boringssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
David Benjamin b85a4c2923 Remove unnecessary NULL initializations in ssl_cert_dup.
A casual grep would suggest this function has the same problems as
CVE-2015-0291, but the structure is memset to 0, so the calls are unnecessary.
Also use BUF_memdup rather than an OPENSSL_malloc + mempcy pair.

Change-Id: Id605374d99cff32e2dccb7f9b8a9da226faf7715
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4051
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-03-19 19:52:57 +00:00

1047 lines
27 KiB
C

/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
#include "../crypto/directory.h"
#include "ssl_locl.h"
int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) {
static int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
int got_write_lock = 0;
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
got_write_lock = 1;
if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
0, "SSL for verify callback", NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
}
if (got_write_lock) {
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
} else {
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
}
return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
}
CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) {
CERT *ret;
ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
ret->key = &ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC];
return ret;
}
CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) {
CERT *ret;
int i;
ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
/* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), if you find that
* more readable */
ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key) {
BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
if (!b) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
}
if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key) {
BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
if (!b) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
}
}
ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
if (cert->ecdh_tmp) {
ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto;
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->x509 != NULL) {
rpk->x509 = X509_up_ref(cpk->x509);
}
if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
rpk->privatekey = EVP_PKEY_dup(cpk->privatekey);
}
if (cpk->chain) {
rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
if (!rpk->chain) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
}
/* Copy over signature algorithm configuration. */
if (cert->conf_sigalgs) {
ret->conf_sigalgs = BUF_memdup(cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen);
if (!ret->conf_sigalgs) {
goto err;
}
ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
}
if (cert->client_sigalgs) {
ret->client_sigalgs = BUF_memdup(cert->client_sigalgs,
cert->client_sigalgslen);
if (!ret->client_sigalgs) {
goto err;
}
ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen;
}
/* Copy any custom client certificate types */
if (cert->client_certificate_types) {
ret->client_certificate_types = BUF_memdup(
cert->client_certificate_types, cert->num_client_certificate_types);
if (!ret->client_certificate_types) {
goto err;
}
ret->num_client_certificate_types = cert->num_client_certificate_types;
}
ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
if (cert->verify_store) {
CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
}
if (cert->chain_store) {
CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
}
return ret;
err:
ssl_cert_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c) {
int i;
if (c == NULL) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->x509) {
X509_free(cpk->x509);
cpk->x509 = NULL;
}
if (cpk->privatekey) {
EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
cpk->privatekey = NULL;
}
if (cpk->chain) {
sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
cpk->chain = NULL;
}
}
}
void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) {
if (c == NULL) {
return;
}
if (c->dh_tmp) {
DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
}
if (c->ecdh_tmp) {
EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
}
ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
if (c->peer_sigalgs) {
OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
}
if (c->conf_sigalgs) {
OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
}
if (c->client_sigalgs) {
OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
}
if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
}
if (c->client_certificate_types) {
OPENSSL_free(c->client_certificate_types);
}
if (c->verify_store) {
X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
}
if (c->chain_store) {
X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
}
if (c->ciphers_raw) {
OPENSSL_free(c->ciphers_raw);
}
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) * chain) {
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
if (!cpk) {
return 0;
}
if (cpk->chain) {
sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
}
cpk->chain = chain;
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) * chain) {
STACK_OF(X509) * dchain;
if (!chain) {
return ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, NULL);
}
dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
if (!dchain) {
return 0;
}
if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, dchain)) {
sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) {
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
if (!cpk) {
return 0;
}
if (!cpk->chain) {
cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
}
if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) {
if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(c, x)) {
return 0;
}
X509_up_ref(x);
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x) {
int i;
if (x == NULL) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == x) {
c->key = &c->pkeys[i];
return 1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
if (c->pkeys[i].x509 && !X509_cmp(c->pkeys[i].x509, x)) {
c->key = &c->pkeys[i];
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) {
c->cert_cb = cb;
c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
}
SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void) {
SESS_CERT *ret;
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
if (ret == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_sess_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof *ret);
ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
return ret;
}
void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc) {
int i;
if (sc == NULL) {
return;
}
if (sc->cert_chain != NULL) {
sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
}
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) {
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
}
}
if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) {
DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
}
if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
}
OPENSSL_free(sc);
}
int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc, int type) {
sc->peer_cert_type = type;
return 1;
}
int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) * sk) {
X509 *x;
int i;
X509_STORE *verify_store;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
if (s->cert->verify_store) {
verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
} else {
verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
}
if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_num(sk) == 0) {
return 0;
}
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_verify_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return 0;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
/* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by the
* context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or vice
* versa. */
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
/* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. */
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
if (s->verify_callback) {
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
}
if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) {
i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
} else {
i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
}
s->verify_result = ctx.error;
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return i;
}
static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * *ca_list,
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * name_list) {
if (*ca_list != NULL) {
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
}
*ca_list = name_list;
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * sk) {
size_t i;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * ret;
X509_NAME *name;
ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i));
if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
return NULL;
}
}
return ret;
}
void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * name_list) {
set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * name_list) {
set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list);
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->client_CA;
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s) {
if (s->server) {
if (s->client_CA != NULL) {
return s->client_CA;
} else {
return s->ctx->client_CA;
}
} else {
if ((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && s->s3 != NULL) {
return s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
} else {
return NULL;
}
}
}
static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * *sk, X509 *x) {
X509_NAME *name;
if (x == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (*sk == NULL) {
*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
if (*sk == NULL) {
return 0;
}
}
name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x));
if (name == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
X509_NAME_free(name);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) {
return add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x);
}
int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
return add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x);
}
static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) {
return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
}
/* Load CA certs from a file into a STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
* it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
* for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
* much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
*
* \param file the file containing one or more certs.
* \return a ::STACK containing the certs. */
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) {
BIO *in;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL, *sk;
sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (sk == NULL || in == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_load_client_CA_file, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) {
goto err;
}
for (;;) {
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL) {
break;
}
if (ret == NULL) {
ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
if (ret == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_load_client_CA_file, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
if (xn == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* check for duplicates */
xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, NULL, xn)) {
X509_NAME_free(xn);
} else {
sk_X509_NAME_push(sk, xn);
sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn);
}
}
if (0) {
err:
if (ret != NULL) {
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
}
ret = NULL;
}
if (sk != NULL) {
sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
}
if (in != NULL) {
BIO_free(in);
}
if (x != NULL) {
X509_free(x);
}
if (ret != NULL) {
ERR_clear_error();
}
return ret;
}
/* Add a file of certs to a stack.
*
* \param stack the stack to add to.
* \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
* already in the stack will be added.
* \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
* certs may have been added to \c stack. */
int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * stack,
const char *file) {
BIO *in;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
int ret = 1;
int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b);
oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_cmp);
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) {
goto err;
}
for (;;) {
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL) {
break;
}
xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
if (xn == NULL) {
goto err;
}
xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, NULL, xn)) {
X509_NAME_free(xn);
} else {
sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn);
}
}
ERR_clear_error();
if (0) {
err:
ret = 0;
}
if (in != NULL) {
BIO_free(in);
}
if (x != NULL) {
X509_free(x);
}
(void) sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
return ret;
}
/* Add a directory of certs to a stack.
*
* \param stack the stack to append to.
* \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
* examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
* SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will
* be included.
* \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
* certs may have been added to \c stack. */
int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * stack,
const char *dir) {
OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
const char *filename;
int ret = 0;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
/* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
char buf[1024];
int r;
if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof(buf)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack,
SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", dir, filename);
if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf) ||
!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (errno) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (d) {
OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
}
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
return ret;
}
/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */
static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) {
int n;
uint8_t *p;
n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_to_buf, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
p = (uint8_t *)&(buf->data[*l]);
l2n3(n, p);
i2d_X509(x, &p);
*l += n + 3;
return 1;
}
/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM structure. */
int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) {
BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
int no_chain = 0;
size_t i;
X509 *x = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) * extra_certs;
X509_STORE *chain_store;
if (cpk) {
x = cpk->x509;
}
if (s->cert->chain_store) {
chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
} else {
chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
}
/* If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. */
if (cpk && cpk->chain) {
extra_certs = cpk->chain;
} else {
extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
}
if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) {
no_chain = 1;
}
/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert. */
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_chain, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (x != NULL) {
if (no_chain) {
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
return 0;
}
} else {
X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return 0;
}
X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
ERR_clear_error();
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
return 0;
}
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */
int ssl_build_cert_chain(CERT *c, X509_STORE *chain_store, int flags) {
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
X509 *x;
int i, rv = 0;
unsigned long error;
if (!cpk->x509) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
goto err;
}
/* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) {
size_t j;
chain_store = X509_STORE_new();
if (!chain_store) {
goto err;
}
for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); j++) {
x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, j);
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) {
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) {
goto err;
}
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
/* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509)) {
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) {
goto err;
}
ERR_clear_error();
}
} else {
if (c->chain_store) {
chain_store = c->chain_store;
}
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED) {
untrusted = cpk->chain;
}
}
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto err;
}
i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) {
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR) {
ERR_clear_error();
}
i = 1;
rv = 2;
}
if (i > 0) {
chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx);
}
if (i <= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&xs_ctx);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
goto err;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
if (cpk->chain) {
sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
}
/* Remove EE certificate from chain */
x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
X509_free(x);
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT) {
if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
/* See if last cert is self signed */
x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) {
x = sk_X509_pop(chain);
X509_free(x);
}
}
}
cpk->chain = chain;
if (rv == 0) {
rv = 1;
}
err:
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) {
X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
}
return rv;
}
int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref) {
X509_STORE **pstore;
if (chain) {
pstore = &c->chain_store;
} else {
pstore = &c->verify_store;
}
if (*pstore) {
X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
}
*pstore = store;
if (ref && store) {
CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
}
return 1;
}