boringssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.c
Adam Langley 5129e2d695 Align EVP return values with BoringSSL convention.
Where possible, functions should return one for success and zero for
error. The use of additional negative values to indicate an error is,
itself, error prone.

This change fixes many EVP functions to remove the possibility of
negative return values. Existing code that is testing for <= 0 will
continue to function, although there is the possibility that some code
was differentiating between negative values (error) and zero (invalid
signature) for the verify functions and will now show the wrong error
message.

Change-Id: I982512596bb18a82df65861394dbd7487783bd3d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1333
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-07-29 21:47:51 +00:00

481 lines
14 KiB
C

/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/thread.h>
#include "../ec/internal.h"
int ECDSA_sign(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, uint8_t *sig,
unsigned int *sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey) {
if (eckey->ecdsa_meth && eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign) {
return eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign(digest, digest_len, sig, sig_len, eckey);
}
return ECDSA_sign_ex(type, digest, digest_len, sig, sig_len, NULL, NULL,
eckey);
}
int ECDSA_verify(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey) {
ECDSA_SIG *s;
int ret = 0;
if (eckey->ecdsa_meth && eckey->ecdsa_meth->verify) {
return eckey->ecdsa_meth->verify(digest, digest_len, sig, sig_len, eckey);
}
s = ECDSA_SIG_new();
if (s == NULL || d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &sig, sig_len) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, s, eckey);
err:
if (s != NULL) {
ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
}
return ret;
}
/* digest_to_bn interprets |digest_len| bytes from |digest| as a big-endian
* number and sets |out| to that value. It then truncates |out| so that it's,
* at most, as long as |order|. It returns one on success and zero otherwise. */
static int digest_to_bn(BIGNUM *out, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const BIGNUM *order) {
size_t num_bits;
num_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
/* Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole
* bytes. */
if (8 * digest_len > num_bits) {
digest_len = (num_bits + 7) / 8;
}
if (!BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, out)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, digest_to_bn, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
return 0;
}
/* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
if ((8 * digest_len > num_bits) &&
!BN_rshift(out, out, 8 - (num_bits & 0x7))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, digest_to_bn, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
EC_KEY *key) {
return ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, NULL, NULL, key);
}
int ECDSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey) {
int ret = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx;
BIGNUM *order, *u1, *u2, *m, *X;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *group;
const EC_POINT *pub_key;
if (eckey->ecdsa_meth && eckey->ecdsa_meth->verify) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ECDSA_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
return 0;
}
/* check input values */
if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL ||
(pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL || sig == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (!ctx) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!X) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) ||
BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
ret = 0; /* signature is invalid */
goto err;
}
/* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */
if (!BN_mod_inverse(u2, sig->s, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!digest_to_bn(m, digest, digest_len, order)) {
goto err;
}
/* u1 = m * tmp mod order */
if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* u2 = r * w mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
point = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (point == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */
ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0);
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (point) {
EC_POINT_free(point);
}
return ret;
}
static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
BIGNUM **rp, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len) {
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *order = NULL, *X = NULL;
EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *group;
int ret = 0;
if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ecdsa_sign_setup, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
if (ctx_in == NULL) {
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ecdsa_sign_setup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
} else {
ctx = ctx_in;
}
k = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */
r = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *rp */
order = BN_new();
X = BN_new();
if (!k || !r || !order || !X) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ecdsa_sign_setup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (tmp_point == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ecdsa_sign_setup, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ecdsa_sign_setup, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
do {
/* If possible, we'll include the private key and message digest in the k
* generation. The |digest| argument is only empty if |ECDSA_sign_setup| is
* being used. */
do {
int ok;
if (digest_len > 0) {
ok = BN_generate_dsa_nonce(k, order, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey),
digest, digest_len, ctx);
} else {
ok = BN_rand_range(k, order);
}
if (!ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ecdsa_sign_setup,
ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(k));
/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
* so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
* bit-length. */
if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order)) {
if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) {
goto err;
}
}
/* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ecdsa_sign_setup, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ecdsa_sign_setup, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ecdsa_sign_setup, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(r));
/* compute the inverse of k */
if (!BN_mod_inverse(k, k, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ecdsa_sign_setup, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* clear old values if necessary */
if (*rp != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(*rp);
}
if (*kinvp != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
}
/* save the pre-computed values */
*rp = r;
*kinvp = k;
ret = 1;
err:
if (!ret) {
if (k != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(k);
}
if (r != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(r);
}
}
if (ctx_in == NULL)
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (order != NULL)
BN_free(order);
if (tmp_point != NULL)
EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
if (X)
BN_clear_free(X);
return ret;
}
int ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinv, BIGNUM **rp) {
return ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, kinv, rp, NULL, 0);
}
ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r,
EC_KEY *eckey) {
int ok = 0;
BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *order = NULL;
const BIGNUM *ckinv;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *group;
ECDSA_SIG *ret;
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
if (eckey->ecdsa_meth && eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_sign_ex, ECDSA_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
return NULL;
}
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey);
if (group == NULL || priv_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_sign_ex, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return NULL;
}
ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
if (!ret) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_sign_ex, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
s = ret->s;
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_sign_ex, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_sign_ex, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!digest_to_bn(m, digest, digest_len, order)) {
goto err;
}
for (;;) {
if (in_kinv == NULL || in_r == NULL) {
if (!ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, digest, digest_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_sign_ex, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
ckinv = kinv;
} else {
ckinv = in_kinv;
if (BN_copy(ret->r, in_r) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_sign_ex, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_sign_ex, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_sign_ex, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_sign_ex, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
/* if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller
* don't to generate new kinv and r values */
if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_sign_ex, ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
goto err;
}
} else {
/* s != 0 => we have a valid signature */
break;
}
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
if (ctx)
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (m)
BN_clear_free(m);
if (tmp)
BN_clear_free(tmp);
if (order)
BN_free(order);
if (kinv)
BN_clear_free(kinv);
return ret;
}
int ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
uint8_t *sig, unsigned int *sig_len, const BIGNUM *kinv,
const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey) {
ECDSA_SIG *s = NULL;
if (eckey->ecdsa_meth && eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_sign_ex, ECDSA_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
*sig_len = 0;
return 0;
}
s = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, kinv, r, eckey);
if (s == NULL) {
*sig_len = 0;
return 0;
}
*sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &sig);
ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
return 1;
}