boringssl/ssl/tls13_enc.cc
David Benjamin 7934f08b26 Replace init_msg/init_num with a get_message hook.
Rather than init_msg/init_num, there is a get_message function which
either returns success or try again. This function does not advance the
current message (see the previous preparatory change). It only completes
the current one if necessary.

Being idempotent means it may be freely placed at the top of states
which otherwise have other asychronous operations. It also eases
converting the TLS 1.2 state machine. See
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/11n7LHsT3GwE34LAJIe3EFs4165TI4UR_3CqiM9LJVpI/edit?usp=sharing
for details.

The read_message hook (later to be replaced by something which doesn't
depend on BIO) intentionally does not finish the handshake, only "makes
progress". A follow-up change will align both TLS and DTLS on consuming
one handshake record and always consuming the entire record (so init_buf
may contain trailing data). In a few places I've gone ahead and
accounted for that case because it was more natural to do so.

This change also removes a couple pointers of redundant state from every
socket.

Bug: 128
Change-Id: I89d8f3622d3b53147d69ee3ac34bb654ed044a71
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18806
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-08-08 21:13:04 +00:00

450 lines
16 KiB
C++

/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <utility>
#include <openssl/aead.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include "../crypto/internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
namespace bssl {
static int init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t version,
int algorithm_prf) {
if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(version, algorithm_prf)) {
return 0;
}
hs->hash_len = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
/* Initialize the secret to the zero key. */
OPENSSL_memset(hs->secret, 0, hs->hash_len);
return 1;
}
int tls13_init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
if (!init_key_schedule(hs, ssl3_protocol_version(hs->ssl),
hs->new_cipher->algorithm_prf)) {
return 0;
}
hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
return 1;
}
int tls13_init_early_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
return init_key_schedule(hs, SSL_SESSION_protocol_version(ssl->session),
ssl->session->cipher->algorithm_prf);
}
int tls13_advance_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const uint8_t *in,
size_t len) {
return HKDF_extract(hs->secret, &hs->hash_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), in,
len, hs->secret, hs->hash_len);
}
static int hkdf_expand_label(uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *digest,
const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len,
const uint8_t *label, size_t label_len,
const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_len, size_t len) {
static const char kTLS13LabelVersion[] = "TLS 1.3, ";
ScopedCBB cbb;
CBB child;
uint8_t *hkdf_label;
size_t hkdf_label_len;
if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 2 + 1 + strlen(kTLS13LabelVersion) + label_len + 1 +
hash_len) ||
!CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), len) ||
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelVersion,
strlen(kTLS13LabelVersion)) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, label, label_len) ||
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, hash, hash_len) ||
!CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &hkdf_label, &hkdf_label_len)) {
return 0;
}
int ret = HKDF_expand(out, len, digest, secret, secret_len, hkdf_label,
hkdf_label_len);
OPENSSL_free(hkdf_label);
return ret;
}
/* derive_secret derives a secret of length |len| and writes the result in |out|
* with the given label and the current base secret and most recently-saved
* handshake context. It returns one on success and zero on error. */
static int derive_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
const uint8_t *label, size_t label_len) {
uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t context_hash_len;
if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len)) {
return 0;
}
return hkdf_expand_label(out, hs->transcript.Digest(), hs->secret,
hs->hash_len, label, label_len, context_hash,
context_hash_len, len);
}
int tls13_set_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
const uint8_t *traffic_secret,
size_t traffic_secret_len) {
const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
uint16_t version = SSL_SESSION_protocol_version(session);
if (traffic_secret_len > 0xff) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
/* Look up cipher suite properties. */
const EVP_AEAD *aead;
size_t discard;
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &discard, &discard, session->cipher,
version, SSL_is_dtls(ssl))) {
return 0;
}
const EVP_MD *digest = SSL_SESSION_get_digest(session);
/* Derive the key. */
size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
if (!hkdf_expand_label(key, digest, traffic_secret, traffic_secret_len,
(const uint8_t *)"key", 3, NULL, 0, key_len)) {
return 0;
}
/* Derive the IV. */
size_t iv_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
uint8_t iv[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
if (!hkdf_expand_label(iv, digest, traffic_secret, traffic_secret_len,
(const uint8_t *)"iv", 2, NULL, 0, iv_len)) {
return 0;
}
UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> traffic_aead = SSLAEADContext::Create(
direction, version, SSL_is_dtls(ssl), session->cipher, key, key_len, NULL,
0, iv, iv_len);
if (!traffic_aead) {
return 0;
}
if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
if (!ssl->method->set_read_state(ssl, std::move(traffic_aead))) {
return 0;
}
} else {
if (!ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, std::move(traffic_aead))) {
return 0;
}
}
/* Save the traffic secret. */
if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret, traffic_secret,
traffic_secret_len);
ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret_len = traffic_secret_len;
} else {
OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret, traffic_secret,
traffic_secret_len);
ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret_len = traffic_secret_len;
}
return 1;
}
static const char kTLS13LabelExporter[] = "exporter master secret";
static const char kTLS13LabelEarlyExporter[] = "early exporter master secret";
static const char kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic[] =
"client early traffic secret";
static const char kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic[] =
"client handshake traffic secret";
static const char kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic[] =
"server handshake traffic secret";
static const char kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic[] =
"client application traffic secret";
static const char kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic[] =
"server application traffic secret";
int tls13_derive_early_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
return derive_secret(hs, hs->early_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len,
(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic,
strlen(kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic)) &&
ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
hs->early_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len) &&
derive_secret(hs, ssl->s3->early_exporter_secret, hs->hash_len,
(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelEarlyExporter,
strlen(kTLS13LabelEarlyExporter));
}
int tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
return derive_secret(hs, hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len,
(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic,
strlen(kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic)) &&
ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len) &&
derive_secret(hs, hs->server_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len,
(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic,
strlen(kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic)) &&
ssl_log_secret(ssl, "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
hs->server_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len);
}
int tls13_derive_application_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
ssl->s3->exporter_secret_len = hs->hash_len;
return derive_secret(hs, hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len,
(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic,
strlen(kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic)) &&
ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0",
hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len) &&
derive_secret(hs, hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len,
(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic,
strlen(kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic)) &&
ssl_log_secret(ssl, "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0",
hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len) &&
derive_secret(hs, ssl->s3->exporter_secret, hs->hash_len,
(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelExporter,
strlen(kTLS13LabelExporter));
}
static const char kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic[] =
"application traffic secret";
int tls13_rotate_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction) {
const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(
SSL_get_session(ssl)->cipher->algorithm_prf, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl));
uint8_t *secret;
size_t secret_len;
if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
secret = ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret;
secret_len = ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret_len;
} else {
secret = ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret;
secret_len = ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret_len;
}
if (!hkdf_expand_label(secret, digest, secret, secret_len,
(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic,
strlen(kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic), NULL, 0,
secret_len)) {
return 0;
}
return tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, direction, secret, secret_len);
}
static const char kTLS13LabelResumption[] = "resumption master secret";
int tls13_derive_resumption_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
if (hs->hash_len > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
hs->new_session->master_key_length = hs->hash_len;
return derive_secret(
hs, hs->new_session->master_key, hs->new_session->master_key_length,
(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelResumption, strlen(kTLS13LabelResumption));
}
static const char kTLS13LabelFinished[] = "finished";
/* tls13_verify_data sets |out| to be the HMAC of |context| using a derived
* Finished key for both Finished messages and the PSK binder. */
static int tls13_verify_data(const EVP_MD *digest, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len, const uint8_t *secret,
size_t hash_len, uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len) {
uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned len;
if (!hkdf_expand_label(key, digest, secret, hash_len,
(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelFinished,
strlen(kTLS13LabelFinished), NULL, 0, hash_len) ||
HMAC(digest, key, hash_len, context, context_len, out, &len) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
*out_len = len;
return 1;
}
int tls13_finished_mac(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
int is_server) {
const uint8_t *traffic_secret;
if (is_server) {
traffic_secret = hs->server_handshake_secret;
} else {
traffic_secret = hs->client_handshake_secret;
}
uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t context_hash_len;
if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len) ||
!tls13_verify_data(hs->transcript.Digest(), out, out_len, traffic_secret,
hs->hash_len, context_hash, context_hash_len)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
const char *label, size_t label_len,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
int use_context) {
const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(
SSL_get_session(ssl)->cipher->algorithm_prf, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl));
const uint8_t *hash = NULL;
size_t hash_len = 0;
if (use_context) {
hash = context;
hash_len = context_len;
}
return hkdf_expand_label(out, digest, ssl->s3->exporter_secret,
ssl->s3->exporter_secret_len, (const uint8_t *)label,
label_len, hash, hash_len, out_len);
}
static const char kTLS13LabelPSKBinder[] = "resumption psk binder key";
static int tls13_psk_binder(uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *digest, uint8_t *psk,
size_t psk_len, uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len, size_t hash_len) {
uint8_t binder_context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned binder_context_len;
if (!EVP_Digest(NULL, 0, binder_context, &binder_context_len, digest, NULL)) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t early_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
size_t early_secret_len;
if (!HKDF_extract(early_secret, &early_secret_len, digest, psk, hash_len,
NULL, 0)) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t binder_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
size_t len;
if (!hkdf_expand_label(binder_key, digest, early_secret, hash_len,
(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelPSKBinder,
strlen(kTLS13LabelPSKBinder), binder_context,
binder_context_len, hash_len) ||
!tls13_verify_data(digest, out, &len, binder_key, hash_len, context,
context_len)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls13_write_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *msg, size_t len) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
const EVP_MD *digest = SSL_SESSION_get_digest(ssl->session);
size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
if (len < hash_len + 3) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned context_len;
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx.get(), digest, NULL) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), hs->transcript.buffer_data(),
hs->transcript.buffer_len()) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), msg, len - hash_len - 3) ||
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), context, &context_len)) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, digest, ssl->session->master_key,
ssl->session->master_key_length, context, context_len,
hash_len)) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(msg + len - hash_len, verify_data, hash_len);
return 1;
}
int tls13_verify_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, SSL_SESSION *session,
const SSLMessage &msg, CBS *binders) {
size_t hash_len = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
/* The message must be large enough to exclude the binders. */
if (CBS_len(&msg.raw) < CBS_len(binders) + 2) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Hash a ClientHello prefix up to the binders. This includes the header. For
* now, this assumes we only ever verify PSK binders on initial
* ClientHellos. */
uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned context_len;
if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&msg.raw), CBS_len(&msg.raw) - CBS_len(binders) - 2,
context, &context_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), NULL)) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
CBS binder;
if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, hs->transcript.Digest(),
session->master_key, session->master_key_length,
context, context_len, hash_len) ||
/* We only consider the first PSK, so compare against the first binder. */
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(binders, &binder)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
int binder_ok =
CBS_len(&binder) == hash_len &&
CRYPTO_memcmp(CBS_data(&binder), verify_data, hash_len) == 0;
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
binder_ok = 1;
#endif
if (!binder_ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
} // namespace bssl