3d622e554e
This is fine because TLS PRFs only go up to SHA-384, but since SSL_SESSION::master_key is sized to 48, not EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, this should explicitly check the bounds. Change-Id: I2b1bcaab5cdfc3ce4d7a8b8ed5cc4c6d15d10270 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12460 CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
458 lines
16 KiB
C
458 lines
16 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/aead.h>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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int tls13_init_key_schedule(SSL *ssl) {
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SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_get_algorithm_prf(ssl));
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hs->hash_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
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/* Initialize the secret to the zero key. */
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memset(hs->secret, 0, hs->hash_len);
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/* Initialize the rolling hashes and release the handshake buffer. */
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if (!ssl3_init_handshake_hash(ssl)) {
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return 0;
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}
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ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl);
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_advance_key_schedule(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
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SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_get_algorithm_prf(ssl));
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return HKDF_extract(hs->secret, &hs->hash_len, digest, in, len, hs->secret,
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hs->hash_len);
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}
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static int hkdf_expand_label(uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *digest,
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const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len,
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const uint8_t *label, size_t label_len,
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const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_len, size_t len) {
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static const char kTLS13LabelVersion[] = "TLS 1.3, ";
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CBB cbb, child;
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uint8_t *hkdf_label;
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size_t hkdf_label_len;
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if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 2 + 1 + strlen(kTLS13LabelVersion) + label_len + 1 +
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hash_len) ||
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!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, len) ||
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!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelVersion,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelVersion)) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child, label, label_len) ||
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!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child, hash, hash_len) ||
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!CBB_finish(&cbb, &hkdf_label, &hkdf_label_len)) {
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CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
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return 0;
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}
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int ret = HKDF_expand(out, len, digest, secret, secret_len, hkdf_label,
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hkdf_label_len);
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OPENSSL_free(hkdf_label);
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return ret;
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}
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int tls13_get_context_hash(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) {
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EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
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unsigned handshake_len = 0;
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int ok = EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ssl->s3->handshake_hash) &&
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EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &handshake_len);
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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if (ok) {
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*out_len = handshake_len;
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}
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return ok;
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}
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/* derive_secret derives a secret of length |len| and writes the result in |out|
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* with the given label and the current base secret and most recently-saved
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* handshake context. It returns one on success and zero on error. */
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static int derive_secret(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
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const uint8_t *label, size_t label_len) {
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SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_get_algorithm_prf(ssl));
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uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t context_hash_len;
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if (!tls13_get_context_hash(ssl, context_hash, &context_hash_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return hkdf_expand_label(out, digest, hs->secret, hs->hash_len, label,
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label_len, context_hash, context_hash_len, len);
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}
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int tls13_set_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
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const uint8_t *traffic_secret,
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size_t traffic_secret_len) {
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if (traffic_secret_len > 0xff) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Look up cipher suite properties. */
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const EVP_AEAD *aead;
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_get_algorithm_prf(ssl));
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size_t discard;
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if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &discard, &discard,
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SSL_get_session(ssl)->cipher,
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ssl3_protocol_version(ssl))) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* Derive the key. */
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size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
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uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(key, digest, traffic_secret, traffic_secret_len,
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(const uint8_t *)"key", 3, NULL, 0, key_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* Derive the IV. */
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size_t iv_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
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uint8_t iv[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(iv, digest, traffic_secret, traffic_secret_len,
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(const uint8_t *)"iv", 2, NULL, 0, iv_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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SSL_AEAD_CTX *traffic_aead = SSL_AEAD_CTX_new(
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direction, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl), SSL_get_session(ssl)->cipher, key,
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key_len, NULL, 0, iv, iv_len);
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if (traffic_aead == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
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if (!ssl->method->set_read_state(ssl, traffic_aead)) {
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return 0;
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}
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} else {
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if (!ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, traffic_aead)) {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/* Save the traffic secret. */
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if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
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memmove(ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret, traffic_secret, traffic_secret_len);
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ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret_len = traffic_secret_len;
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} else {
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memmove(ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret, traffic_secret, traffic_secret_len);
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ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret_len = traffic_secret_len;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic[] =
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"client handshake traffic secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic[] =
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"server handshake traffic secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic[] =
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"client application traffic secret";
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static const char kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic[] =
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"server application traffic secret";
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int tls13_set_handshake_traffic(SSL *ssl) {
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SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
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uint8_t client_traffic_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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uint8_t server_traffic_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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if (!derive_secret(ssl, client_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic)) ||
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!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
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client_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len) ||
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!derive_secret(ssl, server_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic)) ||
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!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
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server_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (ssl->server) {
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if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_open, client_traffic_secret,
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hs->hash_len) ||
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!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal, server_traffic_secret,
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hs->hash_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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} else {
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if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_open, server_traffic_secret,
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hs->hash_len) ||
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!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal, client_traffic_secret,
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hs->hash_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelExporter[] = "exporter master secret";
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int tls13_derive_application_secrets(SSL *ssl) {
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SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
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ssl->s3->exporter_secret_len = hs->hash_len;
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return derive_secret(ssl, hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic)) &&
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ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0",
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hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len) &&
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derive_secret(ssl, hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic)) &&
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ssl_log_secret(ssl, "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0",
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hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len) &&
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derive_secret(ssl, ssl->s3->exporter_secret, hs->hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelExporter,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelExporter));
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic[] =
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"application traffic secret";
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int tls13_rotate_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction) {
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_get_algorithm_prf(ssl));
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uint8_t *secret;
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size_t secret_len;
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if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
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secret = ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret;
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secret_len = ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret_len;
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} else {
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secret = ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret;
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secret_len = ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret_len;
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}
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(secret, digest, secret, secret_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic), NULL, 0,
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secret_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, direction, secret, secret_len);
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelResumption[] = "resumption master secret";
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int tls13_derive_resumption_secret(SSL *ssl) {
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if (ssl->s3->hs->hash_len > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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ssl->s3->new_session->master_key_length = ssl->s3->hs->hash_len;
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return derive_secret(ssl, ssl->s3->new_session->master_key,
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ssl->s3->new_session->master_key_length,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelResumption,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelResumption));
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelFinished[] = "finished";
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/* tls13_verify_data sets |out| to be the HMAC of |context| using a derived
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* Finished key for both Finished messages and the PSK binder. */
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static int tls13_verify_data(const EVP_MD *digest, uint8_t *out,
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size_t *out_len, const uint8_t *secret,
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size_t hash_len, uint8_t *context,
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size_t context_len) {
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uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned len;
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(key, digest, secret, hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelFinished,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelFinished), NULL, 0, hash_len) ||
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HMAC(digest, key, hash_len, context, context_len, out, &len) == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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*out_len = len;
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_finished_mac(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, int is_server) {
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SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_get_algorithm_prf(ssl));
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const uint8_t *traffic_secret;
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if (is_server == ssl->server) {
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traffic_secret = ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret;
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} else {
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traffic_secret = ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret;
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}
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uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t context_hash_len;
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if (!tls13_get_context_hash(ssl, context_hash, &context_hash_len) ||
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!tls13_verify_data(digest, out, out_len, traffic_secret, hs->hash_len,
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context_hash, context_hash_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
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const char *label, size_t label_len,
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const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
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int use_context) {
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const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_get_algorithm_prf(ssl));
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const uint8_t *hash = NULL;
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size_t hash_len = 0;
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if (use_context) {
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hash = context;
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hash_len = context_len;
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}
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return hkdf_expand_label(out, digest, ssl->s3->exporter_secret,
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ssl->s3->exporter_secret_len, (const uint8_t *)label,
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label_len, hash, hash_len, out_len);
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}
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static const char kTLS13LabelPSKBinder[] = "resumption psk binder key";
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static int tls13_psk_binder(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *digest,
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uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len, uint8_t *context,
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size_t context_len, size_t hash_len) {
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uint8_t binder_context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned binder_context_len;
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if (!EVP_Digest(NULL, 0, binder_context, &binder_context_len, digest, NULL)) {
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return 0;
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}
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uint8_t early_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
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size_t early_secret_len;
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if (!HKDF_extract(early_secret, &early_secret_len, digest, psk, hash_len,
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NULL, 0)) {
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return 0;
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}
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uint8_t binder_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
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size_t len;
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if (!hkdf_expand_label(binder_key, digest, early_secret, hash_len,
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(const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelPSKBinder,
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strlen(kTLS13LabelPSKBinder), binder_context,
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binder_context_len, hash_len) ||
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!tls13_verify_data(digest, out, &len, binder_key, hash_len, context,
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context_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_write_psk_binder(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *msg, size_t len) {
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const EVP_MD *digest =
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ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl->session->cipher->algorithm_prf);
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size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
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if (len < hash_len + 3) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
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uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned context_len;
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, digest, NULL) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl->s3->handshake_buffer->data,
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ssl->s3->handshake_buffer->length) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, msg, len - hash_len - 3) ||
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!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, context, &context_len)) {
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
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if (!tls13_psk_binder(ssl, verify_data, digest, ssl->session->master_key,
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ssl->session->master_key_length, context,
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context_len, hash_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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memcpy(msg + len - hash_len, verify_data, hash_len);
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_verify_psk_binder(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session,
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CBS *binders) {
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const EVP_MD *digest =
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ssl_get_handshake_digest(session->cipher->algorithm_prf);
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size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
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/* Get the full ClientHello, including message header. It must be large enough
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* to exclude the binders. */
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CBS message;
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ssl->method->get_current_message(ssl, &message);
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if (CBS_len(&message) < CBS_len(binders) + 2) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Hash a ClientHello prefix up to the binders. For now, this assumes we only
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* ever verify PSK binders on initial ClientHellos. */
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uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned context_len;
|
|
if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&message), CBS_len(&message) - CBS_len(binders) - 2,
|
|
context, &context_len, digest, NULL)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
|
|
CBS binder;
|
|
if (!tls13_psk_binder(ssl, verify_data, digest, session->master_key,
|
|
session->master_key_length, context, context_len,
|
|
hash_len) ||
|
|
/* We only consider the first PSK, so compare against the first binder. */
|
|
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(binders, &binder)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int binder_ok = CBS_len(&binder) == hash_len &&
|
|
CRYPTO_memcmp(CBS_data(&binder), verify_data, hash_len) == 0;
|
|
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
|
|
binder_ok = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!binder_ok) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|