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- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
- #include <assert.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
-
- #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/hmac.h>
- #include <openssl/mem.h>
- #include <openssl/obj.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-
- #include "internal.h"
-
-
- static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const uint8_t *tick, int ticklen,
- const uint8_t *sess_id, int sesslen,
- SSL_SESSION **psess);
- static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
- static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
-
- const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
- tls1_prf,
- tls1_setup_key_block,
- tls1_generate_master_secret,
- tls1_change_cipher_state,
- tls1_final_finish_mac,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
- tls1_export_keying_material,
- 0,
- };
-
- const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
- tls1_prf,
- tls1_setup_key_block,
- tls1_generate_master_secret,
- tls1_change_cipher_state,
- tls1_final_finish_mac,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
- tls1_export_keying_material,
- SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
- };
-
- const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
- tls1_prf,
- tls1_setup_key_block,
- tls1_generate_master_secret,
- tls1_change_cipher_state,
- tls1_final_finish_mac,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
- tls1_export_keying_material,
- SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
- |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
- };
-
- static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
- uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t *)p1);
- uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t *)p2);
- if (u1 < u2) {
- return -1;
- } else if (u1 > u2) {
- return 1;
- } else {
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
- * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
- * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
- * out. */
- static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs) {
- CBS extensions = *cbs;
- size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
- uint16_t *extension_types = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
-
- /* First pass: count the extensions. */
- while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) {
- uint16_t type;
- CBS extension;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
- goto done;
- }
-
- num_extensions++;
- }
-
- if (num_extensions == 0) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- extension_types =
- (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_extensions);
- if (extension_types == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_check_duplicate_extensions,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
- extensions = *cbs;
- for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
- CBS extension;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
- /* This should not happen. */
- goto done;
- }
- }
- assert(CBS_len(&extensions) == 0);
-
- /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
- qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(uint16_t), compare_uint16_t);
- for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
- if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i]) {
- goto done;
- }
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- done:
- OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
- return ret;
- }
-
- char ssl_early_callback_init(struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) {
- CBS client_hello, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods, extensions;
-
- CBS_init(&client_hello, ctx->client_hello, ctx->client_hello_len);
-
- if (/* Skip client version. */
- !CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2) ||
- /* Skip client nonce. */
- !CBS_skip(&client_hello, 32) ||
- /* Extract session_id. */
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- ctx->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id);
- ctx->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id);
-
- /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ctx->ssl)) {
- CBS cookie;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie)) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Extract cipher_suites. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
- CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 || (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0) {
- return 0;
- }
- ctx->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites);
- ctx->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites);
-
- /* Extract compression_methods. */
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
- CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1) {
- return 0;
- }
- ctx->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods);
- ctx->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods);
-
- /* If the ClientHello ends here then it's valid, but doesn't have any
- * extensions. (E.g. SSLv3.) */
- if (CBS_len(&client_hello) == 0) {
- ctx->extensions = NULL;
- ctx->extensions_len = 0;
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Extract extensions and check it is valid. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) ||
- !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) ||
- CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) {
- return 0;
- }
- ctx->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions);
- ctx->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions);
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- char SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(
- const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx, uint16_t extension_type,
- const uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len) {
- CBS extensions;
-
- CBS_init(&extensions, ctx->extensions, ctx->extensions_len);
-
- while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
- uint16_t type;
- CBS extension;
-
- /* Decode the next extension. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (type == extension_type) {
- *out_data = CBS_data(&extension);
- *out_len = CBS_len(&extension);
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
- }
-
- struct tls_curve {
- uint16_t curve_id;
- int nid;
- };
-
- /* ECC curves from RFC4492. */
- static const struct tls_curve tls_curves[] = {
- {21, NID_secp224r1},
- {23, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
- {24, NID_secp384r1},
- {25, NID_secp521r1},
- };
-
- static const uint8_t ecformats_default[] = {
- TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
- };
-
- static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
- 23, /* X9_62_prime256v1 */
- 24, /* secp384r1 */
- };
-
- int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id) {
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tls_curves) / sizeof(tls_curves[0]); i++) {
- if (curve_id == tls_curves[i].curve_id) {
- return tls_curves[i].nid;
- }
- }
- return NID_undef;
- }
-
- int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(uint16_t *out_curve_id, int nid) {
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tls_curves) / sizeof(tls_curves[0]); i++) {
- if (nid == tls_curves[i].nid) {
- *out_curve_id = tls_curves[i].curve_id;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* tls1_get_curvelist sets |*out_curve_ids| and |*out_curve_ids_len| to the
- * list of allowed curve IDs. If |get_peer_curves| is non-zero, return the
- * peer's curve list. Otherwise, return the preferred list. */
- static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int get_peer_curves,
- const uint16_t **out_curve_ids,
- size_t *out_curve_ids_len) {
- if (get_peer_curves) {
- /* Only clients send a curve list, so this function is only called
- * on the server. */
- assert(s->server);
- *out_curve_ids = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist;
- *out_curve_ids_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length;
- return;
- }
-
- *out_curve_ids = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
- *out_curve_ids_len = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
- if (!*out_curve_ids) {
- *out_curve_ids = eccurves_default;
- *out_curve_ids_len = sizeof(eccurves_default) / sizeof(eccurves_default[0]);
- }
- }
-
- int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out_curve_id) {
- uint8_t curve_type;
- uint16_t curve_id;
- const uint16_t *curves;
- size_t curves_len, i;
-
- /* Only support named curves. */
- if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type) ||
- curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE ||
- !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &curve_id)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
- for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) {
- if (curve_id == curves[i]) {
- *out_curve_id = curve_id;
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
- }
-
- int tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *s) {
- const uint16_t *curves, *peer_curves, *pref, *supp;
- size_t curves_len, peer_curves_len, pref_len, supp_len, i, j;
-
- /* Can't do anything on client side */
- if (s->server == 0) {
- return NID_undef;
- }
-
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0 /* local curves */, &curves, &curves_len);
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1 /* peer curves */, &peer_curves, &peer_curves_len);
-
- if (peer_curves_len == 0) {
- /* Clients are not required to send a supported_curves extension. In this
- * case, the server is free to pick any curve it likes. See RFC 4492,
- * section 4, paragraph 3. */
- return (curves_len == 0) ? NID_undef : tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(curves[0]);
- }
-
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
- pref = curves;
- pref_len = curves_len;
- supp = peer_curves;
- supp_len = peer_curves_len;
- } else {
- pref = peer_curves;
- pref_len = peer_curves_len;
- supp = curves;
- supp_len = curves_len;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < pref_len; i++) {
- for (j = 0; j < supp_len; j++) {
- if (pref[i] == supp[j]) {
- return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(pref[i]);
- }
- }
- }
-
- return NID_undef;
- }
-
- int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len,
- const int *curves, size_t ncurves) {
- uint16_t *curve_ids;
- size_t i;
-
- curve_ids = (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t));
- if (curve_ids == NULL) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) {
- if (!tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(&curve_ids[i], curves[i])) {
- OPENSSL_free(curve_ids);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(*out_curve_ids);
- *out_curve_ids = curve_ids;
- *out_curve_ids_len = ncurves;
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key sets |*out_curve_id| and |*out_comp_id| to the
- * TLS curve ID and point format, respectively, for |ec|. It returns one on
- * success and zero on failure. */
- static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id,
- uint8_t *out_comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) {
- int nid;
- uint16_t id;
- const EC_GROUP *grp;
-
- if (ec == NULL) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
- if (grp == NULL) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Determine curve ID */
- nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
- if (!tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(&id, nid)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Set the named curve ID. Arbitrary explicit curves are not supported. */
- *out_curve_id = id;
-
- if (out_comp_id) {
- if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) {
- return 0;
- }
- if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
- *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
- } else {
- *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* tls1_check_point_format returns one if |comp_id| is consistent with the
- * peer's point format preferences. */
- static int tls1_check_point_format(SSL *s, uint8_t comp_id) {
- uint8_t *p = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist;
- size_t plen = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length;
- size_t i;
-
- /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
- * supported (see RFC4492). */
- if (p == NULL) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < plen; i++) {
- if (comp_id == p[i]) {
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* tls1_check_curve_id returns one if |curve_id| is consistent with both our
- * and the peer's curve preferences. Note: if called as the client, only our
- * preferences are checked; the peer (the server) does not send preferences. */
- static int tls1_check_curve_id(SSL *s, uint16_t curve_id) {
- const uint16_t *curves;
- size_t curves_len, i, get_peer_curves;
-
- /* Check against our list, then the peer's list. */
- for (get_peer_curves = 0; get_peer_curves <= 1; get_peer_curves++) {
- if (get_peer_curves && !s->server) {
- /* Servers do not present a preference list so, if we are a client, only
- * check our list. */
- continue;
- }
-
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, get_peer_curves, &curves, &curves_len);
- if (get_peer_curves && curves_len == 0) {
- /* Clients are not required to send a supported_curves extension. In this
- * case, the server is free to pick any curve it likes. See RFC 4492,
- * section 4, paragraph 3. */
- continue;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) {
- if (curves[i] == curve_id) {
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (i == curves_len) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const uint8_t **pformats,
- size_t *pformatslen) {
- /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default */
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
- *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- } else {
- *pformats = ecformats_default;
- *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
- }
- }
-
- int tls1_check_ec_cert(SSL *s, X509 *x) {
- int ret = 0;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
- uint16_t curve_id;
- uint8_t comp_id;
-
- if (!pkey ||
- pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC ||
- !tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec) ||
- !tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) ||
- !tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id)) {
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- done:
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return ret;
- }
-
- int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s) {
- if (s->cert->ecdh_nid != NID_undef) {
- /* If the curve is preconfigured, ECDH is acceptable iff the peer supports
- * the curve. */
- uint16_t curve_id;
- return tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(&curve_id, s->cert->ecdh_nid) &&
- tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id);
- }
-
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL) {
- /* Assume the callback will provide an acceptable curve. */
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Otherwise, the curve gets selected automatically. ECDH is acceptable iff
- * there is a shared curve. */
- return tls1_get_shared_curve(s) != NID_undef;
- }
-
- /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
- * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. */
-
- #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
-
- #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
-
- #define tlsext_sigalg(md) tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
-
- static const uint8_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
- };
-
- size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const uint8_t **psigs) {
- /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
- if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
- *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
- return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
- } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
- *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
- return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
- } else {
- *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
- return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
- }
- }
-
- /* tls12_check_peer_sigalg parses a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm out of |cbs|. It
- * checks it is consistent with |s|'s sent supported signature algorithms and,
- * if so, writes the relevant digest into |*out_md| and returns 1. Otherwise it
- * returns 0 and writes an alert into |*out_alert|. */
- int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert, SSL *s,
- CBS *cbs, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
- const uint8_t *sent_sigs;
- size_t sent_sigslen, i;
- int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
- uint8_t hash, signature;
-
- /* Should never happen */
- if (sigalg == -1) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &hash) ||
- !CBS_get_u8(cbs, &signature)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
- if (sigalg != signature) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- uint16_t curve_id;
- uint8_t comp_id;
- /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
- if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->server && (!tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) ||
- !tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id))) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
- sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
- for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
- if (hash == sent_sigs[0] && signature == sent_sigs[1]) {
- break;
- }
- }
-
- /* Allow fallback to SHA-1. */
- if (i == sent_sigslen && hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha1) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
-
- *out_md = tls12_get_hash(hash);
- if (*out_md == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
- * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
- * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
- * settings. */
- void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) {
- CERT *c = s->cert;
- const uint8_t *sigalgs;
- size_t i, sigalgslen;
- int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
- c->mask_a = 0;
- c->mask_k = 0;
-
- /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
- if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) {
- c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
- } else {
- c->mask_ssl = 0;
- }
-
- /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for RSA,
- * DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. */
- sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
- for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
- switch (sigalgs[1]) {
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- have_rsa = 1;
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
- have_ecdsa = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- /* Disable auth if we don't include any appropriate signature algorithms. */
- if (!have_rsa) {
- c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
- }
- if (!have_ecdsa) {
- c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
- }
-
- /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
- if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
- c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
- c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
- }
- }
-
- /* header_len is the length of the ClientHello header written so far, used to
- * compute padding. It does not include the record header. Pass 0 if no padding
- * is to be done. */
- uint8_t *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t *limit,
- size_t header_len) {
- int extdatalen = 0;
- uint8_t *ret = buf;
- uint8_t *orig = buf;
- /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
- int using_ecc = 0;
-
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- size_t i;
- uint32_t alg_k, alg_a;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
-
- alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
- using_ecc = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
- if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
- return orig;
- }
-
- ret += 2;
-
- if (ret >= limit) {
- return NULL; /* should never occur. */
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
- /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
- unsigned long size_str;
- long lenmax;
-
- /* check for enough space.
- 4 for the servername type and entension length
- 2 for servernamelist length
- 1 for the hostname type
- 2 for hostname length
- + hostname length */
-
- lenmax = limit - ret - 9;
- size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname);
- if (lenmax < 0 || size_str > (unsigned long)lenmax) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* extension type and length */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
- s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
-
- /* length of servername list */
- s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
-
- /* hostname type, length and hostname */
- *(ret++) = (uint8_t)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
- s2n(size_str, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
- ret += size_str;
- }
-
- /* Add RI if renegotiating */
- if (s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
- int el;
-
- if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ret += el;
- }
-
- /* Add extended master secret. */
- if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
- int ticklen = 0;
- /* Renegotiation does not participate in session resumption. However, still
- * advertise the extension to avoid potentially breaking servers which carry
- * over the state from the previous handshake, such as OpenSSL servers
- * without upstream's 3c3f0259238594d77264a78944d409f2127642c4. */
- if (!s->s3->initial_handshake_complete && s->session != NULL &&
- s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL) {
- ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
- }
-
- /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
- * ticket. */
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
- s2n(ticklen, ret);
- if (ticklen) {
- memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
- ret += ticklen;
- }
- }
-
- if (ssl3_version_from_wire(s, s->client_version) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- size_t salglen;
- const uint8_t *salg;
- salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6) {
- return NULL;
- }
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
- s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
- s2n(salglen, ret);
- memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
- ret += salglen;
- }
-
- if (s->ocsp_stapling_enabled) {
- /* The status_request extension is excessively extensible at every layer.
- * On the client, only support requesting OCSP responses with an empty
- * responder_id_list and no extensions. */
- if (limit - ret - 4 - 1 - 2 - 2 < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
- s2n(1 + 2 + 2, ret);
- /* status_type */
- *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
- /* responder_id_list - empty */
- s2n(0, ret);
- /* request_extensions - empty */
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
- !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support for
- * Next Protocol Negotiation */
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (s->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled) {
- /* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support for
- * certificate timestamps. */
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) {
- return NULL;
- }
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
- s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
- s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
- ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support for
- * Channel ID. */
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
- if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new) {
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, ret);
- } else {
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, ret);
- }
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
- int el;
-
- ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
-
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (!ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret += el;
- }
-
- if (using_ecc) {
- /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
- long lenmax;
- const uint8_t *formats;
- const uint16_t *curves;
- size_t formats_len, curves_len, i;
-
- tls1_get_formatlist(s, &formats, &formats_len);
-
- lenmax = limit - ret - 5;
- if (lenmax < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
- if (formats_len > (size_t)lenmax) {
- return NULL;
- }
- if (formats_len > 255) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
- s2n(formats_len + 1, ret);
- *(ret++) = (uint8_t)formats_len;
- memcpy(ret, formats, formats_len);
- ret += formats_len;
-
- /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
-
- lenmax = limit - ret - 6;
- if (lenmax < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
- if (curves_len * 2 > (size_t)lenmax) {
- return NULL;
- }
- if (curves_len * 2 > 65532) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
- s2n((curves_len * 2) + 2, ret);
-
- s2n(curves_len * 2, ret);
- for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) {
- s2n(curves[i], ret);
- }
- }
-
- if (header_len > 0) {
- size_t clienthello_minsize = 0;
- header_len += ret - orig;
- if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200) {
- /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
- *
- * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing extensions
- * it MUST always appear last. */
- clienthello_minsize = 0x200;
- }
- if (s->fastradio_padding) {
- /* Pad the ClientHello record to 1024 bytes to fast forward the radio
- * into DCH (high data rate) state in 3G networks. Note that when
- * fastradio_padding is enabled, even if the header_len is less than 255
- * bytes, the padding will be applied regardless. This is slightly
- * different from the TLS padding extension suggested in
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 */
- clienthello_minsize = 0x400;
- }
- if (header_len < clienthello_minsize) {
- size_t padding_len = clienthello_minsize - header_len;
- /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include least
- * one byte of data if including the extension. WebSphere Application
- * Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */
- if (padding_len >= 4 + 1) {
- padding_len -= 4;
- } else {
- padding_len = 1;
- }
-
- if (limit - ret - 4 - (long)padding_len < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
- s2n(padding_len, ret);
- memset(ret, 0, padding_len);
- ret += padding_len;
- }
- }
-
- extdatalen = ret - orig - 2;
- if (extdatalen == 0) {
- return orig;
- }
-
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
- }
-
- uint8_t *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t *limit) {
- int extdatalen = 0;
- uint8_t *orig = buf;
- uint8_t *ret = buf;
- int next_proto_neg_seen;
- uint32_t alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- uint32_t alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
- using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
-
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
- return orig;
- }
-
- ret += 2;
- if (ret >= limit) {
- return NULL; /* should never happen. */
- }
-
- if (!s->hit && s->should_ack_sni && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
- int el;
-
- if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ret += el;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (using_ecc) {
- const uint8_t *plist;
- size_t plistlen;
- /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
- long lenmax;
-
- tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
-
- lenmax = limit - ret - 5;
- if (lenmax < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
- if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) {
- return NULL;
- }
- if (plistlen > 255) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
- s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
- *(ret++) = (uint8_t)plistlen;
- memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
- ret += plistlen;
- }
- /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
-
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (s->srtp_profile) {
- int el;
-
- ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
-
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (!ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret += el;
- }
-
- next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
- const uint8_t *npa;
- unsigned int npalen;
- int r;
-
- r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(
- s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
- s2n(npalen, ret);
- memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
- ret += npalen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
- const uint8_t *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
- size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
-
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
- s2n(3 + len, ret);
- s2n(1 + len, ret);
- *ret++ = len;
- memcpy(ret, selected, len);
- ret += len;
- }
-
- /* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it
- * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, ret);
- } else {
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, ret);
- }
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- extdatalen = ret - orig - 2;
- if (extdatalen == 0) {
- return orig;
- }
-
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
- * ClientHello.
- * cbs: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
- * out_alert: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a zero
- * return.
- *
- * returns: 1 on success. */
- static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
- CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name_list_copy;
- const uint8_t *selected;
- uint8_t selected_len;
- int r;
-
- if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &protocol_name_list) ||
- CBS_len(cbs) != 0 || CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2) {
- goto parse_error;
- }
-
- /* Validate the protocol list. */
- protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list;
- while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0) {
- CBS protocol_name;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name)) {
- goto parse_error;
- }
- }
-
- r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(
- s, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&protocol_name_list),
- CBS_len(&protocol_name_list), s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- parse_error:
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
- CBS extensions;
-
- s->should_ack_sni = 0;
- s->srtp_profile = NULL;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0;
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
-
- /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
- OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
- s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
- s->cert->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
-
- /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
- OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
- s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
- s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
-
- /* Clear ECC extensions */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
-
- /* There may be no extensions. */
- if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) {
- goto ri_check;
- }
-
- /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
- !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
- uint16_t type;
- CBS extension;
-
- /* Decode the next extension. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
-
- - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
- - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, in
- which case an fatal alert is generated.
- - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
- - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
- to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
- - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
- it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
- Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
- set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
- case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
- a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
- presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
- the value of the Host: field.
- - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
- session,
- i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
- - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. */
-
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
- CBS server_name_list;
- char have_seen_host_name = 0;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &server_name_list) ||
- CBS_len(&server_name_list) < 1 || CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Decode each ServerName in the extension. */
- while (CBS_len(&server_name_list) > 0) {
- uint8_t name_type;
- CBS host_name;
-
- /* Decode the NameType. */
- if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Only host_name is supported. */
- if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
- continue;
- }
-
- if (have_seen_host_name) {
- /* The ServerNameList MUST NOT contain more than one name of the same
- * name_type. */
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- have_seen_host_name = 1;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name) ||
- CBS_len(&host_name) < 1) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
- CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->hit) {
- assert(s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
- /* This should be impossible. */
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Copy the hostname as a string. */
- if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->should_ack_sni = 1;
- }
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
- CBS ec_point_format_list;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list, &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
- CBS elliptic_curve_list;
- size_t i, num_curves;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list) ||
- CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 ||
- (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) & 1) != 0 ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
-
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist =
- (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list));
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist == NULL) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- num_curves = CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) / 2;
- for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) {
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&elliptic_curve_list,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist[i])) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = num_curves;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
- return 0;
- }
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
- CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension,
- &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Ensure the signature algorithms are non-empty. It contains a list of
- * SignatureAndHashAlgorithms which are two bytes each. */
- if (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 ||
- (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) % 2) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal error. */
- if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext,
- SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
- s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* The extension must be empty. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
- if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
- return 0;
- }
- /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled &&
- !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* The extension must be empty. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new &&
- s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* The extension must be empty. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
- s->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
- }
- }
-
- ri_check:
- /* Need RI if renegotiating */
-
- if (!renegotiate_seen && s->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) {
- int alert = -1;
- if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext,
- SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
- * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
- * fill the length of the block. */
- static char ssl_next_proto_validate(const CBS *cbs) {
- CBS copy = *cbs;
-
- while (CBS_len(©) != 0) {
- CBS proto;
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(©, &proto) || CBS_len(&proto) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
- int tlsext_servername = 0;
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
- CBS extensions;
-
- /* TODO(davidben): Move all of these to some per-handshake state that gets
- * systematically reset on a new handshake; perhaps allocate it fresh each
- * time so it's not even kept around post-handshake. */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0;
- s->srtp_profile = NULL;
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
-
- /* Clear ECC extensions */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
-
- /* There may be no extensions. */
- if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) {
- goto ri_check;
- }
-
- /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
- !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
- uint16_t type;
- CBS extension;
-
- /* Decode the next extension. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
- /* The extension must be empty. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* We must have sent it in ClientHello. */
- if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
-
- tlsext_servername = 1;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
- CBS ec_point_format_list;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list, &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || CBS_len(&extension) > 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
- /* The extension MUST be empty and may only sent if we've requested a
- * status request message. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->ocsp_stapling_enabled) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Set a flag to expect a CertificateStatus message */
- s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- uint8_t *selected;
- uint8_t selected_len;
-
- /* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* The data must be valid. */
- if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&extension)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(
- s, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&extension),
- CBS_len(&extension),
- s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->next_proto_negotiated = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
- !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
- CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name;
-
- /* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList which must have
- * exactly one ProtocolName. Each of these is length-prefixed. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &protocol_name_list) ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0 ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) ||
- CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name, &s->s3->alpn_selected,
- &s->s3->alpn_selected_len)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) {
- if (CBS_len(&extension) == 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Session resumption uses the original session information. */
- if (!s->hit &&
- !CBS_stow(&extension, &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
- &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
- if (/* It is invalid for the server to select EMS and
- SSLv3. */
- s->version == SSL3_VERSION || CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1 && s->tlsext_hostname) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
- if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- ri_check:
- /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid an
- * attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello because the
- * client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. However this would
- * mean we could not connect to any server which doesn't support RI so for
- * the immediate future tolerate RI absence on initial connect only. */
- if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) { return 1; }
-
- int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) { return 1; }
-
- static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) {
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
- /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
- * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. */
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- } else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL &&
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
- ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(
- s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- }
-
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->should_ack_sni = 0;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) {
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
- /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite,
- * then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it must contain
- * uncompressed. */
- uint32_t alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- uint32_t alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if (((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) &&
- !tls1_check_point_format(s, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext,
- SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
- return -1;
- }
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- } else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL &&
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
- ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(
- s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- }
-
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) {
- int alert = -1;
- if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext,
- SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
- * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
- * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
- *
- * ctx: contains the early callback context, which is the result of a
- * shallow parse of the ClientHello.
- * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
- * point to the resulting session.
- *
- * Returns:
- * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
- * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
- * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
- * 2: a ticket was offered but couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal
- * error.
- * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
- *
- * Side effects:
- * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
- * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
- * but the client either doesn't have a session ticket or we couldn't use
- * the one it gave us, or if s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew
- * the client's ticket. Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
- */
- int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
- SSL_SESSION **ret) {
- *ret = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- const uint8_t *data;
- size_t len;
- int r;
-
- /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
- * resumption. */
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) ||
- (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION && !ctx->extensions) ||
- !SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,
- &data, &len)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (len == 0) {
- /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have one. */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 1;
- }
-
- r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, data, len, ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len,
- ret);
- switch (r) {
- case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 2;
-
- case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
- return r;
-
- case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 3;
-
- default: /* fatal error */
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
- *
- * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
- * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
- * sess_id: points at the session ID.
- * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
- * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
- * point to the resulting session.
- *
- * Returns:
- * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
- * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
- * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. */
- static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const uint8_t *etick, int eticklen,
- const uint8_t *sess_id, int sesslen,
- SSL_SESSION **psess) {
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- uint8_t *sdec;
- const uint8_t *p;
- int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
- uint8_t tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
-
- /* Ensure there is room for the key name and the largest IV
- * |tlsext_ticket_key_cb| may try to consume. The real limit may be lower, but
- * the maximum IV length should be well under the minimum size for the
- * session material and HMAC. */
- if (eticklen < 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
- return 2;
- }
-
- /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
- uint8_t *nctick = (uint8_t *)etick;
- int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, &ctx, &hctx,
- 0 /* decrypt */);
- if (rv < 0) {
- return -1;
- }
- if (rv == 0) {
- return 2;
- }
- if (rv == 2) {
- renew_ticket = 1;
- }
- } else {
- /* Check key name matches */
- if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) {
- return 2;
- }
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(),
- NULL) ||
- !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16)) {
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* First, check the MAC. The MAC is at the end of the ticket. */
- mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
- if ((size_t) eticklen < 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + 1 + mlen) {
- /* The ticket must be large enough for key name, IV, data, and MAC. */
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return 2;
- }
- eticklen -= mlen;
- /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
- HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return 2;
- }
-
- /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
- /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
- p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
- if (!sdec) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
- }
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
- if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(sdec);
- return 2;
- }
- slen += mlen;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- p = sdec;
-
- sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
- OPENSSL_free(sdec);
- if (sess) {
- /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect that the
- * ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session structure. If it
- * is empty set length to zero as required by standard. */
- if (sesslen) {
- memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
- }
- sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
- *psess = sess;
- if (renew_ticket) {
- return 4;
- }
- return 3;
- }
-
- ERR_clear_error();
- /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. */
- return 2;
- }
-
- /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
- typedef struct {
- int nid;
- int id;
- } tls12_lookup;
-
- static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {{NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
- {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
- {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
- {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
- {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
- {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}};
-
- static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
- {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}};
-
- static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) {
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
- if (table[i].nid == nid) {
- return table[i].id;
- }
- }
-
- return -1;
- }
-
- static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) {
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
- if (table[i].id == id) {
- return table[i].nid;
- }
- }
-
- return NID_undef;
- }
-
- int tls12_get_sigandhash(uint8_t *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) {
- int sig_id, md_id;
-
- if (!md) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
- sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- if (md_id == -1) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
- if (sig_id == -1) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- p[0] = (uint8_t)md_id;
- p[1] = (uint8_t)sig_id;
- return 1;
- }
-
- int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) {
- return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
- sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- }
-
- const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(uint8_t hash_alg) {
- switch (hash_alg) {
- case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
- return EVP_md5();
-
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
- return EVP_sha1();
-
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
- return EVP_sha224();
-
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
- return EVP_sha256();
-
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
- return EVP_sha384();
-
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
- return EVP_sha512();
-
- default:
- return NULL;
- }
- }
-
- /* tls12_get_pkey_type returns the EVP_PKEY type corresponding to TLS signature
- * algorithm |sig_alg|. It returns -1 if the type is unknown. */
- static int tls12_get_pkey_type(uint8_t sig_alg) {
- switch (sig_alg) {
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- return EVP_PKEY_RSA;
-
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
- return EVP_PKEY_EC;
-
- default:
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
- static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
- int *psignhash_nid, const uint8_t *data) {
- int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
- if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) {
- return;
- }
-
- if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
- hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
- sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- if (phash_nid) {
- *phash_nid = hash_nid;
- }
- }
-
- if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
- sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
- sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- if (psign_nid) {
- *psign_nid = sign_nid;
- }
- }
-
- if (psignhash_nid) {
- if (sign_nid && hash_nid) {
- OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
- } else {
- *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
- static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, const uint8_t *pref,
- size_t preflen, const uint8_t *allow,
- size_t allowlen) {
- const uint8_t *ptmp, *atmp;
- size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
-
- for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
- /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
- if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL ||
- tls12_get_pkey_type(ptmp[1]) == -1) {
- continue;
- }
-
- for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
- if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
- nmatch++;
- if (shsig) {
- shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
- shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
- tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, &shsig->sign_nid,
- &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
- shsig++;
- }
-
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-
- return nmatch;
- }
-
- /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
- static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) {
- const uint8_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
- size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
- size_t nmatch;
- TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
- CERT *c = s->cert;
-
- OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
- c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
- c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
-
- /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
- if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs) {
- conf = c->client_sigalgs;
- conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
- } else if (c->conf_sigalgs) {
- conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
- conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
- } else {
- conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
- }
-
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
- pref = conf;
- preflen = conflen;
- allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
- allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
- } else {
- allow = conf;
- allowlen = conflen;
- pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
- preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
- }
-
- nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
- if (!nmatch) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
- if (!salgs) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
- c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
- c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
- int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const CBS *sigalgs) {
- CERT *c = s->cert;
-
- /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
- if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(sigalgs) % 2 != 0 ||
- !CBS_stow(sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgslen) ||
- !tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- const EVP_MD *tls1_choose_signing_digest(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
- CERT *c = s->cert;
- int type = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
- size_t i;
-
- /* Select the first shared digest supported by our key. */
- for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
- const EVP_MD *md = tls12_get_hash(c->shared_sigalgs[i].rhash);
- if (md == NULL ||
- tls12_get_pkey_type(c->shared_sigalgs[i].rsign) != type ||
- !EVP_PKEY_supports_digest(pkey, md)) {
- continue;
- }
- return md;
- }
-
- /* If no suitable digest may be found, default to SHA-1. */
- return EVP_sha1();
- }
-
- int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
- uint8_t *rsig, uint8_t *rhash) {
- const uint8_t *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
-
- if (psig == NULL) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (idx >= 0) {
- idx <<= 1;
- if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen) {
- return 0;
- }
- psig += idx;
- if (rhash) {
- *rhash = psig[0];
- }
- if (rsig) {
- *rsig = psig[1];
- }
- tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
- }
-
- return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
- }
-
- int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash,
- int *psignhash, uint8_t *rsig, uint8_t *rhash) {
- TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
-
- if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- shsigalgs += idx;
- if (phash) {
- *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
- }
- if (psign) {
- *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
- }
- if (psignhash) {
- *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
- }
- if (rsig) {
- *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
- }
- if (rhash) {
- *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
- }
-
- return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
- }
-
- /* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the
- * given SSL connection and writes it to |md|. */
- int tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s) {
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- uint8_t temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned temp_digest_len;
- int i;
- static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
-
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
- !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
-
- if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
- static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic, sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
- if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
- s->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL) {
- continue;
- }
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len);
- }
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
- * hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */
- int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s) {
- int digest_len;
- /* This function should never be called for a resumed session because the
- * handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original, full
- * handshake. */
- if (s->hit) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been
- * negotiated. */
- if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- digest_len =
- tls1_handshake_digest(s, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
- sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash));
- if (digest_len < 0) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len;
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
- int client) {
- uint8_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
- int rhash, rsign;
- size_t i;
-
- if (salglen & 1) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
- if (sigalgs == NULL) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
- rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
- sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
- sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-
- if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) {
- goto err;
- }
- *sptr++ = rhash;
- *sptr++ = rsign;
- }
-
- if (client) {
- OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
- c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
- c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
- } else {
- OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
- c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
- c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- err:
- OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
- return 0;
- }
|