boringssl/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesccm.c
David Benjamin 33f456b8b0 Don't use bsaes over vpaes for CTR-DRBG.
RAND_bytes rarely uses large enough inputs for bsaes to be worth it.
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/33589 includes some
rough benchmarks of various bits here. Some observations:

- 8 blocks of bsaes costs roughly 6.5 blocks of vpaes. Note the comparison
  isn't quite accurate because I'm measuring bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks against
  vpaes_encrypt and vpaes in CTR mode today must make do with a C loop. Even
  assuming a cutoff of 6 rather than 7 blocks, it's rare to ask for 96 bytes
  of entropy at a time.

- CTR-DRBG performs some stray block operations (ctr_drbg_update), which bsaes
  is bad at without extra work to fold them into the CTR loop (not really worth
  it).

- CTR-DRBG calculates a couple new key schedules every RAND_bytes call. We
  don't currently have a constant-time bsaes key schedule. Unfortunately, even
  plain vpaes loses to the current aes_nohw used by bsaes, but it's not
  constant-time. Also taking CTR-DRBG out of the bsaes equation

- Machines without AES hardware (clients) are not going to be RNG-bound. It's
  mostly servers pushing way too many CBC IVs that care. This means bsaes's
  current side channel tradeoffs make even less sense here.

I'm not sure yet what we should do for the rest of the bsaes mess, but it seems
clear that we want to stick with vpaes for the RNG.

Bug: 256
Change-Id: Iec8f13af232794afd007cb1065913e8117eeee24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/34744
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2019-02-01 18:03:39 +00:00

207 lines
6.4 KiB
C

/* Copyright (c) 2018, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <openssl/aead.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/cipher.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
#define EVP_AEAD_AES_CCM_MAX_TAG_LEN 16
struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx {
union {
double align;
AES_KEY ks;
} ks;
CCM128_CONTEXT ccm;
};
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
sizeof(struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx),
"AEAD state is too small");
#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
alignof(struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx),
"AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
#endif
static int aead_aes_ccm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, unsigned M,
unsigned L) {
assert(M == EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead));
assert(M == EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(ctx->aead));
assert(15 - L == EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead));
if (key_len != EVP_AEAD_key_length(ctx->aead)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
return 0; // EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this.
}
if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
tag_len = M;
}
if (tag_len != M) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *ccm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
block128_f block;
ctr128_f ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&ccm_ctx->ks.ks, NULL, &block, key, key_len,
1 /* large inputs */);
ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&ccm_ctx->ccm, &ccm_ctx->ks.ks, block, ctr, M, L)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static void aead_aes_ccm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
static int aead_aes_ccm_seal_scatter(
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
const struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *ccm_ctx =
(struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
if (in_len > CRYPTO_ccm128_max_input(&ccm_ctx->ccm)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (max_out_tag_len < ctx->tag_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(&ccm_ctx->ccm, &ccm_ctx->ks.ks, out, out_tag,
ctx->tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, ad,
ad_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
*out_tag_len = ctx->tag_len;
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_ccm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
const struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *ccm_ctx =
(struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
if (in_len > CRYPTO_ccm128_max_input(&ccm_ctx->ccm)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
if (in_tag_len != ctx->tag_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
uint8_t tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_CCM_MAX_TAG_LEN];
assert(ctx->tag_len <= EVP_AEAD_AES_CCM_MAX_TAG_LEN);
if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(&ccm_ctx->ccm, &ccm_ctx->ks.ks, out, tag,
ctx->tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, ad,
ad_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int aead_aes_ccm_bluetooth_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
return aead_aes_ccm_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, 4, 2);
}
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth = {
16, // key length (AES-128)
13, // nonce length
4, // overhead
4, // max tag length
0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
aead_aes_ccm_bluetooth_init,
NULL /* init_with_direction */,
aead_aes_ccm_cleanup,
NULL /* open */,
aead_aes_ccm_seal_scatter,
aead_aes_ccm_open_gather,
NULL /* get_iv */,
NULL /* tag_len */,
};
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth(void) {
return &aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth;
}
static int aead_aes_ccm_bluetooth_8_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
return aead_aes_ccm_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, 8, 2);
}
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8 = {
16, // key length (AES-128)
13, // nonce length
8, // overhead
8, // max tag length
0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
aead_aes_ccm_bluetooth_8_init,
NULL /* init_with_direction */,
aead_aes_ccm_cleanup,
NULL /* open */,
aead_aes_ccm_seal_scatter,
aead_aes_ccm_open_gather,
NULL /* get_iv */,
NULL /* tag_len */,
};
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8(void) {
return &aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8;
}