|
- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE. */
-
- #include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
- #include <assert.h>
- #include <string.h>
-
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/buf.h>
- #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
- #include <openssl/cipher.h>
- #include <openssl/ec.h>
- #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/hmac.h>
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
- #include <openssl/mem.h>
- #include <openssl/nid.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
-
- #include "internal.h"
- #include "../crypto/internal.h"
-
-
- static int ssl3_process_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_select_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_send_certificate_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_send_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
- static int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-
- static struct CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX g_v2clienthello_lock =
- CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_INIT;
- static uint64_t g_v2clienthello_count = 0;
-
- uint64_t SSL_get_v2clienthello_count(void) {
- CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(&g_v2clienthello_lock);
- uint64_t ret = g_v2clienthello_count;
- CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_read(&g_v2clienthello_lock);
- return ret;
- }
-
- int ssl3_accept(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- uint32_t alg_a;
- int ret = -1;
-
- assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_accept);
- assert(ssl->server);
-
- for (;;) {
- int state = hs->state;
-
- switch (hs->state) {
- case SSL_ST_INIT:
- ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
- ret = ssl3_process_client_hello(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
- ret = ssl3_select_certificate(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- if (hs->state != SSL_ST_TLS13) {
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
- ret = ssl3_select_parameters(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- ssl->method->received_flight(ssl);
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
- ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- if (ssl->session != NULL) {
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- } else {
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
- if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
- ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
- if (hs->certificate_status_expected) {
- ret = ssl3_send_certificate_status(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
- alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- /* PSK ciphers send ServerKeyExchange if there is an identity hint. */
- if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(hs->new_cipher) ||
- ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && ssl->psk_identity_hint)) {
- ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
- if (hs->cert_request) {
- ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
- ret = ssl3_send_server_hello_done(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
- if (hs->cert_request) {
- ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
- ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE:
- ret = ssl->method->read_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
- if (hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
- if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
- ret = ssl3_get_channel_id(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
- ret = ssl3_get_finished(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- ssl->method->received_flight(ssl);
- if (ssl->session != NULL) {
- hs->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- } else {
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- }
-
- /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the handshake
- * hashes in |hs->new_session| in case we need them to verify a
- * ChannelID signature on a resumption of this session in the future. */
- if (ssl->session == NULL && ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
- ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
- if (hs->ticket_expected) {
- ret = ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE:
- if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl) ||
- !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
- ret = ssl3_send_finished(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- if (ssl->session != NULL) {
- hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- } else {
- hs->next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
- ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- hs->state = hs->next_state;
- if (hs->state != SSL_ST_OK) {
- ssl->method->expect_flight(ssl);
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL_ST_TLS13: {
- int early_return = 0;
- ret = tls13_handshake(hs, &early_return);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (early_return) {
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- hs->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- break;
- }
-
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- ssl->method->release_current_message(ssl, 1 /* free_buffer */);
-
- /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it
- * now. */
- if (hs->new_session != NULL &&
- ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
- sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
- hs->new_session->certs = NULL;
- ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_clear(hs->new_session);
- }
-
- SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session);
- if (ssl->session != NULL) {
- SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
- ssl->s3->established_session = ssl->session;
- } else {
- ssl->s3->established_session = hs->new_session;
- ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = 0;
- hs->new_session = NULL;
- }
-
- if (hs->v2_clienthello) {
- CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&g_v2clienthello_lock);
- g_v2clienthello_count++;
- CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(&g_v2clienthello_lock);
- }
-
- ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1;
- ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
-
- default:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (hs->state != state) {
- ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
- }
- }
-
- end:
- ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
- return ret;
- }
-
- int ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
- uint16_t id) {
- CBS cipher_suites;
- CBS_init(&cipher_suites, client_hello->cipher_suites,
- client_hello->cipher_suites_len);
-
- while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
- uint16_t got_id;
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &got_id)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (got_id == id) {
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
- }
-
- static int negotiate_version(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
- const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- assert(!ssl->s3->have_version);
- uint16_t min_version, max_version;
- if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- return 0;
- }
-
- uint16_t version = 0;
- /* Check supported_versions extension if it is present. */
- CBS supported_versions;
- if (ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &supported_versions,
- TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)) {
- CBS versions;
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&supported_versions, &versions) ||
- CBS_len(&supported_versions) != 0 ||
- CBS_len(&versions) == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Choose the newest commonly-supported version advertised by the client.
- * The client orders the versions according to its preferences, but we're
- * not required to honor the client's preferences. */
- int found_version = 0;
- while (CBS_len(&versions) != 0) {
- uint16_t ext_version;
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&versions, &ext_version)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!ssl->method->version_from_wire(&ext_version, ext_version)) {
- continue;
- }
- if (min_version <= ext_version &&
- ext_version <= max_version &&
- (!found_version || version < ext_version)) {
- version = ext_version;
- found_version = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (!found_version) {
- goto unsupported_protocol;
- }
- } else {
- /* Process ClientHello.version instead. Note that versions beyond (D)TLS 1.2
- * do not use this mechanism. */
- if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
- if (client_hello->version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
- version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
- } else if (client_hello->version <= DTLS1_VERSION) {
- version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
- } else {
- goto unsupported_protocol;
- }
- } else {
- if (client_hello->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
- } else if (client_hello->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
- version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
- } else if (client_hello->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
- version = TLS1_VERSION;
- } else if (client_hello->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- version = SSL3_VERSION;
- } else {
- goto unsupported_protocol;
- }
- }
-
- /* Apply our minimum and maximum version. */
- if (version > max_version) {
- version = max_version;
- }
-
- if (version < min_version) {
- goto unsupported_protocol;
- }
- }
-
- /* Handle FALLBACK_SCSV. */
- if (ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(client_hello,
- SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff) &&
- version < max_version) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- *out_alert = SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
- return 0;
- }
-
- hs->client_version = client_hello->version;
- ssl->version = ssl->method->version_to_wire(version);
-
- /* At this point, the connection's version is known and |ssl->version| is
- * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
- ssl->s3->have_version = 1;
-
- return 1;
-
- unsupported_protocol:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- return 0;
- }
-
- static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *
- ssl_parse_client_cipher_list(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
- CBS cipher_suites;
- CBS_init(&cipher_suites, client_hello->cipher_suites,
- client_hello->cipher_suites_len);
-
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
- if (sk == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
- uint16_t cipher_suite;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
- goto err;
- }
-
- const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
- if (c != NULL && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- return sk;
-
- err:
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers determines the key exchange and
- * authentication cipher suite masks compatible with the server configuration
- * and current ClientHello parameters of |hs|. It sets |*out_mask_k| to the key
- * exchange mask and |*out_mask_a| to the authentication mask. */
- static void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
- uint32_t *out_mask_k,
- uint32_t *out_mask_a) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
- *out_mask_k = SSL_kGENERIC;
- *out_mask_a = SSL_aGENERIC;
- return;
- }
-
- uint32_t mask_k = 0;
- uint32_t mask_a = 0;
-
- if (ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
- mask_a |= ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(hs->local_pubkey);
- if (EVP_PKEY_id(hs->local_pubkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
- }
- }
-
- /* Check for a shared group to consider ECDHE ciphers. */
- uint16_t unused;
- if (tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &unused)) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE;
- }
-
- /* PSK requires a server callback. */
- if (ssl->psk_server_callback != NULL) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
- mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
- }
-
- *out_mask_k = mask_k;
- *out_mask_a = mask_a;
- }
-
- static const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(
- SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
- const struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *server_pref) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
- /* in_group_flags will either be NULL, or will point to an array of bytes
- * which indicate equal-preference groups in the |prio| stack. See the
- * comment about |in_group_flags| in the |ssl_cipher_preference_list_st|
- * struct. */
- const uint8_t *in_group_flags;
- /* group_min contains the minimal index so far found in a group, or -1 if no
- * such value exists yet. */
- int group_min = -1;
-
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *client_pref =
- ssl_parse_client_cipher_list(client_hello);
- if (client_pref == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (ssl->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
- prio = server_pref->ciphers;
- in_group_flags = server_pref->in_group_flags;
- allow = client_pref;
- } else {
- prio = client_pref;
- in_group_flags = NULL;
- allow = server_pref->ciphers;
- }
-
- uint32_t mask_k, mask_a;
- ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(hs, &mask_k, &mask_a);
-
- const SSL_CIPHER *ret = NULL;
- for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, i);
-
- size_t cipher_index;
- if (/* Check if the cipher is supported for the current version. */
- SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) <= ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) &&
- ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) <= SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(c) &&
- /* Check the cipher is supported for the server configuration. */
- (c->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) &&
- (c->algorithm_auth & mask_a) &&
- /* Check the cipher is in the |allow| list. */
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, &cipher_index, c)) {
- if (in_group_flags != NULL && in_group_flags[i] == 1) {
- /* This element of |prio| is in a group. Update the minimum index found
- * so far and continue looking. */
- if (group_min == -1 || (size_t)group_min > cipher_index) {
- group_min = cipher_index;
- }
- } else {
- if (group_min != -1 && (size_t)group_min < cipher_index) {
- cipher_index = group_min;
- }
- ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, cipher_index);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (in_group_flags != NULL && in_group_flags[i] == 0 && group_min != -1) {
- /* We are about to leave a group, but we found a match in it, so that's
- * our answer. */
- ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, group_min);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(client_pref);
- return ret;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_process_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
- if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, ssl->init_msg,
- ssl->init_num)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Run the early callback. */
- if (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) {
- switch (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&client_hello)) {
- case ssl_select_cert_retry:
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
- return -1;
-
- case ssl_select_cert_error:
- /* Connection rejected. */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
-
- default:
- /* fallthrough */;
- }
- }
-
- uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- if (!negotiate_version(hs, &alert, &client_hello)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Load the client random. */
- if (client_hello.random_len != SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->client_random, client_hello.random,
- client_hello.random_len);
-
- /* Only null compression is supported. TLS 1.3 further requires the peer
- * advertise no other compression. */
- if (OPENSSL_memchr(client_hello.compression_methods, 0,
- client_hello.compression_methods_len) == NULL ||
- (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
- client_hello.compression_methods_len != 1)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_LIST);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* TLS extensions. */
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &client_hello)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_select_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- /* Call |cert_cb| to update server certificates if required. */
- if (ssl->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
- int rv = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg);
- if (rv == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- if (rv < 0) {
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if (!ssl_on_certificate_selected(hs)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
- /* Jump to the TLS 1.3 state machine. */
- hs->state = SSL_ST_TLS13;
- hs->do_tls13_handshake = tls13_server_handshake;
- return 1;
- }
-
- SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
- if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, ssl->init_msg,
- ssl->init_num)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Negotiate the cipher suite. This must be done after |cert_cb| so the
- * certificate is finalized. */
- hs->new_cipher =
- ssl3_choose_cipher(hs, &client_hello, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl));
- if (hs->new_cipher == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- uint8_t al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- int ret = -1;
- SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
-
- SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
- if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, ssl->init_msg,
- ssl->init_num)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Determine whether we are doing session resumption. */
- int tickets_supported = 0, renew_ticket = 0;
- switch (ssl_get_prev_session(ssl, &session, &tickets_supported, &renew_ticket,
- &client_hello)) {
- case ssl_session_success:
- break;
- case ssl_session_error:
- goto err;
- case ssl_session_retry:
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
- goto err;
- case ssl_session_ticket_retry:
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_TICKET;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (session != NULL) {
- if (session->extended_master_secret && !hs->extended_master_secret) {
- /* A ClientHello without EMS that attempts to resume a session with EMS
- * is fatal to the connection. */
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_session_is_resumable(hs, session) ||
- /* If the client offers the EMS extension, but the previous session
- * didn't use it, then negotiate a new session. */
- hs->extended_master_secret != session->extended_master_secret) {
- SSL_SESSION_free(session);
- session = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- if (session != NULL) {
- /* Use the old session. */
- hs->ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
- ssl->session = session;
- session = NULL;
- ssl->s3->session_reused = 1;
- } else {
- hs->ticket_expected = tickets_supported;
- ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 1 /* server */)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Clear the session ID if we want the session to be single-use. */
- if (!(ssl->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) {
- hs->new_session->session_id_length = 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL &&
- ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&client_hello) == 0) {
- /* Connection rejected for DOS reasons. */
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (ssl->session == NULL) {
- hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
-
- /* On new sessions, stash the SNI value in the session. */
- if (hs->hostname != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(hs->new_session->tlsext_hostname);
- hs->new_session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(hs->hostname);
- if (hs->new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Determine whether to request a client certificate. */
- hs->cert_request = !!(ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER);
- /* Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated. */
- if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
- ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
- hs->cert_request = 0;
- }
- /* CertificateRequest may only be sent in certificate-based ciphers. */
- if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
- hs->cert_request = 0;
- }
-
- if (!hs->cert_request) {
- /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is
- * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
- hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
- }
- }
-
- /* HTTP/2 negotiation depends on the cipher suite, so ALPN negotiation was
- * deferred. Complete it now. */
- if (!ssl_negotiate_alpn(hs, &al, &client_hello)) {
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Now that all parameters are known, initialize the handshake hash and hash
- * the ClientHello. */
- if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init_hash(&hs->transcript, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl),
- hs->new_cipher->algorithm_prf) ||
- !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Release the handshake buffer if client authentication isn't required. */
- if (!hs->cert_request) {
- SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- }
-
- err:
- SSL_SESSION_free(session);
- return ret;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
- /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order to avoid a
- * known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */
- if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
- (hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) == 0) {
- ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
- }
-
- /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't support
- * ChannelID then we didn't record the original handshake hashes in the
- * session and so cannot resume with ChannelIDs. */
- if (ssl->session != NULL &&
- ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
- ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
- }
-
- struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
- ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
- ssl->s3->server_random[0] = now.tv_sec >> 24;
- ssl->s3->server_random[1] = now.tv_sec >> 16;
- ssl->s3->server_random[2] = now.tv_sec >> 8;
- ssl->s3->server_random[3] = now.tv_sec;
- if (!RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->server_random + 4, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - 4)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* TODO(davidben): Implement the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 downgrade sentinels once TLS
- * 1.3 is finalized and we are not implementing a draft version. */
-
- const SSL_SESSION *session = hs->new_session;
- if (ssl->session != NULL) {
- session = ssl->session;
- }
-
- CBB cbb, body, session_id;
- if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
- !CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl->version) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &session_id) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, session->session_id,
- session->session_id_length) ||
- !CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl_cipher_get_value(hs->new_cipher)) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* no compression */) ||
- !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &body) ||
- !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) {
- return -1;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_send_certificate_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- CBB cbb, body, ocsp_response;
- if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(&body, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
- !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &ocsp_response) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response,
- CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(ssl->cert->ocsp_response),
- CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(ssl->cert->ocsp_response)) ||
- !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- CBB cbb, child;
- CBB_zero(&cbb);
-
- /* Put together the parameters. */
- if (hs->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- /* Pre-allocate enough room to comfortably fit an ECDHE public key. */
- if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 128)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* PSK ciphers begin with an identity hint. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
- size_t len =
- (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) ? 0 : strlen(ssl->psk_identity_hint);
- if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)ssl->psk_identity_hint,
- len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
- /* Determine the group to use. */
- uint16_t group_id;
- if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
-
- /* Set up ECDH, generate a key, and emit the public half. */
- if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&hs->ecdh_ctx, group_id) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
- !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, group_id) ||
- !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
- !SSL_ECDH_CTX_offer(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &child)) {
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- assert(alg_k & SSL_kPSK);
- }
-
- if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, &hs->server_params, &hs->server_params_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Assemble the message. */
- CBB body;
- if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
- SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&body, hs->server_params, hs->server_params_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Add a signature. */
- if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
- if (!ssl_has_private_key(ssl)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Determine the signature algorithm. */
- uint16_t signature_algorithm;
- if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
- goto err;
- }
- if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Add space for the signature. */
- const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey);
- uint8_t *ptr;
- if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
- !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- size_t sig_len;
- enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result;
- if (hs->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- CBB transcript;
- uint8_t *transcript_data;
- size_t transcript_len;
- if (!CBB_init(&transcript,
- 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + hs->server_params_len) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->client_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->server_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, hs->server_params,
- hs->server_params_len) ||
- !CBB_finish(&transcript, &transcript_data, &transcript_len)) {
- CBB_cleanup(&transcript);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len,
- signature_algorithm, transcript_data,
- transcript_len);
- OPENSSL_free(transcript_data);
- } else {
- assert(hs->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B);
- sign_result = ssl_private_key_complete(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len);
- }
-
- switch (sign_result) {
- case ssl_private_key_success:
- if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- break;
- case ssl_private_key_failure:
- goto err;
- case ssl_private_key_retry:
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(hs->server_params);
- hs->server_params = NULL;
- hs->server_params_len = 0;
-
- return 1;
-
- err:
- CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
- return -1;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- CBB cbb, body, cert_types, sigalgs_cbb;
- if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ||
- !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &cert_types) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(&cert_types, SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN) ||
- (ssl->version >= TLS1_VERSION &&
- !CBB_add_u8(&cert_types, TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN))) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &sigalgs_cbb) ||
- !tls12_add_verify_sigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs_cbb)) {
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (!ssl_add_client_CA_list(ssl, &body) ||
- !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- err:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
- return -1;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_send_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- CBB cbb, body;
- if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) ||
- !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- assert(hs->cert_request);
-
- int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
- if (msg_ret <= 0) {
- return msg_ret;
- }
-
- if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
- if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION &&
- ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- /* In SSL 3.0, the Certificate message is omitted to signal no
- * certificate. */
- if (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are received. This is
- * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
- hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
- ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- return 1;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- CBS certificate_msg;
- CBS_init(&certificate_msg, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-
- sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
- EVP_PKEY_free(hs->peer_pubkey);
- hs->peer_pubkey = NULL;
- uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- hs->new_session->certs = ssl_parse_cert_chain(
- &alert, &hs->peer_pubkey,
- ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs ? hs->new_session->peer_sha256
- : NULL,
- &certificate_msg, ssl->ctx->pool);
- if (hs->new_session->certs == NULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0 ||
- !ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0) {
- /* No client certificate so the handshake buffer may be discarded. */
- SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
-
- /* In SSL 3.0, sending no certificate is signaled by omitting the
- * Certificate message. */
- if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) {
- /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are received. This is
- * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
- hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* The hash will have been filled in. */
- if (ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
- hs->new_session->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
- }
-
- if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(hs->new_session, ssl)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- int al;
- CBS client_key_exchange;
- uint32_t alg_k;
- uint32_t alg_a;
- uint8_t *premaster_secret = NULL;
- size_t premaster_secret_len = 0;
- uint8_t *decrypt_buf = NULL;
-
- unsigned psk_len = 0;
- uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
-
- if (hs->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
- !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- CBS_init(&client_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
- alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
- CBS psk_identity;
-
- /* If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a psk_identity. If PSK,
- * then this is the only field in the message. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) ||
- ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (ssl->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
- CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &hs->new_session->psk_identity)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Look up the key for the identity. */
- psk_len = ssl->psk_server_callback(ssl, hs->new_session->psk_identity, psk,
- sizeof(psk));
- if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- } else if (psk_len == 0) {
- /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and
- * |premaster_secret_len|. */
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- /* Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption. */
- const size_t rsa_size = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey);
- decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
- if (decrypt_buf == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- enum ssl_private_key_result_t decrypt_result;
- size_t decrypt_len;
- if (hs->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- if (!ssl_has_private_key(ssl) ||
- EVP_PKEY_id(hs->local_pubkey) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- CBS encrypted_premaster_secret;
- if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange,
- &encrypted_premaster_secret) ||
- CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL,
- SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else {
- encrypted_premaster_secret = client_key_exchange;
- }
-
- /* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of the
- * timing-sensitive code below. */
- decrypt_result = ssl_private_key_decrypt(
- ssl, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size,
- CBS_data(&encrypted_premaster_secret),
- CBS_len(&encrypted_premaster_secret));
- } else {
- assert(hs->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B);
- /* Complete async decrypt. */
- decrypt_result =
- ssl_private_key_complete(ssl, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size);
- }
-
- switch (decrypt_result) {
- case ssl_private_key_success:
- break;
- case ssl_private_key_failure:
- goto err;
- case ssl_private_key_retry:
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (decrypt_len != rsa_size) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Prepare a random premaster, to be used on invalid padding. See RFC 5246,
- * section 7.4.7.1. */
- premaster_secret_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
- if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys are
- * publicly invalid. */
- if (decrypt_len < 11 + premaster_secret_len) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
- size_t padding_len = decrypt_len - premaster_secret_len;
- uint8_t good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[0], 0) &
- constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[1], 2);
- for (size_t i = 2; i < padding_len - 1; i++) {
- good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[i]);
- }
- good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len - 1]);
-
- /* The premaster secret must begin with |client_version|. This too must be
- * checked in constant time (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/). */
- good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len],
- (unsigned)(hs->client_version >> 8));
- good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len + 1],
- (unsigned)(hs->client_version & 0xff));
-
- /* Select, in constant time, either the decrypted premaster or the random
- * premaster based on |good|. */
- for (size_t i = 0; i < premaster_secret_len; i++) {
- premaster_secret[i] = constant_time_select_8(
- good, decrypt_buf[padding_len + i], premaster_secret[i]);
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
- decrypt_buf = NULL;
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
- /* Parse the ClientKeyExchange. */
- CBS peer_key;
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &peer_key) ||
- CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Compute the premaster. */
- uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_finish(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &premaster_secret,
- &premaster_secret_len, &alert, CBS_data(&peer_key),
- CBS_len(&peer_key))) {
- al = alert;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */
- SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&hs->ecdh_ctx);
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as the
- * pre-shared key. */
- premaster_secret_len = psk_len;
- premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
- if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- OPENSSL_memset(premaster_secret, 0, premaster_secret_len);
- } else {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with the
- * pre-shared key. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
- CBB new_premaster, child;
- uint8_t *new_data;
- size_t new_len;
-
- CBB_zero(&new_premaster);
- if (!CBB_init(&new_premaster, 2 + psk_len + 2 + premaster_secret_len) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&child, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
- !CBB_finish(&new_premaster, &new_data, &new_len)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- CBB_cleanup(&new_premaster);
- goto err;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
- premaster_secret = new_data;
- premaster_secret_len = new_len;
- }
-
- /* Compute the master secret */
- hs->new_session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(
- hs, hs->new_session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- if (hs->new_session->master_key_length == 0) {
- goto err;
- }
- hs->new_session->extended_master_secret = hs->extended_master_secret;
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
- return 1;
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- if (premaster_secret != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
- }
- OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
-
- return -1;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- int al;
- CBS certificate_verify, signature;
-
- /* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
- * CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a client certificate.
- * */
- if (hs->peer_pubkey == NULL) {
- SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
- return 1;
- }
-
- int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
- if (msg_ret <= 0) {
- return msg_ret;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&certificate_verify, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-
- /* Determine the digest type if needbe. */
- uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
- if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&certificate_verify, &signature_algorithm)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &al, signature_algorithm)) {
- goto f_err;
- }
- hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
- } else if (hs->peer_pubkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1;
- } else if (hs->peer_pubkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
- } else {
- al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Parse and verify the signature. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) ||
- CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- int sig_ok;
- /* The SSL3 construction for CertificateVerify does not decompose into a
- * single final digest and signature, and must be special-cased. */
- if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) {
- uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t digest_len;
- if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_ssl3_cert_verify_hash(&hs->transcript, digest,
- &digest_len, hs->new_session,
- signature_algorithm)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(hs->peer_pubkey, NULL);
- sig_ok = pctx != NULL &&
- EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) &&
- EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature),
- digest, digest_len);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- } else {
- sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(
- ssl, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), signature_algorithm,
- hs->peer_pubkey, (const uint8_t *)hs->transcript.buffer->data,
- hs->transcript.buffer->length);
- }
-
- #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
- sig_ok = 1;
- ERR_clear_error();
- #endif
- if (!sig_ok) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current
- * message.*/
- SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
- if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
- * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
- static int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) ||
- !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- CBS next_protocol, selected_protocol, padding;
- CBS_init(&next_protocol, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) ||
- CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_stow(&selected_protocol, &ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated,
- &ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
- static int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
- if (msg_ret <= 0) {
- return msg_ret;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
- !tls1_verify_channel_id(hs) ||
- !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
- return -1;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- const SSL_SESSION *session;
- SSL_SESSION *session_copy = NULL;
- if (ssl->session == NULL) {
- /* Fix the timeout to measure from the ticket issuance time. */
- ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, hs->new_session);
- session = hs->new_session;
- } else {
- /* We are renewing an existing session. Duplicate the session to adjust the
- * timeout. */
- session_copy = SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session, SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
- if (session_copy == NULL) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session_copy);
- session = session_copy;
- }
-
- CBB cbb, body, ticket;
- int ok =
- ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) &&
- CBB_add_u32(&body, session->timeout) &&
- CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &ticket) &&
- ssl_encrypt_ticket(ssl, &ticket, session) &&
- ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb);
-
- SSL_SESSION_free(session_copy);
- CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
|