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457112e197
boringssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
David Benjamin 457112e197 unifdef a bunch of OPENSSL_NO_* ifdefs. 
Get all this stuff out of the way.

- OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- OPENSSL_NO_EC
- OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- OPENSSL_NO_DH
- OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- OPENSSL_NO_RC4
- OPENSSL_NO_RSA

Also manually removed a couple instances of OPENSSL_NO_DSA that seemed to be
confused anyway. Did some minor manual cleanup. (Removed a few now-pointless
'if (0)'s.)

Change-Id: Id540ba97ee22ff2309ab20ceb24c7eabe766d4c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1662
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-28 00:41:34 +00:00

2707 lines
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/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_client_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ssl3_connect,
ssl3_get_client_method)
int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
ERR_clear_error();
ERR_clear_system_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch(s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate=1;
s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
/* break */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
s->server=0;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_connect, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
{
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
buf=NULL;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
/* setup buffing BIO */
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_send_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
{
/* receive renewed session ticket */
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
}
}
else
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
}
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* at this point we check that we have the
* required stuff from the server */
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
* of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
}
else
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
ret=ssl3_send_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
s->init_num=0;
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B:
ret=ssl3_send_channel_id(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
/* clear flags */
s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
if (s->hit)
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
}
else
{
/* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it
* involves ChannelID, then record the
* handshake hashes at this point in the
* session so that any resumption of this
* session with ChannelID can sign those
* hashes. */
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
{
ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH)
&& ssl3_can_cutthrough(s)
&& s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 /* no cutthrough on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine) */
)
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
}
else
{
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
}
}
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE:
/* At this point, the next message must be entirely
* behind a ChangeCipherSpec. */
if (!ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(s))
{
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
else
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE:
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
ret = 1;
goto end;
/* break; */
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (s->init_buf != NULL)
{
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
}
/* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
* remove the buffering now */
if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
s->init_num=0;
s->renegotiate=0;
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
ret=1;
/* s->server=0; */
s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_connect, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
/* did we do anything */
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
if (s->debug)
{
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
skip=0;
}
end:
s->in_handshake--;
if (buf != NULL)
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i;
unsigned long l;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
if (sess == NULL ||
sess->ssl_version != s->version ||
!sess->session_id_length ||
sess->not_resumable)
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
goto err;
}
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
{
/* Determine which DTLS version to use */
int options = s->options;
/* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)
{
/* Disabling all versions is silly: return an
* error.
*/
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
goto err;
}
/* Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2
* features.
*/
s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
}
else
{
/* We only support one version: update method */
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
}
s->client_version = s->version;
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p=s->s3->client_random;
/* If resending the ClientHello in DTLS after a
* HelloVerifyRequest, don't renegerate the client_random. The
* random must be reused. */
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !s->d1->send_cookie)
{
ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
}
/* Do the message type and length last.
* Note: the final argument to ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext below
* depends on the size of this prefix. */
d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
/* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
* 1.0.
*
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
* 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
* containing version 1.0.
*
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*/
#if 0
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
s->client_version=s->version;
#else
*(p++)=s->client_version>>8;
*(p++)=s->client_version&0xff;
#endif
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* Session ID */
if (s->new_session)
i=0;
else
i=s->session->session_id_length;
*(p++)=i;
if (i != 0)
{
if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
p+=i;
}
/* cookie stuff for DTLS */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
if ( s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
p += s->d1->cookie_len;
}
/* Ciphers supported */
i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &p[2]);
if (i == 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
goto err;
}
s2n(i,p);
p+=i;
/* COMPRESSION */
*(p++)=1;
*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
/* TLS extensions*/
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_hello, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, p-buf)) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
l= p-d;
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
CERT *ct = s->cert;
int al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ok;
long n;
CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id;
uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite;
uint8_t compression_method;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO,
20000, /* ?? */
SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
CBS_init(&server_hello, s->init_msg, n);
if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_version) ||
!CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) ||
CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) ||
!CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method))
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
{
/* Work out correct protocol version to use */
int options = s->options;
if (server_version == DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
else if (server_version == DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
else
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version = server_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->version = s->client_version = s->method->version;
}
if (server_version != s->version)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | (server_version & 0xff);
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
/* Copy over the server random. */
memcpy(s->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
s->hit = 0;
/* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length,
NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
{
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher :
ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
s->hit = 1;
}
}
if (!s->hit && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0 &&
CBS_mem_equal(&session_id,
s->session->session_id, s->session->session_id_length))
{
if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length))
{
/* actually a client application bug */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 1;
}
/* a miss or crap from the other end */
if (!s->hit)
{
/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
* SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
{
goto f_err;
}
}
/* Note: session_id could be empty. */
s->session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
memcpy(s->session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), CBS_len(&session_id));
}
c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
if (c == NULL)
{
/* unknown cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello,
* so return an error.
*/
if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl ||
c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k ||
c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, NULL, c))
{
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
{
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
/* Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for
* client authentication.
*/
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto f_err;
/* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */
if (compression_method != 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* TLS extensions */
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &server_hello))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
/* There should be nothing left over in the record. */
if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0)
{
/* wrong packet length */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
unsigned long n;
X509 *x=NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
CBS cbs, certificate_list;
const uint8_t* data;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE,
s->max_cert_list,
SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n);
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_list) ||
CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0)
{
CBS certificate;
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate))
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
data = CBS_data(&certificate);
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&certificate));
if (x == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (!CBS_skip(&certificate, data - CBS_data(&certificate)))
{
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (CBS_len(&certificate) != 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x=NULL;
}
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
)
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (sc == NULL) goto err;
if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
s->session->sess_cert=sc;
sc->cert_chain=sk;
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
* certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
sk=NULL;
/* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
if ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
if (i < 0)
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx)
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
/* Why would the following ever happen?
* We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = X509_up_ref(x);
sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer = X509_up_ref(x);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x=NULL;
ret=1;
if (0)
{
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
int al,ok;
long n,alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
RSA *rsa=NULL;
DH *dh=NULL;
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
CBS server_key_exchange, server_key_exchange_orig, parameter;
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return -1;
}
/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
later.*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)
{
/* PSK ciphersuites that also send a
* Certificate would have already initialized
* |sess_cert|. */
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
}
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
/* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature
* over. */
CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, s->init_msg, n);
server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
{
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
{
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
{
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
{
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
}
}
else
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
{
CBS psk_identity_hint;
/* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a
* psk_identity_hint. */
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &psk_identity_hint))
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
* ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum
* length of a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum
* length of a PSK identity. Also do not allow NULL
* characters; identities are saved as C strings.
*
* TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint
* rather than a specific identity. */
if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint))
{
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
/* Save the identity hint as a C string. */
if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &s->session->psk_identity_hint))
{
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
CBS rsa_modulus, rsa_exponent;
/* TODO(davidben): This was originally for export
* reasons. Do we still need to support it? */
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &rsa_modulus) ||
CBS_len(&rsa_modulus) == 0 ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &rsa_exponent) ||
CBS_len(&rsa_exponent) == 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&rsa_modulus),
CBS_len(&rsa_modulus), rsa->n)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&rsa_exponent),
CBS_len(&rsa_exponent), rsa->e)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
rsa=NULL;
}
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
{
CBS dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_p) ||
CBS_len(&dh_p) == 0 ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_g) ||
CBS_len(&dh_g) == 0 ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_Ys) ||
CBS_len(&dh_Ys) == 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_p), CBS_len(&dh_p), NULL)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_g), CBS_len(&dh_g), NULL)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Ys), CBS_len(&dh_Ys), NULL)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (DH_size(dh) < 512/8)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
dh=NULL;
}
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
{
uint16_t curve_id;
int curve_nid = 0;
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
CBS point;
/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's
* ephemeral ECDH public key. Check curve is one of
* our preferences, if not server has sent an invalid
* curve.
*/
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, &server_key_exchange, &curve_id))
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(curve_id)) == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point))
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
CBS_data(&point), CBS_len(&point), bn_ctx))
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
* the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
* key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
ecdh=NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
}
else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
/* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the
* signature, if any, while |server_key_exchange_orig|
* contains the entire message. From that, derive a CBS
* containing just the parameter. */
CBS_init(&parameter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig),
CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) -
CBS_len(&server_key_exchange));
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
CBS signature;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, &al, s, &server_key_exchange, pkey))
goto f_err;
}
else
md = EVP_sha1();
/* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the
* signature. */
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) ||
CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
int num;
unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
size_t md_len = 0;
q=md_buf;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
unsigned int digest_len;
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
(num == 2) ? EVP_md5() : EVP_sha1(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&parameter), CBS_len(&parameter));
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &digest_len);
q += digest_len;
md_len += digest_len;
}
if (!RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, md_len,
CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature),
pkey->pkey.rsa))
{
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
{
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&parameter), CBS_len(&parameter));
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), pkey) <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
else
{
if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
if (dh != NULL)
DH_free(dh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
if (ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
}
int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
int ok,ret=0;
unsigned long n;
unsigned int i;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL;
CBS cbs;
CBS certificate_types;
CBS certificate_authorities;
const uint8_t *data;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
/* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records
* as we wont be doing client auth.
*/
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
{
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
}
return(1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
{
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
}
CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n);
ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
if (ca_sk == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* get the certificate types */
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types))
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types,
&s->s3->tmp.certificate_types,
&s->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types))
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms))
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
}
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms))
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_authorities))
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
while (CBS_len(&certificate_authorities) > 0)
{
CBS distinguished_name;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_authorities, &distinguished_name))
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
data = CBS_data(&distinguished_name);
if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&distinguished_name))) == NULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_skip(&distinguished_name, data - CBS_data(&distinguished_name)))
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (CBS_len(&distinguished_name) != 0)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1;
if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk;
ca_sk=NULL;
ret=1;
err:
if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free);
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{
int ok,al,ret=0;
long n;
CBS new_session_ticket, ticket;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET,
16384,
SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
&ok);
if (!ok)
return((int)n);
CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, s->init_msg, n);
if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) ||
CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_new_session_ticket, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick, &s->session->tlsext_ticklen))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_new_session_ticket, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
* One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
* must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
* client session ID matching to work and we know much
* earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
*
* The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
* ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
* session resumption.
*
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with
* assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
* to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
* ticket.
*/
EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket),
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
ret=1;
return(ret);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al;
long n;
CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response;
uint8_t status_type;
size_t resplen;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS,
16384,
SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
CBS_init(&certificate_status, s->init_msg, n);
if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) ||
status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp ||
!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) ||
CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 ||
CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
/* TODO(davidben): Make tlsext_ocsp_resplen a
* size_t. Currently it uses -1 to signal no response. The
* spec does not allow ocsp_response to be zero-length, so
* using 0 should be fine. */
if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, &resplen))
{
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
{
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
goto f_err;
}
if (ret < 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
{
int ok,ret=0;
long n;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */
SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (n > 0)
{
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_done, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return -1;
}
ret=1;
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
int n = 0;
unsigned long alg_k;
unsigned long alg_a;
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
unsigned int psk_len = 0;
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
{
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
size_t identity_len;
unsigned char *t = NULL;
unsigned char pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0;
int psk_err = 1;
n = 0;
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
goto err;
}
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
identity, sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
}
else if (psk_len == 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
identity_len = OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity));
if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
}
if (!(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH))
{
/* Create the shared secret now if we're not using ECDHE-PSK.
* TODO(davidben): Refactor this logic similarly
* to ssl3_get_client_key_exchange. */
pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
t = pre_ms;
s2n(psk_len, t);
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
t+=psk_len;
s2n(psk_len, t);
memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
s2n(identity_len, p);
memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
n = 2 + identity_len;
}
if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, sizeof(pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else
{
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
goto err;
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
q=p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p+=2;
n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (n <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
{
s2n(n,q);
n+=2;
}
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
}
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
{
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
if (scert == NULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
dh_srvr=scert->peer_dh_tmp;
/* generate a new random key */
if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
* make sure to clear it out afterwards */
n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
if (n <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,p,n);
/* clean up */
memset(p,0,n);
/* send off the data */
n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
s2n(n,p);
BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
n+=2;
DH_free(dh_clnt);
/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
}
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
{
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
EC_KEY *tkey;
int field_size = 0;
unsigned char *pre_ms;
unsigned char *t;
unsigned int pre_ms_len;
unsigned int i;
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
* make sure to clear it out afterwards
*/
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
if (field_size <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
if (n <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
{
pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+n;
pre_ms = OPENSSL_malloc(pre_ms_len);
if (pre_ms == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
memset(pre_ms, 0, pre_ms_len);
t = pre_ms;
s2n(psk_len, t);
memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
t += psk_len;
s2n(n, t);
memcpy(t, p, n);
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-> generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
OPENSSL_free(pre_ms);
}
if (!(alg_a & SSL_aPSK))
{
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-> generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, p, n);
}
memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
/* First check the size of encoding and
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
encoded_pt_len =
EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len *
sizeof(unsigned char));
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) ||
(bn_ctx == NULL))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key */
encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
n = 0;
if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
{
i = strlen(s->session->psk_identity);
s2n(i, p);
memcpy(p, s->session->psk_identity, i);
p += i;
n = i + 2;
}
*p = encoded_pt_len; /* length of encoded point */
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
n += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len);
/* increment n to account for length field */
n += encoded_pt_len;
/* Free allocated memory */
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
}
else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK) || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && !(alg_a & SSL_aPSK)))
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf, *p;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t digest_length;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
size_t signature_length = 0;
unsigned long n = 0;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
{
p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* Write out the digest type if needbe. */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
md = s->cert->key->digest;
if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_cert_verify, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
n += 2;
}
/* Compute the digest. */
if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(s, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey))
goto err;
/* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary. */
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
/* Sign the digest. */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL)
goto err;
/* Initialize the EVP_PKEY_CTX and determine the size of the signature. */
if (!EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) ||
!EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, NULL, &signature_length,
digest, digest_length))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_cert_verify, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (p + 2 + signature_length > buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_cert_verify, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, &p[2], &signature_length,
digest, digest_length))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_cert_verify, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(signature_length, p);
n += signature_length + 2;
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return(-1);
}
/* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently
* check the cert exists and if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2.
*/
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
return 0;
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
return 0;
/* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it.
*/
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
return 0;
return 1;
}
int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
X509 *x509=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
int i;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
{
/* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
if (s->cert->cert_cb)
{
i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (i < 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return -1;
}
if (i == 0)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
}
if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
}
/* We need to get a client cert */
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
{
/* If we get an error, we need to
* ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
* We then get retried later */
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
if (i < 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return(-1);
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
i=0;
}
else if (i == 1)
{
i=0;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_certificate, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
i = 0;
if (i == 0)
{
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
return(1);
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
}
}
/* Ok, we have a cert */
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
}
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key);
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i,idx;
long alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
RSA *rsa;
DH *dh;
/* we don't have a certificate */
if (!ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
return 1;
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
sc=s->session->sess_cert;
if (sc == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
/* This is the passed certificate */
idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
{
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
s) == 0)
{ /* check failed */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
else
{
return 1;
}
}
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
err:
return(0);
}
int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int len, padding_len;
unsigned char *d;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A)
{
len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
d[4] = len;
memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
d[5 + len] = padding_len;
memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
s->init_off = 0;
}
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
}
int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *d;
int ret = -1, public_key_len;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
size_t sig_len;
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
unsigned char *public_key = NULL, *derp, *der_sig = NULL;
if (s->state != SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A)
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private && s->ctx->channel_id_cb)
{
EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
s->ctx->channel_id_cb(s, &key);
if (key != NULL)
{
s->tlsext_channel_id_private = key;
}
}
if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
return (-1);
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
l2n3(2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d);
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, d);
else
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, d);
s2n(TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
public_key_len = i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, NULL);
if (public_key_len <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY);
goto err;
}
/* i2d_PublicKey will produce an ANSI X9.62 public key which, for a
* P-256 key, is 0x04 (meaning uncompressed) followed by the x and y
* field elements as 32-byte, big-endian numbers. */
if (public_key_len != 65)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
goto err;
}
public_key = OPENSSL_malloc(public_key_len);
if (!public_key)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
derp = public_key;
i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, &derp);
if (EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL,
s->tlsext_channel_id_private) != 1)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &sig_len))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
goto err;
}
der_sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len);
if (!der_sig)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, der_sig, &sig_len))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
goto err;
}
derp = der_sig;
sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, (const unsigned char**) &derp, sig_len);
if (sig == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG);
goto err;
}
/* The first byte of public_key will be 0x4, denoting an uncompressed key. */
memcpy(d, public_key + 1, 64);
d += 64;
memset(d, 0, 2 * 32);
BN_bn2bin(sig->r, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
d += 32;
BN_bn2bin(sig->s, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
d += 32;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B;
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE;
s->init_off = 0;
ret = ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
if (public_key)
OPENSSL_free(public_key);
if (der_sig)
OPENSSL_free(der_sig);
if (sig)
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
return ret;
}
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
int i = 0;
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey);
return i;
}
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