2f6410ba4e
Functions which lose object reuse and need auditing: - d2i_ECParameters - d2i_ECPrivateKey This adds a handful of bytestring-based APIs to handle EC key serialization. Deprecate all the old serialization APIs. Notes: - An EC_KEY has additional state that controls its encoding, enc_flags and conv_form. conv_form is left alone, but enc_flags in the new API is an explicit parameter. - d2i_ECPrivateKey interpreted its T** argument unlike nearly every other d2i function. This is an explicit EC_GROUP parameter in the new function. - The new specified curve code is much stricter and should parse enough to uniquely identify the curve. - I've not bothered with a new version of i2d_ECParameters. It just writes an OID. This may change later when decoupling from the giant OID table. - Likewise, I've not bothered with new APIs for the public key since the EC_POINT APIs should suffice. - Previously, d2i_ECPrivateKey would not call EC_KEY_check_key and it was possible for the imported public and private key to mismatch. It now calls it. BUG=499653 Change-Id: I30b4dd2841ae76c56ab0e1808360b2628dee0615 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6859 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
481 lines
13 KiB
C
481 lines
13 KiB
C
/* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
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* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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*
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* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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*
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* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license provided above.
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*
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* The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
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* Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems
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* Laboratories. */
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#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/ec.h>
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/thread.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "../internal.h"
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static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
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EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void) { return EC_KEY_new_method(NULL); }
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EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
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EC_KEY *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_KEY));
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if (ret == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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memset(ret, 0, sizeof(EC_KEY));
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if (engine) {
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ret->ecdsa_meth = ENGINE_get_ECDSA_method(engine);
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}
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if (ret->ecdsa_meth) {
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METHOD_ref(ret->ecdsa_meth);
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}
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ret->conv_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
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ret->references = 1;
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CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data);
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if (ret->ecdsa_meth && ret->ecdsa_meth->init && !ret->ecdsa_meth->init(ret)) {
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ret, &ret->ex_data);
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if (ret->ecdsa_meth) {
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METHOD_unref(ret->ecdsa_meth);
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}
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OPENSSL_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid) {
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EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
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if (ret == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
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if (ret->group == NULL) {
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EC_KEY_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r) {
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if (r == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&r->references)) {
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return;
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}
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if (r->ecdsa_meth) {
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if (r->ecdsa_meth->finish) {
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r->ecdsa_meth->finish(r);
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}
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METHOD_unref(r->ecdsa_meth);
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}
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EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
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EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
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BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, r, &r->ex_data);
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OPENSSL_cleanse((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
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OPENSSL_free(r);
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}
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EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src) {
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if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return NULL;
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}
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/* Copy the parameters. */
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if (src->group) {
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/* TODO(fork): duplicating the group seems wasteful. */
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EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
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dest->group = EC_GROUP_dup(src->group);
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if (dest->group == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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}
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/* Copy the public key. */
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if (src->pub_key && src->group) {
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EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
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dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(src->pub_key, src->group);
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if (dest->pub_key == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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}
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/* copy the private key */
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if (src->priv_key) {
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if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
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dest->priv_key = BN_new();
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if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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}
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if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key)) {
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return NULL;
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}
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}
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/* copy method/extra data */
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if (src->ecdsa_meth) {
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METHOD_unref(dest->ecdsa_meth);
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dest->ecdsa_meth = src->ecdsa_meth;
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METHOD_ref(dest->ecdsa_meth);
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}
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dest, &dest->ex_data);
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if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, &dest->ex_data,
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&src->ex_data)) {
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return NULL;
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}
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/* copy the rest */
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dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
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dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
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dest->flags = src->flags;
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return dest;
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}
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EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key) {
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EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
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if (ret == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) {
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EC_KEY_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r) {
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CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&r->references);
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return 1;
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}
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int EC_KEY_is_opaque(const EC_KEY *key) {
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return key->ecdsa_meth && (key->ecdsa_meth->flags & ECDSA_FLAG_OPAQUE);
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}
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const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->group; }
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int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group) {
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EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
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/* TODO(fork): duplicating the group seems wasteful but see
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* |EC_KEY_set_conv_form|. */
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key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
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if (key->group == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* XXX: |BN_cmp| is not constant time. */
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if (key->priv_key != NULL &&
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BN_cmp(key->priv_key, EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) >= 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key) {
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return key->priv_key;
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}
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int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key) {
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/* XXX: |BN_cmp| is not constant time. */
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if (key->group != NULL &&
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BN_cmp(priv_key, EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group)) >= 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
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return 0;
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}
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BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
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key->priv_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
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return (key->priv_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
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}
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const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key) {
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return key->pub_key;
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}
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int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key) {
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EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
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key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
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return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
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}
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unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->enc_flag; }
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void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags) {
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key->enc_flag = flags;
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}
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point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key) {
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return key->conv_form;
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}
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void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform) {
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key->conv_form = cform;
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}
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int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey) {
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int ok = 0;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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EC_POINT *point = NULL;
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if (!eckey || !eckey->group || !eckey->pub_key) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
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goto err;
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}
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ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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if (ctx == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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/* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
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if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
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goto err;
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}
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/* TODO(fork): can this be skipped if the cofactor is one or if we're about
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* to check the private key, below? */
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if (eckey->group->meth->check_pub_key_order != NULL &&
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!eckey->group->meth->check_pub_key_order(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key,
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ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
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goto err;
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}
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/* in case the priv_key is present :
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* check if generator * priv_key == pub_key
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*/
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if (eckey->priv_key) {
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/* XXX: |BN_cmp| is not constant time. */
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if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, EC_GROUP_get0_order(eckey->group)) >= 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
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goto err;
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}
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point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
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if (point == NULL ||
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!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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ok = 1;
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err:
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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EC_POINT_free(point);
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return ok;
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}
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int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
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BIGNUM *y) {
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
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EC_POINT *point = NULL;
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int ok = 0;
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if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
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if (ctx == NULL ||
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point == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point, x, y, ctx) ||
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!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx)) {
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goto err;
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}
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/* Check if retrieved coordinates match originals: if not values
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* are out of range. */
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if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) {
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goto err;
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}
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if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0) {
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goto err;
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}
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ok = 1;
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err:
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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EC_POINT_free(point);
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return ok;
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}
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int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey) {
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int ok = 0;
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BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
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EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
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if (!eckey || !eckey->group) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
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priv_key = BN_new();
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if (priv_key == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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} else {
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priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
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}
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const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(eckey->group);
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do {
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if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, order)) {
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goto err;
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}
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} while (BN_is_zero(priv_key));
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if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
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pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
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if (pub_key == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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} else {
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pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
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}
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if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
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goto err;
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}
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eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
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eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
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ok = 1;
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err:
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if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
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EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
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}
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if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
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BN_free(priv_key);
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}
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return ok;
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}
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int EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
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CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
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CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
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int index;
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if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, dup_func,
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free_func)) {
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return -1;
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}
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return index;
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}
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int EC_KEY_set_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx, void *arg) {
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return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
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}
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void *EC_KEY_get_ex_data(const EC_KEY *d, int idx) {
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return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
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}
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void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag) {}
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