81a5df4d60
The EC_POINT munging is sufficiently heavy on the goto err that I went ahead and tidied it up. Bug: 132 Change-Id: I7a3b3b3f166e39e4559acec834dd8e1ea9ac8620 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17747 Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
343 lines
9.9 KiB
C++
343 lines
9.9 KiB
C++
/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
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#include <openssl/ec.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/nid.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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/* |EC_POINT| implementation. */
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static void ssl_ec_point_cleanup(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx) {
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BIGNUM *private_key = (BIGNUM *)ctx->data;
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BN_clear_free(private_key);
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}
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static int ssl_ec_point_offer(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, CBB *out) {
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/* Set up a shared |BN_CTX| for all operations. */
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bssl::UniquePtr<BN_CTX> bn_ctx(BN_CTX_new());
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if (!bn_ctx) {
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return 0;
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}
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bssl::BN_CTXScope scope(bn_ctx.get());
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/* Generate a private key. */
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bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(ctx->method->nid));
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bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> private_key(BN_new());
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if (!group || !private_key ||
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!BN_rand_range_ex(private_key.get(), 1,
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EC_GROUP_get0_order(group.get()))) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* Compute the corresponding public key and serialize it. */
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bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> public_key(EC_POINT_new(group.get()));
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if (!public_key ||
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!EC_POINT_mul(group.get(), public_key.get(), private_key.get(), NULL,
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NULL, bn_ctx.get()) ||
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!EC_POINT_point2cbb(out, group.get(), public_key.get(),
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POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, bn_ctx.get())) {
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return 0;
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}
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assert(ctx->data == NULL);
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ctx->data = private_key.release();
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return 1;
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}
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static int ssl_ec_point_finish(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t **out_secret,
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size_t *out_secret_len, uint8_t *out_alert,
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const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_len) {
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BIGNUM *private_key = (BIGNUM *)ctx->data;
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assert(private_key != NULL);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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/* Set up a shared |BN_CTX| for all operations. */
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bssl::UniquePtr<BN_CTX> bn_ctx(BN_CTX_new());
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if (!bn_ctx) {
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return 0;
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}
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bssl::BN_CTXScope scope(bn_ctx.get());
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bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(ctx->method->nid));
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if (!group) {
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return 0;
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}
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bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> peer_point(EC_POINT_new(group.get()));
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bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> result(EC_POINT_new(group.get()));
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BIGNUM *x = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx.get());
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if (!peer_point || !result || !x) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group.get(), peer_point.get(), peer_key, peer_key_len,
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bn_ctx.get())) {
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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return 0;
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}
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/* Compute the x-coordinate of |peer_key| * |private_key|. */
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if (!EC_POINT_mul(group.get(), result.get(), NULL, peer_point.get(),
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private_key, bn_ctx.get()) ||
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!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group.get(), result.get(), x, NULL,
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bn_ctx.get())) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* Encode the x-coordinate left-padded with zeros. */
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size_t secret_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group.get()) + 7) / 8;
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bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> secret((uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(secret_len));
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if (!secret || !BN_bn2bin_padded(secret.get(), secret_len, x)) {
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return 0;
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}
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*out_secret = secret.release();
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*out_secret_len = secret_len;
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return 1;
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}
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static int ssl_ec_point_accept(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, CBB *out_public_key,
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uint8_t **out_secret, size_t *out_secret_len,
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uint8_t *out_alert, const uint8_t *peer_key,
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size_t peer_key_len) {
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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if (!ssl_ec_point_offer(ctx, out_public_key) ||
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!ssl_ec_point_finish(ctx, out_secret, out_secret_len, out_alert, peer_key,
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peer_key_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/* X25119 implementation. */
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static void ssl_x25519_cleanup(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx) {
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if (ctx->data == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->data, 32);
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OPENSSL_free(ctx->data);
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}
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static int ssl_x25519_offer(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, CBB *out) {
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assert(ctx->data == NULL);
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ctx->data = OPENSSL_malloc(32);
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if (ctx->data == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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uint8_t public_key[32];
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X25519_keypair(public_key, (uint8_t *)ctx->data);
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return CBB_add_bytes(out, public_key, sizeof(public_key));
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}
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static int ssl_x25519_finish(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t **out_secret,
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size_t *out_secret_len, uint8_t *out_alert,
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const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_len) {
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assert(ctx->data != NULL);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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uint8_t *secret = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(32);
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if (secret == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (peer_key_len != 32 ||
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!X25519(secret, (uint8_t *)ctx->data, peer_key)) {
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OPENSSL_free(secret);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
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return 0;
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}
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*out_secret = secret;
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*out_secret_len = 32;
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return 1;
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}
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static int ssl_x25519_accept(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, CBB *out_public_key,
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uint8_t **out_secret, size_t *out_secret_len,
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uint8_t *out_alert, const uint8_t *peer_key,
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size_t peer_key_len) {
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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if (!ssl_x25519_offer(ctx, out_public_key) ||
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!ssl_x25519_finish(ctx, out_secret, out_secret_len, out_alert, peer_key,
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peer_key_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static const SSL_ECDH_METHOD kMethods[] = {
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{
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NID_secp224r1,
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SSL_CURVE_SECP224R1,
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"P-224",
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ssl_ec_point_cleanup,
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ssl_ec_point_offer,
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ssl_ec_point_accept,
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ssl_ec_point_finish,
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},
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{
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NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
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SSL_CURVE_SECP256R1,
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"P-256",
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ssl_ec_point_cleanup,
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ssl_ec_point_offer,
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ssl_ec_point_accept,
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ssl_ec_point_finish,
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},
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{
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NID_secp384r1,
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SSL_CURVE_SECP384R1,
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"P-384",
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ssl_ec_point_cleanup,
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ssl_ec_point_offer,
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ssl_ec_point_accept,
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ssl_ec_point_finish,
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},
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{
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NID_secp521r1,
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SSL_CURVE_SECP521R1,
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"P-521",
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ssl_ec_point_cleanup,
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ssl_ec_point_offer,
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ssl_ec_point_accept,
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ssl_ec_point_finish,
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},
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{
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NID_X25519,
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SSL_CURVE_X25519,
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"X25519",
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ssl_x25519_cleanup,
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ssl_x25519_offer,
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ssl_x25519_accept,
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ssl_x25519_finish,
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},
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};
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static const SSL_ECDH_METHOD *method_from_group_id(uint16_t group_id) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kMethods); i++) {
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if (kMethods[i].group_id == group_id) {
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return &kMethods[i];
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}
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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static const SSL_ECDH_METHOD *method_from_nid(int nid) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kMethods); i++) {
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if (kMethods[i].nid == nid) {
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return &kMethods[i];
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}
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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static const SSL_ECDH_METHOD *method_from_name(const char *name, size_t len) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kMethods); i++) {
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if (len == strlen(kMethods[i].name) &&
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!strncmp(kMethods[i].name, name, len)) {
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return &kMethods[i];
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}
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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const char* SSL_get_curve_name(uint16_t group_id) {
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const SSL_ECDH_METHOD *method = method_from_group_id(group_id);
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if (method == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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return method->name;
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}
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int ssl_nid_to_group_id(uint16_t *out_group_id, int nid) {
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const SSL_ECDH_METHOD *method = method_from_nid(nid);
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if (method == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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*out_group_id = method->group_id;
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return 1;
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}
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int ssl_name_to_group_id(uint16_t *out_group_id, const char *name, size_t len) {
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const SSL_ECDH_METHOD *method = method_from_name(name, len);
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if (method == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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*out_group_id = method->group_id;
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return 1;
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}
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int SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id) {
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SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
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const SSL_ECDH_METHOD *method = method_from_group_id(group_id);
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if (method == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
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return 0;
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}
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ctx->method = method;
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return 1;
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}
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void SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx) {
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if (ctx->method == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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ctx->method->cleanup(ctx);
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ctx->method = NULL;
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ctx->data = NULL;
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}
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uint16_t SSL_ECDH_CTX_get_id(const SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx) {
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return ctx->method->group_id;
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}
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int SSL_ECDH_CTX_offer(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, CBB *out_public_key) {
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return ctx->method->offer(ctx, out_public_key);
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}
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int SSL_ECDH_CTX_accept(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, CBB *out_public_key,
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uint8_t **out_secret, size_t *out_secret_len,
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uint8_t *out_alert, const uint8_t *peer_key,
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size_t peer_key_len) {
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return ctx->method->accept(ctx, out_public_key, out_secret, out_secret_len,
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out_alert, peer_key, peer_key_len);
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}
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int SSL_ECDH_CTX_finish(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t **out_secret,
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size_t *out_secret_len, uint8_t *out_alert,
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const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_len) {
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return ctx->method->finish(ctx, out_secret, out_secret_len, out_alert,
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peer_key, peer_key_len);
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}
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