2e839244b0
Before RFC 7539 we had a ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suite that had a 64/64 nonce/counter split (as DJB's original ChaCha20 did). RFC 7539 changed that to 96/32 and we've supported both for some time. This change removes the old version and the TLS cipher suites that used it. BUG=chromium:682816 Change-Id: I2345d6db83441691fe0c1ab6d7c6da4d24777849 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13203 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
215 lines
7.2 KiB
C
215 lines
7.2 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#include <openssl/aead.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/chacha.h>
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#include <openssl/cipher.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/poly1305.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "../internal.h"
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#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
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struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx {
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unsigned char key[32];
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unsigned char tag_len;
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};
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static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
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size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
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struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx;
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if (tag_len == 0) {
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tag_len = POLY1305_TAG_LEN;
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}
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if (tag_len > POLY1305_TAG_LEN) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (key_len != sizeof(c20_ctx->key)) {
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return 0; /* internal error - EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this. */
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}
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c20_ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx));
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if (c20_ctx == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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OPENSSL_memcpy(c20_ctx->key, key, key_len);
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c20_ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
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ctx->aead_state = c20_ctx;
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return 1;
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}
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static void aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {
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struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
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OPENSSL_cleanse(c20_ctx->key, sizeof(c20_ctx->key));
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OPENSSL_free(c20_ctx);
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}
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static void poly1305_update_length(poly1305_state *poly1305, size_t data_len) {
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uint8_t length_bytes[8];
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for (unsigned i = 0; i < sizeof(length_bytes); i++) {
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length_bytes[i] = data_len;
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data_len >>= 8;
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}
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CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, length_bytes, sizeof(length_bytes));
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}
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static void poly1305_update_padded_16(poly1305_state *poly1305,
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const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
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static const uint8_t padding[16] = { 0 }; /* Padding is all zeros. */
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CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len);
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if (data_len % 16 != 0) {
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CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, padding,
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sizeof(padding) - (data_len % 16));
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}
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}
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/* calc_tag fills |tag| with the authentication tag for the given inputs. */
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static void calc_tag(uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN],
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const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx,
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const uint8_t nonce[12], const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
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const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len) {
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alignas(16) uint8_t poly1305_key[32];
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OPENSSL_memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
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CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key),
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c20_ctx->key, nonce, 0);
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poly1305_state ctx;
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CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&ctx, poly1305_key);
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poly1305_update_padded_16(&ctx, ad, ad_len);
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poly1305_update_padded_16(&ctx, ciphertext, ciphertext_len);
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poly1305_update_length(&ctx, ad_len);
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poly1305_update_length(&ctx, ciphertext_len);
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CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&ctx, tag);
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}
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static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
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size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
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const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
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const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
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const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
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const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
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if (nonce_len != 12) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
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return 0;
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}
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/* |CRYPTO_chacha_20| uses a 32-bit block counter. Therefore we disallow
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* individual operations that work on more than 256GB at a time.
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* |in_len_64| is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
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* 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
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* Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
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* the warning. */
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if (in_len_64 >= (UINT64_C(1) << 32) * 64 - 64) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len < in_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (max_out_len < in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, c20_ctx->key, nonce, 1);
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alignas(16) uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
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calc_tag(tag, c20_ctx, nonce, ad, ad_len, out, in_len);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out + in_len, tag, c20_ctx->tag_len);
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*out_len = in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len;
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return 1;
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}
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static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
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size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
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const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
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const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
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const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
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size_t plaintext_len;
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const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
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if (nonce_len != 12) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (in_len < c20_ctx->tag_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
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return 0;
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}
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/* |CRYPTO_chacha_20| uses a 32-bit block counter. Therefore we disallow
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* individual operations that work on more than 256GB at a time.
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* |in_len_64| is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
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* 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
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* Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
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* the warning. */
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if (in_len_64 >= (UINT64_C(1) << 32) * 64 - 64) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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plaintext_len = in_len - c20_ctx->tag_len;
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alignas(16) uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
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calc_tag(tag, c20_ctx, nonce, ad, ad_len, in, plaintext_len);
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if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in + plaintext_len, c20_ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
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return 0;
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}
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CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, plaintext_len, c20_ctx->key, nonce, 1);
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*out_len = plaintext_len;
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return 1;
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}
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static const EVP_AEAD aead_chacha20_poly1305 = {
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32, /* key len */
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12, /* nonce len */
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POLY1305_TAG_LEN, /* overhead */
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POLY1305_TAG_LEN, /* max tag length */
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aead_chacha20_poly1305_init,
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NULL, /* init_with_direction */
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aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup,
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aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal,
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aead_chacha20_poly1305_open,
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NULL, /* get_iv */
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};
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const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305(void) {
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return &aead_chacha20_poly1305;
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}
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