2dc0204603
This is in preparation for using the supported_versions extension to experiment with draft TLS 1.3 versions, since we don't wish to restore the fallback. With versions begin opaque values, we will want version_from_wire to reject unknown values, not attempt to preserve order in some way. This means ClientHello.version processing needs to be separate code. That's just written out fully in negotiate_version now. It also means SSL_set_{min,max}_version will notice invalid inputs which aligns us better with upstream's versions of those APIs. This CL doesn't replace ssl->version with an internal-representation version, though follow work should do it once a couple of changes land in consumers. BUG=90 Change-Id: Id2f5e1fa72847c823ee7f082e9e69f55e51ce9da Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11122 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> |
||
---|---|---|
.. | ||
curve25519 | ||
newhope | ||
poly1305 | ||
alert.go | ||
cert.pem | ||
chacha20_poly1305_test.go | ||
chacha20_poly1305.go | ||
channel_id_key.pem | ||
cipher_suites.go | ||
common.go | ||
conn.go | ||
deterministic.go | ||
dtls.go | ||
ecdsa_p256_cert.pem | ||
ecdsa_p256_key.pem | ||
ecdsa_p384_cert.pem | ||
ecdsa_p384_key.pem | ||
ecdsa_p521_cert.pem | ||
ecdsa_p521_key.pem | ||
handshake_client.go | ||
handshake_messages.go | ||
handshake_server.go | ||
hkdf_test.go | ||
hkdf.go | ||
key_agreement.go | ||
key.pem | ||
packet_adapter.go | ||
prf.go | ||
recordingconn.go | ||
rsa_1024_cert.pem | ||
rsa_1024_key.pem | ||
runner_test.go | ||
runner.go | ||
sign.go | ||
test_output.go | ||
ticket.go | ||
tls.go |