|
- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE. */
-
- #include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
- #include <assert.h>
- #include <string.h>
-
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/buf.h>
- #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
- #include <openssl/cipher.h>
- #include <openssl/ec.h>
- #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/hmac.h>
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
- #include <openssl/mem.h>
- #include <openssl/nid.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
-
- #include "internal.h"
- #include "../crypto/internal.h"
-
-
- BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
-
- bool ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(
- const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello, uint16_t id) {
- CBS cipher_suites;
- CBS_init(&cipher_suites, client_hello->cipher_suites,
- client_hello->cipher_suites_len);
-
- while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
- uint16_t got_id;
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &got_id)) {
- return false;
- }
-
- if (got_id == id) {
- return true;
- }
- }
-
- return false;
- }
-
- static bool negotiate_version(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
- const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- assert(!ssl->s3->have_version);
- CBS supported_versions, versions;
- if (ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &supported_versions,
- TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)) {
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&supported_versions, &versions) ||
- CBS_len(&supported_versions) != 0 ||
- CBS_len(&versions) == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return false;
- }
- } else {
- // Convert the ClientHello version to an equivalent supported_versions
- // extension.
- static const uint8_t kTLSVersions[] = {
- 0x03, 0x03, // TLS 1.2
- 0x03, 0x02, // TLS 1.1
- 0x03, 0x01, // TLS 1
- };
-
- static const uint8_t kDTLSVersions[] = {
- 0xfe, 0xfd, // DTLS 1.2
- 0xfe, 0xff, // DTLS 1.0
- };
-
- size_t versions_len = 0;
- if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
- if (client_hello->version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
- versions_len = 4;
- } else if (client_hello->version <= DTLS1_VERSION) {
- versions_len = 2;
- }
- CBS_init(&versions, kDTLSVersions + sizeof(kDTLSVersions) - versions_len,
- versions_len);
- } else {
- if (client_hello->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- versions_len = 6;
- } else if (client_hello->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
- versions_len = 4;
- } else if (client_hello->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
- versions_len = 2;
- }
- CBS_init(&versions, kTLSVersions + sizeof(kTLSVersions) - versions_len,
- versions_len);
- }
- }
-
- if (!ssl_negotiate_version(hs, out_alert, &ssl->version, &versions)) {
- return false;
- }
-
- // At this point, the connection's version is known and |ssl->version| is
- // fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version.
- ssl->s3->have_version = true;
- ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SetVersionIfNullCipher(ssl->version);
-
- // Handle FALLBACK_SCSV.
- if (ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(client_hello,
- SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff) &&
- ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < hs->max_version) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- *out_alert = SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
- return false;
- }
-
- return true;
- }
-
- static UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> ssl_parse_client_cipher_list(
- const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
- CBS cipher_suites;
- CBS_init(&cipher_suites, client_hello->cipher_suites,
- client_hello->cipher_suites_len);
-
- UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> sk(sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null());
- if (!sk) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return nullptr;
- }
-
- while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
- uint16_t cipher_suite;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
- return nullptr;
- }
-
- const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
- if (c != NULL && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk.get(), c)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return nullptr;
- }
- }
-
- return sk;
- }
-
- // ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers determines the key exchange and
- // authentication cipher suite masks compatible with the server configuration
- // and current ClientHello parameters of |hs|. It sets |*out_mask_k| to the key
- // exchange mask and |*out_mask_a| to the authentication mask.
- static void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
- uint32_t *out_mask_k,
- uint32_t *out_mask_a) {
- uint32_t mask_k = 0;
- uint32_t mask_a = 0;
-
- if (ssl_has_certificate(hs->config)) {
- mask_a |= ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(hs->local_pubkey.get());
- if (EVP_PKEY_id(hs->local_pubkey.get()) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
- }
- }
-
- // Check for a shared group to consider ECDHE ciphers.
- uint16_t unused;
- if (tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &unused)) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE;
- }
-
- // PSK requires a server callback.
- if (hs->config->psk_server_callback != NULL) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
- mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
- }
-
- *out_mask_k = mask_k;
- *out_mask_a = mask_a;
- }
-
- static const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(
- SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
- const SSLCipherPreferenceList *server_pref) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- const STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
- // in_group_flags will either be NULL, or will point to an array of bytes
- // which indicate equal-preference groups in the |prio| stack. See the
- // comment about |in_group_flags| in the |SSLCipherPreferenceList|
- // struct.
- const bool *in_group_flags;
- // group_min contains the minimal index so far found in a group, or -1 if no
- // such value exists yet.
- int group_min = -1;
-
- UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> client_pref =
- ssl_parse_client_cipher_list(client_hello);
- if (!client_pref) {
- return nullptr;
- }
-
- if (ssl->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
- prio = server_pref->ciphers.get();
- in_group_flags = server_pref->in_group_flags;
- allow = client_pref.get();
- } else {
- prio = client_pref.get();
- in_group_flags = NULL;
- allow = server_pref->ciphers.get();
- }
-
- uint32_t mask_k, mask_a;
- ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(hs, &mask_k, &mask_a);
-
- for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, i);
-
- size_t cipher_index;
- if (// Check if the cipher is supported for the current version.
- SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) <= ssl_protocol_version(ssl) &&
- ssl_protocol_version(ssl) <= SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(c) &&
- // Check the cipher is supported for the server configuration.
- (c->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) &&
- (c->algorithm_auth & mask_a) &&
- // Check the cipher is in the |allow| list.
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, &cipher_index, c)) {
- if (in_group_flags != NULL && in_group_flags[i]) {
- // This element of |prio| is in a group. Update the minimum index found
- // so far and continue looking.
- if (group_min == -1 || (size_t)group_min > cipher_index) {
- group_min = cipher_index;
- }
- } else {
- if (group_min != -1 && (size_t)group_min < cipher_index) {
- cipher_index = group_min;
- }
- return sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, cipher_index);
- }
- }
-
- if (in_group_flags != NULL && !in_group_flags[i] && group_min != -1) {
- // We are about to leave a group, but we found a match in it, so that's
- // our answer.
- return sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, group_min);
- }
- }
-
- return nullptr;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_start_accept(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
- hs->state = state12_read_client_hello;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
- SSLMessage msg;
- if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_read_message;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (hs->config->handoff) {
- return ssl_hs_handoff;
- }
-
- SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
- if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Run the early callback.
- if (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) {
- switch (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&client_hello)) {
- case ssl_select_cert_retry:
- return ssl_hs_certificate_selection_pending;
-
- case ssl_select_cert_error:
- // Connection rejected.
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return ssl_hs_error;
-
- default:
- /* fallthrough */;
- }
- }
-
- // Freeze the version range after the early callback.
- if (!ssl_get_version_range(hs, &hs->min_version, &hs->max_version)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- if (!negotiate_version(hs, &alert, &client_hello)) {
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- hs->client_version = client_hello.version;
- if (client_hello.random_len != SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->client_random, client_hello.random,
- client_hello.random_len);
-
- // Only null compression is supported. TLS 1.3 further requires the peer
- // advertise no other compression.
- if (OPENSSL_memchr(client_hello.compression_methods, 0,
- client_hello.compression_methods_len) == NULL ||
- (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
- client_hello.compression_methods_len != 1)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_LIST);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // TLS extensions.
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &client_hello)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- hs->state = state12_select_certificate;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
- SSLMessage msg;
- if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_read_message;
- }
-
- // Call |cert_cb| to update server certificates if required.
- if (hs->config->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
- int rv = hs->config->cert->cert_cb(ssl, hs->config->cert->cert_cb_arg);
- if (rv == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- if (rv < 0) {
- return ssl_hs_x509_lookup;
- }
- }
-
- if (!ssl_on_certificate_selected(hs)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (hs->ocsp_stapling_requested &&
- ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback != nullptr) {
- switch (ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback(
- ssl, ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback_arg)) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
- break;
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- hs->ocsp_stapling_requested = false;
- break;
- default:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OCSP_CB_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- }
-
- if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
- // Jump to the TLS 1.3 state machine.
- hs->state = state12_tls13;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
- if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Negotiate the cipher suite. This must be done after |cert_cb| so the
- // certificate is finalized.
- SSLCipherPreferenceList *prefs = hs->config->cipher_list
- ? hs->config->cipher_list.get()
- : ssl->ctx->cipher_list.get();
- hs->new_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(hs, &client_hello, prefs);
- if (hs->new_cipher == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- hs->state = state12_select_parameters;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_tls13(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = tls13_server_handshake(hs);
- if (wait == ssl_hs_ok) {
- hs->state = state12_finish_server_handshake;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- return wait;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
- SSLMessage msg;
- if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_read_message;
- }
-
- SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
- if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Determine whether we are doing session resumption.
- UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
- bool tickets_supported = false, renew_ticket = false;
- enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = ssl_get_prev_session(
- hs, &session, &tickets_supported, &renew_ticket, &client_hello);
- if (wait != ssl_hs_ok) {
- return wait;
- }
-
- if (session) {
- if (session->extended_master_secret && !hs->extended_master_secret) {
- // A ClientHello without EMS that attempts to resume a session with EMS
- // is fatal to the connection.
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_session_is_resumable(hs, session.get()) ||
- // If the client offers the EMS extension, but the previous session
- // didn't use it, then negotiate a new session.
- hs->extended_master_secret != session->extended_master_secret) {
- session.reset();
- }
- }
-
- if (session) {
- // Use the old session.
- hs->ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
- ssl->session = std::move(session);
- ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
- } else {
- hs->ticket_expected = tickets_supported;
- ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 1 /* server */)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Clear the session ID if we want the session to be single-use.
- if (!(ssl->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) {
- hs->new_session->session_id_length = 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL &&
- ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&client_hello) == 0) {
- // Connection rejected for DOS reasons.
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (ssl->session == NULL) {
- hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
-
- // Determine whether to request a client certificate.
- hs->cert_request = !!(hs->config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER);
- // Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated.
- if ((hs->config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
- ssl->s3->channel_id_valid) {
- hs->cert_request = false;
- }
- // CertificateRequest may only be sent in certificate-based ciphers.
- if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
- hs->cert_request = false;
- }
-
- if (!hs->cert_request) {
- // OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is
- // classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX.
- hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
- }
- }
-
- // HTTP/2 negotiation depends on the cipher suite, so ALPN negotiation was
- // deferred. Complete it now.
- uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- if (!ssl_negotiate_alpn(hs, &alert, &client_hello)) {
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Now that all parameters are known, initialize the handshake hash and hash
- // the ClientHello.
- if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(ssl_protocol_version(ssl), hs->new_cipher) ||
- !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Handback includes the whole handshake transcript, so we cannot free the
- // transcript buffer in the handback case.
- if (!hs->cert_request && !hs->handback) {
- hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
- }
-
- ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-
- hs->state = state12_send_server_hello;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
- // We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order to avoid a
- // known attack while we fix ChannelID itself.
- if (ssl->s3->channel_id_valid &&
- (hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) == 0) {
- ssl->s3->channel_id_valid = false;
- }
-
- // If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't support
- // ChannelID then we didn't record the original handshake hashes in the
- // session and so cannot resume with ChannelIDs.
- if (ssl->session != NULL &&
- ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
- ssl->s3->channel_id_valid = false;
- }
-
- struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
- ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
- ssl->s3->server_random[0] = now.tv_sec >> 24;
- ssl->s3->server_random[1] = now.tv_sec >> 16;
- ssl->s3->server_random[2] = now.tv_sec >> 8;
- ssl->s3->server_random[3] = now.tv_sec;
- if (!RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->server_random + 4, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - 4)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Implement the TLS 1.3 anti-downgrade feature.
- if (ssl_supports_version(hs, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
- if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
- sizeof(kTLS13DowngradeRandom),
- kTLS13DowngradeRandom, sizeof(kTLS13DowngradeRandom));
- } else {
- OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
- sizeof(kTLS12DowngradeRandom),
- kTLS12DowngradeRandom, sizeof(kTLS12DowngradeRandom));
- }
- }
-
- const SSL_SESSION *session = hs->new_session.get();
- if (ssl->session != nullptr) {
- session = ssl->session.get();
- }
-
- ScopedCBB cbb;
- CBB body, session_id;
- if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
- !CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl->version) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &session_id) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, session->session_id,
- session->session_id_length) ||
- !CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl_cipher_get_value(hs->new_cipher)) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* no compression */) ||
- !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &body) ||
- !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (ssl->session != NULL) {
- hs->state = state12_send_server_finished;
- } else {
- hs->state = state12_send_server_certificate;
- }
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- ScopedCBB cbb;
-
- if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
- if (!ssl_has_certificate(hs->config)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_output_cert_chain(hs)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (hs->certificate_status_expected) {
- CBB body, ocsp_response;
- if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(&body, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
- !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &ocsp_response) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(
- &ocsp_response,
- CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(hs->config->cert->ocsp_response.get()),
- CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(hs->config->cert->ocsp_response.get())) ||
- !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- }
- }
-
- // Assemble ServerKeyExchange parameters if needed.
- uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(hs->new_cipher) ||
- ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && hs->config->psk_identity_hint)) {
- // Pre-allocate enough room to comfortably fit an ECDHE public key. Prepend
- // the client and server randoms for the signing transcript.
- CBB child;
- if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2 + 128) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // PSK ciphers begin with an identity hint.
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
- size_t len = hs->config->psk_identity_hint == nullptr
- ? 0
- : strlen(hs->config->psk_identity_hint.get());
- if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&child,
- (const uint8_t *)hs->config->psk_identity_hint.get(),
- len)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- }
-
- if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
- // Determine the group to use.
- uint16_t group_id;
- if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
-
- // Set up ECDH, generate a key, and emit the public half.
- hs->key_share = SSLKeyShare::Create(group_id);
- if (!hs->key_share ||
- !CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
- !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), group_id) ||
- !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
- !hs->key_share->Offer(&child)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- } else {
- assert(alg_k & SSL_kPSK);
- }
-
- if (!CBBFinishArray(cbb.get(), &hs->server_params)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- }
-
- hs->state = state12_send_server_key_exchange;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
- if (hs->server_params.size() == 0) {
- hs->state = state12_send_server_hello_done;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- ScopedCBB cbb;
- CBB body, child;
- if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
- SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
- // |hs->server_params| contains a prefix for signing.
- hs->server_params.size() < 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&body, hs->server_params.data() + 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- hs->server_params.size() - 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Add a signature.
- if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
- if (!ssl_has_private_key(hs->config)) {
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Determine the signature algorithm.
- uint16_t signature_algorithm;
- if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- }
-
- // Add space for the signature.
- const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey.get());
- uint8_t *ptr;
- if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
- !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- size_t sig_len;
- switch (ssl_private_key_sign(hs, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len,
- signature_algorithm, hs->server_params)) {
- case ssl_private_key_success:
- if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- break;
- case ssl_private_key_failure:
- return ssl_hs_error;
- case ssl_private_key_retry:
- return ssl_hs_private_key_operation;
- }
- }
-
- if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- hs->server_params.Reset();
-
- hs->state = state12_send_server_hello_done;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
- ScopedCBB cbb;
- CBB body;
-
- if (hs->cert_request) {
- CBB cert_types, sigalgs_cbb;
- if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ||
- !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &cert_types) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(&cert_types, SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(&cert_types, TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN) ||
- // TLS 1.2 has no way to specify different signature algorithms for
- // certificates and the online signature, so emit the more restrictive
- // certificate list.
- (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
- (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &sigalgs_cbb) ||
- !tls12_add_verify_sigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs_cbb, true /* certs */))) ||
- !ssl_add_client_CA_list(hs, &body) ||
- !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- }
-
- if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
- SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) ||
- !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- hs->state = state12_read_client_certificate;
- return ssl_hs_flush;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
- if (hs->handback && hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHE) {
- return ssl_hs_handback;
- }
- if (!hs->cert_request) {
- hs->state = state12_verify_client_certificate;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- SSLMessage msg;
- if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_read_message;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- CBS certificate_msg = msg.body;
- uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- if (!ssl_parse_cert_chain(&alert, &hs->new_session->certs, &hs->peer_pubkey,
- hs->config->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs
- ? hs->new_session->peer_sha256
- : nullptr,
- &certificate_msg, ssl->ctx->pool)) {
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0 ||
- !ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session.get())) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get()) == 0) {
- // No client certificate so the handshake buffer may be discarded.
- hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
-
- if (hs->config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) {
- // Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are received. This is
- // classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX.
- hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
- } else if (hs->config->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
- // The hash will have been filled in.
- hs->new_session->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
- }
-
- ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
- hs->state = state12_verify_client_certificate;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_verify_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get()) > 0) {
- switch (ssl_verify_peer_cert(hs)) {
- case ssl_verify_ok:
- break;
- case ssl_verify_invalid:
- return ssl_hs_error;
- case ssl_verify_retry:
- return ssl_hs_certificate_verify;
- }
- }
-
- hs->state = state12_read_client_key_exchange;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- SSLMessage msg;
- if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_read_message;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- CBS client_key_exchange = msg.body;
- uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- // If using a PSK key exchange, parse the PSK identity.
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
- CBS psk_identity;
-
- // If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a psk_identity. If PSK,
- // then this is the only field in the message.
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) ||
- ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
- CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- char *raw = nullptr;
- if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &raw)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- hs->new_session->psk_identity.reset(raw);
- }
-
- // Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret|.
- Array<uint8_t> premaster_secret;
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- CBS encrypted_premaster_secret;
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange,
- &encrypted_premaster_secret) ||
- CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption.
- Array<uint8_t> decrypt_buf;
- if (!decrypt_buf.Init(EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey.get()))) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of the
- // timing-sensitive code below.
- size_t decrypt_len;
- switch (ssl_private_key_decrypt(hs, decrypt_buf.data(), &decrypt_len,
- decrypt_buf.size(),
- encrypted_premaster_secret)) {
- case ssl_private_key_success:
- break;
- case ssl_private_key_failure:
- return ssl_hs_error;
- case ssl_private_key_retry:
- return ssl_hs_private_key_operation;
- }
-
- if (decrypt_len != decrypt_buf.size()) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Prepare a random premaster, to be used on invalid padding. See RFC 5246,
- // section 7.4.7.1.
- if (!premaster_secret.Init(SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) ||
- !RAND_bytes(premaster_secret.data(), premaster_secret.size())) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys are
- // publicly invalid.
- if (decrypt_len < 11 + premaster_secret.size()) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2.
- size_t padding_len = decrypt_len - premaster_secret.size();
- uint8_t good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[0], 0) &
- constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[1], 2);
- for (size_t i = 2; i < padding_len - 1; i++) {
- good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[i]);
- }
- good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len - 1]);
-
- // The premaster secret must begin with |client_version|. This too must be
- // checked in constant time (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/).
- good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len],
- (unsigned)(hs->client_version >> 8));
- good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len + 1],
- (unsigned)(hs->client_version & 0xff));
-
- // Select, in constant time, either the decrypted premaster or the random
- // premaster based on |good|.
- for (size_t i = 0; i < premaster_secret.size(); i++) {
- premaster_secret[i] = constant_time_select_8(
- good, decrypt_buf[padding_len + i], premaster_secret[i]);
- }
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
- // Parse the ClientKeyExchange.
- CBS peer_key;
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &peer_key) ||
- CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Compute the premaster.
- uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- if (!hs->key_share->Finish(&premaster_secret, &alert, peer_key)) {
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // The key exchange state may now be discarded.
- hs->key_share.reset();
- } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with the
- // pre-shared key.
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
- if (hs->config->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Look up the key for the identity.
- uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
- unsigned psk_len = hs->config->psk_server_callback(
- ssl, hs->new_session->psk_identity.get(), psk, sizeof(psk));
- if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- } else if (psk_len == 0) {
- // PSK related to the given identity not found.
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- // In plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as the
- // pre-shared key.
- if (!premaster_secret.Init(psk_len)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- OPENSSL_memset(premaster_secret.data(), 0, premaster_secret.size());
- }
-
- ScopedCBB new_premaster;
- CBB child;
- if (!CBB_init(new_premaster.get(),
- 2 + psk_len + 2 + premaster_secret.size()) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(new_premaster.get(), &child) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&child, premaster_secret.data(),
- premaster_secret.size()) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(new_premaster.get(), &child) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
- !CBBFinishArray(new_premaster.get(), &premaster_secret)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- }
-
- if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Compute the master secret.
- hs->new_session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(
- hs, hs->new_session->master_key, premaster_secret);
- if (hs->new_session->master_key_length == 0) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- hs->new_session->extended_master_secret = hs->extended_master_secret;
-
- ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
- hs->state = state12_read_client_certificate_verify;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
- // Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
- // CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a client certificate.
- if (!hs->peer_pubkey) {
- hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
- hs->state = state12_read_change_cipher_spec;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- SSLMessage msg;
- if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_read_message;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- CBS certificate_verify = msg.body, signature;
-
- // Determine the signature algorithm.
- uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
- if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&certificate_verify, &signature_algorithm)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &alert, signature_algorithm)) {
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
- } else if (!tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(&signature_algorithm,
- hs->peer_pubkey.get())) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // Parse and verify the signature.
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) ||
- CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- bool sig_ok =
- ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
- hs->peer_pubkey.get(), hs->transcript.buffer());
- #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
- sig_ok = true;
- ERR_clear_error();
- #endif
- if (!sig_ok) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- // The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current
- // message.
- hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
- if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
- hs->state = state12_read_change_cipher_spec;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_change_cipher_spec(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- if (hs->handback && hs->ssl->session != NULL) {
- return ssl_hs_handback;
- }
- hs->state = state12_process_change_cipher_spec;
- return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, evp_aead_open)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- hs->state = state12_read_next_proto;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
- if (!hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- hs->state = state12_read_channel_id;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- SSLMessage msg;
- if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_read_message;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) ||
- !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- CBS next_protocol = msg.body, selected_protocol, padding;
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) ||
- CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (!ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.CopyFrom(selected_protocol)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
- hs->state = state12_read_channel_id;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
- if (!ssl->s3->channel_id_valid) {
- hs->state = state12_read_client_finished;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- SSLMessage msg;
- if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_read_message;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
- !tls1_verify_channel_id(hs, msg) ||
- !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
- hs->state = state12_read_client_finished;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = ssl_get_finished(hs);
- if (wait != ssl_hs_ok) {
- return wait;
- }
-
- if (ssl->session != NULL) {
- hs->state = state12_finish_server_handshake;
- } else {
- hs->state = state12_send_server_finished;
- }
-
- // If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the handshake
- // hashes in |hs->new_session| in case we need them to verify a
- // ChannelID signature on a resumption of this session in the future.
- if (ssl->session == NULL && ssl->s3->channel_id_valid &&
- !tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(hs)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
- if (hs->ticket_expected) {
- const SSL_SESSION *session;
- UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session_copy;
- if (ssl->session == NULL) {
- // Fix the timeout to measure from the ticket issuance time.
- ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, hs->new_session.get());
- session = hs->new_session.get();
- } else {
- // We are renewing an existing session. Duplicate the session to adjust
- // the timeout.
- session_copy =
- SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session.get(), SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
- if (!session_copy) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session_copy.get());
- session = session_copy.get();
- }
-
- ScopedCBB cbb;
- CBB body, ticket;
- if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
- SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) ||
- !CBB_add_u32(&body, session->timeout) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &ticket) ||
- !ssl_encrypt_ticket(hs, &ticket, session) ||
- !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
- }
-
- if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl) ||
- !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, evp_aead_seal) ||
- !ssl_send_finished(hs)) {
- return ssl_hs_error;
- }
-
- if (ssl->session != NULL) {
- hs->state = state12_read_change_cipher_spec;
- } else {
- hs->state = state12_finish_server_handshake;
- }
- return ssl_hs_flush;
- }
-
- static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_server_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
- if (hs->handback) {
- return ssl_hs_handback;
- }
-
- ssl->method->on_handshake_complete(ssl);
-
- // If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it now.
- if (hs->new_session != NULL &&
- hs->config->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
- hs->new_session->certs.reset();
- ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_clear(hs->new_session.get());
- }
-
- if (ssl->session != NULL) {
- ssl->s3->established_session = UpRef(ssl->session);
- } else {
- ssl->s3->established_session = std::move(hs->new_session);
- ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = false;
- }
-
- hs->handshake_finalized = true;
- ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = true;
- ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- hs->state = state12_done;
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_server_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- while (hs->state != state12_done) {
- enum ssl_hs_wait_t ret = ssl_hs_error;
- enum tls12_server_hs_state_t state =
- static_cast<enum tls12_server_hs_state_t>(hs->state);
- switch (state) {
- case state12_start_accept:
- ret = do_start_accept(hs);
- break;
- case state12_read_client_hello:
- ret = do_read_client_hello(hs);
- break;
- case state12_select_certificate:
- ret = do_select_certificate(hs);
- break;
- case state12_tls13:
- ret = do_tls13(hs);
- break;
- case state12_select_parameters:
- ret = do_select_parameters(hs);
- break;
- case state12_send_server_hello:
- ret = do_send_server_hello(hs);
- break;
- case state12_send_server_certificate:
- ret = do_send_server_certificate(hs);
- break;
- case state12_send_server_key_exchange:
- ret = do_send_server_key_exchange(hs);
- break;
- case state12_send_server_hello_done:
- ret = do_send_server_hello_done(hs);
- break;
- case state12_read_client_certificate:
- ret = do_read_client_certificate(hs);
- break;
- case state12_verify_client_certificate:
- ret = do_verify_client_certificate(hs);
- break;
- case state12_read_client_key_exchange:
- ret = do_read_client_key_exchange(hs);
- break;
- case state12_read_client_certificate_verify:
- ret = do_read_client_certificate_verify(hs);
- break;
- case state12_read_change_cipher_spec:
- ret = do_read_change_cipher_spec(hs);
- break;
- case state12_process_change_cipher_spec:
- ret = do_process_change_cipher_spec(hs);
- break;
- case state12_read_next_proto:
- ret = do_read_next_proto(hs);
- break;
- case state12_read_channel_id:
- ret = do_read_channel_id(hs);
- break;
- case state12_read_client_finished:
- ret = do_read_client_finished(hs);
- break;
- case state12_send_server_finished:
- ret = do_send_server_finished(hs);
- break;
- case state12_finish_server_handshake:
- ret = do_finish_server_handshake(hs);
- break;
- case state12_done:
- ret = ssl_hs_ok;
- break;
- }
-
- if (hs->state != state) {
- ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
- }
-
- if (ret != ssl_hs_ok) {
- return ret;
- }
- }
-
- ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
- return ssl_hs_ok;
- }
-
- const char *ssl_server_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- enum tls12_server_hs_state_t state =
- static_cast<enum tls12_server_hs_state_t>(hs->state);
- switch (state) {
- case state12_start_accept:
- return "TLS server start_accept";
- case state12_read_client_hello:
- return "TLS server read_client_hello";
- case state12_select_certificate:
- return "TLS server select_certificate";
- case state12_tls13:
- return tls13_server_handshake_state(hs);
- case state12_select_parameters:
- return "TLS server select_parameters";
- case state12_send_server_hello:
- return "TLS server send_server_hello";
- case state12_send_server_certificate:
- return "TLS server send_server_certificate";
- case state12_send_server_key_exchange:
- return "TLS server send_server_key_exchange";
- case state12_send_server_hello_done:
- return "TLS server send_server_hello_done";
- case state12_read_client_certificate:
- return "TLS server read_client_certificate";
- case state12_verify_client_certificate:
- return "TLS server verify_client_certificate";
- case state12_read_client_key_exchange:
- return "TLS server read_client_key_exchange";
- case state12_read_client_certificate_verify:
- return "TLS server read_client_certificate_verify";
- case state12_read_change_cipher_spec:
- return "TLS server read_change_cipher_spec";
- case state12_process_change_cipher_spec:
- return "TLS server process_change_cipher_spec";
- case state12_read_next_proto:
- return "TLS server read_next_proto";
- case state12_read_channel_id:
- return "TLS server read_channel_id";
- case state12_read_client_finished:
- return "TLS server read_client_finished";
- case state12_send_server_finished:
- return "TLS server send_server_finished";
- case state12_finish_server_handshake:
- return "TLS server finish_server_handshake";
- case state12_done:
- return "TLS server done";
- }
-
- return "TLS server unknown";
- }
-
- BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
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