650d8c393e
Bug: 222 Change-Id: I33ee56358a62afcd9c3921026d55efcc543a5c11 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23945 Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
561 lines
21 KiB
C++
561 lines
21 KiB
C++
/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <utility>
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#include <openssl/aead.h>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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namespace bssl {
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static int init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t version,
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const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
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if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(version, cipher)) {
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return 0;
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}
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hs->hash_len = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
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// Initialize the secret to the zero key.
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OPENSSL_memset(hs->secret, 0, hs->hash_len);
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const uint8_t *psk,
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size_t psk_len) {
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if (!init_key_schedule(hs, ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl), hs->new_cipher)) {
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return 0;
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}
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hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
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return HKDF_extract(hs->secret, &hs->hash_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), psk,
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psk_len, hs->secret, hs->hash_len);
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}
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int tls13_init_early_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const uint8_t *psk,
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size_t psk_len) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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return init_key_schedule(hs, ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session),
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ssl->session->cipher) &&
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HKDF_extract(hs->secret, &hs->hash_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), psk,
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psk_len, hs->secret, hs->hash_len);
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}
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static int hkdf_expand_label(uint8_t *out, uint16_t version,
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const EVP_MD *digest, const uint8_t *secret,
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size_t secret_len, const char *label,
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size_t label_len, const uint8_t *hash,
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size_t hash_len, size_t len) {
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const char *kTLS13LabelVersion =
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ssl_is_draft21(version) ? "tls13 " : "TLS 1.3, ";
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ScopedCBB cbb;
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CBB child;
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uint8_t *hkdf_label;
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size_t hkdf_label_len;
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if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 2 + 1 + strlen(kTLS13LabelVersion) + label_len + 1 +
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hash_len) ||
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!CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), len) ||
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!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelVersion,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelVersion)) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)label, label_len) ||
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!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child, hash, hash_len) ||
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!CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &hkdf_label, &hkdf_label_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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int ret = HKDF_expand(out, len, digest, secret, secret_len, hkdf_label,
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hkdf_label_len);
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OPENSSL_free(hkdf_label);
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return ret;
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelDerived[] = "derived";
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int tls13_advance_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const uint8_t *in,
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size_t len) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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// Draft 18 does not include the extra Derive-Secret step.
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if (ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)) {
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uint8_t derive_context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned derive_context_len;
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if (!EVP_Digest(nullptr, 0, derive_context, &derive_context_len,
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hs->transcript.Digest(), nullptr)) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(hs->secret, ssl->version, hs->transcript.Digest(),
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hs->secret, hs->hash_len, kTLS13LabelDerived,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelDerived), derive_context,
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derive_context_len, hs->hash_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return HKDF_extract(hs->secret, &hs->hash_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), in,
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len, hs->secret, hs->hash_len);
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}
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// derive_secret derives a secret of length |len| and writes the result in |out|
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// with the given label and the current base secret and most recently-saved
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// handshake context. It returns one on success and zero on error.
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static int derive_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
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const char *label, size_t label_len) {
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uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t context_hash_len;
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if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return hkdf_expand_label(out, SSL_get_session(hs->ssl)->ssl_version,
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hs->transcript.Digest(), hs->secret, hs->hash_len,
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label, label_len, context_hash, context_hash_len,
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len);
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}
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int tls13_set_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
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const uint8_t *traffic_secret,
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size_t traffic_secret_len) {
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const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
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uint16_t version = ssl_session_protocol_version(session);
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if (traffic_secret_len > 0xff) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return 0;
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}
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// Look up cipher suite properties.
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const EVP_AEAD *aead;
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size_t discard;
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if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &discard, &discard, session->cipher,
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version, SSL_is_dtls(ssl))) {
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return 0;
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}
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(session);
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// Derive the key.
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size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
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uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(key, session->ssl_version, digest, traffic_secret,
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traffic_secret_len, "key", 3, NULL, 0, key_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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// Derive the IV.
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size_t iv_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
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uint8_t iv[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(iv, session->ssl_version, digest, traffic_secret,
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traffic_secret_len, "iv", 2, NULL, 0, iv_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> traffic_aead =
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SSLAEADContext::Create(direction, session->ssl_version, SSL_is_dtls(ssl),
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session->cipher, MakeConstSpan(key, key_len),
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Span<const uint8_t>(), MakeConstSpan(iv, iv_len));
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if (!traffic_aead) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
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if (!ssl->method->set_read_state(ssl, std::move(traffic_aead))) {
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return 0;
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}
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} else {
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if (!ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, std::move(traffic_aead))) {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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// Save the traffic secret.
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if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
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OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret, traffic_secret,
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traffic_secret_len);
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ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret_len = traffic_secret_len;
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} else {
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OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret, traffic_secret,
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traffic_secret_len);
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ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret_len = traffic_secret_len;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelExporter[] = "exporter master secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelEarlyExporter[] = "early exporter master secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic[] =
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"client early traffic secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic[] =
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"client handshake traffic secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic[] =
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"server handshake traffic secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic[] =
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"client application traffic secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic[] =
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"server application traffic secret";
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static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelExporter[] = "exp master";
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static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelEarlyExporter[] = "e exp master";
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static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelClientEarlyTraffic[] = "c e traffic";
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static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelClientHandshakeTraffic[] = "c hs traffic";
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static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelServerHandshakeTraffic[] = "s hs traffic";
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static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelClientApplicationTraffic[] = "c ap traffic";
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static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelServerApplicationTraffic[] = "s ap traffic";
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int tls13_derive_early_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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uint16_t version = SSL_get_session(ssl)->ssl_version;
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const char *early_traffic_label = ssl_is_draft21(version)
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? kTLS13Draft21LabelClientEarlyTraffic
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: kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic;
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const char *early_exporter_label = ssl_is_draft21(version)
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? kTLS13Draft21LabelEarlyExporter
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: kTLS13LabelEarlyExporter;
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if (!derive_secret(hs, hs->early_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len,
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early_traffic_label, strlen(early_traffic_label)) ||
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!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
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hs->early_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len) ||
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!derive_secret(hs, ssl->s3->early_exporter_secret, hs->hash_len,
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early_exporter_label, strlen(early_exporter_label))) {
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return 0;
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}
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ssl->s3->early_exporter_secret_len = hs->hash_len;
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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const char *client_label = ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)
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? kTLS13Draft21LabelClientHandshakeTraffic
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: kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic;
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const char *server_label = ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)
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? kTLS13Draft21LabelServerHandshakeTraffic
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: kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic;
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return derive_secret(hs, hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len,
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client_label, strlen(client_label)) &&
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ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
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hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len) &&
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derive_secret(hs, hs->server_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len,
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server_label, strlen(server_label)) &&
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ssl_log_secret(ssl, "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
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hs->server_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len);
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}
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int tls13_derive_application_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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ssl->s3->exporter_secret_len = hs->hash_len;
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const char *client_label = ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)
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? kTLS13Draft21LabelClientApplicationTraffic
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: kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic;
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const char *server_label = ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)
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? kTLS13Draft21LabelServerApplicationTraffic
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: kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic;
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const char *exporter_label = ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)
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? kTLS13Draft21LabelExporter
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: kTLS13LabelExporter;
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return derive_secret(hs, hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len,
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client_label, strlen(client_label)) &&
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ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0",
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hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len) &&
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derive_secret(hs, hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len,
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server_label, strlen(server_label)) &&
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ssl_log_secret(ssl, "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0",
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hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len) &&
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derive_secret(hs, ssl->s3->exporter_secret, hs->hash_len,
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exporter_label, strlen(exporter_label)) &&
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ssl_log_secret(ssl, "EXPORTER_SECRET", ssl->s3->exporter_secret,
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hs->hash_len);
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic[] =
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"application traffic secret";
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static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelApplicationTraffic[] = "traffic upd";
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int tls13_rotate_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction) {
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uint8_t *secret;
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size_t secret_len;
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if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
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secret = ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret;
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secret_len = ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret_len;
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} else {
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secret = ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret;
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secret_len = ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret_len;
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}
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const char *traffic_label = ssl_is_draft21(ssl->version)
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? kTLS13Draft21LabelApplicationTraffic
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: kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic;
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(SSL_get_session(ssl));
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(secret, ssl->version, digest, secret, secret_len,
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traffic_label, strlen(traffic_label), NULL, 0,
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secret_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, direction, secret, secret_len);
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelResumption[] = "resumption master secret";
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static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelResumption[] = "res master";
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int tls13_derive_resumption_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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if (hs->hash_len > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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const char *resumption_label = ssl_is_draft21(hs->ssl->version)
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? kTLS13Draft21LabelResumption
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: kTLS13LabelResumption;
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hs->new_session->master_key_length = hs->hash_len;
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return derive_secret(hs, hs->new_session->master_key,
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hs->new_session->master_key_length, resumption_label,
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strlen(resumption_label));
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelFinished[] = "finished";
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// tls13_verify_data sets |out| to be the HMAC of |context| using a derived
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// Finished key for both Finished messages and the PSK binder.
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static int tls13_verify_data(const EVP_MD *digest, uint16_t version,
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uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
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const uint8_t *secret, size_t hash_len,
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uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
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uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned len;
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(key, version, digest, secret, hash_len,
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kTLS13LabelFinished, strlen(kTLS13LabelFinished), NULL,
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0, hash_len) ||
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HMAC(digest, key, hash_len, context, context_len, out, &len) == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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*out_len = len;
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_finished_mac(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
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int is_server) {
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const uint8_t *traffic_secret;
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if (is_server) {
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traffic_secret = hs->server_handshake_secret;
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} else {
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traffic_secret = hs->client_handshake_secret;
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}
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uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t context_hash_len;
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if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len) ||
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!tls13_verify_data(hs->transcript.Digest(), hs->ssl->version, out,
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out_len, traffic_secret, hs->hash_len, context_hash,
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context_hash_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelResumptionPSK[] = "resumption";
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bool tls13_derive_session_psk(SSL_SESSION *session, Span<const uint8_t> nonce) {
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if (!ssl_is_draft21(session->ssl_version)) {
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return true;
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}
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(session);
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return hkdf_expand_label(session->master_key, session->ssl_version, digest,
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session->master_key, session->master_key_length,
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kTLS13LabelResumptionPSK,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelResumptionPSK), nonce.data(),
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nonce.size(), session->master_key_length);
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelExportKeying[] = "exporter";
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int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> out,
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Span<const uint8_t> secret,
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Span<const char> label,
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Span<const uint8_t> context) {
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if (secret.empty()) {
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assert(0);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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uint16_t version = SSL_get_session(ssl)->ssl_version;
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if (!ssl_is_draft21(version)) {
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(SSL_get_session(ssl));
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return hkdf_expand_label(out.data(), version, digest, secret.data(),
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secret.size(), label.data(), label.size(),
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context.data(), context.size(), out.size());
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}
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(SSL_get_session(ssl));
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uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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uint8_t export_context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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uint8_t derived_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned hash_len;
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unsigned export_context_len;
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unsigned derived_secret_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
|
|
return EVP_Digest(context.data(), context.size(), hash, &hash_len, digest,
|
|
nullptr) &&
|
|
EVP_Digest(nullptr, 0, export_context, &export_context_len, digest,
|
|
nullptr) &&
|
|
hkdf_expand_label(derived_secret, version, digest, secret.data(),
|
|
secret.size(), label.data(), label.size(),
|
|
export_context, export_context_len,
|
|
derived_secret_len) &&
|
|
hkdf_expand_label(out.data(), version, digest, derived_secret,
|
|
derived_secret_len, kTLS13LabelExportKeying,
|
|
strlen(kTLS13LabelExportKeying), hash, hash_len,
|
|
out.size());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const char kTLS13LabelPSKBinder[] = "resumption psk binder key";
|
|
static const char kTLS13Draft21LabelPSKBinder[] = "res binder";
|
|
|
|
static int tls13_psk_binder(uint8_t *out, uint16_t version,
|
|
const EVP_MD *digest, uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len,
|
|
uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
|
|
size_t hash_len) {
|
|
uint8_t binder_context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned binder_context_len;
|
|
if (!EVP_Digest(NULL, 0, binder_context, &binder_context_len, digest, NULL)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t early_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
|
|
size_t early_secret_len;
|
|
if (!HKDF_extract(early_secret, &early_secret_len, digest, psk, hash_len,
|
|
NULL, 0)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
const char *binder_label = ssl_is_draft21(version)
|
|
? kTLS13Draft21LabelPSKBinder
|
|
: kTLS13LabelPSKBinder;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t binder_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
if (!hkdf_expand_label(binder_key, version, digest, early_secret, hash_len,
|
|
binder_label, strlen(binder_label), binder_context,
|
|
binder_context_len, hash_len) ||
|
|
!tls13_verify_data(digest, version, out, &len, binder_key, hash_len,
|
|
context, context_len)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls13_write_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *msg, size_t len) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(ssl->session);
|
|
size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
|
|
|
|
if (len < hash_len + 3) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned context_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx.get(), digest, NULL) ||
|
|
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), hs->transcript.buffer().data(),
|
|
hs->transcript.buffer().size()) ||
|
|
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), msg, len - hash_len - 3) ||
|
|
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), context, &context_len)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
|
|
if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, ssl->session->ssl_version, digest,
|
|
ssl->session->master_key,
|
|
ssl->session->master_key_length, context, context_len,
|
|
hash_len)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(msg + len - hash_len, verify_data, hash_len);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls13_verify_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, SSL_SESSION *session,
|
|
const SSLMessage &msg, CBS *binders) {
|
|
size_t hash_len = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
|
|
|
|
// The message must be large enough to exclude the binders.
|
|
if (CBS_len(&msg.raw) < CBS_len(binders) + 2) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Hash a ClientHello prefix up to the binders. This includes the header. For
|
|
// now, this assumes we only ever verify PSK binders on initial
|
|
// ClientHellos.
|
|
uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned context_len;
|
|
if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&msg.raw), CBS_len(&msg.raw) - CBS_len(binders) - 2,
|
|
context, &context_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), NULL)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
|
|
CBS binder;
|
|
if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, hs->ssl->version, hs->transcript.Digest(),
|
|
session->master_key, session->master_key_length,
|
|
context, context_len, hash_len) ||
|
|
// We only consider the first PSK, so compare against the first binder.
|
|
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(binders, &binder)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int binder_ok =
|
|
CBS_len(&binder) == hash_len &&
|
|
CRYPTO_memcmp(CBS_data(&binder), verify_data, hash_len) == 0;
|
|
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
|
|
binder_ok = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!binder_ok) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // namespace bssl
|