8f36c51f98
This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
455 lines
16 KiB
C
455 lines
16 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/aead.h>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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static int init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t version,
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int algorithm_prf) {
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if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init_hash(&hs->transcript, version, algorithm_prf)) {
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return 0;
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}
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hs->hash_len = SSL_TRANSCRIPT_digest_len(&hs->transcript);
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/* Initialize the secret to the zero key. */
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OPENSSL_memset(hs->secret, 0, hs->hash_len);
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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if (!init_key_schedule(hs, ssl3_protocol_version(hs->ssl),
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hs->new_cipher->algorithm_prf)) {
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return 0;
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}
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SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_init_early_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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return init_key_schedule(hs, SSL_SESSION_protocol_version(ssl->session),
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ssl->session->cipher->algorithm_prf);
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}
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int tls13_advance_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const uint8_t *in,
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size_t len) {
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return HKDF_extract(hs->secret, &hs->hash_len,
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SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript), in, len, hs->secret,
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hs->hash_len);
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}
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static int hkdf_expand_label(uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *digest,
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const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len,
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const uint8_t *label, size_t label_len,
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const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_len, size_t len) {
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static const char kTLS13LabelVersion[] = "TLS 1.3, ";
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CBB cbb, child;
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uint8_t *hkdf_label;
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size_t hkdf_label_len;
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if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 2 + 1 + strlen(kTLS13LabelVersion) + label_len + 1 +
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hash_len) ||
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!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, len) ||
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!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelVersion,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelVersion)) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child, label, label_len) ||
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!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child, hash, hash_len) ||
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!CBB_finish(&cbb, &hkdf_label, &hkdf_label_len)) {
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CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
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return 0;
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}
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int ret = HKDF_expand(out, len, digest, secret, secret_len, hkdf_label,
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hkdf_label_len);
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OPENSSL_free(hkdf_label);
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return ret;
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}
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/* derive_secret derives a secret of length |len| and writes the result in |out|
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* with the given label and the current base secret and most recently-saved
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* handshake context. It returns one on success and zero on error. */
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static int derive_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
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const uint8_t *label, size_t label_len) {
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uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t context_hash_len;
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if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_get_hash(&hs->transcript, context_hash,
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&context_hash_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return hkdf_expand_label(out, SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript), hs->secret,
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hs->hash_len, label, label_len, context_hash,
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context_hash_len, len);
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}
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int tls13_set_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
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const uint8_t *traffic_secret,
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size_t traffic_secret_len) {
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const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
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uint16_t version = SSL_SESSION_protocol_version(session);
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if (traffic_secret_len > 0xff) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Look up cipher suite properties. */
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const EVP_AEAD *aead;
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size_t discard;
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if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &discard, &discard, session->cipher,
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version, SSL_is_dtls(ssl))) {
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return 0;
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}
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const EVP_MD *digest = SSL_SESSION_get_digest(session);
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/* Derive the key. */
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size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
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uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(key, digest, traffic_secret, traffic_secret_len,
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(const uint8_t *)"key", 3, NULL, 0, key_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* Derive the IV. */
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size_t iv_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
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uint8_t iv[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(iv, digest, traffic_secret, traffic_secret_len,
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(const uint8_t *)"iv", 2, NULL, 0, iv_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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SSL_AEAD_CTX *traffic_aead =
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SSL_AEAD_CTX_new(direction, version, SSL_is_dtls(ssl), session->cipher,
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key, key_len, NULL, 0, iv, iv_len);
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if (traffic_aead == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
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if (!ssl->method->set_read_state(ssl, traffic_aead)) {
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return 0;
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}
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} else {
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if (!ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, traffic_aead)) {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/* Save the traffic secret. */
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if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
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OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret, traffic_secret,
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traffic_secret_len);
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ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret_len = traffic_secret_len;
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} else {
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OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret, traffic_secret,
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traffic_secret_len);
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ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret_len = traffic_secret_len;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelExporter[] = "exporter master secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelEarlyExporter[] = "early exporter master secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic[] =
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"client early traffic secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic[] =
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"client handshake traffic secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic[] =
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"server handshake traffic secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic[] =
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"client application traffic secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic[] =
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"server application traffic secret";
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int tls13_derive_early_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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return derive_secret(hs, hs->early_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic)) &&
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ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
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hs->early_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len) &&
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derive_secret(hs, ssl->s3->early_exporter_secret, hs->hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelEarlyExporter,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelEarlyExporter));
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}
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int tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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return derive_secret(hs, hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic)) &&
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ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
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hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len) &&
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derive_secret(hs, hs->server_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic)) &&
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ssl_log_secret(ssl, "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
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hs->server_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len);
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}
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int tls13_derive_application_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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ssl->s3->exporter_secret_len = hs->hash_len;
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return derive_secret(hs, hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic)) &&
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ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0",
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hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len) &&
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derive_secret(hs, hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic)) &&
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ssl_log_secret(ssl, "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0",
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hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len) &&
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derive_secret(hs, ssl->s3->exporter_secret, hs->hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelExporter,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelExporter));
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic[] =
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"application traffic secret";
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int tls13_rotate_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction) {
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(
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SSL_get_session(ssl)->cipher->algorithm_prf, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl));
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uint8_t *secret;
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size_t secret_len;
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if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
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secret = ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret;
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secret_len = ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret_len;
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} else {
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secret = ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret;
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secret_len = ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret_len;
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}
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(secret, digest, secret, secret_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic), NULL, 0,
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secret_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, direction, secret, secret_len);
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelResumption[] = "resumption master secret";
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int tls13_derive_resumption_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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if (hs->hash_len > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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hs->new_session->master_key_length = hs->hash_len;
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return derive_secret(
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hs, hs->new_session->master_key, hs->new_session->master_key_length,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelResumption, strlen(kTLS13LabelResumption));
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelFinished[] = "finished";
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/* tls13_verify_data sets |out| to be the HMAC of |context| using a derived
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* Finished key for both Finished messages and the PSK binder. */
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static int tls13_verify_data(const EVP_MD *digest, uint8_t *out,
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size_t *out_len, const uint8_t *secret,
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size_t hash_len, uint8_t *context,
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size_t context_len) {
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uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned len;
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(key, digest, secret, hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelFinished,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelFinished), NULL, 0, hash_len) ||
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HMAC(digest, key, hash_len, context, context_len, out, &len) == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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*out_len = len;
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_finished_mac(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
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int is_server) {
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const uint8_t *traffic_secret;
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if (is_server) {
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traffic_secret = hs->server_handshake_secret;
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} else {
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traffic_secret = hs->client_handshake_secret;
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}
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uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t context_hash_len;
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if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_get_hash(&hs->transcript, context_hash,
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&context_hash_len) ||
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!tls13_verify_data(SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript), out, out_len,
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traffic_secret, hs->hash_len, context_hash,
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context_hash_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
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const char *label, size_t label_len,
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const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
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int use_context) {
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(
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SSL_get_session(ssl)->cipher->algorithm_prf, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl));
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const uint8_t *hash = NULL;
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size_t hash_len = 0;
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if (use_context) {
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hash = context;
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hash_len = context_len;
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}
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return hkdf_expand_label(out, digest, ssl->s3->exporter_secret,
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ssl->s3->exporter_secret_len, (const uint8_t *)label,
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label_len, hash, hash_len, out_len);
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelPSKBinder[] = "resumption psk binder key";
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static int tls13_psk_binder(uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *digest, uint8_t *psk,
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size_t psk_len, uint8_t *context,
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size_t context_len, size_t hash_len) {
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uint8_t binder_context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned binder_context_len;
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if (!EVP_Digest(NULL, 0, binder_context, &binder_context_len, digest, NULL)) {
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return 0;
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}
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uint8_t early_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
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size_t early_secret_len;
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if (!HKDF_extract(early_secret, &early_secret_len, digest, psk, hash_len,
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NULL, 0)) {
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return 0;
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}
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uint8_t binder_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
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size_t len;
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(binder_key, digest, early_secret, hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelPSKBinder,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelPSKBinder), binder_context,
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binder_context_len, hash_len) ||
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!tls13_verify_data(digest, out, &len, binder_key, hash_len, context,
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context_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_write_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *msg, size_t len) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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const EVP_MD *digest = SSL_SESSION_get_digest(ssl->session);
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size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
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if (len < hash_len + 3) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
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uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned context_len;
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, digest, NULL) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, hs->transcript.buffer->data,
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hs->transcript.buffer->length) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, msg, len - hash_len - 3) ||
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!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, context, &context_len)) {
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
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if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, digest, ssl->session->master_key,
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ssl->session->master_key_length, context, context_len,
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hash_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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OPENSSL_memcpy(msg + len - hash_len, verify_data, hash_len);
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_verify_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, SSL_SESSION *session,
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CBS *binders) {
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size_t hash_len = SSL_TRANSCRIPT_digest_len(&hs->transcript);
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/* Get the full ClientHello, including message header. It must be large enough
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* to exclude the binders. */
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CBS message;
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hs->ssl->method->get_current_message(hs->ssl, &message);
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if (CBS_len(&message) < CBS_len(binders) + 2) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Hash a ClientHello prefix up to the binders. For now, this assumes we only
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* ever verify PSK binders on initial ClientHellos. */
|
|
uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned context_len;
|
|
if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&message), CBS_len(&message) - CBS_len(binders) - 2,
|
|
context, &context_len, SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript),
|
|
NULL)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
|
|
CBS binder;
|
|
if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript),
|
|
session->master_key, session->master_key_length,
|
|
context, context_len, hash_len) ||
|
|
/* We only consider the first PSK, so compare against the first binder. */
|
|
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(binders, &binder)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int binder_ok =
|
|
CBS_len(&binder) == hash_len &&
|
|
CRYPTO_memcmp(CBS_data(&binder), verify_data, hash_len) == 0;
|
|
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
|
|
binder_ok = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!binder_ok) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|