6aedfc137b
BN_generate_dsa_nonce will never generate a zero value of k. Change-Id: I06964b815bc82aa678ffbc80664f9d788cf3851d Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22884 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
443 lines
13 KiB
C
443 lines
13 KiB
C
/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include "../bn/internal.h"
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#include "../ec/internal.h"
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#include "../../internal.h"
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// digest_to_bn interprets |digest_len| bytes from |digest| as a big-endian
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// number and sets |out| to that value. It then truncates |out| so that it's,
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// at most, as long as |order|. It returns one on success and zero otherwise.
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static int digest_to_bn(BIGNUM *out, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
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const BIGNUM *order) {
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size_t num_bits;
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num_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
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// Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole
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// bytes.
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if (8 * digest_len > num_bits) {
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digest_len = (num_bits + 7) / 8;
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}
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if (!BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, out)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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// If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift
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if ((8 * digest_len > num_bits) &&
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!BN_rshift(out, out, 8 - (num_bits & 0x7))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void) {
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ECDSA_SIG *sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ECDSA_SIG));
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if (sig == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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sig->r = BN_new();
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sig->s = BN_new();
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if (sig->r == NULL || sig->s == NULL) {
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ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
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return NULL;
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}
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return sig;
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}
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void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig) {
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if (sig == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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BN_free(sig->r);
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BN_free(sig->s);
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OPENSSL_free(sig);
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}
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ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
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const EC_KEY *key) {
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return ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, NULL, NULL, key);
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}
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int ECDSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
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const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const EC_KEY *eckey) {
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int ret = 0;
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BN_CTX *ctx;
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BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *m, *X;
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EC_POINT *point = NULL;
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const EC_GROUP *group;
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const EC_POINT *pub_key;
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// check input values
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if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL ||
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(pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL ||
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sig == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
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return 0;
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}
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ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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if (!ctx) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (u1 == NULL || u2 == NULL || m == NULL || X == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
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if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
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BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) ||
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BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
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goto err;
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}
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// calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order
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int no_inverse;
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if (!BN_mod_inverse_odd(u2, &no_inverse, sig->s, order, ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!digest_to_bn(m, digest, digest_len, order)) {
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goto err;
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}
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// u1 = m * tmp mod order
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if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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// u2 = r * w mod q
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if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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point = EC_POINT_new(group);
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if (point == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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// if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r
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if (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) != 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
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goto err;
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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EC_POINT_free(point);
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return ret;
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}
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static int ecdsa_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
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BIGNUM **rp, const uint8_t *digest,
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size_t digest_len) {
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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BIGNUM *k = NULL, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
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EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
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const EC_GROUP *group;
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int ret = 0;
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if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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if (ctx_in == NULL) {
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if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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} else {
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ctx = ctx_in;
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}
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k = BN_new();
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kinv = BN_new(); // this value is later returned in *kinvp
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r = BN_new(); // this value is later returned in *rp
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tmp = BN_new();
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if (k == NULL || kinv == NULL || r == NULL || tmp == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group);
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if (tmp_point == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
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// Check that the size of the group order is FIPS compliant (FIPS 186-4
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// B.5.2).
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if (BN_num_bits(order) < 160) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
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goto err;
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}
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do {
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// If possible, we'll include the private key and message digest in the k
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// generation. The |digest| argument is only empty if |ECDSA_sign_setup| is
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// being used.
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if (eckey->fixed_k != NULL) {
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if (!BN_copy(k, eckey->fixed_k)) {
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goto err;
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}
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} else if (digest_len > 0) {
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if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce(k, order, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey),
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digest, digest_len, ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
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goto err;
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}
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} else if (!BN_rand_range_ex(k, 1, order)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
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goto err;
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}
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// Compute the inverse of k. The order is a prime, so use Fermat's Little
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// Theorem. Note |ec_group_get_order_mont| may return NULL but
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// |bn_mod_inverse_prime| allows this.
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if (!bn_mod_inverse_prime(kinv, k, order, ctx,
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ec_group_get_order_mont(group))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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// We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
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// so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
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// bit-length.
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if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) {
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goto err;
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}
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if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order)) {
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if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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// compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k
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if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, tmp_point, tmp, NULL,
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ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!BN_nnmod(r, tmp, order, ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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} while (BN_is_zero(r));
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// clear old values if necessary
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BN_clear_free(*rp);
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BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
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// save the pre-computed values
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*rp = r;
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*kinvp = kinv;
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ret = 1;
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err:
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BN_clear_free(k);
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if (!ret) {
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BN_clear_free(kinv);
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BN_clear_free(r);
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}
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if (ctx_in == NULL) {
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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}
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EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
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BN_clear_free(tmp);
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return ret;
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}
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int ECDSA_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinv,
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BIGNUM **rp) {
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return ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, kinv, rp, NULL, 0);
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}
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ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
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const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r,
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const EC_KEY *eckey) {
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int ok = 0;
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BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
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const BIGNUM *ckinv;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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const EC_GROUP *group;
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ECDSA_SIG *ret;
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const BIGNUM *priv_key;
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if (eckey->ecdsa_meth && eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
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return NULL;
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}
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group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
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priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey);
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if (group == NULL || priv_key == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return NULL;
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}
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ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
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if (!ret) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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s = ret->s;
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if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
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(tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
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(m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
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if (!digest_to_bn(m, digest, digest_len, order)) {
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goto err;
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}
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for (;;) {
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if (in_kinv == NULL || in_r == NULL) {
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if (!ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, digest, digest_len)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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ckinv = kinv;
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} else {
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ckinv = in_kinv;
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if (BN_copy(ret->r, in_r) == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
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// if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller
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// don't to generate new kinv and r values
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if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
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goto err;
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}
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} else {
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// s != 0 => we have a valid signature
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break;
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}
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}
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ok = 1;
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err:
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if (!ok) {
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ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
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ret = NULL;
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}
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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BN_clear_free(m);
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BN_clear_free(tmp);
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BN_clear_free(kinv);
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return ret;
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}
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