7934f08b26
Rather than init_msg/init_num, there is a get_message function which either returns success or try again. This function does not advance the current message (see the previous preparatory change). It only completes the current one if necessary. Being idempotent means it may be freely placed at the top of states which otherwise have other asychronous operations. It also eases converting the TLS 1.2 state machine. See https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/11n7LHsT3GwE34LAJIe3EFs4165TI4UR_3CqiM9LJVpI/edit?usp=sharing for details. The read_message hook (later to be replaced by something which doesn't depend on BIO) intentionally does not finish the handshake, only "makes progress". A follow-up change will align both TLS and DTLS on consuming one handshake record and always consuming the entire record (so init_buf may contain trailing data). In a few places I've gone ahead and accounted for that case because it was more natural to do so. This change also removes a couple pointers of redundant state from every socket. Bug: 128 Change-Id: I89d8f3622d3b53147d69ee3ac34bb654ed044a71 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18806 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
595 lines
19 KiB
C++
595 lines
19 KiB
C++
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/buf.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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namespace bssl {
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static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned len);
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/* ssl3_get_record reads a new input record. On success, it places it in
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* |ssl->s3->rrec| and returns one. Otherwise it returns <= 0 on error or if
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* more data is needed. */
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static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *ssl) {
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again:
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switch (ssl->s3->recv_shutdown) {
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case ssl_shutdown_none:
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break;
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case ssl_shutdown_fatal_alert:
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
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return -1;
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case ssl_shutdown_close_notify:
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return 0;
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}
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CBS body;
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uint8_t type, alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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size_t consumed;
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enum ssl_open_record_t open_ret =
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tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, &consumed, &alert,
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ssl_read_buffer(ssl), ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl));
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if (open_ret != ssl_open_record_partial) {
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ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, consumed);
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}
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switch (open_ret) {
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case ssl_open_record_partial: {
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int read_ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, consumed);
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if (read_ret <= 0) {
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return read_ret;
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}
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goto again;
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}
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case ssl_open_record_success: {
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if (CBS_len(&body) > 0xffff) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return -1;
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}
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SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
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rr->type = type;
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rr->length = (uint16_t)CBS_len(&body);
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rr->data = (uint8_t *)CBS_data(&body);
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return 1;
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}
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case ssl_open_record_discard:
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goto again;
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case ssl_open_record_close_notify:
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return 0;
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case ssl_open_record_fatal_alert:
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return -1;
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case ssl_open_record_error:
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
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return -1;
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}
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assert(0);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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int ssl3_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, int *out_needs_handshake, const uint8_t *buf,
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int len) {
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assert(ssl_can_write(ssl));
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assert(!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher());
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*out_needs_handshake = 0;
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unsigned tot, n, nw;
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assert(ssl->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
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tot = ssl->s3->wnum;
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ssl->s3->wnum = 0;
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/* Ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out than
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* the the original len from a write which didn't complete for non-blocking
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* I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for this in
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* ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be possible to
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* end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then promptly send
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* beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and report the error in
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* a way the user will notice. */
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if (len < 0 || (size_t)len < tot) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
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return -1;
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}
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const int is_early_data_write =
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!ssl->server && SSL_in_early_data(ssl) && ssl->s3->hs->can_early_write;
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n = len - tot;
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for (;;) {
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/* max contains the maximum number of bytes that we can put into a
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* record. */
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unsigned max = ssl->max_send_fragment;
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if (is_early_data_write && max > ssl->session->ticket_max_early_data -
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ssl->s3->hs->early_data_written) {
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max = ssl->session->ticket_max_early_data - ssl->s3->hs->early_data_written;
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if (max == 0) {
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ssl->s3->wnum = tot;
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ssl->s3->hs->can_early_write = 0;
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*out_needs_handshake = 1;
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return -1;
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}
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}
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if (n > max) {
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nw = max;
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} else {
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nw = n;
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}
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int ret = do_ssl3_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, &buf[tot], nw);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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ssl->s3->wnum = tot;
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return ret;
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}
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if (is_early_data_write) {
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ssl->s3->hs->early_data_written += ret;
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}
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if (ret == (int)n || (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)) {
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return tot + ret;
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}
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n -= ret;
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tot += ret;
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}
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}
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static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *buf,
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unsigned int len) {
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if (ssl->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len ||
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(!(ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) &&
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ssl->s3->wpend_buf != buf) ||
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ssl->s3->wpend_type != type) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
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return -1;
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}
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int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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return ret;
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}
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ssl->s3->wpend_pending = 0;
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return ssl->s3->wpend_ret;
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}
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/* do_ssl3_write writes an SSL record of the given type. */
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static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned len) {
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/* If there is still data from the previous record, flush it. */
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if (ssl->s3->wpend_pending) {
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return ssl3_write_pending(ssl, type, buf, len);
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}
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if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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if (len == 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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size_t flight_len = 0;
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if (ssl->s3->pending_flight != NULL) {
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flight_len =
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ssl->s3->pending_flight->length - ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset;
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}
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size_t max_out = len + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
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if (max_out < len || max_out + flight_len < max_out) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return -1;
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}
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max_out += flight_len;
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uint8_t *out;
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size_t ciphertext_len;
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if (!ssl_write_buffer_init(ssl, &out, max_out)) {
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return -1;
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}
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/* Add any unflushed handshake data as a prefix. This may be a KeyUpdate
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* acknowledgment or 0-RTT key change messages. |pending_flight| must be clear
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* when data is added to |write_buffer| or it will be written in the wrong
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* order. */
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if (ssl->s3->pending_flight != NULL) {
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OPENSSL_memcpy(
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out, ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset,
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flight_len);
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BUF_MEM_free(ssl->s3->pending_flight);
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ssl->s3->pending_flight = NULL;
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ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0;
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}
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if (!tls_seal_record(ssl, out + flight_len, &ciphertext_len,
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max_out - flight_len, type, buf, len)) {
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return -1;
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}
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ssl_write_buffer_set_len(ssl, flight_len + ciphertext_len);
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/* Now that we've made progress on the connection, uncork KeyUpdate
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* acknowledgments. */
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ssl->s3->key_update_pending = 0;
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/* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries
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* later */
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ssl->s3->wpend_tot = len;
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ssl->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
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ssl->s3->wpend_type = type;
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ssl->s3->wpend_ret = len;
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ssl->s3->wpend_pending = 1;
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/* we now just need to write the buffer */
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return ssl3_write_pending(ssl, type, buf, len);
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}
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static int consume_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, int len, int peek) {
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SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
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if (len <= 0) {
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return len;
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}
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if (len > (int)rr->length) {
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len = (int)rr->length;
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}
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out, rr->data, len);
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if (!peek) {
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rr->length -= len;
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rr->data += len;
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if (rr->length == 0) {
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/* The record has been consumed, so we may now clear the buffer. */
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ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
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}
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}
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return len;
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}
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int ssl3_read_app_data(SSL *ssl, int *out_got_handshake, uint8_t *buf, int len,
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int peek) {
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assert(ssl_can_read(ssl));
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assert(!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher());
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*out_got_handshake = 0;
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SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
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for (;;) {
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/* A previous iteration may have read a partial handshake message. Do not
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* allow more app data in that case. */
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int has_hs_data = ssl->init_buf != NULL && ssl->init_buf->length > 0;
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/* Get new packet if necessary. */
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if (rr->length == 0 && !has_hs_data) {
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int ret = ssl3_get_record(ssl);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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return ret;
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}
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}
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if (has_hs_data || rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
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/* If reading 0-RTT data, reject handshake data. 0-RTT data is terminated
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* by an alert. */
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if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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return -1;
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}
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/* Post-handshake data prior to TLS 1.3 is always renegotiation, which we
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* never accept as a server. Otherwise |ssl3_get_message| will send
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* |SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE|. */
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if (ssl->server && ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
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return -1;
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}
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/* Parse post-handshake handshake messages. */
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int ret = ssl3_read_message(ssl);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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return ret;
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}
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*out_got_handshake = 1;
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return -1;
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}
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const int is_early_data_read = ssl->server &&
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ssl->s3->hs != NULL &&
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ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read &&
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ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION;
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|
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/* Handle the end_of_early_data alert. */
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if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT &&
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rr->length == 2 &&
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rr->data[0] == SSL3_AL_WARNING &&
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rr->data[1] == TLS1_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA &&
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is_early_data_read) {
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/* Consume the record. */
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rr->length = 0;
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ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
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/* Stop accepting early data. */
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ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read = 0;
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*out_got_handshake = 1;
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return -1;
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}
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if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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return -1;
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}
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if (is_early_data_read) {
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if (rr->length > kMaxEarlyDataAccepted - ssl->s3->hs->early_data_read) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_READ_EARLY_DATA);
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->hs->early_data_read += rr->length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length != 0) {
|
|
return consume_record(ssl, buf, len, peek);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Discard empty records and loop again. */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_read_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length == 0) {
|
|
int ret = ssl3_get_record(ssl);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length != 1 || rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data,
|
|
rr->length);
|
|
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl3_read_close_notify(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
/* Read records until an error or close_notify. */
|
|
while (ssl3_get_record(ssl) > 0) {
|
|
;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_read_handshake_bytes(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *buf, int len) {
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
/* Get new packet if necessary. */
|
|
if (rr->length == 0) {
|
|
int ret = ssl3_get_record(ssl);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* WatchGuard's TLS 1.3 interference bug is very distinctive: they drop the
|
|
* ServerHello and send the remaining encrypted application data records
|
|
* as-is. This manifests as an application data record when we expect
|
|
* handshake. Report a dedicated error code for this case. */
|
|
if (!ssl->server && rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
|
|
ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_INSTEAD_OF_HANDSHAKE);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Accept server_plaintext_handshake records when the content type TLS 1.3
|
|
* variant is enabled. */
|
|
if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
|
|
!(!ssl->server &&
|
|
ssl->tls13_variant == tls13_record_type_experiment &&
|
|
ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
|
|
rr->type == SSL3_RT_PLAINTEXT_HANDSHAKE)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length != 0) {
|
|
return consume_record(ssl, buf, len, 0 /* consume data */);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Discard empty records and loop again. */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *ssl, int level, int desc) {
|
|
/* It is illegal to send an alert when we've already sent a closing one. */
|
|
if (ssl->s3->send_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (level == SSL3_AL_WARNING && desc == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
|
|
ssl->s3->send_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
|
|
} else {
|
|
assert(level == SSL3_AL_FATAL);
|
|
ssl->s3->send_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_fatal_alert;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
|
|
ssl->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
|
|
ssl->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
|
|
if (!ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(ssl)) {
|
|
/* Nothing is being written out, so the alert may be dispatched
|
|
* immediately. */
|
|
return ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The alert will be dispatched later. */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
int ret = do_ssl3_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &ssl->s3->send_alert[0], 2);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* If the alert is fatal, flush the BIO now. */
|
|
if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
|
|
BIO_flush(ssl->wbio);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert,
|
|
2);
|
|
|
|
int alert = (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | ssl->s3->send_alert[1];
|
|
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, alert);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // namespace bssl
|