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6acf476eb6
boringssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
Adam Langley 6acf476eb6 Make tls_session_secret_cb work with CVE-2014-0224 fix. 
If application uses tls_session_secret_cb for session resumption set the
CCS_OK flag.

(Imported from upstream's a21f350a76b34b66dcaf9c1676baec945f32e980)
2014-06-20 13:17:41 -07:00

3533 lines
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/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_client_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ssl3_connect,
ssl3_get_client_method)
int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
ERR_clear_error();
ERR_clear_system_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
* already got and don't await it anymore, because
* Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
*/
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
{
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
}
#endif
if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH)
{
/* Send app data along with CCS/Finished */
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED;
}
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch(s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate=1;
s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
/* break */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
s->server=0;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_connect, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
{
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
buf=NULL;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
/* setup buffing BIO */
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
{
/* receive renewed session ticket */
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
}
#endif
}
else
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* The server hello indicated that
* an audit proof would follow. */
if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
else
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
}
s->init_num=0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_CR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
ret = tls1_get_server_supplemental_data(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (ret == 2)
{
s->hit = 1;
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
}
#endif
/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
/* or non-RSA PSK */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
!((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) &&
!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA)))
{
ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* at this point we check that we have the
* required stuff from the server */
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
/* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
* sent back */
/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
* of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
* ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
* We need to skip the certificate verify
* message when client's ECDH public key is sent
* inside the client certificate.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
}
else
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
# endif
#endif
s->init_num=0;
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
s->session->compress_meth=0;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
break;
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B:
ret=ssl3_send_channel_id(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
/* clear flags */
s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
if (s->hit)
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
{
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
}
}
else
{
/* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it
* involves ChannelID, then record the
* handshake hashes at this point in the
* session so that any resumption of this
* session with ChannelID can sign those
* hashes. */
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
{
ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH)
&& ssl3_can_cutthrough(s)
&& s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 /* no cutthrough on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine) */
)
{
if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
}
}
else
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
#endif
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
}
}
s->init_num=0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
else
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
/* SSL_write() will take care of flushing buffered data if
* DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED is set.
*/
if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED))
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
ret = 1;
goto end;
/* break; */
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (s->init_buf != NULL)
{
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
}
/* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
* remove the buffering now */
if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
s->init_num=0;
s->renegotiate=0;
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
ret=1;
/* s->server=0; */
s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_connect, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
/* did we do anything */
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
if (s->debug)
{
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
skip=0;
}
end:
s->in_handshake--;
if (buf != NULL)
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i;
unsigned long l;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
if ((sess == NULL) ||
(sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
!sess->session_id_length ||
#else
(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
#endif
(sess->not_resumable))
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
goto err;
}
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
{
/* Determine which DTLS version to use */
int options = s->options;
/* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)
{
if (tls1_suiteb(s))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
goto err;
}
/* Disabling all versions is silly: return an
* error.
*/
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
goto err;
}
/* Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2
* features.
*/
s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
}
else
{
/* We only support one version: update method */
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
}
s->client_version = s->version;
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p=s->s3->client_random;
/* for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
* required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
size_t idx;
i = 1;
for (idx=0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++)
{
if (p[idx])
{
i = 0;
break;
}
}
}
else
i = 1;
if (i)
ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
/* Do the message type and length last.
* Note: the final argument to ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext below
* depends on the size of this prefix. */
d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
/* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
* 1.0.
*
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
* 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
* containing version 1.0.
*
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*/
#if 0
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
s->client_version=s->version;
#else
*(p++)=s->client_version>>8;
*(p++)=s->client_version&0xff;
#endif
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* Session ID */
if (s->new_session)
i=0;
else
i=s->session->session_id_length;
*(p++)=i;
if (i != 0)
{
if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
p+=i;
}
/* cookie stuff for DTLS */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
if ( s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
p += s->d1->cookie_len;
}
/* Ciphers supported */
i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
if (i == 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
/* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes
* as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers
* to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
#endif
s2n(i,p);
p+=i;
/* COMPRESSION */
*(p++)=1;
*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions*/
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, p-buf)) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#endif
l= p-d;
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
CERT *ct = s->cert;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ok;
unsigned int j;
long n;
/* Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not
* match so set first packet if we're negotiating version.
*/
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
s->first_packet = 1;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
-1,
20000, /* ?? */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
s->first_packet = 0;
if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
{
if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return 1;
}
else /* already sent a cookie */
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
{
/* Work out correct protocol version to use */
int hversion = (p[0] << 8)|p[1];
int options = s->options;
if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
s->version = hversion;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
else
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version = hversion;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->version = s->client_version = s->method->version;
}
if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1];
al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
p+=2;
/* load the server hello data */
/* load the server random */
memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* get the session-id */
j= *(p++);
if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
{
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length,
NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
{
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
{
if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length))
{
/* actually a client application bug */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->hit=1;
}
else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
{
/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
* SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
s->hit=0;
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
{
goto f_err;
}
}
s->session->session_id_length=j;
memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */
}
p+=j;
c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
if (c == NULL)
{
/* unknown cipher */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello,
* so return an error.
*/
if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl ||
c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k ||
c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, NULL, c))
{
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
{
/* Workaround is now obsolete */
#if 0
if (!(s->options &
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
#endif
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
/* Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for
* client authentication.
*/
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto f_err;
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
/* COMPRESSION */
if (*(p++) != 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions*/
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
#endif
if (p != (d+n))
{
/* wrong packet length */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
X509 *x=NULL;
const unsigned char *q,*p;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)))
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2l3(p,llen);
if (llen+3 != n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
{
n2l3(p,l);
if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q=p;
x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l);
if (x == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (q != (p+l))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x=NULL;
nc+=l+3;
p=q;
}
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
)
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (sc == NULL) goto err;
if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
s->session->sess_cert=sc;
sc->cert_chain=sk;
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
* certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
sk=NULL;
/* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
? 0 : 1;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
if (need_cert && i < 0)
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (need_cert)
{
int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx)
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
/* Why would the following ever happen?
* We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
s->session->peer=x;
}
else
{
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
sc->peer_key= NULL;
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer=NULL;
}
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x=NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* Check the audit proof. */
if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
{
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb(s,
s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb_arg);
if (ret <= 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_INVALID_AUDIT_PROOF);
goto f_err;
}
}
#endif
ret=1;
if (0)
{
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param,*p;
int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
long n,alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
int curve_nid = 0;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
later.*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_aPSK)
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
}
#endif
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
{
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
{
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
{
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
}
else
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
param_len=0;
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
{
char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
n2s(p,i);
param_len=i+2;
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
if (i != 0)
{
/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
* in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the
* maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
* long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
* characters, the hint is truncated from the first
* NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
* NULL-terminated string. */
memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
if (0) {}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2s(p,i);
param_len=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n2s(p,i);
param_len+=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
rsa=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
{
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
n2s(p,i);
param_len=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n2s(p,i);
param_len+=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n2s(p,i);
param_len+=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
dh=NULL;
}
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
{
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
* server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
* Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
*/
/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
* and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
*/
param_len=3;
/* Check curve is one of our prefrences, if not server has
* sent an invalid curve.
*/
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, param_len))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
p+=3;
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p+=1;
param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
if ((param_len > n) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
n-=param_len;
p+=encoded_pt_len;
/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
* the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
* key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
ecdh=NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
if (rv == -1)
goto err;
else if (rv == 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
p += 2;
n -= 2;
}
else
md = EVP_sha1();
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
/* wrong packet length */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
int num;
j=0;
q=md_buf;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
{
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
else
{
if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) &&
/* Among PSK ciphers only RSA_PSK needs a public key */
!((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA)))
{
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_key_exchange, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (dh != NULL)
DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
if (ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
}
int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
int ok,ret=0;
unsigned long n,nc,l;
unsigned int llen, ctype_num,i;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
const unsigned char *p,*q;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
/* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records
* as we wont be doing client auth.
*/
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
{
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
}
return(1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
{
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
}
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
if (ca_sk == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* get the certificate types */
ctype_num= *(p++);
if (s->cert->ctypes)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
}
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
{
/* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
}
for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
p+=p[-1];
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
n2s(p, llen);
/* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and
* following length value.
*/
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
}
if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen))
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += llen;
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
n2s(p,llen);
#if 0
{
FILE *out;
out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w");
fwrite(p,1,llen,out);
fclose(out);
}
#endif
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
{
n2s(p,l);
if ((l+nc+2) > llen)
{
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
q=p;
if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL)
{
/* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
goto cont;
else
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (q != (p+l))
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p+=l;
nc+=l+2;
}
if (0)
{
cont:
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1;
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num;
if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk;
ca_sk=NULL;
ret=1;
err:
if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free);
return(ret);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{
int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen;
long n;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *d;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
-1,
16384,
&ok);
if (!ok)
return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_new_session_ticket, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (n < 6)
{
/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_new_session_ticket, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
n2s(p, ticklen);
/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
if (ticklen + 6 != n)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_new_session_ticket, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->session->tlsext_tick)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_new_session_ticket, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
* One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
* must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
* client session ID matching to work and we know much
* earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
*
* The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
* ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
* session resumption.
*
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with
* assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
* to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
* ticket.
*/
EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
#else
EVP_sha1(), NULL);
#endif
ret=1;
return(ret);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al;
unsigned long resplen,n;
const unsigned char *p;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS,
16384,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (n < 4)
{
/* need at least status type + length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
n2l3(p, resplen);
if (resplen + 4 != n)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
{
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
{
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
goto f_err;
}
if (ret < 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
return(-1);
}
#endif
int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
{
int ok,ret=0;
long n;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (n > 0)
{
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_done, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return -1;
}
ret=1;
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
int n = 0;
unsigned long alg_k;
unsigned long alg_a;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
unsigned int psk_len = 0;
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
{
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
size_t identity_len;
unsigned char *t = NULL;
unsigned char pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0;
int psk_err = 1;
n = 0;
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
goto err;
}
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
identity, sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
}
else if (psk_len == 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
identity_len = OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity));
if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
}
if (!(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH))
{
/* Create the shared secret now if we're not using ECDHE-PSK.*/
pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
t = pre_ms;
s2n(psk_len, t);
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
t+=psk_len;
s2n(psk_len, t);
memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
s2n(identity_len, p);
memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
n = 2 + identity_len;
}
if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, sizeof(pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
/* Fool emacs indentation */
if (0) {}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else
{
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
goto err;
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
q=p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p+=2;
n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
#endif
if (n <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
{
s2n(n,q);
n+=2;
}
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
if (scert == NULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
dh_srvr=scert->peer_dh_tmp;
else
{
/* we get them from the cert */
int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
dh_srvr = NULL;
if (idx >= 0)
spkey = X509_get_pubkey(
scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
if (spkey)
{
dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
}
if (dh_srvr == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
{
/* Use client certificate key */
EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
dh_clnt = NULL;
if (clkey)
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
if (dh_clnt == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
/* generate a new random key */
if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
}
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
* make sure to clear it out afterwards */
n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
DH_free(dh_srvr);
if (n <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,p,n);
/* clean up */
memset(p,0,n);
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
n = 0;
else
{
/* send off the data */
n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
s2n(n,p);
BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
n+=2;
}
DH_free(dh_clnt);
/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
EC_KEY *tkey;
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
int field_size = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
unsigned char *pre_ms;
unsigned char *t;
unsigned int pre_ms_len;
unsigned int i;
#endif
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
/* Did we send out the client's
* ECDH share for use in premaster
* computation as part of client certificate?
* If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
*/
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL))
{
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
* To add such support, one needs to add
* code that checks for appropriate
* conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
* For example, the cert have an ECC
* key on the same curve as the server's
* and the key should be authorized for
* key agreement.
*
* One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
* to skip sending the certificate verify
* message.
*
* if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
* (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
* EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
* ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
*/
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
{
tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
}
else
{
/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
(srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
(srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
}
srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
{
/* Reuse key info from our certificate
* We only need our private key to perform
* the ECDH computation.
*/
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
if (priv_key == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
* make sure to clear it out afterwards
*/
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
if (field_size <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
if (n <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
{
pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+n;
pre_ms = OPENSSL_malloc(pre_ms_len);
if (pre_ms == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
memset(pre_ms, 0, pre_ms_len);
t = pre_ms;
s2n(psk_len, t);
memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
t += psk_len;
s2n(n, t);
memcpy(t, p, n);
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-> generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
OPENSSL_free(pre_ms);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
if (!(alg_a & SSL_aPSK))
{
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-> generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, p, n);
}
memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
{
/* Send empty client key exch message */
n = 0;
}
else
{
/* First check the size of encoding and
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
encoded_pt_len =
EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len *
sizeof(unsigned char));
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) ||
(bn_ctx == NULL))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key */
encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
n = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
{
i = strlen(s->session->psk_identity);
s2n(i, p);
memcpy(p, s->session->psk_identity, i);
p += i;
n = i + 2;
}
#endif
*p = encoded_pt_len; /* length of encoded point */
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
n += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len);
/* increment n to account for length field */
n += encoded_pt_len;
}
/* Free allocated memory */
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_GOST_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto err;
}
else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK) || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && !(alg_a & SSL_aPSK)))
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
#endif
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
unsigned signature_length = 0;
unsigned long n;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
{
p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature
* using agreed digest and cached handshake records.
*/
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
long hdatalen = 0;
char *hdata;
const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer,
&hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_verify, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2,
&signature_length, pkey))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_verify, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(signature_length, p);
n = signature_length + 4;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
}
else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, data);
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_sha1, &data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]);
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
&p[2], &signature_length, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_verify, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(signature_length, p);
n = signature_length + 2;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, data);
if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type, data,
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
&signature_length, pkey->pkey.dsa))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_verify, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(signature_length, p);
n = signature_length + 2;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, data);
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, data,
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
&signature_length, pkey->pkey.ec))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_verify, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(signature_length, p);
n = signature_length + 2;
}
else
#endif
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
{
unsigned char signbuf[64];
int i, j;
size_t sigsize=64;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_id_GostR3411_94,
data);
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_verify, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) {
p[2+j]=signbuf[i];
}
s2n(j,p);
n=j+2;
}
else
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_verify, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return(-1);
}
/* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently
* check cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if
* static DH client certificates can be used and optionally checks
* suitability for Suite B.
*/
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k;
if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
return 0;
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
return 0;
/* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it.
* This also adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
*/
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
return 0;
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
int i = scert->peer_cert_type;
EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
return 1;
if (i >= 0)
spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
if (spkey)
{
/* Compare server and client parameters */
i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
if (i != 1)
return 0;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
X509 *x509=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
int i;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
{
/* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
if (s->cert->cert_cb)
{
i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (i < 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return -1;
}
if (i == 0)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
}
if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
}
/* We need to get a client cert */
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
{
/* If we get an error, we need to
* ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
* We then get retied later */
i=0;
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
if (i < 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return(-1);
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
i=0;
}
else if (i == 1)
{
i=0;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
i = 0;
if (i == 0)
{
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
return(1);
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
}
}
/* Ok, we have a cert */
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
}
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key);
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i,idx;
long alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh;
#endif
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA)))
return(1);
sc=s->session->sess_cert;
if (sc == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
#endif
/* This is the passed certificate */
idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
{
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
s) == 0)
{ /* check failed */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
else
{
return 1;
}
}
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
!has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
!has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#endif
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
if (rsa == NULL
|| RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
if (dh == NULL
|| DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
err:
return(0);
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int len, padding_len;
unsigned char *d;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A)
{
len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
d[4] = len;
memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
d[5 + len] = padding_len;
memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
s->init_off = 0;
}
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
}
# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *d;
int ret = -1, public_key_len;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
size_t sig_len;
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
unsigned char *public_key = NULL, *derp, *der_sig = NULL;
if (s->state != SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A)
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private && s->ctx->channel_id_cb)
{
EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
s->ctx->channel_id_cb(s, &key);
if (key != NULL)
{
s->tlsext_channel_id_private = key;
}
}
if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
return (-1);
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
l2n3(2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d);
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, d);
else
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, d);
s2n(TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
public_key_len = i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, NULL);
if (public_key_len <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY);
goto err;
}
/* i2d_PublicKey will produce an ANSI X9.62 public key which, for a
* P-256 key, is 0x04 (meaning uncompressed) followed by the x and y
* field elements as 32-byte, big-endian numbers. */
if (public_key_len != 65)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
goto err;
}
public_key = OPENSSL_malloc(public_key_len);
if (!public_key)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
derp = public_key;
i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, &derp);
if (EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL,
s->tlsext_channel_id_private) != 1)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &sig_len))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
goto err;
}
der_sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len);
if (!der_sig)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, der_sig, &sig_len))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
goto err;
}
derp = der_sig;
sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, (const unsigned char**) &derp, sig_len);
if (sig == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG);
goto err;
}
/* The first byte of public_key will be 0x4, denoting an uncompressed key. */
memcpy(d, public_key + 1, 64);
d += 64;
memset(d, 0, 2 * 32);
BN_bn2bin(sig->r, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
d += 32;
BN_bn2bin(sig->s, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
d += 32;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B;
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE;
s->init_off = 0;
ret = ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
if (public_key)
OPENSSL_free(public_key);
if (der_sig)
OPENSSL_free(der_sig);
if (sig)
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
return ret;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
* case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
* session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
{
int ok;
long n;
/* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
return 1;
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
* message, so permit appropriate message length */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
|| (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
return 2;
return 1;
}
#endif
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
int i = 0;
/* TODO(fork): remove */
#if 0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine)
{
i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (i != 0)
return i;
}
#endif
#endif
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey);
return i;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int tls1_get_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
{
int al;
int ok;
unsigned long supp_data_len, authz_data_len;
long n;
unsigned short supp_data_type, authz_data_type, proof_len;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *new_proof;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B,
SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,
/* use default limit */
TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* The message cannot be empty */
if (n < 3)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* Length of supplemental data */
n2l3(p,supp_data_len);
n -= 3;
/* We must have at least one supplemental data entry
* with type (1 byte) and length (2 bytes). */
if (supp_data_len != (unsigned long) n || n < 4)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* Supplemental data type: must be authz_data */
n2s(p,supp_data_type);
n -= 2;
if (supp_data_type != TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data)
{
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
/* Authz data length */
n2s(p, authz_data_len);
n -= 2;
if (authz_data_len != (unsigned long) n || n < 1)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* Authz data type: must be audit_proof */
authz_data_type = *(p++);
n -= 1;
if (authz_data_type != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_AUTHZ_DATA_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
/* We have a proof: read its length */
if (n < 2)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, proof_len);
n -= 2;
if (proof_len != (unsigned long) n)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* Store the proof */
new_proof = OPENSSL_realloc(s->session->audit_proof,
proof_len);
if (new_proof == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
s->session->audit_proof_length = proof_len;
s->session->audit_proof = new_proof;
memcpy(s->session->audit_proof, p, proof_len);
/* Got the proof, but can't verify it yet. */
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
return -1;
}
#endif
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