38feb990a1
This removes a sharp corner in the API where |ECDH_compute_key| assumed that callers were either using ephemeral keys, or else had already checked that the public key was on the curve. A public key that's not on the curve can be in a small subgroup and thus the result can leak information about the private key. This change causes |EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp| to require that points are on the curve. |EC_POINT_oct2point| already does this. Change-Id: I77d10ce117b6efd87ebb4a631be3a9630f5e6636 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5861 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> |
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openssl |