55db667c62
This patches vpaes-armv8.pl to add vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks. CTR mode is by far the most important mode these days. It should have access to _vpaes_encrypt_2x, which gives a considerable speed boost. Also exclude vpaes_ecb_* as they're not even used. For iOS, this change is completely a no-op. iOS ARMv8 always has crypto extensions, and we already statically drop all other AES implementations. Android ARMv8 is *not* required to have crypto extensions, but every ARMv8 device I've seen has them. For those, it is a no-op performance-wise and a win on size. vpaes appears to be about 5.6KiB smaller than the tables. ARMv8 always makes SIMD (NEON) available, so we can statically drop aes_nohw. In theory, however, crypto-less Android ARMv8 is possible. Today such chips get a variable-time AES. This CL fixes this, but the performance story is complex. The Raspberry Pi 3 is not Android but has a Cortex-A53 chip without crypto extensions. (But the official images are 32-bit, so even this is slightly artificial...) There, vpaes is a performance win. Raspberry Pi 3, Model B+, Cortex-A53 Before: Did 265000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1003312us (264125.2 ops/sec): 4.2 MB/s Did 44000 AES-128-GCM (256 bytes) seal operations in 1002141us (43906.0 ops/sec): 11.2 MB/s Did 9394 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1032104us (9101.8 ops/sec): 12.3 MB/s Did 1562 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1008982us (1548.1 ops/sec): 12.7 MB/s After: Did 277000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1001884us (276479.1 ops/sec): 4.4 MB/s Did 52000 AES-128-GCM (256 bytes) seal operations in 1001480us (51923.2 ops/sec): 13.3 MB/s Did 11000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1007979us (10912.9 ops/sec): 14.7 MB/s Did 2013 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1085545us (1854.4 ops/sec): 15.2 MB/s The Pixel 3 has a Cortex-A75 with crypto extensions, so it would never run this code. However, artificially ignoring them gives another data point (ARM documentation[*] suggests the extensions are still optional on a Cortex-A75.) Sadly, vpaes no longer wins on perf over aes_nohw. But, it is constant-time: Pixel 3, AES/PMULL extensions ignored, Cortex-A75: Before: Did 2102000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000378us (2101205.7 ops/sec): 33.6 MB/s Did 358000 AES-128-GCM (256 bytes) seal operations in 1002658us (357051.0 ops/sec): 91.4 MB/s Did 75000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1012830us (74049.9 ops/sec): 100.0 MB/s Did 13000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1036524us (12541.9 ops/sec): 102.7 MB/s After: Did 1453000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000213us (1452690.6 ops/sec): 23.2 MB/s Did 285000 AES-128-GCM (256 bytes) seal operations in 1002227us (284366.7 ops/sec): 72.8 MB/s Did 60000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1016106us (59049.0 ops/sec): 79.7 MB/s Did 11000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1094184us (10053.2 ops/sec): 82.4 MB/s Note the numbers above run with PMULL off, so the slow GHASH is dampening the regression. If we test aes_nohw and vpaes paired with PMULL on, the 20% perf hit becomes a 31% hit. The PMULL-less variant is more likely to represent a real chip. This is consistent with upstream's note in the comment, though it is unclear if 20% is the right order of magnitude: "these results are worse than scalar compiler-generated code, but it's constant-time and therefore preferred". [*] http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.100458_0301_00_en/lau1442495529696.html Bug: 246 Change-Id: If1dc87f5131fce742052498295476fbae4628dbf Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/35026 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
1244 lines
36 KiB
C
1244 lines
36 KiB
C
/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ==================================================================== */
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/aead.h>
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#include <openssl/aes.h>
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#include <openssl/cipher.h>
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#include <openssl/cpu.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/nid.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "../../internal.h"
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#include "../aes/internal.h"
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#include "../modes/internal.h"
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#include "../delocate.h"
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OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push))
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OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable: 4702)) // Unreachable code.
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typedef struct {
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union {
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double align;
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AES_KEY ks;
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} ks;
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block128_f block;
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union {
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cbc128_f cbc;
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ctr128_f ctr;
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} stream;
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} EVP_AES_KEY;
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typedef struct {
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GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;
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union {
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double align;
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AES_KEY ks;
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} ks; // AES key schedule to use
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int key_set; // Set if key initialised
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int iv_set; // Set if an iv is set
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uint8_t *iv; // Temporary IV store
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int ivlen; // IV length
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int taglen;
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int iv_gen; // It is OK to generate IVs
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ctr128_f ctr;
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} EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
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static int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
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const uint8_t *iv, int enc) {
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int ret, mode;
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EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
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mode = ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE_MASK;
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if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) && !enc) {
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if (hwaes_capable()) {
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ret = aes_hw_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
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dat->block = aes_hw_decrypt;
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dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
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if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
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dat->stream.cbc = aes_hw_cbc_encrypt;
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}
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} else if (bsaes_capable() && mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
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ret = aes_nohw_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
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dat->block = aes_nohw_decrypt;
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dat->stream.cbc = bsaes_cbc_encrypt;
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} else if (vpaes_capable()) {
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ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
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dat->block = vpaes_decrypt;
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dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
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} else {
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ret = aes_nohw_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
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dat->block = aes_nohw_decrypt;
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dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
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#if defined(AES_NOHW_CBC)
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if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
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dat->stream.cbc = aes_nohw_cbc_encrypt;
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}
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#endif
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}
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} else if (hwaes_capable()) {
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ret = aes_hw_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
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dat->block = aes_hw_encrypt;
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dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
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if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
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dat->stream.cbc = aes_hw_cbc_encrypt;
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} else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) {
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dat->stream.ctr = aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
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}
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} else if (bsaes_capable() && mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) {
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ret = aes_nohw_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
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dat->block = aes_nohw_encrypt;
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dat->stream.ctr = bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
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} else if (vpaes_capable()) {
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ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
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dat->block = vpaes_encrypt;
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dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
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if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
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dat->stream.cbc = vpaes_cbc_encrypt;
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}
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#if defined(VPAES_CTR32)
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if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) {
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dat->stream.ctr = vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
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}
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#endif
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} else {
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ret = aes_nohw_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
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dat->block = aes_nohw_encrypt;
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dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
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#if defined(AES_NOHW_CBC)
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if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
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dat->stream.cbc = aes_nohw_cbc_encrypt;
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}
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#endif
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}
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if (ret < 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
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size_t len) {
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EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
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if (dat->stream.cbc) {
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(*dat->stream.cbc)(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
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} else if (ctx->encrypt) {
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CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, dat->block);
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} else {
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CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, dat->block);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
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size_t len) {
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size_t bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
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EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
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if (len < bl) {
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return 1;
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}
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len -= bl;
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for (size_t i = 0; i <= len; i += bl) {
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(*dat->block)(in + i, out + i, &dat->ks.ks);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
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size_t len) {
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EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
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if (dat->stream.ctr) {
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CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, ctx->buf,
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&ctx->num, dat->stream.ctr);
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} else {
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CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, ctx->buf,
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&ctx->num, dat->block);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
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size_t len) {
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EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
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CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, &ctx->num,
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dat->block);
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return 1;
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}
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ctr128_f aes_ctr_set_key(AES_KEY *aes_key, GCM128_KEY *gcm_key,
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block128_f *out_block, const uint8_t *key,
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size_t key_bytes, int large_inputs) {
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if (hwaes_capable()) {
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aes_hw_set_encrypt_key(key, key_bytes * 8, aes_key);
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if (gcm_key != NULL) {
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CRYPTO_gcm128_init_key(gcm_key, aes_key, aes_hw_encrypt, 1);
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}
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if (out_block) {
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*out_block = aes_hw_encrypt;
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}
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return aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
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}
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const int bsaes_ok = bsaes_capable();
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const int vpaes_ok = vpaes_capable();
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if (bsaes_ok && (large_inputs || !vpaes_ok)) {
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aes_nohw_set_encrypt_key(key, key_bytes * 8, aes_key);
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if (gcm_key != NULL) {
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CRYPTO_gcm128_init_key(gcm_key, aes_key, aes_nohw_encrypt, 0);
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}
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if (out_block) {
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*out_block = aes_nohw_encrypt;
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}
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return bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
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}
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if (vpaes_ok) {
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vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, key_bytes * 8, aes_key);
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if (out_block) {
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*out_block = vpaes_encrypt;
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}
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if (gcm_key != NULL) {
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CRYPTO_gcm128_init_key(gcm_key, aes_key, vpaes_encrypt, 0);
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}
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#if defined(VPAES_CTR32)
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return vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
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#else
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return NULL;
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#endif
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}
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aes_nohw_set_encrypt_key(key, key_bytes * 8, aes_key);
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if (gcm_key != NULL) {
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CRYPTO_gcm128_init_key(gcm_key, aes_key, aes_nohw_encrypt, 0);
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}
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if (out_block) {
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*out_block = aes_nohw_encrypt;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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#if defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT)
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#define EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING (4+8)
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#else
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#define EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING 8
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#endif
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static EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
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#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
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OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
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alignof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) <= 16,
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"EVP_AES_GCM_CTX needs more alignment than this function provides");
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#endif
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// |malloc| guarantees up to 4-byte alignment on 32-bit and 8-byte alignment
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// on 64-bit systems, so we need to adjust to reach 16-byte alignment.
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assert(ctx->cipher->ctx_size ==
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sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING);
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char *ptr = ctx->cipher_data;
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#if defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT)
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assert((uintptr_t)ptr % 4 == 0);
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ptr += (uintptr_t)ptr & 4;
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#endif
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assert((uintptr_t)ptr % 8 == 0);
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ptr += (uintptr_t)ptr & 8;
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return (EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *)ptr;
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}
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static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
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const uint8_t *iv, int enc) {
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EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(ctx);
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if (!iv && !key) {
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return 1;
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}
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if (key) {
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OPENSSL_memset(&gctx->gcm, 0, sizeof(gctx->gcm));
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gctx->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&gctx->ks.ks, &gctx->gcm.gcm_key, NULL, key,
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ctx->key_len, 1 /* large inputs */);
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// If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
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if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) {
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iv = gctx->iv;
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}
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if (iv) {
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CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, iv, gctx->ivlen);
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gctx->iv_set = 1;
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}
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gctx->key_set = 1;
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} else {
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// If key set use IV, otherwise copy
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if (gctx->key_set) {
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CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, iv, gctx->ivlen);
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} else {
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OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
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}
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gctx->iv_set = 1;
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gctx->iv_gen = 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static void aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) {
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EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(c);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm));
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if (gctx->iv != c->iv) {
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OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
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}
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}
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// increment counter (64-bit int) by 1
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static void ctr64_inc(uint8_t *counter) {
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int n = 8;
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uint8_t c;
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do {
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--n;
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c = counter[n];
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++c;
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counter[n] = c;
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if (c) {
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return;
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}
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} while (n);
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}
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static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) {
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EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(c);
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switch (type) {
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case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
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gctx->key_set = 0;
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gctx->iv_set = 0;
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gctx->ivlen = c->cipher->iv_len;
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gctx->iv = c->iv;
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gctx->taglen = -1;
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gctx->iv_gen = 0;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
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if (arg <= 0) {
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return 0;
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|
}
|
|
|
|
// Allocate memory for IV if needed
|
|
if (arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH && arg > gctx->ivlen) {
|
|
if (gctx->iv != c->iv) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
|
|
}
|
|
gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg);
|
|
if (!gctx->iv) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
gctx->ivlen = arg;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
|
|
if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || c->encrypt) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
|
|
gctx->taglen = arg;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
|
|
if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt || gctx->taglen < 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, c->buf, arg);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED:
|
|
// Special case: -1 length restores whole IV
|
|
if (arg == -1) {
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen);
|
|
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
// Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field
|
|
// at least 8.
|
|
if (arg < 4 || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (arg) {
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
if (c->encrypt && !RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN:
|
|
if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
|
if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen) {
|
|
arg = gctx->ivlen;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg);
|
|
// Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and
|
|
// so no need to check wrap around or increment more than
|
|
// last 8 bytes.
|
|
ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
|
|
gctx->iv_set = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
|
|
if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || c->encrypt) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
|
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
|
gctx->iv_set = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_CTRL_COPY: {
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
|
|
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(out);
|
|
if (gctx->iv == c->iv) {
|
|
gctx_out->iv = out->iv;
|
|
} else {
|
|
gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen);
|
|
if (!gctx_out->iv) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
|
|
size_t len) {
|
|
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(ctx);
|
|
|
|
// If not set up, return error
|
|
if (!gctx->key_set) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!gctx->iv_set) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (in) {
|
|
if (out == NULL) {
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (ctx->encrypt) {
|
|
if (gctx->ctr) {
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, len,
|
|
gctx->ctr)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, len)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (gctx->ctr) {
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, len,
|
|
gctx->ctr)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, len)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return len;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!ctx->encrypt) {
|
|
if (gctx->taglen < 0 ||
|
|
!CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->taglen)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
gctx->iv_set = 0;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, 16);
|
|
gctx->taglen = 16;
|
|
// Don't reuse the IV
|
|
gctx->iv_set = 0;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_128_cbc_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_128_cbc;
|
|
out->block_size = 16;
|
|
out->key_len = 16;
|
|
out->iv_len = 16;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_cbc_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_128_ctr_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_128_ctr;
|
|
out->block_size = 1;
|
|
out->key_len = 16;
|
|
out->iv_len = 16;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_ctr_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_128_ecb_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_128_ecb;
|
|
out->block_size = 16;
|
|
out->key_len = 16;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_ecb_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_128_ofb_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_128_ofb128;
|
|
out->block_size = 1;
|
|
out->key_len = 16;
|
|
out->iv_len = 16;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_ofb_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_128_gcm_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_128_gcm;
|
|
out->block_size = 1;
|
|
out->key_len = 16;
|
|
out->iv_len = 12;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
|
|
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
|
|
EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER;
|
|
out->init = aes_gcm_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_gcm_cipher;
|
|
out->cleanup = aes_gcm_cleanup;
|
|
out->ctrl = aes_gcm_ctrl;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_192_cbc_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_192_cbc;
|
|
out->block_size = 16;
|
|
out->key_len = 24;
|
|
out->iv_len = 16;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_cbc_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_192_ctr_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_192_ctr;
|
|
out->block_size = 1;
|
|
out->key_len = 24;
|
|
out->iv_len = 16;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_ctr_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_192_ecb_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_192_ecb;
|
|
out->block_size = 16;
|
|
out->key_len = 24;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_ecb_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_192_ofb_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_192_ofb128;
|
|
out->block_size = 1;
|
|
out->key_len = 24;
|
|
out->iv_len = 16;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_ofb_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_192_gcm_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_192_gcm;
|
|
out->block_size = 1;
|
|
out->key_len = 24;
|
|
out->iv_len = 12;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
|
|
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
|
|
EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER;
|
|
out->init = aes_gcm_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_gcm_cipher;
|
|
out->cleanup = aes_gcm_cleanup;
|
|
out->ctrl = aes_gcm_ctrl;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_256_cbc_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_256_cbc;
|
|
out->block_size = 16;
|
|
out->key_len = 32;
|
|
out->iv_len = 16;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_cbc_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_256_ctr_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_256_ctr;
|
|
out->block_size = 1;
|
|
out->key_len = 32;
|
|
out->iv_len = 16;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_ctr_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_256_ecb_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_256_ecb;
|
|
out->block_size = 16;
|
|
out->key_len = 32;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_ecb_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_256_ofb_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_256_ofb128;
|
|
out->block_size = 1;
|
|
out->key_len = 32;
|
|
out->iv_len = 16;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_ofb_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_256_gcm_generic) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_256_gcm;
|
|
out->block_size = 1;
|
|
out->key_len = 32;
|
|
out->iv_len = 12;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
|
|
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
|
|
EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER;
|
|
out->init = aes_gcm_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_gcm_cipher;
|
|
out->cleanup = aes_gcm_cleanup;
|
|
out->ctrl = aes_gcm_ctrl;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(HWAES_ECB)
|
|
|
|
static int aes_hw_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
|
|
size_t bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
|
|
|
|
if (len < bl) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
aes_hw_ecb_encrypt(in, out, len, ctx->cipher_data, ctx->encrypt);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_hw_128_ecb) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_128_ecb;
|
|
out->block_size = 16;
|
|
out->key_len = 16;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_hw_ecb_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_hw_192_ecb) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_192_ecb;
|
|
out->block_size = 16;
|
|
out->key_len = 24;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_hw_ecb_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_hw_256_ecb) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
|
|
|
|
out->nid = NID_aes_256_ecb;
|
|
out->block_size = 16;
|
|
out->key_len = 32;
|
|
out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY);
|
|
out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE;
|
|
out->init = aes_init_key;
|
|
out->cipher = aes_hw_ecb_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(keybits) \
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keybits##_ecb(void) { \
|
|
if (hwaes_capable()) { \
|
|
return aes_hw_##keybits##_ecb(); \
|
|
} \
|
|
return aes_##keybits##_ecb_generic(); \
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
#define EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(keybits) \
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keybits##_ecb(void) { \
|
|
return aes_##keybits##_ecb_generic(); \
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif // HWAES_ECB
|
|
|
|
#define EVP_CIPHER_FUNCTION(keybits, mode) \
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keybits##_##mode(void) { \
|
|
return aes_##keybits##_##mode##_generic(); \
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_FUNCTION(128, cbc)
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_FUNCTION(128, ctr)
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_FUNCTION(128, ofb)
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_FUNCTION(128, gcm)
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_FUNCTION(192, cbc)
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_FUNCTION(192, ctr)
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_FUNCTION(192, ofb)
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_FUNCTION(192, gcm)
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_FUNCTION(256, cbc)
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_FUNCTION(256, ctr)
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_FUNCTION(256, ofb)
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_FUNCTION(256, gcm)
|
|
|
|
EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(128)
|
|
EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(192)
|
|
EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(256)
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN 16
|
|
|
|
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx {
|
|
union {
|
|
double align;
|
|
AES_KEY ks;
|
|
} ks;
|
|
GCM128_KEY gcm_key;
|
|
ctr128_f ctr;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int aead_aes_gcm_init_impl(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
|
|
size_t *out_tag_len, const uint8_t *key,
|
|
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
|
|
const size_t key_bits = key_len * 8;
|
|
|
|
if (key_bits != 128 && key_bits != 256) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
return 0; // EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this.
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
|
|
tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tag_len > EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gcm_ctx->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&gcm_ctx->ks.ks, &gcm_ctx->gcm_key, NULL, key,
|
|
key_len, 1 /* large inputs */);
|
|
*out_tag_len = tag_len;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
|
|
sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx),
|
|
"AEAD state is too small");
|
|
#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
|
|
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
|
|
alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx),
|
|
"AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int aead_aes_gcm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
|
|
size_t key_len, size_t requested_tag_len) {
|
|
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
|
|
|
|
size_t actual_tag_len;
|
|
if (!aead_aes_gcm_init_impl(gcm_ctx, &actual_tag_len, key, key_len,
|
|
requested_tag_len)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->tag_len = actual_tag_len;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void aead_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
|
|
|
|
static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
|
|
uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len,
|
|
size_t max_out_tag_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *extra_in,
|
|
size_t extra_in_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
|
|
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
|
|
|
|
if (extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len < ctx->tag_len) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (max_out_tag_len < extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (nonce_len == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const AES_KEY *key = &gcm_ctx->ks.ks;
|
|
|
|
GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;
|
|
OPENSSL_memset(&gcm, 0, sizeof(gcm));
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(&gcm.gcm_key, &gcm_ctx->gcm_key, sizeof(gcm.gcm_key));
|
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, key, nonce, nonce_len);
|
|
|
|
if (ad_len > 0 && !CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (gcm_ctx->ctr) {
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len,
|
|
gcm_ctx->ctr)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (extra_in_len) {
|
|
if (gcm_ctx->ctr) {
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gcm, key, extra_in, out_tag,
|
|
extra_in_len, gcm_ctx->ctr)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gcm, key, extra_in, out_tag, extra_in_len)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out_tag + extra_in_len, ctx->tag_len);
|
|
*out_tag_len = ctx->tag_len + extra_in_len;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
|
|
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
|
|
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
|
|
uint8_t tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN];
|
|
|
|
if (nonce_len == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (in_tag_len != ctx->tag_len) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const AES_KEY *key = &gcm_ctx->ks.ks;
|
|
|
|
GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;
|
|
OPENSSL_memset(&gcm, 0, sizeof(gcm));
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(&gcm.gcm_key, &gcm_ctx->gcm_key, sizeof(gcm.gcm_key));
|
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, key, nonce, nonce_len);
|
|
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (gcm_ctx->ctr) {
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len,
|
|
gcm_ctx->ctr)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, ctx->tag_len);
|
|
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
|
|
|
|
out->key_len = 16;
|
|
out->nonce_len = 12;
|
|
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
|
|
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
|
|
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
|
|
|
|
out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init;
|
|
out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
|
|
out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter;
|
|
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
|
|
|
|
out->key_len = 32;
|
|
out->nonce_len = 12;
|
|
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
|
|
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
|
|
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
|
|
|
|
out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init;
|
|
out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
|
|
out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter;
|
|
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx {
|
|
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx gcm_ctx;
|
|
uint64_t min_next_nonce;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
|
|
sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx),
|
|
"AEAD state is too small");
|
|
#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
|
|
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
|
|
alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx),
|
|
"AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int aead_aes_gcm_tls12_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
|
|
size_t key_len, size_t requested_tag_len) {
|
|
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *gcm_ctx =
|
|
(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *) &ctx->state;
|
|
|
|
gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t actual_tag_len;
|
|
if (!aead_aes_gcm_init_impl(&gcm_ctx->gcm_ctx, &actual_tag_len, key, key_len,
|
|
requested_tag_len)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->tag_len = actual_tag_len;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter(
|
|
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
|
|
size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
|
|
size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
|
|
size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
|
|
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *gcm_ctx =
|
|
(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *) &ctx->state;
|
|
|
|
if (nonce_len != 12) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The given nonces must be strictly monotonically increasing.
|
|
uint64_t given_counter;
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(&given_counter, nonce + nonce_len - sizeof(given_counter),
|
|
sizeof(given_counter));
|
|
given_counter = CRYPTO_bswap8(given_counter);
|
|
if (given_counter == UINT64_MAX ||
|
|
given_counter < gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce = given_counter + 1;
|
|
|
|
return aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len,
|
|
max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in,
|
|
in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls12) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
|
|
|
|
out->key_len = 16;
|
|
out->nonce_len = 12;
|
|
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
|
|
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
|
|
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
|
|
|
|
out->init = aead_aes_gcm_tls12_init;
|
|
out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
|
|
out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter;
|
|
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls12) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
|
|
|
|
out->key_len = 32;
|
|
out->nonce_len = 12;
|
|
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
|
|
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
|
|
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
|
|
|
|
out->init = aead_aes_gcm_tls12_init;
|
|
out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
|
|
out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter;
|
|
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx {
|
|
struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx gcm_ctx;
|
|
uint64_t min_next_nonce;
|
|
uint64_t mask;
|
|
uint8_t first;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
|
|
sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx),
|
|
"AEAD state is too small");
|
|
#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
|
|
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
|
|
alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx),
|
|
"AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
|
|
size_t key_len, size_t requested_tag_len) {
|
|
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *gcm_ctx =
|
|
(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *) &ctx->state;
|
|
|
|
gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce = 0;
|
|
gcm_ctx->first = 1;
|
|
|
|
size_t actual_tag_len;
|
|
if (!aead_aes_gcm_init_impl(&gcm_ctx->gcm_ctx, &actual_tag_len, key, key_len,
|
|
requested_tag_len)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->tag_len = actual_tag_len;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter(
|
|
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
|
|
size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
|
|
size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
|
|
size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
|
|
struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *gcm_ctx =
|
|
(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *) &ctx->state;
|
|
|
|
if (nonce_len != 12) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The given nonces must be strictly monotonically increasing. See
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-5.3 for details of the TLS 1.3
|
|
// nonce construction.
|
|
uint64_t given_counter;
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(&given_counter, nonce + nonce_len - sizeof(given_counter),
|
|
sizeof(given_counter));
|
|
given_counter = CRYPTO_bswap8(given_counter);
|
|
|
|
if (gcm_ctx->first) {
|
|
// In the first call the sequence number will be zero and therefore the
|
|
// given nonce will be 0 ^ mask = mask.
|
|
gcm_ctx->mask = given_counter;
|
|
gcm_ctx->first = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
given_counter ^= gcm_ctx->mask;
|
|
|
|
if (given_counter == UINT64_MAX ||
|
|
given_counter < gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce = given_counter + 1;
|
|
|
|
return aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len,
|
|
max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in,
|
|
in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls13) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
|
|
|
|
out->key_len = 16;
|
|
out->nonce_len = 12;
|
|
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
|
|
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
|
|
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
|
|
|
|
out->init = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_init;
|
|
out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
|
|
out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter;
|
|
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls13) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
|
|
|
|
out->key_len = 32;
|
|
out->nonce_len = 12;
|
|
out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
|
|
out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
|
|
out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
|
|
|
|
out->init = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_init;
|
|
out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
|
|
out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter;
|
|
out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_has_aes_hardware(void) {
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
|
|
return hwaes_capable() && crypto_gcm_clmul_enabled();
|
|
#elif defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
|
|
return hwaes_capable() && CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_PMULL_capable();
|
|
#else
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))
|