08d774a45f
Functions that deserialize from bytes and Montgomery multiplication have no reason to minimize their inputs. Bug: 232 Change-Id: I121cc9b388033d684057b9df4ad0c08364849f58 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25258 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
280 lines
8.5 KiB
C
280 lines
8.5 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const uint8_t *in, size_t len, BIGNUM *ret) {
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size_t num_words;
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unsigned m;
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BN_ULONG word = 0;
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BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
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if (ret == NULL) {
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ret = bn = BN_new();
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}
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if (ret == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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if (len == 0) {
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ret->width = 0;
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return ret;
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}
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num_words = ((len - 1) / BN_BYTES) + 1;
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m = (len - 1) % BN_BYTES;
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if (!bn_wexpand(ret, num_words)) {
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if (bn) {
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BN_free(bn);
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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// |bn_wexpand| must check bounds on |num_words| to write it into
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// |ret->dmax|.
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assert(num_words <= INT_MAX);
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ret->width = (int)num_words;
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ret->neg = 0;
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while (len--) {
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word = (word << 8) | *(in++);
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if (m-- == 0) {
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ret->d[--num_words] = word;
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word = 0;
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m = BN_BYTES - 1;
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}
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}
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return ret;
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}
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BIGNUM *BN_le2bn(const uint8_t *in, size_t len, BIGNUM *ret) {
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BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
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if (ret == NULL) {
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bn = BN_new();
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ret = bn;
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}
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if (ret == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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if (len == 0) {
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ret->width = 0;
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ret->neg = 0;
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return ret;
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}
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// Reserve enough space in |ret|.
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size_t num_words = ((len - 1) / BN_BYTES) + 1;
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if (!bn_wexpand(ret, num_words)) {
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BN_free(bn);
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return NULL;
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}
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ret->width = num_words;
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// Make sure the top bytes will be zeroed.
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ret->d[num_words - 1] = 0;
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// We only support little-endian platforms, so we can simply memcpy the
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// internal representation.
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OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->d, in, len);
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return ret;
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}
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size_t BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *in, uint8_t *out) {
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size_t n, i;
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BN_ULONG l;
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n = i = BN_num_bytes(in);
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while (i--) {
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l = in->d[i / BN_BYTES];
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*(out++) = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES))) & 0xff;
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}
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return n;
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}
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// TODO(davidben): This does not need to be quite so complex once the |BIGNUM|s
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// we care about are fixed-width. |read_word_padded| is a hack to paper over
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// the historical |bn_minimal_width| leak. This can be simplified once that's
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// fixed.
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// constant_time_select_ulong returns |x| if |v| is 1 and |y| if |v| is 0. Its
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// behavior is undefined if |v| takes any other value.
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static BN_ULONG constant_time_select_ulong(int v, BN_ULONG x, BN_ULONG y) {
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BN_ULONG mask = v;
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mask--;
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return (~mask & x) | (mask & y);
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}
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// constant_time_le_size_t returns 1 if |x| <= |y| and 0 otherwise. |x| and |y|
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// must not have their MSBs set.
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static int constant_time_le_size_t(size_t x, size_t y) {
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return ((x - y - 1) >> (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 1)) & 1;
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}
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// read_word_padded returns the |i|'th word of |in|, if it is not out of
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// bounds. Otherwise, it returns 0. It does so without branches on the size of
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// |in|, however it necessarily does not have the same memory access pattern. If
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// the access would be out of bounds, it reads the last word of |in|. |in| must
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// not be zero.
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static BN_ULONG read_word_padded(const BIGNUM *in, size_t i) {
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if (in->dmax == 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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// Read |in->d[i]| if valid. Otherwise, read the last word.
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BN_ULONG l = in->d[constant_time_select_ulong(
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constant_time_le_size_t(in->dmax, i), in->dmax - 1, i)];
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// Clamp to zero if above |d->width|.
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return constant_time_select_ulong(constant_time_le_size_t(in->width, i), 0,
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l);
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}
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static int fits_in_bytes(const BIGNUM *in, size_t len) {
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BN_ULONG mask = 0;
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for (size_t i = (len + (BN_BYTES - 1)) / BN_BYTES; i < (size_t)in->width;
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i++) {
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mask |= in->d[i];
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}
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if ((len % BN_BYTES) != 0) {
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BN_ULONG l = read_word_padded(in, len / BN_BYTES);
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mask |= l >> (8 * (len % BN_BYTES));
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}
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return mask == 0;
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}
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int BN_bn2le_padded(uint8_t *out, size_t len, const BIGNUM *in) {
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// If we don't have enough space, fail out.
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if (!fits_in_bytes(in, len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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size_t todo = in->width * BN_BYTES;
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if (todo > len) {
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todo = len;
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}
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// We only support little-endian platforms, so we can simply memcpy into the
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// internal representation.
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out, in->d, todo);
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// Pad out the rest of the buffer with zeroes.
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OPENSSL_memset(out + todo, 0, len - todo);
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return 1;
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}
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int BN_bn2bin_padded(uint8_t *out, size_t len, const BIGNUM *in) {
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// Check if the integer is too big. This case can exit early in non-constant
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// time.
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if (!fits_in_bytes(in, len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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// Write the bytes out one by one. Serialization is done without branching on
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// the bits of |in| or on |in->width|, but if the routine would otherwise read
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// out of bounds, the memory access pattern can't be fixed. However, for an
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// RSA key of size a multiple of the word size, the probability of BN_BYTES
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// leading zero octets is low.
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//
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// See Falko Stenzke, "Manger's Attack revisited", ICICS 2010.
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size_t i = len;
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while (i--) {
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BN_ULONG l = read_word_padded(in, i / BN_BYTES);
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*(out++) = (uint8_t)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES))) & 0xff;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *bn) {
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switch (bn_minimal_width(bn)) {
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case 0:
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return 0;
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case 1:
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return bn->d[0];
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default:
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return BN_MASK2;
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}
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}
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int BN_get_u64(const BIGNUM *bn, uint64_t *out) {
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switch (bn_minimal_width(bn)) {
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case 0:
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*out = 0;
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return 1;
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case 1:
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*out = bn->d[0];
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return 1;
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#if defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT)
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case 2:
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*out = (uint64_t) bn->d[0] | (((uint64_t) bn->d[1]) << 32);
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return 1;
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#endif
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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