boringssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
David Benjamin 77a942b7fe Don't use the RSA key exchange with a signing-only key.
This removes the last case where the server generates an RSA key for the
ServerKeyExchange. Remove the code for this. Client support to accept them
still remains.

Leave the APIs for now, but they don't do anything anymore.

Change-Id: I84439e034cc575719f5bc9b3e501165e12b62107
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-07-24 21:35:40 +00:00

1229 lines
30 KiB
C

/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
#include "../crypto/directory.h"
#include "ssl_locl.h"
int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
{
static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
int got_write_lock = 0;
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
{
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
got_write_lock = 1;
if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
{
ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
}
}
if (got_write_lock)
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
else
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
}
void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
{
/* Set digest values to defaults */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
}
CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
{
CERT *ret;
ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
}
memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT));
ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
return(ret);
}
CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
{
CERT *ret;
int i;
ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
/* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys),
* if you find that more readable */
ret->valid = cert->valid;
ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
{
ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key)
{
BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
if (!b)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
}
if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key)
{
BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
if (!b)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
}
}
ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (cert->ecdh_tmp)
{
ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto;
#endif
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->x509 != NULL)
{
rpk->x509 = cpk->x509;
CRYPTO_add(&rpk->x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
if (cpk->privatekey != NULL)
{
rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1,
CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
switch(i)
{
/* If there was anything special to do for
* certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
* (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
/* We have an RSA key. */
break;
case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
/* We have a DSA key. */
break;
case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
/* We have a DH key. */
break;
case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
/* We have an ECC key */
break;
default:
/* Can't happen. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
}
}
if (cpk->chain)
{
rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
if (!rpk->chain)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
rpk->valid_flags = 0;
}
/* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
* will be set during handshake.
*/
ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
/* Peer sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */
ret->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
ret->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
/* Configured sigalgs however we copy across */
if (cert->conf_sigalgs)
{
ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen);
if (!ret->conf_sigalgs)
goto err;
memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs,
cert->conf_sigalgslen);
ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
}
else
ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
if (cert->client_sigalgs)
{
ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen);
if (!ret->client_sigalgs)
goto err;
memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs,
cert->client_sigalgslen);
ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen;
}
else
ret->client_sigalgs = NULL;
/* Shared sigalgs also NULL */
ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
/* Copy any custom client certificate types */
if (cert->client_certificate_types)
{
ret->client_certificate_types = BUF_memdup(
cert->client_certificate_types,
cert->num_client_certificate_types);
if (!ret->client_certificate_types)
goto err;
ret->num_client_certificate_types = cert->num_client_certificate_types;
}
ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
if (cert->verify_store)
{
CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
}
if (cert->chain_store)
{
CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
}
ret->ciphers_raw = NULL;
return(ret);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
err:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
#endif
ssl_cert_clear_certs(ret);
return NULL;
}
/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c)
{
int i;
if (c == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->x509)
{
X509_free(cpk->x509);
cpk->x509 = NULL;
}
if (cpk->privatekey)
{
EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
cpk->privatekey = NULL;
}
if (cpk->chain)
{
sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
cpk->chain = NULL;
}
/* Clear all flags apart from explicit sign */
cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
}
}
void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
{
if(c == NULL)
return;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
#endif
ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
if (c->peer_sigalgs)
OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
if (c->conf_sigalgs)
OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
if (c->client_sigalgs)
OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
if (c->shared_sigalgs)
OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
if (c->client_certificate_types)
OPENSSL_free(c->client_certificate_types);
if (c->verify_store)
X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
if (c->chain_store)
X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
if (c->ciphers_raw)
OPENSSL_free(c->ciphers_raw);
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
{
/* Create a CERT if there isn't already one
* (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in
* SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one
* being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might
* turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm
* not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
* s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the
* initialization in SSL_CTX_new).
*/
if (o == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_inst, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return(0);
}
if (*o == NULL)
{
if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(0);
}
}
return(1);
}
int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
if (!cpk)
return 0;
if (cpk->chain)
sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
cpk->chain = chain;
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
if (!chain)
return ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, NULL);
dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
if (!dchain)
return 0;
if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, dchain))
{
sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
if (!cpk)
return 0;
if (!cpk->chain)
cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x))
return 0;
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
{
if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(c, x))
return 0;
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x)
{
int i;
if (x == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == x)
{
c->key = &c->pkeys[i];
return 1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
if (c->pkeys[i].x509 && !X509_cmp(c->pkeys[i].x509, x))
{
c->key = &c->pkeys[i];
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
{
c->cert_cb = cb;
c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
}
SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
{
SESS_CERT *ret;
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
if (ret == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_sess_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret);
ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
ret->references = 1;
return ret;
}
void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
{
int i;
if (sc == NULL)
return;
i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
#endif
if (i > 0)
return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
if (i < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
/* i == 0 */
if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key. These lines are just
* here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
* data structure. */
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
#endif
}
if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
#endif
OPENSSL_free(sc);
}
int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type)
{
sc->peer_cert_type = type;
return(1);
}
int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
X509 *x;
int i;
X509_STORE *verify_store;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
if (s->cert->verify_store)
verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
else
verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
return(0);
x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,verify_store,x,sk))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_verify_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return(0);
}
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
#if 0
if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
#endif
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s);
/* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
* the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
* or vice versa.
*/
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx,
s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
/* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the
* ctx.
*/
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
if (s->verify_callback)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
#else
i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
#endif
else
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
#else
i=0;
ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_verify_cert_chain, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
#endif
}
s->verify_result=ctx.error;
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(i);
}
static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
if (*ca_list != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
*ca_list=name_list;
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
{
int i;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
X509_NAME *name;
ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
{
name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i));
if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name))
{
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
return(NULL);
}
}
return(ret);
}
void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),name_list);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),name_list);
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return(ctx->client_CA);
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
{ /* we are in the client */
if (((s->version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
(s->s3 != NULL))
return(s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
else
return(NULL);
}
else
{
if (s->client_CA != NULL)
return(s->client_CA);
else
return(s->ctx->client_CA);
}
}
static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x)
{
X509_NAME *name;
if (x == NULL) return(0);
if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
return(0);
if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
return(0);
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name))
{
X509_NAME_free(name);
return(0);
}
return(1);
}
int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x)
{
return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x));
}
int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
{
return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x));
}
void SSL_get_client_certificate_types(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **ctype,
size_t *ctype_num)
{
/* TODO(fork): Remove this function once Chromium is updated
* to use the new one. */
*ctype_num = SSL_get0_certificate_types((SSL*)s, ctype);
}
static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
/*!
* Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
* it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
* for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
* much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
* \param file the file containing one or more certs.
* \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
*/
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
{
BIO *in;
X509 *x=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL,*sk;
sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_load_client_CA_file, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
goto err;
for (;;)
{
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
break;
if (ret == NULL)
{
ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
if (ret == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_load_client_CA_file, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
/* check for duplicates */
xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL) goto err;
if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, NULL, xn))
X509_NAME_free(xn);
else
{
sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn);
sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn);
}
}
if (0)
{
err:
if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
ret=NULL;
}
if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
if (ret != NULL)
ERR_clear_error();
return(ret);
}
#endif
/*!
* Add a file of certs to a stack.
* \param stack the stack to add to.
* \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
* already in the stack will be added.
* \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
* certs may have been added to \c stack.
*/
int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
const char *file)
{
BIO *in;
X509 *x=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
int ret=1;
int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b);
oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp);
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
goto err;
for (;;)
{
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
break;
if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL) goto err;
if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, NULL, xn))
X509_NAME_free(xn);
else
sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
}
ERR_clear_error();
if (0)
{
err:
ret=0;
}
if(in != NULL)
BIO_free(in);
if(x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
(void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
return ret;
}
/*!
* Add a directory of certs to a stack.
* \param stack the stack to append to.
* \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
* examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
* SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
* included.
* \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
* certs may have been added to \c stack.
*/
int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
const char *dir)
{
OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
const char *filename;
int ret = 0;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
/* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir)))
{
char buf[1024];
int r;
if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack, SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename);
#else
r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename);
#endif
if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
goto err;
if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
goto err;
}
if (errno)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
return ret;
}
/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */
static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
{
int n;
unsigned char *p;
n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_to_buf, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
l2n3(n,p);
i2d_X509(x,&p);
*l+=n+3;
return 1;
}
/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */
int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
{
BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
int no_chain;
int i;
X509 *x;
STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
X509_STORE *chain_store;
if (cpk)
x = cpk->x509;
else
x = NULL;
if (s->cert->chain_store)
chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
else
chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
/* If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use
* parent ctx.
*/
if (cpk && cpk->chain)
extra_certs = cpk->chain;
else
extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
no_chain = 1;
else
no_chain = 0;
/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_chain, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (x != NULL)
{
if (no_chain)
{
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
return 0;
}
else
{
X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,chain_store,x,NULL))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return(0);
}
X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
ERR_clear_error();
for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
{
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
return 0;
}
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
}
}
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++)
{
x=sk_X509_value(extra_certs,i);
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */
int ssl_build_cert_chain(CERT *c, X509_STORE *chain_store, int flags)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
X509 *x;
int i, rv = 0;
unsigned long error;
if (!cpk->x509)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
goto err;
}
/* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
{
chain_store = X509_STORE_new();
if (!chain_store)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i);
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x))
{
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
goto err;
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
/* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509))
{
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
goto err;
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
else
{
if (c->chain_store)
chain_store = c->chain_store;
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED)
untrusted = cpk->chain;
}
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted))
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx, c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR)
{
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR)
ERR_clear_error();
i = 1;
rv = 2;
}
if (i > 0)
chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx);
if (i <= 0)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&xs_ctx);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
goto err;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
if (cpk->chain)
sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
/* Remove EE certificate from chain */
x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
X509_free(x);
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT)
{
if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0)
{
/* See if last cert is self signed */
x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
{
x = sk_X509_pop(chain);
X509_free(x);
}
}
}
cpk->chain = chain;
if (rv == 0)
rv = 1;
err:
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
return rv;
}
int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref)
{
X509_STORE **pstore;
if (chain)
pstore = &c->chain_store;
else
pstore = &c->verify_store;
if (*pstore)
X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
*pstore = store;
if (ref && store)
CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
return 1;
}