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- /* v3_purp.c */
- /*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2001.
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
- #include <stdio.h>
-
- #include <string.h>
-
- #include <openssl/buf.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/digest.h>
- #include <openssl/mem.h>
- #include <openssl/obj.h>
- #include <openssl/thread.h>
- #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
- #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
- #include "../internal.h"
-
- #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
- #define ku_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
- #define xku_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
- #define ns_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
-
- static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
-
- static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
- static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
- static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
- static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
- static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
- static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
- static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
- static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
- static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
- static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
- static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-
- static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b);
- static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
-
- static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
- {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0,
- check_purpose_ssl_client, (char *)"SSL client", (char *)"sslclient",
- NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
- check_purpose_ssl_server, (char *)"SSL server", (char *)"sslserver",
- NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
- check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, (char *)"Netscape SSL server",
- (char *)"nssslserver", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign,
- (char *)"S/MIME signing", (char *)"smimesign", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0,
- check_purpose_smime_encrypt, (char *)"S/MIME encryption",
- (char *)"smimeencrypt", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign,
- (char *)"CRL signing", (char *)"crlsign", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, (char *)"Any Purpose",
- (char *)"any", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper,
- (char *)"OCSP helper", (char *)"ocsphelper", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0,
- check_purpose_timestamp_sign, (char *)"Time Stamp signing",
- (char *)"timestampsign", NULL},
- };
-
- #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
-
- static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
-
- static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b)
- {
- return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
- }
-
- /*
- * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I
- * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
- * things.
- */
- int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
- {
- int idx;
- const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
- x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
- if (id == -1)
- return 1;
- idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
- if (idx == -1)
- return -1;
- pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
- return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
- }
-
- int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
- {
- if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
- return 0;
- }
- *p = purpose;
- return 1;
- }
-
- int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
- {
- if (!xptable)
- return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
- return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
- }
-
- X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
- {
- if (idx < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT)
- return xstandard + idx;
- return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
- }
-
- int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
- {
- int i;
- X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
- for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
- xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
- if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname))
- return i;
- }
- return -1;
- }
-
- int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
- {
- X509_PURPOSE tmp;
- size_t idx;
-
- if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
- return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
- tmp.purpose = purpose;
- if (!xptable)
- return -1;
-
- if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &idx, &tmp))
- return -1;
- return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
- }
-
- int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
- int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
- char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
- {
- int idx;
- X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
- char *name_dup, *sname_dup;
-
- /*
- * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
- */
- flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
- /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
- flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
- /* Get existing entry if any */
- idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
- /* Need a new entry */
- if (idx == -1) {
- if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
- } else
- ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-
- /* Duplicate the supplied names. */
- name_dup = BUF_strdup(name);
- sname_dup = BUF_strdup(sname);
- if (name_dup == NULL || sname_dup == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- if (name_dup != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(name_dup);
- if (sname_dup != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(sname_dup);
- if (idx == -1)
- OPENSSL_free(ptmp);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
- if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
- OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
- OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
- }
- /* dup supplied name */
- ptmp->name = name_dup;
- ptmp->sname = sname_dup;
- /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
- ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
- /* Set all other flags */
- ptmp->flags |= flags;
-
- ptmp->purpose = id;
- ptmp->trust = trust;
- ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
- ptmp->usr_data = arg;
-
- /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
- if (idx == -1) {
- if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- xptable_free(ptmp);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- xptable_free(ptmp);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
- {
- if (!p)
- return;
- if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) {
- if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
- OPENSSL_free(p->name);
- OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
- }
- OPENSSL_free(p);
- }
- }
-
- void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
- {
- unsigned int i;
- sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
- for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++)
- xptable_free(xstandard + i);
- xptable = NULL;
- }
-
- int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
- {
- return xp->purpose;
- }
-
- char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
- {
- return xp->name;
- }
-
- char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
- {
- return xp->sname;
- }
-
- int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
- {
- return xp->trust;
- }
-
- static int nid_cmp(const void *void_a, const void *void_b)
- {
- const int *a = void_a, *b = void_b;
-
- return *a - *b;
- }
-
- int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
- {
- /*
- * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is
- * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is
- * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will
- * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical
- * order because it will be searched using bsearch.
- */
-
- static const int supported_nids[] = {
- NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
- NID_key_usage, /* 83 */
- NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */
- NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */
- NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
- NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */
- NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
- NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */
- NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */
- NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */
- NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */
- };
-
- int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
-
- if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
- return 0;
-
- if (bsearch
- (&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int),
- sizeof(int), nid_cmp) != NULL)
- return 1;
- return 0;
- }
-
- static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
- {
- X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
- size_t i;
- if (dp->reasons) {
- if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
- dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
- if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
- dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
- dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
- } else
- dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
- if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
- return;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
- GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
- if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
- iname = gen->d.directoryName;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!iname)
- iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
-
- DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
-
- }
-
- static void setup_crldp(X509 *x)
- {
- size_t i;
- x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
- setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
- }
-
- static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
- {
- BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
- PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
- EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
- X509_EXTENSION *ex;
- size_t i;
- int j;
-
- CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&x->lock);
- const int is_set = x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET;
- CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&x->lock);
-
- if (is_set) {
- return;
- }
-
- CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&x->lock);
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
- CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
- return;
- }
-
- X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
- /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
- if (!X509_get_version(x))
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
- /* Handle basic constraints */
- if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
- if (bs->ca)
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
- if (bs->pathlen) {
- if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
- || !bs->ca) {
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
- x->ex_pathlen = 0;
- } else
- x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
- } else
- x->ex_pathlen = -1;
- BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
- }
- /* Handle proxy certificates */
- if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
- || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
- || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
- }
- if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
- x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
- } else
- x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
- PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
- }
- /* Handle key usage */
- if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
- if (usage->length > 0) {
- x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
- if (usage->length > 1)
- x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
- } else
- x->ex_kusage = 0;
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
- }
- x->ex_xkusage = 0;
- if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
- switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
- case NID_server_auth:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
- break;
-
- case NID_client_auth:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
- break;
-
- case NID_email_protect:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
- break;
-
- case NID_code_sign:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
- break;
-
- case NID_ms_sgc:
- case NID_ns_sgc:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
- break;
-
- case NID_OCSP_sign:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
- break;
-
- case NID_time_stamp:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
- break;
-
- case NID_dvcs:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
- break;
-
- case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
- break;
- }
- }
- sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
- }
-
- if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
- if (ns->length > 0)
- x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
- else
- x->ex_nscert = 0;
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
- }
- x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
- x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
- /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
- /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */
- if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
- !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
- }
- x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
- x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL);
- if (!x->nc && (j != -1))
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
- setup_crldp(x);
-
- for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++) {
- ex = X509_get_ext(x, j);
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
- == NID_freshest_crl)
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
- if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
- continue;
- if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) {
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
- break;
- }
- }
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
-
- CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
- }
-
- /*
- * CA checks common to all purposes return codes: 0 not a CA 1 is a CA 2
- * basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA 3 basicConstraints absent but self
- * signed V1. 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign
- * asserted.
- */
-
- static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
- {
- /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
- if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
- return 0;
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
- return 1;
- /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
- else
- return 0;
- } else {
- /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
- if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT)
- return 3;
- /*
- * If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it
- */
- else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
- return 4;
- /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
- else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA)
- return 5;
- /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
- {
- x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
- return check_ca(x);
- }
-
- /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
- static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
- {
- int ca_ret;
- ca_ret = check_ca(x);
- if (!ca_ret)
- return 0;
- /* check nsCertType if present */
- if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA)
- return ca_ret;
- else
- return 0;
- }
-
- static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
- {
- if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT))
- return 0;
- if (ca)
- return check_ssl_ca(x);
- /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */
- if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
- return 0;
- /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
- if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT))
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
-
- /*
- * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
- * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
- * key types.
- */
- #define KU_TLS \
- (KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)
-
- static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
- {
- if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC))
- return 0;
- if (ca)
- return check_ssl_ca(x);
-
- if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER))
- return 0;
- if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
- }
-
- static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
- {
- int ret;
- ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
- if (!ret || ca)
- return ret;
- /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
- if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
- return 0;
- return ret;
- }
-
- /* common S/MIME checks */
- static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
- {
- if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME))
- return 0;
- if (ca) {
- int ca_ret;
- ca_ret = check_ca(x);
- if (!ca_ret)
- return 0;
- /* check nsCertType if present */
- if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA)
- return ca_ret;
- else
- return 0;
- }
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
- if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME)
- return 1;
- /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
- if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT)
- return 2;
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
- {
- int ret;
- ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
- if (!ret || ca)
- return ret;
- if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION))
- return 0;
- return ret;
- }
-
- static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
- {
- int ret;
- ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
- if (!ret || ca)
- return ret;
- if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
- return 0;
- return ret;
- }
-
- static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
- {
- if (ca) {
- int ca_ret;
- if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2)
- return ca_ret;
- else
- return 0;
- }
- if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN))
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
-
- /*
- * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA
- * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
- */
-
- static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
- {
- /*
- * Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value
- * (2)?
- */
- if (ca)
- return check_ca(x);
- /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
- {
- int i_ext;
-
- /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
- if (ca)
- return check_ca(x);
-
- /*
- * Check the optional key usage field:
- * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
- * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
- * be rejected).
- */
- if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
- && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
- !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
- return 0;
-
- /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
- return 0;
-
- /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
- i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
- if (i_ext >= 0) {
- X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext);
- if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
- {
- return 1;
- }
-
- /*
- * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. This can be
- * used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which have been looked
- * up using some simple method such as by subject name. These are: 1. Check
- * issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) 2. If akid(subject) exists
- * check it matches issuer 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports
- * certificate signing returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch,
- * reasons match codes for X509_verify_cert()
- */
-
- int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
- {
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
- X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
- return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
- x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
- x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
-
- if (subject->akid) {
- int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
- if (ret != X509_V_OK)
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
- if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
- return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
- } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
- return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
- return X509_V_OK;
- }
-
- int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
- {
-
- if (!akid)
- return X509_V_OK;
-
- /* Check key ids (if present) */
- if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid))
- return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
- /* Check serial number */
- if (akid->serial &&
- ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
- return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
- /* Check issuer name */
- if (akid->issuer) {
- /*
- * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF
- * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but
- * we only take any notice of the first.
- */
- GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
- GENERAL_NAME *gen;
- X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
- size_t i;
- gens = akid->issuer;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
- gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
- if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
- nm = gen->d.dirn;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
- return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
- }
- return X509_V_OK;
- }
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