256_CTX *out_inner, SHA256_CTX *out_outer,
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const uint8_t hmac_key[32]) {
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static const size_t hmac_key_len = 32;
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uint8_t block[SHA256_CBLOCK];
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OPENSSL_memcpy(block, hmac_key, hmac_key_len);
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OPENSSL_memset(block + hmac_key_len, 0x36, sizeof(block) - hmac_key_len);
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unsigned i;
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for (i = 0; i < hmac_key_len; i++) {
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block[i] ^= 0x36;
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}
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SHA256_Init(out_inner);
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SHA256_Update(out_inner, block, sizeof(block));
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OPENSSL_memset(block + hmac_key_len, 0x5c, sizeof(block) - hmac_key_len);
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for (i = 0; i < hmac_key_len; i++) {
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block[i] ^= (0x36 ^ 0x5c);
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}
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SHA256_Init(out_outer);
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SHA256_Update(out_outer, block, sizeof(block));
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}
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static int aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
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size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
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struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx *aes_ctx =
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(struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx *)&ctx->state;
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static const size_t hmac_key_len = 32;
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if (key_len < hmac_key_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
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return 0; // EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this.
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}
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const size_t aes_key_len = key_len - hmac_key_len;
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if (aes_key_len != 16 && aes_key_len != 32) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
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return 0; // EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this.
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}
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if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
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tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_TAG_LEN;
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}
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if (tag_len > EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_TAG_LEN) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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aes_ctx->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&aes_ctx->ks.ks, NULL, &aes_ctx->block, key,
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aes_key_len, 1 /* large inputs */);
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ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
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hmac_init(&aes_ctx->inner_init_state, &aes_ctx->outer_init_state,
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key + aes_key_len);
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return 1;
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}
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static void aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
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static void hmac_update_uint64(SHA256_CTX *sha256, uint64_t value) {
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unsigned i;
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uint8_t bytes[8];
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(bytes); i++) {
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bytes[i] = value & 0xff;
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value >>= 8;
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}
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SHA256_Update(sha256, bytes, sizeof(bytes));
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}
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static void hmac_calculate(uint8_t out[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH],
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const SHA256_CTX *inner_init_state,
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const SHA256_CTX *outer_init_state,
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const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
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const uint8_t *nonce, const uint8_t *ciphertext,
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size_t ciphertext_len) {
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SHA256_CTX sha256;
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OPENSSL_memcpy(&sha256, inner_init_state, sizeof(sha256));
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hmac_update_uint64(&sha256, ad_len);
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hmac_update_uint64(&sha256, ciphertext_len);
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SHA256_Update(&sha256, nonce, EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_NONCE_LEN);
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SHA256_Update(&sha256, ad, ad_len);
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// Pad with zeros to the end of the SHA-256 block.
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const unsigned num_padding =
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(SHA256_CBLOCK - ((sizeof(uint64_t)*2 +
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EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_NONCE_LEN + ad_len) %
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SHA256_CBLOCK)) %
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SHA256_CBLOCK;
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uint8_t padding[SHA256_CBLOCK];
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OPENSSL_memset(padding, 0, num_padding);
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SHA256_Update(&sha256, padding, num_padding);
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SHA256_Update(&sha256, ciphertext, ciphertext_len);
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uint8_t inner_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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SHA256_Final(inner_digest, &sha256);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(&sha256, outer_init_state, sizeof(sha256));
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SHA256_Update(&sha256, inner_digest, sizeof(inner_digest));
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SHA256_Final(out, &sha256);
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}
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static void aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_crypt(
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const struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx *aes_ctx, uint8_t *out,
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const uint8_t *in, size_t len, const uint8_t *nonce) {
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// Since the AEAD operation is one-shot, keeping a buffer of unused keystream
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// bytes is pointless. However, |CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt| requires it.
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uint8_t partial_block_buffer[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
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unsigned partial_block_offset = 0;
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OPENSSL_memset(partial_block_buffer, 0, sizeof(partial_block_buffer));
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uint8_t counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
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OPENSSL_memcpy(counter, nonce, EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_NONCE_LEN);
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OPENSSL_memset(counter + EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_NONCE_LEN, 0, 4);
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if (aes_ctx->ctr) {
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CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &aes_ctx->ks.ks, counter,
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partial_block_buffer, &partial_block_offset,
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aes_ctx->ctr);
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} else {
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CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &aes_ctx->ks.ks, counter,
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partial_block_buffer, &partial_block_offset,
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aes_ctx->block);
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}
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}
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static int aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_seal_scatter(
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const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
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size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
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size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
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size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
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const struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx *aes_ctx =
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(struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx *) &ctx->state;
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const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
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if (in_len_64 >= (UINT64_C(1) << 32) * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
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// This input is so large it would overflow the 32-bit block counter.
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (max_out_tag_len < ctx->tag_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_NONCE_LEN) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
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return 0;
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}
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aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_crypt(aes_ctx, out, in, in_len, nonce);
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uint8_t hmac_result[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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hmac_calculate(hmac_result, &aes_ctx->inner_init_state,
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&aes_ctx->outer_init_state, ad, ad_len, nonce, out, in_len);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out_tag, hmac_result, ctx->tag_len);
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*out_tag_len = ctx->tag_len;
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return 1;
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}
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static int aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_open_gather(
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const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *nonce,
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size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *in_tag,
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size_t in_tag_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
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const struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx *aes_ctx =
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(struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx *) &ctx->state;
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if (in_tag_len != ctx->tag_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
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return 0;
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}
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if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_NONCE_LEN) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
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return 0;
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}
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uint8_t hmac_result[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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hmac_calculate(hmac_result, &aes_ctx->inner_init_state,
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&aes_ctx->outer_init_state, ad, ad_len, nonce, in,
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in_len);
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if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac_result, in_tag, ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
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return 0;
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}
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aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_crypt(aes_ctx, out, in, in_len, nonce);
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return 1;
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}
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static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_ctr_hmac_sha256 = {
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16 /* AES key */ + 32 /* HMAC key */,
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12, // nonce length
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EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_TAG_LEN, // overhead
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EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_TAG_LEN, // max tag length
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0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
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aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_init,
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NULL /* init_with_direction */,
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aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_cleanup,
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NULL /* open */,
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aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_seal_scatter,
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aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_open_gather,
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NULL /* get_iv */,
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NULL /* tag_len */,
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};
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static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_ctr_hmac_sha256 = {
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32 /* AES key */ + 32 /* HMAC key */,
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12, // nonce length
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EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_TAG_LEN, // overhead
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EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_TAG_LEN, // max tag length
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0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
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aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_init,
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NULL /* init_with_direction */,
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aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_cleanup,
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NULL /* open */,
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aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_seal_scatter,
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aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_open_gather,
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NULL /* get_iv */,
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NULL /* tag_len */,
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};
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const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_ctr_hmac_sha256(void) {
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return &aead_aes_128_ctr_hmac_sha256;
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}
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const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_ctr_hmac_sha256(void) {
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return &aead_aes_256_ctr_hmac_sha256;
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}
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