32e0d10069
This introduces EC_FELEM, which is analogous to EC_SCALAR. It is used for EC_POINT's representation in the generic EC_METHOD, as well as random operations on tuned EC_METHODs that still are implemented genericly. Unlike EC_SCALAR, EC_FELEM's exact representation is awkwardly specific to the EC_METHOD, analogous to how the old values were BIGNUMs but may or may not have been in Montgomery form. This is kind of a nuisance, but no more than before. (If p224-64.c were easily convertable to Montgomery form, we could say |EC_FELEM| is always in Montgomery form. If we exposed the internal add and double implementations in each of the curves, we could give |EC_POINT| an |EC_METHOD|-specific representation and |EC_FELEM| is purely a |EC_GFp_mont_method| type. I'll leave this for later.) The generic add and doubling formulas are aligned with the formulas proved in fiat-crypto. Those only applied to a = -3, so I've proved a generic one in https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto/pull/356, in case someone uses a custom curve. The new formulas are verified, constant-time, and swap a multiply for a square. As expressed in fiat-crypto they do use more temporaries, but this seems to be fine with stack-allocated EC_FELEMs. (We can try to help the compiler later, but benchamrks below suggest this isn't necessary.) Unlike BIGNUM, EC_FELEM can be stack-allocated. It also captures the bounds in the type system and, in particular, that the width is correct, which will make it easier to select a point in constant-time in the future. (Indeed the old code did not always have the correct width. Its point formula involved halving and implemented this in variable time and variable width.) Before: Did 77274 ECDH P-256 operations in 10046087us (7692.0 ops/sec) Did 5959 ECDH P-384 operations in 10031701us (594.0 ops/sec) Did 10815 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10087892us (1072.1 ops/sec) Did 8976 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10071038us (891.3 ops/sec) Did 2600 ECDH P-521 operations in 10091688us (257.6 ops/sec) Did 4590 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10055195us (456.5 ops/sec) Did 3811 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10003574us (381.0 ops/sec) After: Did 77736 ECDH P-256 operations in 10029858us (7750.5 ops/sec) [+0.8%] Did 7519 ECDH P-384 operations in 10068076us (746.8 ops/sec) [+25.7%] Did 13335 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10029962us (1329.5 ops/sec) [+24.0%] Did 11021 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10088600us (1092.4 ops/sec) [+22.6%] Did 2912 ECDH P-521 operations in 10001325us (291.2 ops/sec) [+13.0%] Did 5150 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10027462us (513.6 ops/sec) [+12.5%] Did 4264 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10069694us (423.4 ops/sec) [+11.1%] This more than pays for removing points_make_affine previously and even speeds up ECDH P-256 slightly. (The point-on-curve check uses the generic code.) Next is to push the stack-allocating up to ec_wNAF_mul, followed by a constant-time single-point multiplication. Bug: 239 Change-Id: I44a2dff7c52522e491d0f8cffff64c4ab5cd353c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27668 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
151 lines
3.9 KiB
C
151 lines
3.9 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2017, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#if !defined(_GNU_SOURCE)
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#define _GNU_SOURCE // needed for syscall() on Linux.
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#endif
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/sha.h>
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#include "../internal.h"
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#include "aes/aes.c"
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#include "aes/key_wrap.c"
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#include "aes/mode_wrappers.c"
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#include "bn/add.c"
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#include "bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c"
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#include "bn/bn.c"
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#include "bn/bytes.c"
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#include "bn/cmp.c"
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#include "bn/ctx.c"
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#include "bn/div.c"
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#include "bn/exponentiation.c"
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#include "bn/gcd.c"
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#include "bn/generic.c"
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#include "bn/jacobi.c"
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#include "bn/montgomery.c"
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#include "bn/montgomery_inv.c"
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#include "bn/mul.c"
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#include "bn/prime.c"
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#include "bn/random.c"
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#include "bn/rsaz_exp.c"
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#include "bn/shift.c"
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#include "bn/sqrt.c"
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#include "cipher/aead.c"
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#include "cipher/cipher.c"
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#include "cipher/e_aes.c"
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#include "cipher/e_des.c"
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#include "des/des.c"
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#include "digest/digest.c"
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#include "digest/digests.c"
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#include "ecdsa/ecdsa.c"
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#include "ec/ec.c"
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#include "ec/ec_key.c"
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#include "ec/ec_montgomery.c"
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#include "ec/felem.c"
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#include "ec/oct.c"
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#include "ec/p224-64.c"
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#include "../../third_party/fiat/p256.c"
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#include "ec/p256-x86_64.c"
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#include "ec/scalar.c"
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#include "ec/simple.c"
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#include "ec/util.c"
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#include "ec/wnaf.c"
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#include "hmac/hmac.c"
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#include "md4/md4.c"
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#include "md5/md5.c"
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#include "modes/cbc.c"
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#include "modes/ccm.c"
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#include "modes/cfb.c"
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#include "modes/ctr.c"
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#include "modes/gcm.c"
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#include "modes/ofb.c"
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#include "modes/polyval.c"
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#include "rand/ctrdrbg.c"
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#include "rand/rand.c"
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#include "rand/urandom.c"
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#include "rsa/blinding.c"
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#include "rsa/padding.c"
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#include "rsa/rsa.c"
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#include "rsa/rsa_impl.c"
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#include "self_check/self_check.c"
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#include "sha/sha1-altivec.c"
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#include "sha/sha1.c"
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#include "sha/sha256.c"
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#include "sha/sha512.c"
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#include "tls/kdf.c"
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#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_ASAN)
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// These symbols are filled in by delocate.go. They point to the start and end
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// of the module, and the location of the integrity hash, respectively.
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extern const uint8_t BORINGSSL_bcm_text_start[];
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extern const uint8_t BORINGSSL_bcm_text_end[];
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extern const uint8_t BORINGSSL_bcm_text_hash[];
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#endif
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static void __attribute__((constructor))
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BORINGSSL_bcm_power_on_self_test(void) {
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CRYPTO_library_init();
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_ASAN)
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// Integrity tests cannot run under ASAN because it involves reading the full
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// .text section, which triggers the global-buffer overflow detection.
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const uint8_t *const start = BORINGSSL_bcm_text_start;
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const uint8_t *const end = BORINGSSL_bcm_text_end;
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static const uint8_t kHMACKey[64] = {0};
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uint8_t result[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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unsigned result_len;
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if (!HMAC(EVP_sha512(), kHMACKey, sizeof(kHMACKey), start, end - start,
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result, &result_len) ||
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result_len != sizeof(result)) {
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goto err;
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}
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const uint8_t *expected = BORINGSSL_bcm_text_hash;
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if (!check_test(expected, result, sizeof(result), "FIPS integrity test")) {
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goto err;
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}
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#endif
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if (!BORINGSSL_self_test()) {
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goto err;
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}
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return;
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err:
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BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
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}
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void BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort(void) {
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for (;;) {
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abort();
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exit(1);
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}
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}
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#endif // BORINGSSL_FIPS
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