688d8dfe48
There's not much point in retaining the identity hint in the SSL_SESSION. This avoids the complexity around setting psk_identity hint on either the SSL or the SSL_SESSION. Introduce a peer_psk_identity_hint for the client to store the one received from the server. This changes the semantics of SSL_get_psk_identity_hint; it now only returns the value configured for the server. The client learns the hint through the callback. This is compatible with the one use of this API in conscrypt (it pulls the hint back out to pass to a callback). Change-Id: I6d9131636b47f13ac5800b4451436a057021054a Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2213 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
3218 lines
80 KiB
C
3218 lines
80 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
|
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
|
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
|
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
|
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
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*
|
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
|
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
|
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
|
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
|
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*
|
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
|
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
|
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
|
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
|
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
|
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
|
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*
|
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
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*
|
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
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* distribution.
|
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*
|
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
|
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
|
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
|
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
|
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
|
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
|
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
|
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
|
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* acknowledgment:
|
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
|
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
|
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
|
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
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* ====================================================================
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*
|
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
|
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
|
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
|
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
|
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
|
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
|
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
|
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
|
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
|
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
|
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
|
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
|
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE. */
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/dh.h>
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#include <openssl/lhash.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/obj.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={
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/* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */
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(int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function,
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(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
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ssl_undefined_function,
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(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
|
|
(int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function,
|
|
(int (*)(SSL *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
|
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0, /* finish_mac_length */
|
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(int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
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NULL, /* client_finished_label */
|
|
0, /* client_finished_label_len */
|
|
NULL, /* server_finished_label */
|
|
0, /* server_finished_label_len */
|
|
(int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function,
|
|
(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
|
|
size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
|
|
int use_context)) ssl_undefined_function,
|
|
};
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|
|
/* Some error codes are special. Ensure the make_errors.go script
|
|
* never regresses this. */
|
|
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(
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SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION ==
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SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION + SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET,
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ssl_alert_reason_code_mismatch);
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|
|
int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
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|
{
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|
|
|
if (s->method == NULL)
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{
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|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_clear, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
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|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
|
|
{
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|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
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s->session=NULL;
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|
}
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s->hit=0;
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|
s->shutdown=0;
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|
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#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
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* needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */
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/* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
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* the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */
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if (s->renegotiate) return(1);
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#else
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if (s->renegotiate)
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{
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_clear, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
|
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#endif
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s->type=0;
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|
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s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT);
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|
|
s->version=s->method->version;
|
|
s->client_version=s->version;
|
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s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
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s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
|
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#if 0
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s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead;
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|
#endif
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|
|
if (s->init_buf != NULL)
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|
{
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|
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
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|
s->init_buf=NULL;
|
|
}
|
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|
|
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
|
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
|
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
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|
|
s->first_packet=0;
|
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|
|
#if 1
|
|
/* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if
|
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* so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */
|
|
if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
|
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{
|
|
s->method->ssl_free(s);
|
|
s->method=s->ctx->method;
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
|
|
{
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
|
|
|
ctx->method=meth;
|
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|
|
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(
|
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ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,
|
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meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ?
|
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"SSLv2" :
|
|
SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST,
|
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ctx->cert);
|
|
|
|
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL *s;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->method == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
|
|
if (s == NULL) goto err;
|
|
memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL));
|
|
|
|
s->options=ctx->options;
|
|
s->mode=ctx->mode;
|
|
s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->cert != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to
|
|
* the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new
|
|
* parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be
|
|
* called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX
|
|
* settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly
|
|
* accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
|
|
* used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert).
|
|
* Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having
|
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* duplicated it once. */
|
|
|
|
s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
|
|
if (s->cert == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
|
|
|
|
s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead;
|
|
s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback;
|
|
s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg;
|
|
s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode;
|
|
#if 0
|
|
s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
|
|
assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
|
|
memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
|
|
s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
|
|
s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;
|
|
|
|
s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
|
|
if (!s->param)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
|
|
#if 0
|
|
s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
|
|
s->trust = ctx->trust;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
|
|
s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
s->ctx=ctx;
|
|
s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
|
|
s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
s->initial_ctx=ctx;
|
|
if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
|
|
{
|
|
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
|
|
BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
|
|
ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
|
|
if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
|
|
ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
|
|
{
|
|
s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
|
|
BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
|
|
ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length * 2);
|
|
if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
|
|
ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
|
|
}
|
|
s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
|
|
{
|
|
s->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(
|
|
s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list,
|
|
s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
|
|
if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
s->method=ctx->method;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
s->references=1;
|
|
s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1;
|
|
|
|
SSL_clear(s);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
s->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
|
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint)
|
|
{
|
|
s->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
if (s->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback;
|
|
s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->server)
|
|
{
|
|
s->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = s->ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled;
|
|
s->ocsp_stapling_enabled = s->ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return(s);
|
|
err:
|
|
if (s != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->cert != NULL)
|
|
ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
|
|
if (s->ctx != NULL)
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s);
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
|
|
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
|
|
memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
|
|
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_session_id_context, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
|
|
memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
|
|
ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
|
|
unsigned int id_len)
|
|
{
|
|
/* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
|
|
* we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
|
|
* find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
|
|
* any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in
|
|
* use by this SSL. */
|
|
SSL_SESSION r, *p;
|
|
|
|
if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
|
|
r.session_id_length = id_len;
|
|
memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
|
|
/* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
|
|
* callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
|
|
* must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
|
|
* converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */
|
|
if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
|
|
(id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
|
|
{
|
|
memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0,
|
|
SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
|
|
r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
|
|
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
return (p != NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(
|
|
struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list)
|
|
{
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list->ciphers);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(cipher_list->in_group_flags);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(cipher_list);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st*
|
|
ssl_cipher_preference_list_dup(
|
|
struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st* ret = NULL;
|
|
size_t n = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list->ciphers);
|
|
|
|
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st));
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
ret->ciphers = NULL;
|
|
ret->in_group_flags = NULL;
|
|
ret->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list->ciphers);
|
|
if (!ret->ciphers)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
ret->in_group_flags = BUF_memdup(cipher_list->in_group_flags, n);
|
|
if (!ret->in_group_flags)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (ret && ret->ciphers)
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ret->ciphers);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ret);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st*
|
|
ssl_cipher_preference_list_from_ciphers(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st* ret = NULL;
|
|
size_t n = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers);
|
|
|
|
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st));
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
ret->ciphers = NULL;
|
|
ret->in_group_flags = NULL;
|
|
ret->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(ciphers);
|
|
if (!ret->ciphers)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
ret->in_group_flags = OPENSSL_malloc(n);
|
|
if (!ret->in_group_flags)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
memset(ret->in_group_flags, 0, n);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (ret && ret->ciphers)
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ret->ciphers);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ret);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->param;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
return ssl->param;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_free(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if(s == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
|
|
#ifdef REF_PRINT
|
|
REF_PRINT("SSL",s);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (i > 0) return;
|
|
#ifdef REF_CHECK
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
|
|
abort(); /* ok */
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (s->param)
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
if (s->bbio != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
|
|
if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
|
|
{
|
|
s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
|
|
}
|
|
BIO_free(s->bbio);
|
|
s->bbio=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->rbio != NULL)
|
|
BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
|
|
if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
|
|
BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
|
|
|
|
if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
|
|
|
/* add extra stuff */
|
|
if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
|
|
ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(s->cipher_list);
|
|
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
|
|
|
|
/* Make the next call work :-) */
|
|
if (s->session != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
|
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
|
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
|
|
|
|
if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
|
|
/* Free up if allocated */
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_hostname)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
|
|
if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
|
|
if (s->alpn_client_proto_list)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list);
|
|
if (s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(s->tlsext_channel_id_private);
|
|
|
|
if (s->psk_identity_hint)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
|
|
if (s->client_CA != NULL)
|
|
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
|
|
|
|
if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s);
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
|
|
|
|
if (s->srtp_profiles)
|
|
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->bbio != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->wbio == s->bbio)
|
|
{
|
|
s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio;
|
|
s->bbio->next_bio=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
|
|
BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
|
|
if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
|
|
BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
|
|
s->rbio=rbio;
|
|
s->wbio=wbio;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
|
|
{ return(s->rbio); }
|
|
|
|
BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
|
|
{ return(s->wbio); }
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return(SSL_get_rfd(s));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret= -1;
|
|
BIO *b,*r;
|
|
|
|
b=SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
|
|
if (r != NULL)
|
|
BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret= -1;
|
|
BIO *b,*r;
|
|
|
|
b=SSL_get_wbio(s);
|
|
r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
|
|
if (r != NULL)
|
|
BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
|
|
int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret=0;
|
|
BIO *bio=NULL;
|
|
|
|
bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_fd());
|
|
|
|
if (bio == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_fd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
|
|
SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio);
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
err:
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret=0;
|
|
BIO *bio=NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_FD)
|
|
|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd))
|
|
{
|
|
bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_fd());
|
|
|
|
if (bio == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_wfd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
|
|
SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
err:
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret=0;
|
|
BIO *bio=NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_FD)
|
|
|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd))
|
|
{
|
|
bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_fd());
|
|
|
|
if (bio == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_rfd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
|
|
SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s));
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s));
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
err:
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
|
|
size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3 != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
|
|
if (count > ret)
|
|
count = ret;
|
|
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
|
|
size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3 != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
|
|
if (count > ret)
|
|
count = ret;
|
|
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return(s->verify_mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
|
|
{
|
|
return(s->verify_callback);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return(ctx->verify_mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
|
|
{
|
|
return(ctx->default_verify_callback);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode,
|
|
int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
|
|
{
|
|
s->verify_mode=mode;
|
|
if (callback != NULL)
|
|
s->verify_callback=callback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes)
|
|
{
|
|
s->read_ahead=yes;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return(s->read_ahead);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
/* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
|
|
* (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)),
|
|
* and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report
|
|
* errors that may be observed while scanning the new data.
|
|
* (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value,
|
|
* so we'd better not return -1.)
|
|
*/
|
|
return(s->method->ssl_pending(s));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *r;
|
|
|
|
if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
|
|
r=NULL;
|
|
else
|
|
r=s->session->peer;
|
|
|
|
if (r == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
return X509_up_ref(r);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *r;
|
|
|
|
if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
|
|
r=NULL;
|
|
else
|
|
r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
|
|
|
|
/* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own
|
|
* certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */
|
|
|
|
return(r);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
|
|
int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if ( (ctx == NULL) ||
|
|
(ctx->cert == NULL) ||
|
|
(ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
|
|
int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ssl == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl->cert == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
|
|
ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
|
|
/* Not properly initialized yet */
|
|
SSL_set_accept_state(s);
|
|
|
|
return(s->method->ssl_accept(s));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
|
|
/* Not properly initialized yet */
|
|
SSL_set_connect_state(s);
|
|
|
|
return(s->method->ssl_connect(s));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_read, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
|
|
{
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_peek, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
|
|
{
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_write, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)
|
|
{
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_write, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
|
|
* expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet),
|
|
* 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough,
|
|
* even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_shutdown, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_in_init(s))
|
|
return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
|
|
else
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->renegotiate == 0)
|
|
s->renegotiate=1;
|
|
|
|
s->new_session=1;
|
|
|
|
return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->renegotiate == 0)
|
|
s->renegotiate=1;
|
|
|
|
s->new_session=0;
|
|
|
|
return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
/* becomes true when negotiation is requested;
|
|
* false again once a handshake has finished */
|
|
return (s->renegotiate != 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
|
|
{
|
|
long l;
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
|
|
return(s->read_ahead);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
|
|
l=s->read_ahead;
|
|
s->read_ahead=larg;
|
|
return(l);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
|
|
s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
|
|
return(s->options|=larg);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
|
|
return(s->options&=~larg);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
|
|
return(s->mode|=larg);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
|
|
return(s->mode &=~larg);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
|
|
return(s->max_cert_list);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
|
|
l=s->max_cert_list;
|
|
s->max_cert_list=larg;
|
|
return(l);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
|
|
if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
{
|
|
s->d1->mtu = larg;
|
|
return larg;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
|
|
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
s->max_send_fragment = larg;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
|
|
if (s->s3)
|
|
return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
|
|
else return 0;
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
|
|
return(s->cert->cert_flags|=larg);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
|
|
return(s->cert->cert_flags &=~larg);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST:
|
|
if (parg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
*(unsigned char **)parg = s->cert->ciphers_raw;
|
|
return (int)s->cert->ciphers_rawlen;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Passing a NULL |parg| returns the size of a single
|
|
* cipher suite value. */
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
|
|
{
|
|
switch(cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
|
|
s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->sessions;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
|
|
{
|
|
long l;
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
|
|
return(ctx->read_ahead);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
|
|
l=ctx->read_ahead;
|
|
ctx->read_ahead=larg;
|
|
return(l);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
|
|
ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
|
|
return(ctx->max_cert_list);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
|
|
l=ctx->max_cert_list;
|
|
ctx->max_cert_list=larg;
|
|
return(l);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
|
|
l=ctx->session_cache_size;
|
|
ctx->session_cache_size=larg;
|
|
return(l);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
|
|
return(ctx->session_cache_size);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
|
|
l=ctx->session_cache_mode;
|
|
ctx->session_cache_mode=larg;
|
|
return(l);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
|
|
return(ctx->session_cache_mode);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
|
|
return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
|
|
return(ctx->stats.sess_connect);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
|
|
return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
|
|
return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
|
|
return(ctx->stats.sess_accept);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
|
|
return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
|
|
return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
|
|
return(ctx->stats.sess_hit);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
|
|
return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
|
|
return(ctx->stats.sess_miss);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
|
|
return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
|
|
return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
|
|
return(ctx->options|=larg);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
|
|
return(ctx->options&=~larg);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
|
|
return(ctx->mode|=larg);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
|
|
return(ctx->mode&=~larg);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
|
|
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
|
|
return(ctx->cert->cert_flags|=larg);
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
|
|
return(ctx->cert->cert_flags &=~larg);
|
|
default:
|
|
return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
|
|
{
|
|
switch(cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
|
|
ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
|
|
{
|
|
long l;
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *a = in_a;
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *b = in_b;
|
|
const long a_id = a->id;
|
|
const long b_id = b->id;
|
|
|
|
l = a_id - b_id;
|
|
if (l == 0L)
|
|
return(0);
|
|
else
|
|
return((l > 0)?1:-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER **ap, const SSL_CIPHER **bp)
|
|
{
|
|
long l;
|
|
const long a_id = (*ap)->id;
|
|
const long b_id = (*bp)->id;
|
|
|
|
l = a_id - b_id;
|
|
if (l == 0)
|
|
return(0);
|
|
else
|
|
return((l > 0)?1:-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
|
|
* preference */
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
return(s->cipher_list->ciphers);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->cipher_list_tls11 != NULL)
|
|
return s->ctx->cipher_list_tls11->ciphers;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
|
|
(s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
return(s->ctx->cipher_list->ciphers);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
|
|
* algorithm id */
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
return(s->cipher_list_by_id);
|
|
}
|
|
else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
|
|
(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
|
|
const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n)
|
|
{
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
|
|
if (sk == NULL || n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n);
|
|
if (c == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return c->name;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
|
|
|
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
|
|
&ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str, ctx->cert);
|
|
/* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
|
|
* was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
|
|
* (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
|
|
* has been disabled). This is not an error as far as
|
|
* ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
|
|
* ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been
|
|
* updated. */
|
|
if (sk == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls11(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
|
|
|
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list_tls11, NULL, str, ctx->cert);
|
|
if (sk == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls11, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
|
|
int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
|
|
|
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list,
|
|
&s->cipher_list_by_id,str, s->cert);
|
|
/* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
|
|
if (sk == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_cipher_list, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, uint8_t *p)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
CERT *ct = s->cert;
|
|
uint8_t *q;
|
|
/* Set disabled masks for this session */
|
|
ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
|
|
|
|
if (sk == NULL) return(0);
|
|
q=p;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
|
|
/* Skip disabled ciphers */
|
|
if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl ||
|
|
c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k ||
|
|
c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
|
|
continue;
|
|
s2n(ssl3_get_cipher_value(c), p);
|
|
}
|
|
/* If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller. */
|
|
if (p == q)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add SCSVs. */
|
|
if (!s->renegotiate)
|
|
{
|
|
s2n(SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff, p);
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->fallback_scsv)
|
|
{
|
|
s2n(SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return(p-q);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const CBS *cbs)
|
|
{
|
|
CBS cipher_suites = *cbs;
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3)
|
|
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
|
|
if (sk == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_stow(&cipher_suites,
|
|
&s->cert->ciphers_raw, &s->cert->ciphers_rawlen))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
uint16_t cipher_suite;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check for SCSV. */
|
|
if (s->s3 && cipher_suite == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff))
|
|
{
|
|
/* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating. */
|
|
if (s->renegotiate)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check for FALLBACK_SCSV. */
|
|
if (s->s3 && cipher_suite == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff))
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->version < ssl_get_max_version(s))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
|
|
if (c != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return sk;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (sk != NULL)
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
|
|
* So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
|
|
{
|
|
if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
|
|
s->session->tlsext_hostname :
|
|
s->tlsext_hostname;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
|
|
return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Currently not implemented server-side. */
|
|
if (ssl->server)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Currently not implemented server-side. */
|
|
if (ssl->server)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->session;
|
|
|
|
*out_len = 0;
|
|
*out = NULL;
|
|
if (ssl->server)
|
|
return;
|
|
if (!session || !session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list)
|
|
return;
|
|
*out = session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list;
|
|
*out_len = session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->session;
|
|
|
|
*out_len = 0;
|
|
*out = NULL;
|
|
if (ssl->server)
|
|
return;
|
|
if (!session || !session->ocsp_response)
|
|
return;
|
|
*out = session->ocsp_response;
|
|
*out_len = session->ocsp_response_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
|
|
* expected that this function is called from the callback set by
|
|
* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
|
|
*
|
|
* The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
|
|
* strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
|
|
* string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
|
|
*
|
|
* The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
|
|
* callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
|
|
* or have a default application level protocol.
|
|
*
|
|
* 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
|
|
* client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
|
|
* API that this fallback case was enacted.
|
|
*
|
|
* 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
|
|
* that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
|
|
* assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
|
|
* a client should use.
|
|
*
|
|
* 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
|
|
* protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
|
|
*
|
|
* It returns either
|
|
* OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
|
|
* OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
|
|
*/
|
|
int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int i, j;
|
|
const unsigned char *result;
|
|
int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
|
|
|
|
/* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
|
|
{
|
|
for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
|
|
{
|
|
if (server[i] == client[j] &&
|
|
memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* We found a match */
|
|
result = &server[i];
|
|
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
|
|
goto found;
|
|
}
|
|
j += client[j];
|
|
j++;
|
|
}
|
|
i += server[i];
|
|
i++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
|
|
result = client;
|
|
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
|
|
|
|
found:
|
|
*out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
|
|
*outlen = result[0];
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
|
|
* requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
|
|
* request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
|
|
* from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
|
|
* provided by the callback.
|
|
*/
|
|
void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const uint8_t **data, unsigned *len)
|
|
{
|
|
*data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
|
|
if (!*data) {
|
|
*len = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
|
|
* TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
|
|
* Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned
|
|
* by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
|
|
* not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
|
|
* it.
|
|
*
|
|
* The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
|
|
* such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
|
|
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
|
|
* client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
|
|
* must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
|
|
* The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
|
|
* advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
|
|
* assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
|
|
*
|
|
* The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
|
|
* callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
|
|
*/
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
|
|
ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|.
|
|
* |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
|
|
* length-prefixed strings).
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success. */
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char* protos,
|
|
unsigned protos_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
|
|
|
|
ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len);
|
|
if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|.
|
|
* |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
|
|
* length-prefixed strings).
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success. */
|
|
int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char* protos,
|
|
unsigned protos_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
|
|
|
|
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len);
|
|
if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is called
|
|
* during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol from the
|
|
* client's list of offered protocols. */
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX* ctx,
|
|
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char **out,
|
|
unsigned char *outlen,
|
|
const unsigned char *in,
|
|
unsigned int inlen,
|
|
void *arg),
|
|
void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb;
|
|
ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|.
|
|
* On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name (not
|
|
* including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't respond with
|
|
* a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero. */
|
|
void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
|
|
unsigned *len)
|
|
{
|
|
*data = NULL;
|
|
if (ssl->s3)
|
|
*data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected;
|
|
if (*data == NULL)
|
|
*len = 0;
|
|
else
|
|
*len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
|
|
const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
|
|
int use_context)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
|
|
llen, p, plen,
|
|
use_context);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint32_t ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t hash = ((uint32_t) a->session_id[0]) ||
|
|
((uint32_t) a->session_id[1] << 8) ||
|
|
((uint32_t) a->session_id[2] << 16) ||
|
|
((uint32_t) a->session_id[3] << 24);
|
|
|
|
return hash;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
|
|
* coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
|
|
* SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
|
|
* able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
|
|
* with a matching session ID. */
|
|
static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b)
|
|
{
|
|
if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
|
|
return(1);
|
|
if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
|
|
return(1);
|
|
return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_CTX *ret=NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (meth == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
|
|
if (ret == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX));
|
|
|
|
ret->method=meth;
|
|
|
|
ret->cert_store=NULL;
|
|
ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
|
|
ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
|
|
ret->session_cache_head=NULL;
|
|
ret->session_cache_tail=NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* We take the system default */
|
|
ret->session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
|
|
|
|
ret->new_session_cb=0;
|
|
ret->remove_session_cb=0;
|
|
ret->get_session_cb=0;
|
|
ret->generate_session_id=0;
|
|
|
|
memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats));
|
|
|
|
ret->references=1;
|
|
ret->quiet_shutdown=0;
|
|
|
|
ret->info_callback=NULL;
|
|
|
|
ret->app_verify_callback=0;
|
|
ret->app_verify_arg=NULL;
|
|
|
|
ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
|
|
ret->read_ahead=0;
|
|
ret->msg_callback=0;
|
|
ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL;
|
|
ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
|
|
#if 0
|
|
ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
|
|
#endif
|
|
ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
|
|
ret->default_verify_callback=NULL;
|
|
if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
ret->default_passwd_callback=0;
|
|
ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL;
|
|
ret->client_cert_cb=0;
|
|
ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0;
|
|
ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0;
|
|
|
|
ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp);
|
|
if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err;
|
|
ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
|
|
if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err;
|
|
|
|
ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
|
|
&ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
|
|
meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert);
|
|
if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
|
|
|| sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list->ciphers) <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
|
|
if (!ret->param)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
ret->extra_certs=NULL;
|
|
|
|
ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
|
|
ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
|
|
/* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
|
|
if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
|
|
|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
|
|
|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
|
|
ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
|
|
|
|
ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
|
|
ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
|
|
ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
|
|
ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
|
|
ret->psk_client_callback=NULL;
|
|
ret->psk_server_callback=NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
|
|
* deployed might change this.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
|
|
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
err2:
|
|
if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret);
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (a == NULL) return;
|
|
|
|
i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
#ifdef REF_PRINT
|
|
REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (i > 0) return;
|
|
#ifdef REF_CHECK
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
|
|
abort(); /* ok */
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (a->param)
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
|
|
* the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
|
|
* after the sessions were flushed.
|
|
* As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
|
|
* the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
|
|
* free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
|
|
* (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (a->sessions != NULL)
|
|
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
if (a->sessions != NULL)
|
|
lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
|
|
|
|
if (a->cert_store != NULL)
|
|
X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
|
|
if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
|
|
ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(a->cipher_list);
|
|
if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
|
|
if (a->cipher_list_tls11 != NULL)
|
|
ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(a->cipher_list_tls11);
|
|
if (a->cert != NULL)
|
|
ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
|
|
if (a->client_CA != NULL)
|
|
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
|
|
if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free);
|
|
|
|
if (a->srtp_profiles)
|
|
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
|
|
|
|
if (a->psk_identity_hint)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
|
|
if (a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
|
|
if (a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
|
|
if (a->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list);
|
|
|
|
if (a->tlsext_channel_id_private)
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(a->tlsext_channel_id_private);
|
|
|
|
if (a->keylog_bio)
|
|
BIO_free(a->keylog_bio);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(a);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->app_verify_callback=cb;
|
|
ctx->app_verify_arg=arg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->verify_mode=mode;
|
|
ctx->default_verify_callback=cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk;
|
|
int rsa_enc,rsa_sign,dh_tmp;
|
|
unsigned long mask_k,mask_a;
|
|
int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok;
|
|
int have_ecdh_tmp;
|
|
X509 *x = NULL;
|
|
if (c == NULL) return;
|
|
|
|
dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
|
|
|
|
have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp || c->ecdh_tmp_cb || c->ecdh_tmp_auto);
|
|
cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
|
|
rsa_enc= cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
|
|
cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
|
|
rsa_sign= cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
|
|
cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
|
|
have_ecc_cert= cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
|
|
mask_k=0;
|
|
mask_a=0;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
|
printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
|
|
rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
|
|
rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (rsa_enc)
|
|
mask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
|
|
|
|
if (dh_tmp)
|
|
mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
|
|
|
|
if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign)
|
|
{
|
|
mask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
|
|
|
|
/* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDSA cipher suites depending on
|
|
* the key usage extension. */
|
|
if (have_ecc_cert)
|
|
{
|
|
cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC];
|
|
x = cpk->x509;
|
|
/* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
|
|
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
|
|
ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
|
|
(x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
|
|
if (!(cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN))
|
|
ecdsa_ok = 0;
|
|
if (ecdsa_ok)
|
|
{
|
|
mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (have_ecdh_tmp)
|
|
{
|
|
mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
|
|
mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
|
|
|
|
c->mask_k=mask_k;
|
|
c->mask_a=mask_a;
|
|
c->valid=1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
|
|
#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
|
|
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long alg_a;
|
|
int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
|
|
alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
|
|
|
|
/* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
|
|
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
|
|
if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
|
|
{
|
|
signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
|
|
OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
|
|
}
|
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
|
|
{
|
|
/* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
|
|
if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1; /* all checks are ok */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int idx;
|
|
idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
|
|
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509)
|
|
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
|
|
if (idx == -1)
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_server_cert_index, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return idx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT *c;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
c = s->cert;
|
|
ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
|
|
|
|
i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);
|
|
|
|
/* This may or may not be an error. */
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* May be NULL. */
|
|
return &c->pkeys[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long alg_a;
|
|
CERT *c;
|
|
int idx = -1;
|
|
|
|
alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
c=s->cert;
|
|
|
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
|
{
|
|
if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
|
|
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
|
|
else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
|
|
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
|
|
}
|
|
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
|
|
(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
|
|
idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
|
|
if (idx == -1)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_sign_pkey, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
if (pmd)
|
|
*pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest;
|
|
return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it,
|
|
* and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */
|
|
if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return;
|
|
|
|
i=s->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode;
|
|
if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
|
|
&& ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
|
|
|| SSL_CTX_add_session(s->initial_ctx,s->session))
|
|
&& (s->initial_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
if (!s->initial_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session))
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* auto flush every 255 connections */
|
|
if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) &&
|
|
((i & mode) == mode))
|
|
{
|
|
if ( (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
|
|
?s->initial_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
|
|
:s->initial_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->initial_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->method;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return(s->method);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
|
|
{
|
|
int conn= -1;
|
|
int ret=1;
|
|
|
|
if (s->method != meth)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
|
|
conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
|
|
|
|
if (s->method->version == meth->version)
|
|
s->method=meth;
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
s->method->ssl_free(s);
|
|
s->method=meth;
|
|
ret=s->method->ssl_new(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conn == 1)
|
|
s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect;
|
|
else if (conn == 0)
|
|
s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept;
|
|
}
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i)
|
|
{
|
|
int reason;
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
|
|
if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE);
|
|
|
|
/* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake
|
|
* etc, where we do encode the error */
|
|
if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
|
|
else
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_SSL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_session(s))
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION);
|
|
|
|
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_certificate(s))
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
|
|
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s))
|
|
{
|
|
bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
if (BIO_should_read(bio))
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
|
|
else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
|
|
/* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try
|
|
* to write to the rbio, and an application program where
|
|
* rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it
|
|
* should wait for.
|
|
* However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly
|
|
* (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of
|
|
* SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same,
|
|
* this test works around that bug; so it might be safer
|
|
* to keep it. */
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
|
|
else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
|
|
{
|
|
reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
|
|
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
|
|
else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
|
|
else
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s))
|
|
{
|
|
bio=SSL_get_wbio(s);
|
|
if (BIO_should_write(bio))
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
|
|
else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
|
|
/* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
|
|
else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
|
|
{
|
|
reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
|
|
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
|
|
else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
|
|
else
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s))
|
|
{
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
|
|
}
|
|
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(s))
|
|
{
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
|
|
{
|
|
/* assume it is the socket being closed */
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
|
|
(s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret=1;
|
|
|
|
if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_do_handshake, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
|
|
{
|
|
ret=s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
}
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so
|
|
* one of these calls will reset it */
|
|
void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
s->server=1;
|
|
s->shutdown=0;
|
|
s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
|
|
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
|
|
/* clear the current cipher */
|
|
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
|
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
|
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
s->server=0;
|
|
s->shutdown=0;
|
|
s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
|
|
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
|
|
/* clear the current cipher */
|
|
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
|
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
|
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_undefined_function, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_undefined_void_function, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_undefined_const_function, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bad_method, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const char *ssl_get_version(int version)
|
|
{
|
|
if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
|
return("TLSv1.2");
|
|
else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
|
|
return("TLSv1.1");
|
|
else if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
|
|
return("TLSv1");
|
|
else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
return("SSLv3");
|
|
else if (version == SSL2_VERSION)
|
|
return("SSLv2");
|
|
else
|
|
return("unknown");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return ssl_get_version(s->version);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *sess)
|
|
{
|
|
return ssl_get_version(sess->ssl_version);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
|
|
s->enc_read_ctx=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
|
|
s->enc_write_ctx=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->aead_read_ctx != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&s->aead_read_ctx->ctx);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->aead_read_ctx);
|
|
s->aead_read_ctx = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&s->aead_write_ctx->ctx);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->aead_write_ctx);
|
|
s->aead_write_ctx = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->cert != NULL)
|
|
return(s->cert->key->x509);
|
|
else
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->cert != NULL)
|
|
return(s->cert->key->privatekey);
|
|
else
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ctx->cert != NULL)
|
|
return ctx->cert->key->x509;
|
|
else
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ctx->cert != NULL)
|
|
return ctx->cert->key->privatekey;
|
|
else
|
|
return NULL ;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
|
|
return(s->session->cipher);
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push)
|
|
{
|
|
BIO *bbio;
|
|
|
|
if (s->bbio == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
|
|
if (bbio == NULL) return(0);
|
|
s->bbio=bbio;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
bbio=s->bbio;
|
|
if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
|
|
s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
|
|
}
|
|
(void)BIO_reset(bbio);
|
|
/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
|
|
if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_init_wbio_buffer, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
if (push)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->wbio != bbio)
|
|
s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->wbio == bbio)
|
|
s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio);
|
|
}
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->bbio == NULL) return;
|
|
|
|
if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
|
|
{
|
|
/* remove buffering */
|
|
s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
|
|
#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */
|
|
assert(s->wbio != NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
BIO_free(s->bbio);
|
|
s->bbio=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return(ctx->quiet_shutdown);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
|
|
{
|
|
s->quiet_shutdown=mode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return(s->quiet_shutdown);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
|
|
{
|
|
s->shutdown=mode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return(s->shutdown);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return(s->version);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
return(ssl->ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
|
|
return ssl->ctx;
|
|
if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
|
|
if (ssl->cert != NULL)
|
|
ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
|
|
ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
|
|
ssl->ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
|
|
assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
|
|
memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
|
|
|
|
return(ssl->ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
|
|
const char *CApath)
|
|
{
|
|
return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
|
|
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->info_callback=cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned
|
|
function pointer. */
|
|
void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/)
|
|
{
|
|
return ssl->info_callback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
return(ssl->state);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->state = state;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->verify_result=arg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
return(ssl->verify_result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
|
|
{
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
|
|
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx)
|
|
{
|
|
return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
|
|
{
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
|
|
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx)
|
|
{
|
|
return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return(ctx->cert_store);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
|
|
X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
|
|
ctx->cert_store=store;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return(s->rwstate);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*!
|
|
* \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
|
|
* \param ctx the SSL context.
|
|
* \param cb the callback
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
|
|
int is_export,
|
|
int keylength))
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
|
|
int is_export,
|
|
int keylength))
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DOXYGEN
|
|
/*!
|
|
* \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
|
|
* \param ssl the SSL session.
|
|
* \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
|
|
* \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
|
|
* of the required key in bits.
|
|
* \return the temporary RSA key.
|
|
* \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength)
|
|
{}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*!
|
|
* \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
|
|
* \param ctx the SSL context.
|
|
* \param dh the callback
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
|
|
int keylength))
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
|
|
int keylength))
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
|
|
int keylength))
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
|
|
int keylength))
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
|
|
{
|
|
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
if (identity_hint != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
|
|
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_use_psk_identity_hint, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Clear currently configured hint, if any. */
|
|
if (s->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
s->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (identity_hint != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
s->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
|
|
if (s->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return s->psk_identity_hint;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return(s->session->psk_identity);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
|
|
unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
|
|
char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
|
|
unsigned int max_psk_len))
|
|
{
|
|
s->psk_client_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
|
|
char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
|
|
unsigned int max_psk_len))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
|
|
unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
|
|
unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
|
|
{
|
|
s->psk_server_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
|
|
unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
|
|
}
|
|
void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_bio(SSL_CTX *ctx, BIO *keylog_bio)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ctx->keylog_bio != NULL)
|
|
BIO_free(ctx->keylog_bio);
|
|
ctx->keylog_bio = keylog_bio;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int cbb_add_hex(CBB *cbb, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len)
|
|
{
|
|
static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef";
|
|
uint8_t *out;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &out, in_len * 2))
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
*(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] >> 4];
|
|
*(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] & 0xf];
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
const uint8_t *encrypted_premaster, size_t encrypted_premaster_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *premaster, size_t premaster_len)
|
|
{
|
|
BIO *bio = ctx->keylog_bio;
|
|
CBB cbb;
|
|
uint8_t *out;
|
|
size_t out_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (bio == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (encrypted_premaster_len < 8)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 4 + 16 + 1 + premaster_len*2 + 1))
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)"RSA ", 4) ||
|
|
/* Only the first 8 bytes of the encrypted premaster secret are
|
|
* logged. */
|
|
!cbb_add_hex(&cbb, encrypted_premaster, 8) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)" ", 1) ||
|
|
!cbb_add_hex(&cbb, premaster, premaster_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)"\n", 1) ||
|
|
!CBB_finish(&cbb, &out, &out_len))
|
|
{
|
|
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
ret = BIO_write(bio, out, out_len) >= 0 && BIO_flush(bio);
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(out);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_ctx_log_master_secret(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
const uint8_t *client_random, size_t client_random_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *master, size_t master_len)
|
|
{
|
|
BIO *bio = ctx->keylog_bio;
|
|
CBB cbb;
|
|
uint8_t *out;
|
|
size_t out_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (bio == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (client_random_len != 32)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_ctx_log_master_secret, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 14 + 64 + 1 + master_len*2 + 1))
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)"CLIENT_RANDOM ", 14) ||
|
|
!cbb_add_hex(&cbb, client_random, 32) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)" ", 1) ||
|
|
!cbb_add_hex(&cbb, master, master_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)"\n", 1) ||
|
|
!CBB_finish(&cbb, &out, &out_len))
|
|
{
|
|
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
ret = BIO_write(bio, out, out_len) >= 0 && BIO_flush(bio);
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(out);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return (!s->server && /* cutthrough only applies to clients */
|
|
!s->hit && /* full-handshake */
|
|
s->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
|
|
s->s3->in_read_app_data == 0 && /* cutthrough only applies to write() */
|
|
(SSL_get_mode((SSL*)s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) && /* cutthrough enabled */
|
|
ssl3_can_cutthrough(s) && /* cutthrough allowed */
|
|
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 && /* not a renegotiation handshake */
|
|
(s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A || /* ready to write app-data*/
|
|
s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE ||
|
|
s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_get_structure_sizes(size_t* ssl_size, size_t* ssl_ctx_size,
|
|
size_t* ssl_session_size)
|
|
{
|
|
*ssl_size = sizeof(SSL);
|
|
*ssl_ctx_size = sizeof(SSL_CTX);
|
|
*ssl_session_size = sizeof(SSL_SESSION);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_can_cutthrough(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
|
|
/* require a strong enough cipher */
|
|
if (SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) < 128)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* require ALPN or NPN extension */
|
|
if (!s->s3->alpn_selected && !s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* require a forward-secret cipher */
|
|
c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
|
|
if (!c || (c->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kEDH &&
|
|
c->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kEECDH))
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ssl_get_max_version returns the maximum SSL/TLS version number supported by
|
|
* |s|, or zero if all versions are disabled. */
|
|
int ssl_get_max_version(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Only one version supported for DTLS. */
|
|
if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
|
|
return DTLS1_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
|
|
return TLS1_2_VERSION;
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
|
|
return TLS1_1_VERSION;
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
|
|
return TLS1_VERSION;
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
|
|
return SSL3_VERSION;
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
|
|
return SSL2_VERSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
|
|
* vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if
|
|
* any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md
|
|
* Returns newly allocated ctx;
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
|
|
*hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
|
if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash,md,NULL);
|
|
return *hash;
|
|
}
|
|
void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
|
|
*hash=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
|
|
{
|
|
s->debug = debug;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return s->hit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_is_server(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return s->server;
|
|
}
|