d17d74d73f
Unlike the Scoped* types, bssl::UniquePtr is available to C++ users, and offered for a large variety of types. The 'extern "C++"' trick is used to make the C++ bits digestible to C callers that wrap header files in 'extern "C"'. Change-Id: Ifbca4c2997d6628e33028c7d7620c72aff0f862e Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10521 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
142 lines
4.5 KiB
C++
142 lines
4.5 KiB
C++
/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#include <math.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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// Set to 10 for quick execution. Tested up to 1,000,000.
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static const int kNumTests = 10;
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static bool TestKeys(void) {
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// Alice generates a public key.
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bssl::UniquePtr<NEWHOPE_POLY> sk(NEWHOPE_POLY_new());
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uint8_t offer_msg[NEWHOPE_OFFERMSG_LENGTH];
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NEWHOPE_offer(offer_msg, sk.get());
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// Bob derives a secret key and creates a response.
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uint8_t accept_msg[NEWHOPE_ACCEPTMSG_LENGTH];
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uint8_t accept_key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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if (!NEWHOPE_accept(accept_key, accept_msg, offer_msg, sizeof(offer_msg))) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR accept key exchange failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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// Alice uses Bob's response to get her secret key.
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uint8_t offer_key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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if (!NEWHOPE_finish(offer_key, sk.get(), accept_msg, sizeof(accept_msg))) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR finish key exchange failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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if (memcmp(offer_key, accept_key, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR keys did not agree\n");
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static bool TestInvalidSK(void) {
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// Alice generates a public key.
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uint8_t offer_msg[NEWHOPE_OFFERMSG_LENGTH];
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bssl::UniquePtr<NEWHOPE_POLY> sk(NEWHOPE_POLY_new());
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NEWHOPE_offer(offer_msg, sk.get());
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// Bob derives a secret key and creates a response.
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uint8_t accept_key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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uint8_t accept_msg[NEWHOPE_ACCEPTMSG_LENGTH];
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if (!NEWHOPE_accept(accept_key, accept_msg, offer_msg, sizeof(offer_msg))) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR accept key exchange failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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// Corrupt the secret key. It turns out that you need to corrupt a lot of
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// bits to ensure that the key exchange always fails!
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sk->coeffs[PARAM_N - 1] = 0;
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sk->coeffs[PARAM_N - 2] = 0;
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sk->coeffs[PARAM_N - 3] = 0;
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sk->coeffs[PARAM_N - 4] = 0;
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// Alice uses Bob's response to get her secret key.
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uint8_t offer_key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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if (!NEWHOPE_finish(offer_key, sk.get(), accept_msg, sizeof(accept_msg))) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR finish key exchange failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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if (memcmp(offer_key, accept_key, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR keys agreed despite corrupt sk\n");
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static bool TestInvalidAcceptMsg(void) {
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// Alice generates a public key.
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bssl::UniquePtr<NEWHOPE_POLY> sk(NEWHOPE_POLY_new());
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uint8_t offer_msg[NEWHOPE_OFFERMSG_LENGTH];
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NEWHOPE_offer(offer_msg, sk.get());
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// Bob derives a secret key and creates a response.
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uint8_t accept_key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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uint8_t accept_msg[NEWHOPE_ACCEPTMSG_LENGTH];
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if (!NEWHOPE_accept(accept_key, accept_msg, offer_msg, sizeof(offer_msg))) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR accept key exchange failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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// Corrupt the (polynomial part of the) accept message. It turns out that
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// you need to corrupt a lot of bits to ensure that the key exchange always
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// fails!
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accept_msg[PARAM_N - 1] = 0;
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accept_msg[PARAM_N - 2] = 0;
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accept_msg[PARAM_N - 3] = 0;
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accept_msg[PARAM_N - 4] = 0;
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// Alice uses Bob's response to get her secret key.
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uint8_t offer_key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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if (!NEWHOPE_finish(offer_key, sk.get(), accept_msg, sizeof(accept_msg))) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR finish key exchange failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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if (!memcmp(offer_key, accept_key, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR keys agreed despite corrupt accept message\n");
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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int main(void) {
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for (int i = 0; i < kNumTests; i++) {
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if (!TestKeys() ||
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!TestInvalidSK() ||
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!TestInvalidAcceptMsg()) {
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return 1;
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}
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}
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printf("PASS\n");
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return 0;
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}
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