cca4ba7611
Finish up the e's. Change-Id: Iabb8da000fbca6efee541edb469b90896f60d54b Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4516 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
602 lines
18 KiB
C
602 lines
18 KiB
C
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
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* project 2006.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/buf.h>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/obj.h>
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include "../rsa/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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typedef struct {
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/* Key gen parameters */
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int nbits;
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BIGNUM *pub_exp;
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/* RSA padding mode */
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int pad_mode;
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/* message digest */
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const EVP_MD *md;
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/* message digest for MGF1 */
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const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
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/* PSS salt length */
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int saltlen;
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/* tbuf is a buffer which is either NULL, or is the size of the RSA modulus.
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* It's used to store the output of RSA operations. */
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uint8_t *tbuf;
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/* OAEP label */
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uint8_t *oaep_label;
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size_t oaep_labellen;
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} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
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static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx;
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rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
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if (!rctx) {
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return 0;
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}
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memset(rctx, 0, sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
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rctx->nbits = 2048;
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rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
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rctx->saltlen = -2;
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ctx->data = rctx;
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
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if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst)) {
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return 0;
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}
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sctx = src->data;
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dctx = dst->data;
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dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
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if (sctx->pub_exp) {
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dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
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if (!dctx->pub_exp) {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
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dctx->md = sctx->md;
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dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
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if (sctx->oaep_label) {
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OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
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dctx->oaep_label = BUF_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
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if (!dctx->oaep_label) {
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return 0;
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}
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dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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if (rctx == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
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OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
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OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
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OPENSSL_free(rctx);
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}
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static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk) {
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if (ctx->tbuf) {
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return 1;
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}
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ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey));
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if (!ctx->tbuf) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
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const uint8_t *tbs, size_t tbslen) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
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const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
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if (!sig) {
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*siglen = key_len;
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return 1;
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}
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if (*siglen < key_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_rsa_sign, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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if (rctx->md) {
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unsigned int out_len;
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if (tbslen != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_rsa_sign, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_rsa_sign, EVP_R_NO_MDC2_SUPPORT);
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return 0;
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}
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switch (rctx->pad_mode) {
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case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
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if (!RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, &out_len, rsa)) {
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return 0;
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}
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*siglen = out_len;
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return 1;
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case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
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!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, rctx->tbuf, tbs, rctx->md,
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rctx->mgf1md, rctx->saltlen) ||
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!RSA_sign_raw(rsa, siglen, sig, *siglen, rctx->tbuf, key_len,
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RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return RSA_sign_raw(rsa, siglen, sig, *siglen, tbs, tbslen, rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig,
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size_t siglen, const uint8_t *tbs,
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size_t tbslen) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
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size_t rslen;
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const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
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if (rctx->md) {
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switch (rctx->pad_mode) {
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case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
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return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, rsa);
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case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
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!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &rslen, rctx->tbuf, key_len, sig, siglen,
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RSA_NO_PADDING) ||
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!RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
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rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
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!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &rslen, rctx->tbuf, key_len, sig, siglen,
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rctx->pad_mode) ||
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rslen != tbslen ||
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CRYPTO_memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen) != 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *outlen,
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const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
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const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
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if (!out) {
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*outlen = key_len;
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return 1;
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}
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if (*outlen < key_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_rsa_encrypt, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
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!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, key_len, in, inlen,
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rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen,
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rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md) ||
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!RSA_encrypt(rsa, outlen, out, *outlen, rctx->tbuf, key_len,
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RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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return RSA_encrypt(rsa, outlen, out, *outlen, in, inlen, rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
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size_t *outlen, const uint8_t *in,
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size_t inlen) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
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const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
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if (!out) {
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*outlen = key_len;
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return 1;
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}
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if (*outlen < key_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_rsa_decrypt, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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size_t plaintext_len;
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int message_len;
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
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!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &plaintext_len, rctx->tbuf, key_len, in, inlen,
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RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
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return 0;
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}
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message_len = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(
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out, key_len, rctx->tbuf, plaintext_len, rctx->oaep_label,
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rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
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if (message_len < 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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*outlen = message_len;
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return 1;
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}
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return RSA_decrypt(rsa, outlen, out, key_len, in, inlen, rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding) {
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if (!md) {
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return 1;
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}
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if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, check_padding_md, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int is_known_padding(int padding_mode) {
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switch (padding_mode) {
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case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
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case RSA_NO_PADDING:
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case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
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case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
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return 1;
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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switch (type) {
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
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if (!is_known_padding(p1) || !check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1) ||
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(p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING &&
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0 == (ctx->operation & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY))) ||
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(p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING &&
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0 == (ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_rsa_ctrl,
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EVP_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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if ((p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING || p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) &&
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rctx->md == NULL) {
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rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
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}
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rctx->pad_mode = p1;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
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*(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
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if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_rsa_ctrl, EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
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return 0;
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}
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if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
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*(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
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} else {
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if (p1 < -2) {
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return 0;
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}
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rctx->saltlen = p1;
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}
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
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if (p1 < 256) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_rsa_ctrl, EVP_R_INVALID_KEYBITS);
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return 0;
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}
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rctx->nbits = p1;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
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if (!p2) {
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return 0;
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}
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BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
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rctx->pub_exp = p2;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
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if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_rsa_ctrl, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD) {
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*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
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} else {
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rctx->md = p2;
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}
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
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if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode)) {
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return 0;
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}
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rctx->md = p2;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
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*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
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if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING &&
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rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_rsa_ctrl, EVP_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
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return 0;
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}
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if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
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if (rctx->mgf1md) {
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*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
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} else {
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*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
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}
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} else {
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rctx->mgf1md = p2;
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}
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
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if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_rsa_ctrl, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
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if (p2 && p1 > 0) {
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/* TODO(fork): this seems wrong. Shouldn't it take a copy of the
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* buffer? */
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rctx->oaep_label = p2;
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rctx->oaep_labellen = p1;
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} else {
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rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
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rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
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}
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
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if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_rsa_ctrl, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
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|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
CBS_init((CBS *)p2, rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, pkey_rsa_ctrl, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
|
|
RSA *rsa = NULL;
|
|
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
|
|
|
if (!rctx->pub_exp) {
|
|
rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
|
|
if (!rctx->pub_exp || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
rsa = RSA_new();
|
|
if (!rsa) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, NULL)) {
|
|
RSA_free(rsa);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
|
|
EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0 /* flags */, pkey_rsa_init,
|
|
pkey_rsa_copy, pkey_rsa_cleanup, 0 /* paramgen_init */,
|
|
0 /* paramgen */, 0 /* keygen_init */, pkey_rsa_keygen,
|
|
0 /* sign_init */, pkey_rsa_sign, 0 /* verify_init */,
|
|
pkey_rsa_verify, 0 /* signctx_init */, 0 /* signctx */,
|
|
0 /* verifyctx_init */, 0 /* verifyctx */, 0 /* encrypt_init */,
|
|
pkey_rsa_encrypt, 0 /* decrypt_init */, pkey_rsa_decrypt,
|
|
0 /* derive_init */, 0 /* derive */, pkey_rsa_ctrl,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int padding) {
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING,
|
|
padding, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *out_padding) {
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING,
|
|
0, out_padding);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int salt_len) {
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA,
|
|
(EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY),
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, salt_len, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *out_salt_len) {
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA,
|
|
(EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY),
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, 0, out_salt_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int bits) {
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS, bits, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *e) {
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, e);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) {
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **out_md) {
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void*) out_md);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) {
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void*) md);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **out_md) {
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void*) out_md);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *label,
|
|
size_t label_len) {
|
|
int label_len_int = label_len;
|
|
if (((size_t) label_len_int) != label_len) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, label_len,
|
|
(void *)label);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
|
const uint8_t **out_label) {
|
|
CBS label;
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0, &label)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (CBS_len(&label) > INT_MAX) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
*out_label = CBS_data(&label);
|
|
return (int)CBS_len(&label);
|
|
}
|