a19fc259f0
There's no need to store them on the session. They're temporary handshake state and weren't serialized in d2i_SSL_SESSION anyway. Change-Id: I830d378ab49aaa4fc6c4c7a6a8c035e2263fb763 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1990 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
3173 lines
84 KiB
C
3173 lines
84 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/obj.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
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const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
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SSL_SESSION **psess);
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static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
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static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
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SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
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tls1_enc,
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tls1_mac,
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tls1_setup_key_block,
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tls1_generate_master_secret,
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tls1_change_cipher_state,
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tls1_final_finish_mac,
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TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
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tls1_cert_verify_mac,
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TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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tls1_alert_code,
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tls1_export_keying_material,
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0,
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SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
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ssl3_set_handshake_header,
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ssl3_handshake_write
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};
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SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
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tls1_enc,
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tls1_mac,
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tls1_setup_key_block,
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tls1_generate_master_secret,
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tls1_change_cipher_state,
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tls1_final_finish_mac,
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TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
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tls1_cert_verify_mac,
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TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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tls1_alert_code,
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tls1_export_keying_material,
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SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
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SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
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ssl3_set_handshake_header,
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ssl3_handshake_write
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};
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SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
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tls1_enc,
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tls1_mac,
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tls1_setup_key_block,
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tls1_generate_master_secret,
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tls1_change_cipher_state,
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tls1_final_finish_mac,
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TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
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tls1_cert_verify_mac,
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TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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tls1_alert_code,
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tls1_export_keying_material,
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SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
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|SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
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SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
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ssl3_set_handshake_header,
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ssl3_handshake_write
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};
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static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2)
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{
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uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t*)p1);
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uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t*)p2);
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if (u1 < u2)
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{
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return -1;
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}
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else if (u1 > u2)
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{
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return 1;
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}
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else
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{
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be more
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* than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. This
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* function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
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* out. */
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static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs)
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{
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CBS extensions = *cbs;
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size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
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uint16_t *extension_types = NULL;
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int ret = 0;
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/* First pass: count the extensions. */
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while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0)
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{
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uint16_t type;
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CBS extension;
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if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
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!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
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{
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goto done;
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}
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num_extensions++;
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}
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if (num_extensions == 0)
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{
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return 1;
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}
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extension_types = (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_extensions);
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if (extension_types == NULL)
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{
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_check_duplicate_extensions, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto done;
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}
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/* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
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extensions = *cbs;
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for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++)
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{
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CBS extension;
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if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
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!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
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{
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/* This should not happen. */
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goto done;
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}
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}
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assert(CBS_len(&extensions) == 0);
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/* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
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qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(uint16_t), compare_uint16_t);
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for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++)
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{
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if (extension_types[i-1] == extension_types[i])
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{
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goto done;
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}
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}
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ret = 1;
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done:
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if (extension_types)
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OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
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return ret;
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}
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char ssl_early_callback_init(struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx)
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{
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CBS client_hello, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods, extensions;
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CBS_init(&client_hello, ctx->client_hello, ctx->client_hello_len);
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/* Skip client version. */
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if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2))
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return 0;
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/* Skip client nonce. */
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if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 32))
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return 0;
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/* Extract session_id. */
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if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id))
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return 0;
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ctx->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id);
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ctx->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id);
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/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ctx->ssl))
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{
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CBS cookie;
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if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie))
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return 0;
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}
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/* Extract cipher_suites. */
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if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
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CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 ||
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(CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0)
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return 0;
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ctx->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites);
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ctx->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites);
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/* Extract compression_methods. */
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if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
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CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1)
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return 0;
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ctx->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods);
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ctx->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods);
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/* If the ClientHello ends here then it's valid, but doesn't have any
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* extensions. (E.g. SSLv3.) */
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if (CBS_len(&client_hello) == 0)
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{
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ctx->extensions = NULL;
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ctx->extensions_len = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Extract extensions and check it is valid. */
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if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) ||
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!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) ||
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CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0)
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return 0;
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ctx->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions);
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ctx->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions);
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return 1;
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}
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char
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SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
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uint16_t extension_type,
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const unsigned char **out_data,
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size_t *out_len)
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{
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CBS extensions;
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CBS_init(&extensions, ctx->extensions, ctx->extensions_len);
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while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0)
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{
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uint16_t type;
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CBS extension;
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|
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/* Decode the next extension. */
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if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
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!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
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return 0;
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if (type == extension_type)
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{
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*out_data = CBS_data(&extension);
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*out_len = CBS_len(&extension);
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return 1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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|
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static const int nid_list[] =
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{
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NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
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NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
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NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
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NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
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NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
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NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
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NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
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NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
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NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
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NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
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NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
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NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
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NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
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NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
|
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NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
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NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
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NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
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NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
|
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NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
|
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NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
|
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NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
|
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NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
|
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NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
|
|
NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
|
|
NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
|
|
NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
|
|
NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
|
|
NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const uint8_t ecformats_default[] =
|
|
{
|
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TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] =
|
|
{
|
|
23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
|
|
24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
|
|
25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id)
|
|
{
|
|
/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
|
|
if (curve_id < 1 || curve_id > sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))
|
|
return OBJ_undef;
|
|
return nid_list[curve_id-1];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint16_t tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
/* nid_list[i] stores the NID corresponding to curve ID i+1. */
|
|
if (nid == nid_list[i])
|
|
return i + 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Use 0 for non-existent curve ID. Note: this assumes that curve ID 0
|
|
* will never be allocated. */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls1_get_curvelist sets |*out_curve_ids| and |*out_curve_ids_len|
|
|
* to the list of allowed curve IDs. If |get_peer_curves| is non-zero,
|
|
* return the peer's curve list. Otherwise, return the preferred
|
|
* list. */
|
|
static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int get_peer_curves,
|
|
const uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (get_peer_curves)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_curve_ids = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist;
|
|
*out_curve_ids_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_curve_ids = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
|
|
*out_curve_ids_len = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
|
|
if (!*out_curve_ids)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_curve_ids = eccurves_default;
|
|
*out_curve_ids_len = sizeof(eccurves_default) / sizeof(eccurves_default[0]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out_curve_id)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t curve_type;
|
|
uint16_t curve_id;
|
|
const uint16_t *curves;
|
|
size_t curves_len, i;
|
|
|
|
/* Only support named curves. */
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type) ||
|
|
curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16(cbs, &curve_id))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (curve_id == curves[i])
|
|
{
|
|
*out_curve_id = curve_id;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
|
|
size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
|
|
|
|
/* Can't do anything on client side */
|
|
if (s->server == 0)
|
|
return NID_undef;
|
|
|
|
/* Return first preference shared curve */
|
|
tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
|
|
&supp, &supplen);
|
|
tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
|
|
&pref, &preflen);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pref[i] == supp[j])
|
|
return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(pref[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return NID_undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* NOTE: tls1_ec_curve_id2nid and tls1_set_curves assume that
|
|
*
|
|
* (a) 0 is not a valid curve ID.
|
|
*
|
|
* (b) The largest curve ID is 31.
|
|
*
|
|
* Those implementations must be revised before adding support for curve IDs
|
|
* that break these assumptions. */
|
|
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(
|
|
(sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])) < 32, small_curve_ids);
|
|
|
|
int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len,
|
|
const int *curves, size_t ncurves)
|
|
{
|
|
uint16_t *curve_ids;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
/* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
|
|
* while curve ids < 32
|
|
*/
|
|
uint32_t dup_list = 0;
|
|
curve_ids = (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t));
|
|
if (!curve_ids)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t idmask;
|
|
uint16_t id;
|
|
id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
|
|
idmask = ((uint32_t)1) << id;
|
|
if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(curve_ids);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
dup_list |= idmask;
|
|
curve_ids[i] = id;
|
|
}
|
|
if (*out_curve_ids)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(*out_curve_ids);
|
|
*out_curve_ids = curve_ids;
|
|
*out_curve_ids_len = ncurves;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key sets |*out_curve_id| and |*out_comp_id| to the
|
|
* TLS curve ID and point format, respectively, for |ec|. It returns one on
|
|
* success and zero on failure. */
|
|
static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id, uint8_t *out_comp_id, EC_KEY *ec)
|
|
{
|
|
int nid;
|
|
uint16_t id;
|
|
const EC_GROUP *grp;
|
|
if (!ec)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
|
|
if (!grp)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Determine curve ID */
|
|
nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
|
|
id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
|
|
if (!id)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Set the named curve ID. Arbitrary explicit curves are not
|
|
* supported. */
|
|
*out_curve_id = id;
|
|
|
|
if (out_comp_id)
|
|
{
|
|
if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
|
|
*out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
|
|
else
|
|
*out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls1_check_point_format returns one if |comp_id| is consistent with the
|
|
* peer's point format preferences. */
|
|
static int tls1_check_point_format(SSL *s, uint8_t comp_id)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t *p = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist;
|
|
size_t plen = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
/* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
|
|
* is supported (see RFC4492). */
|
|
if (p == NULL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < plen; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (comp_id == p[i])
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls1_check_curve_id returns one if |curve_id| is consistent with both our and
|
|
* the peer's curve preferences. Note: if called as the client, only our
|
|
* preferences are checked; the peer (the server) does not send preferences. */
|
|
static int tls1_check_curve_id(SSL *s, uint16_t curve_id)
|
|
{
|
|
const uint16_t *curves;
|
|
size_t curves_len, i, j;
|
|
|
|
/* Check against our list, then the peer's list. */
|
|
for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
|
|
{
|
|
tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &curves, &curves_len);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (curves[i] == curve_id)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i == curves_len)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Servers do not present a preference list so, if we are a
|
|
* client, only check our list. */
|
|
if (!s->server)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
|
|
size_t *pformatslen)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
|
|
* use default */
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
|
|
{
|
|
*pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
|
|
*pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
*pformats = ecformats_default;
|
|
*pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
|
|
* EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t comp_id;
|
|
uint16_t curve_id;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
int rv;
|
|
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
|
|
if (!pkey)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* If not EC nothing to do */
|
|
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
rv = tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
if (!rv)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
|
|
* supported curves extension. */
|
|
if (s->server && !tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
|
|
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
uint16_t curve_id;
|
|
EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
|
|
if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Need a shared curve */
|
|
return tls1_get_shared_curve(s) != NID_undef;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ec)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
else
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, NULL, ec) &&
|
|
tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
|
|
* customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
|
|
|
|
#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
|
|
|
|
#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
|
|
tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
|
|
tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
|
|
|
|
static const uint8_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
|
|
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
|
|
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
|
|
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
|
|
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
|
|
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
|
|
};
|
|
size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
|
|
if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
|
|
{
|
|
*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
|
|
return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
|
|
{
|
|
*psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
|
|
return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
*psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
|
|
return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls12_check_peer_sigalg parses a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm out of
|
|
* |cbs|. It checks it is consistent with |s|'s sent supported
|
|
* signature algorithms and, if so, writes the relevant digest into
|
|
* |*out_md| and returns 1. Otherwise it returns 0 and writes an alert
|
|
* into |*out_alert|.
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert,
|
|
SSL *s, CBS *cbs, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
|
|
size_t sent_sigslen, i;
|
|
int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
|
|
uint8_t hash, signature;
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
if (sigalg == -1)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &hash) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &signature))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
|
|
if (sigalg != signature)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
|
|
{
|
|
uint16_t curve_id;
|
|
uint8_t comp_id;
|
|
/* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
|
|
if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->server)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) ||
|
|
!tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
|
|
sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
|
|
{
|
|
if (hash == sent_sigs[0] && signature == sent_sigs[1])
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
|
|
if (i == sent_sigslen && (hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
*out_md = tls12_get_hash(hash);
|
|
if (*out_md == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
|
|
* wish.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *out_md;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
|
|
* if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
|
|
* algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
|
|
* session and not global settings.
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT *c = s->cert;
|
|
const unsigned char *sigalgs;
|
|
size_t i, sigalgslen;
|
|
int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
|
|
c->mask_a = 0;
|
|
c->mask_k = 0;
|
|
/* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
|
|
if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
|
|
c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
|
|
else
|
|
c->mask_ssl = 0;
|
|
/* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
|
|
* any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
|
|
* TLS 1.2.
|
|
*/
|
|
sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
|
|
{
|
|
switch(sigalgs[1])
|
|
{
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
|
|
have_rsa = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
|
|
have_ecdsa = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Disable auth if we don't include any appropriate signature
|
|
* algorithms.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!have_rsa)
|
|
{
|
|
c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!have_ecdsa)
|
|
{
|
|
c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
|
|
}
|
|
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
|
|
if (!s->psk_client_callback)
|
|
{
|
|
c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
|
|
c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
|
|
}
|
|
c->valid = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* header_len is the length of the ClientHello header written so far, used to
|
|
* compute padding. It does not include the record header. Pass 0 if no padding
|
|
* is to be done. */
|
|
unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, size_t header_len)
|
|
{
|
|
int extdatalen=0;
|
|
unsigned char *ret = buf;
|
|
unsigned char *orig = buf;
|
|
/* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
|
|
int using_ecc = 0;
|
|
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
|
|
|
|
alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
|
|
if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
|
|
{
|
|
using_ecc = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
|
|
if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
|
|
&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
|
|
return orig;
|
|
|
|
ret+=2;
|
|
|
|
if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
|
|
unsigned long size_str;
|
|
long lenmax;
|
|
|
|
/* check for enough space.
|
|
4 for the servername type and entension length
|
|
2 for servernamelist length
|
|
1 for the hostname type
|
|
2 for hostname length
|
|
+ hostname length
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
|
|
|| (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* extension type and length */
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
|
|
s2n(size_str+5,ret);
|
|
|
|
/* length of servername list */
|
|
s2n(size_str+3,ret);
|
|
|
|
/* hostname type, length and hostname */
|
|
*(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
|
|
s2n(size_str,ret);
|
|
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
|
|
ret+=size_str;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add RI if renegotiating */
|
|
if (s->renegotiate)
|
|
{
|
|
int el;
|
|
|
|
if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
|
|
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
|
|
s2n(el,ret);
|
|
|
|
if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret += el;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
|
|
{
|
|
int ticklen;
|
|
if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
|
ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
|
|
else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
|
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
|
|
{
|
|
s->session->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(
|
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
|
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->length);
|
|
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
|
|
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
ticklen = 0;
|
|
if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
|
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
|
|
goto skip_ext;
|
|
/* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
|
|
* rest for ticket
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
|
|
s2n(ticklen,ret);
|
|
if (ticklen)
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
|
|
ret += ticklen;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
skip_ext:
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
|
|
{
|
|
size_t salglen;
|
|
const unsigned char *salg;
|
|
salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
|
|
if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
|
|
s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
|
|
s2n(salglen, ret);
|
|
memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
|
|
ret += salglen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->ocsp_stapling_enabled)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The status_request extension is excessively extensible at
|
|
* every layer. On the client, only support requesting OCSP
|
|
* responses with an empty responder_id_list and no
|
|
* extensions. */
|
|
if (limit - ret - 4 - 1 - 2 - 2 < 0) return NULL;
|
|
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
|
|
s2n(1 + 2 + 2, ret);
|
|
/* status_type */
|
|
*(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
|
|
/* responder_id_list - empty */
|
|
s2n(0, ret);
|
|
/* request_extensions - empty */
|
|
s2n(0, ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
|
|
* support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
|
|
if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
|
|
s2n(0,ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support for
|
|
* certificate timestamps. */
|
|
if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp,ret);
|
|
s2n(0,ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
|
|
s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
|
|
s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
|
|
memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
|
|
s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
|
|
ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
|
|
* support for Channel ID. */
|
|
if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new)
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
|
|
else
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
|
|
s2n(0,ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
|
|
{
|
|
int el;
|
|
|
|
ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
|
|
|
|
if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
|
|
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
|
|
s2n(el,ret);
|
|
|
|
if(!ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
ret += el;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (using_ecc)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
|
|
long lenmax;
|
|
const uint8_t *formats;
|
|
const uint16_t *curves;
|
|
size_t formats_len, curves_len, i;
|
|
|
|
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &formats, &formats_len);
|
|
|
|
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
|
|
if (formats_len > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
|
|
if (formats_len > 255)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
|
|
s2n(formats_len + 1,ret);
|
|
*(ret++) = (unsigned char)formats_len;
|
|
memcpy(ret, formats, formats_len);
|
|
ret+=formats_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
|
|
tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
|
|
|
|
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
|
|
if ((curves_len * 2) > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
|
|
if ((curves_len * 2) > 65532)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
|
|
s2n((curves_len * 2) + 2, ret);
|
|
|
|
/* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
|
|
* elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
|
|
* http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
|
|
* resolves this to two bytes.
|
|
*/
|
|
s2n(curves_len * 2, ret);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
s2n(curves[i], ret);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
|
|
/* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
|
|
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
|
|
*
|
|
* NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
|
|
* extensions it MUST always appear last. */
|
|
if (header_len > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
header_len += ret - orig;
|
|
if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t padding_len = 0x200 - header_len;
|
|
/* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always
|
|
* include least one byte of data if including the
|
|
* extension. WebSphere Application Server 7.0 is
|
|
* intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */
|
|
if (padding_len >= 4 + 1)
|
|
padding_len -= 4;
|
|
else
|
|
padding_len = 1;
|
|
if (limit - ret - 4 - (long)padding_len < 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
|
|
s2n(padding_len, ret);
|
|
memset(ret, 0, padding_len);
|
|
ret += padding_len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
|
|
return orig;
|
|
|
|
s2n(extdatalen, orig);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
|
|
{
|
|
int extdatalen=0;
|
|
unsigned char *orig = buf;
|
|
unsigned char *ret = buf;
|
|
int next_proto_neg_seen;
|
|
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
|
|
using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
|
|
/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
|
|
return orig;
|
|
|
|
ret+=2;
|
|
if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit && s->should_ack_sni && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
|
|
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
|
|
s2n(0,ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
|
|
{
|
|
int el;
|
|
|
|
if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
|
|
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
|
|
s2n(el,ret);
|
|
|
|
if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret += el;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (using_ecc)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *plist;
|
|
size_t plistlen;
|
|
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
|
|
long lenmax;
|
|
|
|
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
|
|
|
|
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
|
|
if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
|
|
if (plistlen > 255)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
|
|
s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
|
|
*(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
|
|
memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
|
|
ret+=plistlen;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
/* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
|
|
&& !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
|
|
{
|
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
|
|
s2n(0,ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
|
|
s2n(0,ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(s->srtp_profile)
|
|
{
|
|
int el;
|
|
|
|
ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
|
|
|
|
if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
|
|
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
|
|
s2n(el,ret);
|
|
|
|
if(!ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
ret+=el;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
|
if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *npa;
|
|
unsigned int npalen;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
|
|
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
|
|
s2n(npalen,ret);
|
|
memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
|
|
ret += npalen;
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
|
|
{
|
|
const uint8_t *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
|
|
size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
|
|
|
|
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
|
|
s2n(3 + len,ret);
|
|
s2n(1 + len,ret);
|
|
*ret++ = len;
|
|
memcpy(ret, selected, len);
|
|
ret += len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it
|
|
* enabled, then we want to echo it back. */
|
|
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
|
|
{
|
|
if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
|
|
else
|
|
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
|
|
s2n(0,ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2) == 0)
|
|
return orig;
|
|
|
|
s2n(extdatalen, orig);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
|
|
* ClientHello.
|
|
* cbs: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
|
|
* out_alert: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a zero
|
|
* return.
|
|
*
|
|
* returns: 1 on success. */
|
|
static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
|
|
{
|
|
CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name_list_copy;
|
|
const unsigned char *selected;
|
|
unsigned char selected_len;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &protocol_name_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(cbs) != 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2)
|
|
goto parse_error;
|
|
|
|
/* Validate the protocol list. */
|
|
protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list;
|
|
while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
CBS protocol_name;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name))
|
|
goto parse_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
|
|
CBS_data(&protocol_name_list), CBS_len(&protocol_name_list),
|
|
s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
|
|
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
|
|
if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
|
|
if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
parse_error:
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
|
|
{
|
|
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
|
|
CBS extensions;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
s->should_ack_sni = 0;
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
|
|
if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
|
|
s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
|
|
if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
|
|
s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
|
|
s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Clear ECC extensions */
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* There may be no extensions. */
|
|
if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
goto ri_check;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
|
|
!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
uint16_t type;
|
|
CBS extension;
|
|
|
|
/* Decode the next extension. */
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, (unsigned char*)CBS_data(&extension),
|
|
CBS_len(&extension), s->tlsext_debug_arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
|
|
|
|
- Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
|
|
- The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
|
|
in which case an fatal alert is generated.
|
|
- The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
|
|
- When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
|
|
to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
|
|
- The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
|
|
it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
|
|
Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
|
|
set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
|
|
case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
|
|
a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
|
|
presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
|
|
the value of the Host: field.
|
|
- Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
|
|
if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
|
|
i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
|
|
- On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|
|
{
|
|
CBS server_name_list;
|
|
char have_seen_host_name = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &server_name_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&server_name_list) < 1 ||
|
|
CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decode each ServerName in the extension. */
|
|
while (CBS_len(&server_name_list) > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t name_type;
|
|
CBS host_name;
|
|
|
|
/* Decode the NameType. */
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Only host_name is supported. */
|
|
if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (have_seen_host_name)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The ServerNameList MUST NOT contain
|
|
* more than one name of the same
|
|
* name_type. */
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
have_seen_host_name = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&host_name) < 1)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
|
|
CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit)
|
|
{
|
|
assert(s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
|
|
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
|
|
{
|
|
/* This should be impossible. */
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the hostname as a string. */
|
|
if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &s->session->tlsext_hostname))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->should_ack_sni = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
|
|
{
|
|
CBS ec_point_format_list;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list,
|
|
&s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist,
|
|
&s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
|
|
{
|
|
CBS elliptic_curve_list;
|
|
size_t i, num_curves;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 ||
|
|
(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) & 1) != 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist =
|
|
(uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list));
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
num_curves = CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) / 2;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&elliptic_curve_list,
|
|
&s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist[i]))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = num_curves;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
|
|
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, CBS_data(&extension), CBS_len(&extension), s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
renegotiate_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
|
|
{
|
|
CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure the signature algorithms are non-empty. It
|
|
* contains a list of SignatureAndHashAlgorithms
|
|
* which are two bytes each. */
|
|
if (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 ||
|
|
(CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) % 2) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
|
|
* error.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
|
|
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The extension must be empty. */
|
|
if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
|
|
* renegotiation.
|
|
*
|
|
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
|
|
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
|
|
* the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
|
|
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
|
|
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
|
|
* anything like that, but this might change).
|
|
|
|
* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
|
|
* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
|
|
* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
|
|
* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
|
|
* Finished message could have been computed.) */
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
|
|
s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
|
|
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, out_alert))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id &&
|
|
s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The extension must be empty. */
|
|
if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new &&
|
|
s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The extension must be empty. */
|
|
if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
|
|
s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* session ticket processed earlier */
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ri_check:
|
|
|
|
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
|
|
|
|
if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
|
|
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
|
|
if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
|
|
ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
|
|
{
|
|
int alert = -1;
|
|
if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
|
|
* elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
|
|
* the length of the block. */
|
|
static char ssl_next_proto_validate(const CBS *cbs)
|
|
{
|
|
CBS copy = *cbs;
|
|
|
|
while (CBS_len(©) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
CBS proto;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(©, &proto) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&proto) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
|
|
{
|
|
int tlsext_servername = 0;
|
|
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
|
|
CBS extensions;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO(davidben): Move all of these to some per-handshake state that
|
|
* gets systematically reset on a new handshake; perhaps allocate it
|
|
* fresh each time so it's not even kept around post-handshake. */
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Clear ECC extensions */
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* There may be no extensions. */
|
|
if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
goto ri_check;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
|
|
!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
uint16_t type;
|
|
CBS extension;
|
|
|
|
/* Decode the next extension. */
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, (unsigned char*)CBS_data(&extension),
|
|
CBS_len(&extension), s->tlsext_debug_arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The extension must be empty. */
|
|
if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* We must have sent it in ClientHello. */
|
|
if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
tlsext_servername = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
|
|
{
|
|
CBS ec_point_format_list;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list,
|
|
&s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist,
|
|
&s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
|
|
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, CBS_data(&extension), CBS_len(&extension),
|
|
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || CBS_len(&extension) > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The extension MUST be empty and may only sent if
|
|
* we've requested a status request message. */
|
|
if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!s->ocsp_stapling_enabled)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Set a flag to expect a CertificateStatus message */
|
|
s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
|
|
unsigned char *selected;
|
|
unsigned char selected_len;
|
|
|
|
/* We must have requested it. */
|
|
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The data must be valid. */
|
|
if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&extension))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
|
|
CBS_data(&extension), CBS_len(&extension),
|
|
s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->next_proto_negotiated = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
|
|
if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
|
|
{
|
|
CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name;
|
|
|
|
/* We must have requested it. */
|
|
if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList
|
|
* which must have exactly one ProtocolName. Each of
|
|
* these is length-prefixed. */
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &protocol_name_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&extension) != 0 ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name,
|
|
&s->s3->alpn_selected,
|
|
&s->s3->alpn_selected_len))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id)
|
|
{
|
|
if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new)
|
|
{
|
|
if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
|
|
s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (CBS_len(&extension) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Session resumption uses the original session information. */
|
|
if (!s->hit)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!CBS_stow(&extension,
|
|
&s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
|
|
&s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
renegotiate_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->tlsext_hostname)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
|
|
if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ri_check:
|
|
|
|
/* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
|
|
* avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
|
|
* hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
|
|
* attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
|
|
* which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
|
|
* absence on initial connect only.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!renegotiate_seen
|
|
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
|
|
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
|
|
{
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
|
|
/* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
|
|
* ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
|
|
* ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
|
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
|
else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
|
ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
|
|
|
switch (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
|
|
s->should_ack_sni = 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
|
|
/* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
|
|
* suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
|
|
* it must contain uncompressed.
|
|
*/
|
|
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
if (((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) &&
|
|
!tls1_check_point_format(s, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
|
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
|
else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
|
ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
|
|
|
switch (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
|
|
{
|
|
int alert = -1;
|
|
if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
|
|
* ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
|
|
* any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
|
|
*
|
|
* ctx: contains the early callback context, which is the result of a
|
|
* shallow parse of the ClientHello.
|
|
* ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
|
|
* point to the resulting session.
|
|
*
|
|
* If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
|
|
* ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
|
|
* never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns:
|
|
* -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
|
|
* 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
|
|
* 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
|
|
* session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
|
|
* 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
|
|
* couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
|
|
* 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
|
|
*
|
|
* Side effects:
|
|
* Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
|
|
* a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
|
|
* (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
|
|
* a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
|
|
* s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
|
|
* Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
|
|
SSL_SESSION **ret)
|
|
{
|
|
*ret = NULL;
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
|
|
const unsigned char *data;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
/* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
|
|
* to permit stateful resumption.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) && !ctx->extensions)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(
|
|
ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, &data, &len))
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (len == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
|
|
* currently have one. */
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
|
|
* decrypted rather than generating the session
|
|
* from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
|
|
* handshake based on external mechanism to
|
|
* calculate the master secret later. */
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, data, len, ctx->session_id,
|
|
ctx->session_id_len, ret);
|
|
switch (r)
|
|
{
|
|
case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
|
return 2;
|
|
case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
|
|
return r;
|
|
case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
|
return 3;
|
|
default: /* fatal error */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
|
|
*
|
|
* etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
|
|
* eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
|
|
* sess_id: points at the session ID.
|
|
* sesslen: the length of the session ID.
|
|
* psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
|
|
* point to the resulting session.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns:
|
|
* -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
|
|
* 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
|
|
* 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
|
|
* 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
|
|
const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
|
|
SSL_SESSION **psess)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
|
unsigned char *sdec;
|
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
|
int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
|
|
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
HMAC_CTX hctx;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
|
|
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
|
|
/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
|
|
if (eticklen < 48)
|
|
return 2;
|
|
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
|
|
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
|
|
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
|
|
&ctx, &hctx, 0);
|
|
if (rv < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
if (rv == 0)
|
|
return 2;
|
|
if (rv == 2)
|
|
renew_ticket = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Check key name matches */
|
|
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
|
|
return 2;
|
|
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
|
|
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
|
|
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
|
|
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
|
|
* integrity checks on ticket.
|
|
*/
|
|
mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
|
|
if (mlen < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
eticklen -= mlen;
|
|
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
|
|
HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
|
|
HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
|
|
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
|
|
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
|
|
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
|
|
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
|
|
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
|
|
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
|
|
if (!sdec)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
|
|
if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
slen += mlen;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
p = sdec;
|
|
|
|
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
|
|
if (sess)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
|
|
* detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
|
|
* the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
|
|
* as required by standard.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sesslen)
|
|
memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
|
|
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
|
|
*psess = sess;
|
|
if (renew_ticket)
|
|
return 4;
|
|
else
|
|
return 3;
|
|
}
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
/* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
|
|
* ticket. */
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
|
|
|
|
typedef struct
|
|
{
|
|
int nid;
|
|
int id;
|
|
} tls12_lookup;
|
|
|
|
static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
|
|
{NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
|
|
{NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
|
|
{NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
|
|
{NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
|
|
{NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
|
|
{NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
|
|
{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
|
|
{EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (table[i].nid == nid)
|
|
return table[i].id;
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((table[i].id) == id)
|
|
return table[i].nid;
|
|
}
|
|
return NID_undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
|
|
{
|
|
int sig_id, md_id;
|
|
if (!md)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
|
|
sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
|
|
if (md_id == -1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
|
|
if (sig_id == -1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
|
|
p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
|
|
{
|
|
return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
|
|
sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
|
|
{
|
|
switch(hash_alg)
|
|
{
|
|
case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
|
|
return EVP_md5();
|
|
case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
|
|
return EVP_sha1();
|
|
case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
|
|
return EVP_sha224();
|
|
|
|
case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
|
|
return EVP_sha256();
|
|
case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
|
|
return EVP_sha384();
|
|
|
|
case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
|
|
return EVP_sha512();
|
|
default:
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
|
|
{
|
|
switch(sig_alg)
|
|
{
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
|
|
return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
|
|
return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
|
|
static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
|
|
int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
|
|
{
|
|
int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
|
|
if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
|
|
return;
|
|
if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
|
|
{
|
|
hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
|
|
sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
|
|
if (phash_nid)
|
|
*phash_nid = hash_nid;
|
|
}
|
|
if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
|
|
{
|
|
sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
|
|
sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
|
|
if (psign_nid)
|
|
*psign_nid = sign_nid;
|
|
}
|
|
if (psignhash_nid)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
|
|
OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
|
|
hash_nid, sign_nid);
|
|
else
|
|
*psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
|
|
static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
|
|
const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
|
|
const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
|
|
size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
|
|
if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
|
|
continue;
|
|
for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
|
|
{
|
|
nmatch++;
|
|
if (shsig)
|
|
{
|
|
shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
|
|
shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
|
|
tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
|
|
&shsig->sign_nid,
|
|
&shsig->signandhash_nid,
|
|
ptmp);
|
|
shsig++;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nmatch;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
|
|
static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
|
|
size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
|
|
size_t nmatch;
|
|
TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
|
|
CERT *c = s->cert;
|
|
if (c->shared_sigalgs)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
|
|
c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
|
|
if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs)
|
|
{
|
|
conf = c->client_sigalgs;
|
|
conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (c->conf_sigalgs)
|
|
{
|
|
conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
|
|
conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
|
|
if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
|
|
{
|
|
pref = conf;
|
|
preflen = conflen;
|
|
allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
|
|
allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
allow = conf;
|
|
allowlen = conflen;
|
|
pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
|
|
preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
|
|
}
|
|
nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
|
|
if (!nmatch)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
|
|
if (!salgs)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
|
|
c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
|
|
c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
|
|
|
|
int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const CBS *sigalgs)
|
|
{
|
|
int idx;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
CERT *c = s->cert;
|
|
TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
|
|
|
|
/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
|
|
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
/* Length must be even */
|
|
if (CBS_len(sigalgs) % 2 != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
if (!c)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_stow(sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgslen))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
|
|
i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
|
|
{
|
|
idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
|
|
if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
|
|
c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
|
|
c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
|
|
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
|
|
{
|
|
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
|
|
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
/* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
|
|
* use the certificate for signing.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
|
|
{
|
|
/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
|
|
* not supported it stays as NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
|
|
{
|
|
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
|
|
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
|
|
}
|
|
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
|
|
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
|
|
int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
|
|
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
|
|
if (psig == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (idx >= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
idx <<= 1;
|
|
if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
psig += idx;
|
|
if (rhash)
|
|
*rhash = psig[0];
|
|
if (rsig)
|
|
*rsig = psig[1];
|
|
tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
|
|
}
|
|
return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
|
|
int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
|
|
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
|
|
{
|
|
TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
|
|
if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
shsigalgs += idx;
|
|
if (phash)
|
|
*phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
|
|
if (psign)
|
|
*psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
|
|
if (psignhash)
|
|
*psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
|
|
if (rsig)
|
|
*rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
|
|
if (rhash)
|
|
*rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
|
|
return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the given
|
|
* SSL connection and writes it to |md|. */
|
|
int
|
|
tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
unsigned char temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned temp_digest_len;
|
|
int i;
|
|
static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
|
|
{
|
|
static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic,
|
|
sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
|
|
if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
|
|
s->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL)
|
|
continue;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len);
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
|
|
* hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */
|
|
int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int digest_len;
|
|
/* This function should never be called for a resumed session because
|
|
* the handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original,
|
|
* full handshake. */
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
/* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been
|
|
* negotiated. */
|
|
if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
digest_len = tls1_handshake_digest(
|
|
s, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
|
|
sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash));
|
|
if (digest_len < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
|
|
int rhash, rsign;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
if (salglen & 1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
|
|
if (sigalgs == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
|
|
{
|
|
rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
|
|
sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
|
|
rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
|
|
sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
|
|
|
|
if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
*sptr++ = rhash;
|
|
*sptr++ = rsign;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (client)
|
|
{
|
|
if (c->client_sigalgs)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
|
|
c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
|
|
c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (c->conf_sigalgs)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
|
|
c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
|
|
c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
|
|
{
|
|
int sig_nid;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
if (default_nid == -1)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
|
|
if (default_nid)
|
|
return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
|
|
if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
|
|
static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_NAME *nm;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
|
|
* usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
|
|
* check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
|
|
* server to check chains before attempting to use them.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
|
|
|
|
#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
|
|
(CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
|
|
/* Strict mode flags */
|
|
#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
|
|
(CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
|
|
| CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
|
|
|
|
int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
|
|
int idx)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
int rv = 0;
|
|
int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
|
|
CERT *c = s->cert;
|
|
/* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
|
|
if (idx != -1)
|
|
{
|
|
/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
|
|
if (idx == -2)
|
|
{
|
|
cpk = c->key;
|
|
idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
|
|
x = cpk->x509;
|
|
pk = cpk->privatekey;
|
|
chain = cpk->chain;
|
|
strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
|
|
/* If no cert or key, forget it */
|
|
if (!x || !pk)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (!x || !pk)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
|
|
if (idx == -1)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
|
|
if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
|
|
check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
|
|
else
|
|
check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
|
|
strict_mode = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
|
|
* signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
|
|
* and strict mode.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
|
|
{
|
|
int default_nid;
|
|
unsigned char rsign = 0;
|
|
if (c->peer_sigalgs)
|
|
default_nid = 0;
|
|
/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
switch(idx)
|
|
{
|
|
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
|
|
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
|
|
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
|
|
default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
|
|
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
|
|
default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
default_nid = -1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
|
|
* have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
|
|
* sha1.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t j;
|
|
const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
|
|
for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
|
|
{
|
|
if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
|
|
{
|
|
if (check_flags)
|
|
goto skip_sigs;
|
|
else
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
|
|
if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
|
|
{
|
|
if (!check_flags) goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
|
|
default_nid))
|
|
{
|
|
if (check_flags)
|
|
{
|
|
rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
|
|
else if(check_flags)
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
|
|
skip_sigs:
|
|
/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
|
|
if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
|
|
else if (!check_flags)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
if (!s->server)
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
|
|
/* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
|
|
else if (strict_mode)
|
|
{
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
|
|
if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
|
|
{
|
|
if (check_flags)
|
|
{
|
|
rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!s->server && strict_mode)
|
|
{
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
|
|
uint8_t check_type = 0;
|
|
switch (pk->type)
|
|
{
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
|
|
check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
|
|
break;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
|
|
check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (check_type)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_types &&
|
|
memchr(s->s3->tmp.certificate_types, check_type, s->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types))
|
|
{
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
|
|
|
|
if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
|
|
|
|
if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
|
|
{
|
|
if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
|
|
{
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
|
|
if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
|
|
{
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
|
|
|
|
if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
|
{
|
|
if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
|
|
else if (cpk->digest)
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
|
|
|
|
/* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
|
|
* if the chain is invalid.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!check_flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
|
|
cpk->valid_flags = rv;
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
|
|
cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
|
|
void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
|
|
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
|
|
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
|
|
}
|
|
/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
|
|
int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
|
|
{
|
|
return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
|
|
}
|
|
|