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boringssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
David Benjamin 9f33fc63c6 Remove hash table lookups from ex_data. 
Instead, each module defines a static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS to hold the values.
This makes CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data a no-op as spreading the
CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASSes across modules (and across crypto and ssl) makes cleanup
slightly trickier. We can make it do something if needbe, but it's probably not
worth the trouble.

Change-Id: Ib6f6fd39a51d8ba88649f0fa29c66db540610c76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4375
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-04-15 23:59:35 +00:00

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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/thread.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "vpm_int.h"
#include "../internal.h"
static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
/* CRL score values */
/* No unhandled critical extensions */
#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
/* certificate is within CRL scope */
#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
/* CRL times valid */
#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
/* Issuer name matches certificate */
#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
unsigned int *preasons,
X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
unsigned int *preasons);
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
const char X509_version[]="X.509";
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
{
return ok;
}
#if 0
static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
{
return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
}
#endif
/* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
{
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
X509 *xtmp = NULL;
size_t i;
/* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
if (certs == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Look for exact match */
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
{
xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
break;
}
if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
X509_up_ref(xtmp);
else
xtmp = NULL;
sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
return xtmp;
}
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
int bad_chain = 0;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
int depth,i,ok=0;
int num;
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
if (ctx->cert == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_verify_cert, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
return -1;
}
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
* present and that the first entry is in place */
if (ctx->chain == NULL)
{
if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_verify_cert, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
ctx->last_untrusted=1;
}
/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
&& (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_verify_cert, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
depth=param->depth;
for (;;)
{
/* If we have enough, we break */
if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
* note of it and, if appropriate, use the
* X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
* code later.
*/
/* If we are self signed, we break */
if (cert_self_signed(x))
break;
/* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
{
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if (ok < 0)
return ok;
/* If successful for now free up cert so it
* will be picked up again later.
*/
if (ok > 0)
{
X509_free(xtmp);
break;
}
}
/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
{
xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
if (xtmp != NULL)
{
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_verify_cert, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
ctx->last_untrusted++;
x=xtmp;
num++;
/* reparse the full chain for
* the next one */
continue;
}
}
break;
}
/* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
* certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
* if possible, otherwise we complain. */
/* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
* is self signed.
*/
i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
if (cert_self_signed(x))
{
/* we have a self signed certificate */
if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
{
/* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
* we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
* match to avoid possible impersonation.
*/
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
ctx->current_cert=x;
ctx->error_depth=i-1;
if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
bad_chain = 1;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
else
{
/* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
* so we get any trust settings.
*/
X509_free(x);
x = xtmp;
(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
ctx->last_untrusted=0;
}
}
else
{
/* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
ctx->last_untrusted--;
num--;
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
}
}
/* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
for (;;)
{
/* If we have enough, we break */
if (depth < num) break;
/* If we are self signed, we break */
if (cert_self_signed(x))
break;
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if (ok < 0) return ok;
if (ok == 0) break;
x = xtmp;
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
{
X509_free(xtmp);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_verify_cert, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
num++;
}
/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
i = check_trust(ctx);
/* If explicitly rejected error */
if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
goto end;
/* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's
* a single self signed certificate in which case we've indicated
* an error already and set bad_chain == 1
*/
if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain)
{
if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
{
if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
else
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
ctx->current_cert=x;
}
else
{
sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
num++;
ctx->last_untrusted=num;
ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
chain_ss=NULL;
}
ctx->error_depth=num-1;
bad_chain = 1;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
/* Check name constraints */
ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
ok = check_id(ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
/* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
* because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
*/
ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
if(!ok) goto end;
i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
ctx->param->flags);
if (i != X509_V_OK)
{
ctx->error = i;
ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
if (ctx->verify != NULL)
ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
else
ok=internal_verify(ctx);
if(!ok) goto end;
/* If we get this far evaluate policies */
if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
end:
if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
return ok;
}
/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
*/
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
{
size_t i;
X509 *issuer;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
{
issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
return issuer;
}
return NULL;
}
/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
{
int ret;
ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
if (ret == X509_V_OK)
return 1;
/* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
return 0;
ctx->error = ret;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
if (*issuer)
{
X509_up_ref(*issuer);
return 1;
}
else
return 0;
}
/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
* with the supplied purpose
*/
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
X509 *x;
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
int proxy_path_length = 0;
int purpose;
int allow_proxy_certs;
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
/* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
-1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
*/
must_be_ca = -1;
/* CRL path validation */
if (ctx->parent)
{
allow_proxy_certs = 0;
purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
}
else
{
allow_proxy_certs =
!!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
/* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
software happy */
if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
allow_proxy_certs = 1;
purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
}
/* Check all untrusted certificates */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
{
int ret;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
ret = X509_check_ca(x);
switch(must_be_ca)
{
case -1:
if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
{
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
}
else
ret = 1;
break;
case 0:
if (ret != 0)
{
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
}
else
ret = 1;
break;
default:
if ((ret == 0)
|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
&& (ret != 1)))
{
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
}
else
ret = 1;
break;
}
if (ret == 0)
{
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
{
ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
if ((ret == 0)
|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
&& (ret != 1)))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
}
/* Check pathlen if not self issued */
if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
&& (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
&& (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
/* Increment path length if not self issued */
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
plen++;
/* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
CA certificate. */
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
{
if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
{
ctx->error =
X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
proxy_path_length++;
must_be_ca = 0;
}
else
must_be_ca = 1;
}
ok = 1;
end:
return ok;
}
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509 *x;
int i, j, rv;
/* Check name constraints for all certificates */
for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
/* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
continue;
/* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
* chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
* speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
* assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
*/
for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
{
NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
if (nc)
{
rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
if (rv != X509_V_OK)
{
ctx->error = rv;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
return 0;
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
{
ctx->error = errcode;
ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
{
size_t i;
size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
char *name;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
{
name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags,
&id->peername) > 0)
return 1;
}
return n == 0;
}
static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
X509 *x = ctx->cert;
if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0)
{
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0)
{
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0)
{
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
size_t i;
int ok;
X509 *x = NULL;
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
/* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
/* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
/* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
* not overridden.
*/
if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
{
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
}
}
/* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
* certificate return success.
*/
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
{
X509 *mx;
if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int) sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
if (mx)
{
(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
X509_free(x);
ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
}
}
/* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
* allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
*/
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i, last, ok;
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
return 1;
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
else
{
/* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
if (ctx->parent)
return 1;
last = 0;
}
for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
{
ctx->error_depth = i;
ok = check_cert(ctx);
if (!ok) return ok;
}
return 1;
}
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_POTENTIALLY_UNINITIALIZED_WARNINGS
{
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
X509 *x;
int ok, cnum;
unsigned int last_reasons;
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
{
last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
if (ctx->get_crl)
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
else
ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
/* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
* notify callback
*/
if(!ok)
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
goto err;
}
ctx->current_crl = crl;
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
if (!ok)
goto err;
if (dcrl)
{
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
if (!ok)
goto err;
ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
else
ok = 1;
/* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
if (ok != 2)
{
ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
X509_CRL_free(crl);
X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
crl = NULL;
dcrl = NULL;
/* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
* another iteration, so exit loop.
*/
if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
goto err;
}
}
err:
X509_CRL_free(crl);
X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
return ok;
}
/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
{
time_t *ptime;
int i;
if (notify)
ctx->current_crl = crl;
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
else
ptime = NULL;
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
if (i == 0)
{
if (!notify)
return 0;
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
if (i > 0)
{
if (!notify)
return 0;
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
{
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
if (i == 0)
{
if (!notify)
return 0;
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
/* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
{
if (!notify)
return 0;
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
}
if (notify)
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
return 1;
}
static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
size_t i;
unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
{
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
reasons = *preasons;
crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
if (crl_score > best_score)
{
best_crl = crl;
best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
best_score = crl_score;
best_reasons = reasons;
}
}
if (best_crl)
{
if (*pcrl)
X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
*pcrl = best_crl;
*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
*pscore = best_score;
*preasons = best_reasons;
CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
if (*pdcrl)
{
X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
*pdcrl = NULL;
}
get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
}
if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
* both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
*/
static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
int i;
i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
if (i >= 0)
{
/* Can't have multiple occurrences */
if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
return 0;
exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
}
else
exta = NULL;
i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
if (i >= 0)
{
if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
return 0;
extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
}
else
extb = NULL;
if (!exta && !extb)
return 1;
if (!exta || !extb)
return 0;
if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
{
/* Delta CRL must be a delta */
if (!delta->base_crl_number)
return 0;
/* Base must have a CRL number */
if (!base->crl_number)
return 0;
/* Issuer names must match */
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
return 0;
/* AKID and IDP must match */
if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
return 0;
if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
return 0;
/* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
return 0;
/* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
* or retrieve a chain of deltas...
*/
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
X509_CRL *delta;
size_t i;
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
return;
if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
return;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
{
delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
{
if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
*pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
*dcrl = delta;
return;
}
}
*dcrl = NULL;
}
/* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
* The return value is a mask of several criteria.
* If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
* The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
* no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
*/
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
unsigned int *preasons,
X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
int crl_score = 0;
unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
/* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
/* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
return 0;
/* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
{
if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
return 0;
}
else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
{
/* If no new reasons reject */
if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
return 0;
}
/* Don't process deltas at this stage */
else if (crl->base_crl_number)
return 0;
/* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
{
if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
return 0;
}
else
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
/* Check expiry */
if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
/* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
/* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
return 0;
/* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
{
/* If no new reasons reject */
if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
return 0;
tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
}
*preasons = tmp_reasons;
return crl_score;
}
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
{
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
size_t i;
if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
cidx++;
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
{
if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
{
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
*pissuer = crl_issuer;
return;
}
}
for (cidx++; cidx < (int) sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
{
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
continue;
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
{
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
*pissuer = crl_issuer;
return;
}
}
/* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
return;
/* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
* set of untrusted certificates.
*/
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
{
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
continue;
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
{
*pissuer = crl_issuer;
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
return;
}
}
}
/* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
* X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
* parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
* will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
* practice.
*/
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
int ret;
/* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
if (ctx->parent)
return 0;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
return -1;
crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
/* Copy verify params across */
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
/* Verify CRL issuer */
ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
if (ret <= 0)
goto err;
/* Check chain is acceptable */
ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
err:
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
* and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
* certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
* to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
* end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
* until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
*/
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
{
X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
* 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
* 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
* 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
* 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
*/
static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
{
X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
size_t i, j;
if (!a || !b)
return 1;
if (a->type == 1)
{
if (!a->dpname)
return 0;
/* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
if (b->type == 1)
{
if (!b->dpname)
return 0;
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
nm = a->dpname;
gens = b->name.fullname;
}
else if (b->type == 1)
{
if (!b->dpname)
return 0;
/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
gens = a->name.fullname;
nm = b->dpname;
}
/* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
if (nm)
{
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
{
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
continue;
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
{
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
{
genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
{
size_t i;
X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
/* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
if (!dp->CRLissuer)
return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
{
GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
continue;
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
unsigned int *preasons)
{
size_t i;
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
return 0;
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
{
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
return 0;
}
else
{
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
return 0;
}
*preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
{
DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
{
if (!crl->idp ||
idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
{
*preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
return 1;
}
}
}
if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
* If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
*/
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
{
int ok;
X509 *issuer = NULL;
int crl_score = 0;
unsigned int reasons;
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
&issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
if (ok)
goto done;
/* Lookup CRLs from store */
skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
/* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
if (!skcrl && crl)
goto done;
get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
done:
/* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
if (crl)
{
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
*pcrl = crl;
*pdcrl = dcrl;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Check CRL validity */
static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
{
X509 *issuer = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
/* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
if (ctx->current_issuer)
issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
/* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
* is next certificate in chain.
*/
else if (cnum < chnum)
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
else
{
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
/* If not self signed, can't check signature */
if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok) goto err;
}
}
if(issuer)
{
/* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
* been done
*/
if (!crl->base_crl_number)
{
/* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
!(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok) goto err;
}
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok) goto err;
}
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
{
if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok) goto err;
}
}
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok) goto err;
}
}
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
{
ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
if(!ikey)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok) goto err;
}
else
{
int rv;
rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK)
{
ctx->error=rv;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
/* Verify CRL signature */
if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok) goto err;
}
}
}
ok = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
return ok;
}
/* Check certificate against CRL */
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
int ok;
X509_REVOKED *rev;
/* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
* unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
* a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
* critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
*/
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
&& (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok)
return 0;
}
/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
* If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
*/
if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
{
if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
return 2;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret;
if (ctx->parent)
return 1;
ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
if (ret == 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, check_policy, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
if (ret == -1)
{
/* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
* callback.
*/
X509 *x;
size_t i;
for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
continue;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
if (ret == -2)
{
ctx->current_cert = NULL;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
{
ctx->current_cert = NULL;
ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
time_t *ptime;
int i;
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
else
ptime = NULL;
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
if (i == 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
ctx->current_cert=x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
if (i > 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
ctx->current_cert=x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
if (i == 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
ctx->current_cert=x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
if (i < 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
ctx->current_cert=x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int ok=0,n;
X509 *xs,*xi;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
ctx->error_depth=n-1;
n--;
xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
xs=xi;
else
{
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
{
xs = xi;
goto check_cert;
}
if (n <= 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
ctx->current_cert=xi;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
goto end;
}
else
{
n--;
ctx->error_depth=n;
xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
}
}
/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
while (n >= 0)
{
ctx->error_depth=n;
/* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
* explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
* just wastes time.
*/
if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
{
if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
ctx->current_cert=xi;
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ctx->current_cert=xs;
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
if (!ok)
{
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
goto end;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey=NULL;
}
xs->valid = 1;
check_cert:
ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
if (!ok)
goto end;
/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
ctx->current_issuer=xi;
ctx->current_cert=xs;
ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
n--;
if (n >= 0)
{
xi=xs;
xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
}
}
ok=1;
end:
return ok;
}
int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
{
return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
}
int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
{
char *str;
ASN1_TIME atm;
long offset;
char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
int i,j;
p=buff1;
i=ctm->length;
str=(char *)ctm->data;
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
{
if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
memcpy(p,str,10);
p+=10;
str+=10;
}
else
{
if (i < 13) return 0;
memcpy(p,str,12);
p+=12;
str+=12;
}
if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
else
{
*(p++)= *(str++);
*(p++)= *(str++);
/* Skip any fractional seconds... */
if (*str == '.')
{
str++;
while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
}
}
*(p++)='Z';
*(p++)='\0';
if (*str == 'Z')
offset=0;
else
{
if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
return 0;
offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
if (*str == '-')
offset= -offset;
}
atm.type=ctm->type;
atm.flags = 0;
atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
return 0;
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
{
i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
if (j < 50) j+=100;
if (i < j) return -1;
if (i > j) return 1;
}
i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
return -1;
else
return i;
}
ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
{
return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
}
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
{
return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
}
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
{
time_t t = 0;
if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
else time(&t);
if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
{
if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
offset_sec);
}
return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
}
/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
{
X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
int i;
size_t j;
STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
/* CRLs can't be delta already */
if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
return NULL;
}
/* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
return NULL;
}
/* Issuer names must match */
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
return NULL;
}
/* AKID and IDP must match */
if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
return NULL;
}
if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
return NULL;
}
/* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
return NULL;
}
/* CRLs must verify */
if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
/* Create new CRL */
crl = X509_CRL_new();
if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
goto memerr;
/* Set issuer name */
if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
goto memerr;
if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
goto memerr;
if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
goto memerr;
/* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
goto memerr;
/* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
* CRL number to correct value too.
*/
for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
{
X509_EXTENSION *ext;
ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
goto memerr;
}
/* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++)
{
X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j);
/* Add only if not also in base.
* TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
* CRLs covering multiple CAs.
*/
if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
{
rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
if (!rvtmp)
goto memerr;
if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
{
X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
goto memerr;
}
}
}
/* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
goto memerr;
return crl;
memerr:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
if (crl)
X509_CRL_free(crl);
return NULL;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
/* This function is (usually) called only once, by
* SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
int index;
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
new_func, dup_func, free_func))
{
return -1;
}
return index;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
{
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
}
void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->error;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
{
ctx->error=err;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->error_depth;
}
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->current_cert;
}
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->chain;
}
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
if (!ctx->chain)
return NULL;
return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
}
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->current_issuer;
}
X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->current_crl;
}
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->parent;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
ctx->cert=x;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
ctx->untrusted=sk;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
{
ctx->crls=sk;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
{
return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
{
return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
}
/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
* values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
* own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
* the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
* purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
* An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
* purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
* aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
*/
int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
int purpose, int trust)
{
int idx;
/* If purpose not set use default */
if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
/* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
if (purpose)
{
X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
if (idx == -1)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
return 0;
}
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
{
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
if (idx == -1)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
return 0;
}
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
}
/* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
}
if (trust)
{
idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
if (idx == -1)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
return 0;
}
}
if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
return 1;
}
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
{
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
if (!ctx)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_STORE_CTX_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
return ctx;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
int ret = 1;
int ex_data_allocated = 0;
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
ctx->ctx=store;
ctx->cert=x509;
ctx->untrusted=chain;
if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx,
&ctx->ex_data))
{
goto err;
}
ex_data_allocated = 1;
ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (!ctx->param)
goto err;
/* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
* use defaults. */
if (store)
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
else
ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
if (store)
{
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
}
else
ctx->cleanup = 0;
if (ret)
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
if (ret == 0)
goto err;
if (store && store->check_issued)
ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
else
ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
if (store && store->get_issuer)
ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
else
ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
if (store && store->verify_cb)
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
else
ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
if (store && store->verify)
ctx->verify = store->verify;
else
ctx->verify = internal_verify;
if (store && store->check_revocation)
ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
else
ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
if (store && store->get_crl)
ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
else
ctx->get_crl = NULL;
if (store && store->check_crl)
ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
else
ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
if (store && store->cert_crl)
ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
else
ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
if (store && store->lookup_certs)
ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
else
ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
if (store && store->lookup_crls)
ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
else
ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
return 1;
err:
if (ex_data_allocated)
{
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
}
if (ctx->param != NULL)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
}
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_STORE_CTX_init, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
* This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
*/
void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
ctx->other_ctx = sk;
ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
if (ctx->param != NULL)
{
if (ctx->parent == NULL)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
ctx->param=NULL;
}
if (ctx->tree != NULL)
{
X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
ctx->tree=NULL;
}
if (ctx->chain != NULL)
{
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
ctx->chain=NULL;
}
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
{
ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
}
X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->tree;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->explicit_policy;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
{
const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
if (!param)
return 0;
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
}
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->param;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
{
if (ctx->param)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
ctx->param = param;
}
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
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