3f5b43df07
This check was fixed a while ago, but it could have been much simpler. In the RSA key exchange, the expected size of the output is known, making the padding check much simpler. There isn't any use in exporting the more general RSA_message_index_PKCS1_type_2. (Without knowing the expected size, any integrity check or swap to randomness or other mitigation is basically doomed to fail.) Verified with the valgrind uninitialized memory trick that we're still constant-time. Also update rsa.h to recommend against using the PKCS#1 v1.5 schemes. Thanks to Ryan Sleevi for the suggestion. Change-Id: I4328076b1d2e5e06617dd8907cdaa702635c2651 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6613 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> |
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blinding.c | ||
CMakeLists.txt | ||
internal.h | ||
padding.c | ||
rsa_asn1.c | ||
rsa_impl.c | ||
rsa_test.cc | ||
rsa.c |