2fe7f2d0d9
In an attempt to assign a zero-length HMAC key, consumers might incorrectly call: HMAC_Init_ex(key=NULL, key_len=0) This does not work as expected since |key==NULL| has special semantics. This bug may consequently result in uninitialized memory being used for the HMAC key data. This workaround doesn't fix all the problems associated with this pattern, however by defaulting to a zero key the results are more predictable than before. BUG=http://crbug.com/449409 Change-Id: I777276d57c61f1c0cce80b18e28a9b063784733f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3040 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
232 lines
7.9 KiB
C
232 lines
7.9 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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uint8_t *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, size_t key_len,
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const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len, uint8_t *out,
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unsigned int *out_len) {
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HMAC_CTX ctx;
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static uint8_t static_out_buffer[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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/* OpenSSL has traditionally supported using a static buffer if |out| is
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* NULL. We maintain that but don't document it. This behaviour should be
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* considered to be deprecated. */
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if (out == NULL) {
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out = static_out_buffer;
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}
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/* If key_len is 0, the value of key doesn't matter. However, if we pass
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* key == NULL into HMAC_Init, it interprets it to mean "use the previous
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* value" instead of using a key of length 0. */
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if (key == NULL && key_len == 0) {
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key = static_out_buffer;
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}
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HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
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if (!HMAC_Init(&ctx, key, key_len, evp_md) ||
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!HMAC_Update(&ctx, data, data_len) ||
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!HMAC_Final(&ctx, out, out_len)) {
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out = NULL;
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}
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HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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return out;
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}
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void HMAC_CTX_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
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ctx->md = NULL;
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ctx->key_length = 0;
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->i_ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->o_ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->md_ctx);
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}
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void HMAC_CTX_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->i_ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->o_ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->md_ctx);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(ctx));
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}
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int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t key_len,
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const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl) {
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unsigned i, reset = 0;
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uint8_t pad[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK];
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if (md != NULL) {
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if (ctx->md == NULL && key == NULL && ctx->key_length == 0) {
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/* TODO(eroman): Change the API instead of this hack.
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* If a key hasn't yet been assigned to the context, then default to using
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* an all-zero key. This is to work around callers of
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* HMAC_Init_ex(key=NULL, key_len=0) intending to set a zero-length key.
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* Rather than resulting in uninitialized memory reads, it will
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* predictably use a zero key. */
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memset(ctx->key, 0, sizeof(ctx->key));
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}
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reset = 1;
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ctx->md = md;
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} else {
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md = ctx->md;
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}
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if (key != NULL) {
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size_t block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(md);
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reset = 1;
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assert(block_size <= sizeof(ctx->key));
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if (block_size < key_len) {
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, md, impl) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, key, key_len) ||
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!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&(ctx->md_ctx), ctx->key, &ctx->key_length)) {
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goto err;
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}
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} else {
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assert(key_len >= 0 && key_len <= sizeof(ctx->key));
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memcpy(ctx->key, key, key_len);
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ctx->key_length = key_len;
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}
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if (ctx->key_length != HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK) {
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memset(&ctx->key[ctx->key_length], 0, sizeof(ctx->key) - ctx->key_length);
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}
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}
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if (reset) {
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for (i = 0; i < HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK; i++) {
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pad[i] = 0x36 ^ ctx->key[i];
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}
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->i_ctx, md, impl) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->i_ctx, pad, EVP_MD_block_size(md))) {
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goto err;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK; i++) {
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pad[i] = 0x5c ^ ctx->key[i];
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}
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->o_ctx, md, impl) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->o_ctx, pad, EVP_MD_block_size(md))) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->i_ctx)) {
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goto err;
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}
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return 1;
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err:
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return 0;
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}
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int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
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return EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, data, data_len);
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}
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int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, unsigned int *out_len) {
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unsigned int i;
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uint8_t buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i) ||
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!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->o_ctx) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, i) ||
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!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, out, out_len)) {
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*out_len = 0;
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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size_t HMAC_size(const HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
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return EVP_MD_size(ctx->md);
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}
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int HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(HMAC_CTX *dest, const HMAC_CTX *src) {
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if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->i_ctx, &src->i_ctx) ||
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!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->o_ctx, &src->o_ctx) ||
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!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->md_ctx, &src->md_ctx)) {
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return 0;
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}
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memcpy(dest->key, src->key, HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK);
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dest->key_length = src->key_length;
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dest->md = src->md;
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return 1;
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}
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void HMAC_CTX_set_flags(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) {
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EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx->i_ctx, flags);
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EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx->o_ctx, flags);
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EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx->md_ctx, flags);
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}
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int HMAC_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, const EVP_MD *md) {
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if (key && md) {
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HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
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}
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return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, key_len, md, NULL);
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}
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int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dest, const HMAC_CTX *src) {
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HMAC_CTX_init(dest);
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return HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(dest, src);
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}
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