|
- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE. */
-
- #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
-
- #include <assert.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <string.h>
-
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/buf.h>
- #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
- #include <openssl/cipher.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/ec.h>
- #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/hmac.h>
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
- #include <openssl/mem.h>
- #include <openssl/obj.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include <openssl/sha.h>
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
-
- #include "ssl_locl.h"
- #include "../crypto/internal.h"
- #include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
-
- IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, TLSv1_2_server_method,
- ssl3_accept,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- TLSv1_2_enc_data)
-
- IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, TLSv1_1_server_method,
- ssl3_accept,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- TLSv1_1_enc_data)
-
- IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, TLSv1_server_method,
- ssl3_accept,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- TLSv1_enc_data)
-
- IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(SSL3_VERSION, SSLv3_server_method,
- ssl3_accept,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- SSLv3_enc_data)
-
- int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
- {
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- unsigned long alg_a;
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
- int ret= -1;
- int new_state,state,skip=0;
-
- ERR_clear_error();
- ERR_clear_system_error();
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb=s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- /* init things to blank */
- s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
-
- if (s->cert == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
- return(-1);
- }
-
- for (;;)
- {
- state=s->state;
-
- switch (s->state)
- {
- case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
- s->renegotiate=1;
- /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
-
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
- case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
- case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-
- s->server=1;
- if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
-
- if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
-
- if (s->init_buf == NULL)
- {
- if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
- {
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
- {
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_buf=buf;
- }
-
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
- {
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->init_num=0;
-
- if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
- {
- /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
- * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
- */
- if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-
- if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
- }
- else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
- {
- /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
- * client that doesn't support secure
- * renegotiation.
- */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- else
- {
- /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
- * we will just send a HelloRequest */
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
-
- s->shutdown=0;
- ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->init_num=0;
-
- if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
- s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
- s->shutdown=0;
- ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
- if (ret == PENDING_SESSION) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
- goto end;
- }
- if (ret == CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING)
- {
- s->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
- goto end;
- }
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->renegotiate = 2;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
- ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- if (s->hit)
- {
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- }
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
- if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
- {
- ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
- else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
- else
- {
- skip = 1;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- /* Send a ServerKeyExchange message if:
- * - The key exchange is ephemeral or anonymous
- * Diffie-Hellman.
- * - There is a PSK identity hint.
- *
- * TODO(davidben): This logic is currently duplicated
- * in d1_srvr.c. Fix this. In the meantime, keep them
- * in sync.
- */
- if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ||
- ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && s->psk_identity_hint))
- {
- ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- }
- else
- skip=1;
-
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
- if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
- /* Don't request a certificate if an obc was presented */
- ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) ||
- /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
- * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
- ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
- /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
- * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
- * and in RFC 2246): */
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
- /* ... except when the application insists on verification
- * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
- /* With normal PSK Certificates and
- * Certificate Requests are omitted */
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
- {
- /* no cert request */
- skip=1;
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
- return -1;
- }
- else
- {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
- ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- #else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
- #endif
- s->init_num=0;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
- ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-
- /* This code originally checked to see if
- * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
- * and then flushed. This caused problems
- * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
- * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
- * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
- * still exist. So instead we just flush
- * unconditionally.
- */
-
- s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
- if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
- {
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-
- s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
- {
- ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- }
- s->init_num=0;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
- ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE: {
- char next_proto_neg = 0;
- char channel_id = 0;
- next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
- channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid;
-
- /* At this point, the next message must be entirely
- * behind a ChangeCipherSpec. */
- if (!ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(s))
- {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- if (next_proto_neg)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- else if (channel_id)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- break;
- }
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
- ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->init_num = 0;
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
- else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B:
- ret=ssl3_get_channel_id(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- if (s->hit)
- s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
- else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then
- * record the hashshake hashes in |s->session| in case
- * we need them to verify a ChannelID signature on a
- * resumption of this session in the future. */
- if (!s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
- {
- ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- }
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
- ret=ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- #if 0
- // TODO(davidben): Implement OCSP stapling on the server.
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
- ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
- #endif
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
-
- s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
- { ret= -1; goto end; }
-
- ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
- SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
-
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num=0;
-
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
- {
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
- ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
- SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
- s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
- s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- if (s->hit)
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- else
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf=NULL;
-
- /* remove buffering on output */
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
- s->init_num=0;
-
- /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can
- * discard it now. */
- if (s->session->peer && s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs)
- {
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer = NULL;
- }
-
- if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
- {
- s->renegotiate=0;
- s->new_session=0;
-
- ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
- /* s->server=1; */
- s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
-
- if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
- }
-
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
-
- default:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
- }
-
- if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
- {
- if (s->debug)
- {
- if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
-
-
- if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
- {
- new_state=s->state;
- s->state=state;
- cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
- s->state=new_state;
- }
- }
- skip=0;
- }
- end:
- /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
-
- s->in_handshake--;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
- return(ret);
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
- {
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
- {
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- {
- int i,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
- long n;
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
- struct ssl_early_callback_ctx early_ctx;
- CBS client_hello;
- uint16_t client_version;
- CBS client_random, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods;
-
- /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
- * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
- * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
- * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
- * TLSv1.
- */
- switch (s->state) {
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
- s->first_packet=1;
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
- SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
- SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
- &ok);
-
- if (!ok) return((int)n);
- s->first_packet=0;
-
- /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
- * contain one, just return since we do not want to
- * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
- */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
- {
- CBS session_id;
- uint8_t cookie_length;
-
- CBS_init(&client_hello, s->init_msg, n);
- if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
- !CBS_get_u8(&client_hello, &cookie_length))
- {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (cookie_length == 0)
- return 1;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
- /* fallthrough */
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
- /* We have previously parsed the ClientHello message,
- * and can't call ssl_get_message again without hashing
- * the message into the Finished digest again. */
- n = s->init_num;
-
- memset(&early_ctx, 0, sizeof(early_ctx));
- early_ctx.ssl = s;
- early_ctx.client_hello = s->init_msg;
- early_ctx.client_hello_len = n;
- if (!ssl_early_callback_init(&early_ctx))
- {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C &&
- s->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL)
- {
- int ret;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
- ret = s->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&early_ctx);
- if (ret == 0)
- return CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
- else if (ret == -1)
- {
- /* Connection rejected. */
- al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
- break;
- default:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&client_hello, s->init_msg, n);
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &client_version) ||
- !CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
- CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
- * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
- s->client_version = client_version;
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
- s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
- : (s->client_version < s->version))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
- !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
- {
- /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
- s->version = s->client_version;
- }
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Load the client random. */
- memcpy(s->s3->client_random, CBS_data(&client_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- {
- CBS cookie;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) ||
- CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
- CBS_len(&cookie) > 0)
- {
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
- {
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s,
- CBS_data(&cookie), CBS_len(&cookie)) == 0)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* else cookie verification succeeded */
- }
- else if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len))
- {
- /* default verification */
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 and
- * don't send HelloVerifyRequest. */
- ret = -2;
- }
-
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
- {
- /* Select version to use */
- if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
- {
- s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
- s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
- }
- else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
- {
- s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
- s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
- }
- else
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- s->version = s->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- s->hit=0;
- /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
- * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
- * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
- * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
- * won't even compile against older library versions).
- *
- * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
- * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
- * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- * setting will be ignored.
- */
- if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
- {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
- goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &early_ctx);
- if (i == PENDING_SESSION)
- {
- ret = PENDING_SESSION;
- goto err;
- }
- else if (i == -1)
- {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
- * version: most clients do not accept a mismatch. */
- if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
- {
- s->hit = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- /* No session was found or it was unacceptable. */
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
- CBS_len(&compression_methods) == 0)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* TODO(davidben): Per spec, cipher_suites can never be empty
- * (specified at the ClientHello structure level). This logic
- * allows it to be empty if resuming a session. Can we always
- * require non-empty? If a client sends empty cipher_suites
- * because it's resuming a session, it could always fail to
- * resume a session, so it's unlikely to actually work. */
- if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0)
- {
- /* We need a cipher if we are not resuming a session. */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites);
- if (ciphers == NULL)
- {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
- if (s->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0)
- {
- size_t j;
- int found_cipher = 0;
- unsigned long id = s->session->cipher->id;
-
- for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); j++)
- {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j);
- if (c->id == id)
- {
- found_cipher = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!found_cipher)
- {
- /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
- * list if we are asked to reuse it */
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Only null compression is supported. */
- if (memchr(CBS_data(&compression_methods), 0,
- CBS_len(&compression_methods)) == NULL)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* TLS extensions*/
- if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
- {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &client_hello))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */
- if (CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0)
- {
- /* wrong packet length */
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Given ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */
- if (!s->hit)
- {
- if (ciphers == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
- if (s->cert->cert_cb)
- {
- int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
- if (rv == 0)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (rv < 0)
- {
- s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- goto err;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- }
- c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(s));
-
- if (c == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
- }
- else
- {
- /* Session-id reuse */
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
- }
-
- if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
- {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* we now have the following setup.
- * client_random
- * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
- * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
- * compression - basically ignored right now
- * ssl version is set - sslv3
- * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
- * s->hit - session reuse flag
- * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
- */
-
- if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
- if (0)
- {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- }
- err:
- if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- return ret;
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *buf;
- unsigned char *p,*d;
- int sl;
- unsigned long l;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
- {
- /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order
- * to avoid a known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEECDH) == 0)
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-
- /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't
- * support ChannelID then we didn't record the original
- * handshake hashes in the session and so cannot resume with
- * ChannelIDs. */
- if (s->hit &&
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new &&
- s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0)
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-
- buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- /* Do the message type and length last */
- d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
-
- *(p++)=s->version>>8;
- *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
-
- /* Random stuff */
- if (!ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
- * back in the server hello:
- * - For session reuse from the session cache,
- * we send back the old session ID.
- * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
- * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
- * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
- * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
- * session ID.
- * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
- * we send back a 0-length session ID.
- * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
- * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
- * to send back.
- */
- if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
- && !s->hit)
- s->session->session_id_length=0;
-
- sl=s->session->session_id_length;
- if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- *(p++)=sl;
- memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
- p+=sl;
-
- /* put the cipher */
- s2n(ssl3_get_cipher_value(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), p);
-
- /* put the compression method */
- *(p++)=0;
- if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return -1;
- }
- if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- /* do the header */
- l=(p-d);
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
- {
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
- {
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *q;
- int j,num;
- unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned int u;
- DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
- EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
- unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
- int encodedlen = 0;
- int curve_id = 0;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
- const char* psk_identity_hint = NULL;
- size_t psk_identity_hint_len = 0;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- unsigned char *p,*d;
- int al,i;
- unsigned long alg_k;
- unsigned long alg_a;
- int n;
- CERT *cert;
- BIGNUM *r[4];
- int nr[4],kn;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
- {
- alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- cert=s->cert;
-
- buf=s->init_buf;
-
- r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
- n=0;
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
- {
- /* size for PSK identity hint */
- psk_identity_hint = s->psk_identity_hint;
- if (psk_identity_hint)
- psk_identity_hint_len = strlen(psk_identity_hint);
- else
- psk_identity_hint_len = 0;
- n+=2+psk_identity_hint_len;
- }
- if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
- {
- dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
- if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
- dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
- if (dhp == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
- if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
- dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
- {
- if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
- dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
- if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
- (dh->priv_key == NULL))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- r[0]=dh->p;
- r[1]=dh->g;
- r[2]=dh->pub_key;
- }
- else
- if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
- {
- const EC_GROUP *group;
-
- ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
- {
- /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
- int nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s);
- if (nid != NID_undef)
- ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
- }
- else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
- {
- ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
- }
- if (ecdhp == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
- if (ecdhp == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
- ecdh = ecdhp;
- else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
- if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
- {
- if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
- * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
- * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
- */
- if ((curve_id =
- tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
- == 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Encode the public key.
- * First check the size of encoding and
- * allocate memory accordingly.
- */
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
- bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
-
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
-
- if (encodedlen == 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
-
- /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
- * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
- * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
- * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
- * structure.
- */
- n += 4 + encodedlen;
-
- /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
- * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
- */
- r[0]=NULL;
- r[1]=NULL;
- r[2]=NULL;
- r[3]=NULL;
- }
- else
- if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
- {
- nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
- n+=2+nr[i];
- }
-
- if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
- {
- if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
- == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- }
- else
- {
- pkey=NULL;
- kn=0;
- }
-
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_BUF);
- goto err;
- }
- d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
-
- for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
- {
- s2n(nr[i],p);
- BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
- p+=nr[i];
- }
-
- /* Note: ECDHE PSK ciphersuites use SSL_kEECDH and SSL_aPSK.
- * When one of them is used, the server key exchange record needs to have both
- * the psk_identity_hint and the ServerECDHParams. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
- {
- /* copy PSK identity hint (if provided) */
- s2n(psk_identity_hint_len, p);
- if (psk_identity_hint_len > 0)
- {
- memcpy(p, psk_identity_hint, psk_identity_hint_len);
- p+=psk_identity_hint_len;
- }
- }
-
- if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
- {
- /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
- * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
- * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
- * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
- * the actual encoded point itself
- */
- *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
- p += 1;
- *p = 0;
- p += 1;
- *p = curve_id;
- p += 1;
- *p = encodedlen;
- p += 1;
- memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
- (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
- encodedlen);
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- encodedPoint = NULL;
- p += encodedlen;
- }
-
- /* not anonymous */
- if (pkey != NULL)
- {
- /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
- * and p points to the space at the end. */
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- {
- q=md_buf;
- j=0;
- for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
- {
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
- (num == 2) ? EVP_md5() : EVP_sha1(), NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
- (unsigned int *)&i);
- q+=i;
- j+=i;
- }
- if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
- &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(u,p);
- n+=u+2;
- }
- else
- {
- const EVP_MD *md;
- size_t sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-
-
- /* send signature algorithm */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- {
- md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(s, pkey);
- if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
- {
- /* Should never happen */
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p+=2;
- }
- else
- {
- md = EVP_sha1();
- }
- if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) ||
- !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) ||
- !EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, &p[2], &sig_len))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_EVP);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(sig_len, p);
- n += sig_len + 2;
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- n += 2;
- }
- }
-
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
- }
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- err:
- if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return(-1);
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *p,*d;
- size_t i;
- int j,nl,off,n;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
- X509_NAME *name;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
- {
- buf=s->init_buf;
-
- d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
-
- /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
- p++;
- n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
- d[0]=n;
- p+=n;
- n++;
-
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- {
- const unsigned char *psigs;
- nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
- s2n(nl, p);
- memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
- p += nl;
- n += nl + 2;
- }
-
- off=n;
- p+=2;
- n+=2;
-
- sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
- nl=0;
- if (sk != NULL)
- {
- for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
- {
- name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
- j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_certificate_request, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
- s2n(j,p);
- i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
- n+=2+j;
- nl+=2+j;
- }
- }
- /* else no CA names */
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
- s2n(nl,p);
-
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
-
- #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- {
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_certificate_request, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
- /* do the header */
- *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
- s->init_num += 4;
- }
- #endif
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- err:
- return(-1);
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
- {
- int al,ok;
- long n;
- CBS client_key_exchange;
- unsigned long alg_k;
- unsigned long alg_a;
- uint8_t *premaster_secret = NULL;
- size_t premaster_secret_len = 0;
- RSA *rsa=NULL;
- uint8_t *decrypt_buf = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
- BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
- DH *dh_srvr;
-
- EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
- EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
- unsigned int psk_len = 0;
- unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
-
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
- SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- 2048, /* ??? */
- SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
- &ok);
-
- if (!ok) return((int)n);
- CBS_init(&client_key_exchange, s->init_msg, n);
-
- alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
- {
- CBS psk_identity;
-
- /* If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a
- * psk_identity. If PSK, then this is the only field
- * in the message. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) ||
- ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
- CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity))
- {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Look up the key for the identity. */
- psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, psk, sizeof(psk));
- if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- else if (psk_len == 0)
- {
- /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and
- * |premaster_secret_len|. */
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
- {
- CBS encrypted_premaster_secret;
- uint8_t rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- uint8_t good;
- size_t rsa_size, decrypt_len, premaster_index, j;
-
- pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
- if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
- (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
- (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
-
- /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
- {
- CBS copy = client_key_exchange;
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange,
- &encrypted_premaster_secret) ||
- CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)
- {
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
- {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
- else
- encrypted_premaster_secret = copy;
- }
- }
- else
- encrypted_premaster_secret = client_key_exchange;
-
- /* Reject overly short RSA keys because we want to be sure that
- * the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire size
- * of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The actual
- * expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the bound is
- * sufficient to be safe. */
- rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
- if (rsa_size < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
- * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
- * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
- * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
- * case that the decrypt fails. See
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
- sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption. */
- decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
- if (decrypt_buf == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as
- * part of the timing-sensitive code below. */
- if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &decrypt_len, decrypt_buf, rsa_size,
- CBS_data(&encrypted_premaster_secret),
- CBS_len(&encrypted_premaster_secret),
- RSA_NO_PADDING))
- {
- goto err;
- }
- if (decrypt_len != rsa_size)
- {
- /* This should never happen, but do a check so we do not
- * read uninitialized memory. */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Remove the PKCS#1 padding and adjust |decrypt_len| as
- * appropriate. |good| will be 0xff if the premaster is
- * acceptable and zero otherwise. */
- good = constant_time_eq_int_8(
- RSA_message_index_PKCS1_type_2(decrypt_buf, decrypt_len, &premaster_index), 1);
- decrypt_len = decrypt_len - premaster_index;
-
- /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. */
- good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
-
- /* Copy over the unpadded premaster. Whatever the value of
- * |decrypt_good_mask|, copy as if the premaster were the right
- * length. It is important the memory access pattern be
- * constant. */
- premaster_secret = BUF_memdup(
- decrypt_buf + (rsa_size - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH),
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
- if (premaster_secret == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
- decrypt_buf = NULL;
-
- /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
- * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
- * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
- * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
- * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
- * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
- * decryption error. */
- good &= constant_time_eq_8(premaster_secret[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
- good &= constant_time_eq_8(premaster_secret[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
-
- /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over premaster_secret using
- * decrypt_good_mask. */
- for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++)
- {
- premaster_secret[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, premaster_secret[j], rand_premaster_secret[j]);
- }
-
- premaster_secret_len = sizeof(rand_premaster_secret);
- }
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
- {
- CBS dh_Yc;
- int dh_len;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &dh_Yc) ||
- CBS_len(&dh_Yc) == 0 ||
- CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
- al = SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
-
- pub = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL);
- if (pub == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Allocate a buffer for the premaster secret. */
- premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dh_srvr));
- if (premaster_secret == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- dh_len = DH_compute_key(premaster_secret, pub, dh_srvr);
- if (dh_len <= 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- BN_clear_free(pub);
- goto err;
- }
-
- DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
- s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
- BN_clear_free(pub);
- pub=NULL;
-
- premaster_secret_len = dh_len;
- }
-
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
- {
- int field_size = 0, ecdh_len;
- const EC_KEY *tkey;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- const BIGNUM *priv_key;
- CBS ecdh_Yc;
-
- /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
- if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
- * ServerKeyExchange msg. */
- tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
-
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
- priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
-
- if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
- !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Let's get client's public key */
- if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Get client's public key from encoded point
- * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
- */
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &ecdh_Yc) ||
- CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint,
- CBS_data(&ecdh_Yc), CBS_len(&ecdh_Yc), bn_ctx))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Allocate a buffer for both the secret and the PSK. */
- field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
- if (field_size <= 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ecdh_len = (field_size + 7) / 8;
- premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(ecdh_len);
- if (premaster_secret == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
- ecdh_len = ECDH_compute_key(premaster_secret,
- ecdh_len, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
- if (ecdh_len <= 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
- clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
- EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- srvr_ecdh = NULL;
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- bn_ctx = NULL;
- EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
-
- premaster_secret_len = ecdh_len;
- }
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
- {
- /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same
- * length as the pre-shared key. */
- premaster_secret_len = psk_len;
- premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
- if (premaster_secret == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- memset(premaster_secret, 0, premaster_secret_len);
- }
- else
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with
- * the pre-shared key. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
- {
- CBB new_premaster, child;
- uint8_t *new_data;
- size_t new_len;
-
- if (!CBB_init(&new_premaster, 2 + psk_len + 2 + premaster_secret_len))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&child, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
- !CBB_finish(&new_premaster, &new_data, &new_len))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- CBB_cleanup(&new_premaster);
- goto err;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
- premaster_secret = new_data;
- premaster_secret_len = new_len;
- }
-
- /* Compute the master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc
- ->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- if (s->session->master_key_length == 0)
- goto err;
- s->session->extended_master_secret = s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret;
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
- return 1;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- err:
- if (premaster_secret)
- {
- if (premaster_secret_len)
- OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
- }
- if (decrypt_buf)
- OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
- EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
- EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- return(-1);
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
- {
- int al,ok,ret=0;
- long n;
- CBS certificate_verify, signature;
- X509 *peer = s->session->peer;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t digest_length;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
-
- /* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
- * CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a
- * client certificate. */
- if (peer == NULL)
- {
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
- return -1;
- return 1;
- }
-
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
- SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE,
- &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return (int)n;
-
- /* Filter out unsupported certificate types. */
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
- if (!(X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey) & EVP_PKT_SIGN) ||
- (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
- {
- al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&certificate_verify, s->init_msg, n);
-
- /* Determine the digest type if needbe. */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- {
- if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, &al, s, &certificate_verify, pkey))
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Compute the digest. */
- if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(s, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey))
- goto err;
-
- /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the
- * current message.*/
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
- goto err;
- ssl3_hash_current_message(s);
-
- /* Parse and verify the signature. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) ||
- CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- if (pctx == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) ||
- !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) ||
- !EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature),
- digest, digest_length))
- {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
- if (0)
- {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- }
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return(ret);
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
- {
- int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
- X509 *x=NULL;
- unsigned long n;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
- SHA256_CTX sha256;
- CBS certificate_msg, certificate_list;
- int is_first_certificate = 1;
-
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
- -1,
- s->max_cert_list,
- SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
- &ok);
-
- if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
- {
- if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
- if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
- return(1);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&certificate_msg, s->init_msg, n);
-
- if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_msg, &certificate_list) ||
- CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0)
- {
- CBS certificate;
- const uint8_t *data;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate))
- {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (is_first_certificate && s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs)
- {
- /* If this is the first certificate, and we don't want
- * to keep peer certificates in memory, then we hash it
- * right away. */
- SHA256_Init(&sha256);
- SHA256_Update(&sha256, CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate));
- SHA256_Final(s->session->peer_sha256, &sha256);
- s->session->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
- }
- is_first_certificate = 0;
- data = CBS_data(&certificate);
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&certificate));
- if (x == NULL)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!CBS_skip(&certificate, data - CBS_data(&certificate)))
- {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (CBS_len(&certificate) != 0)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- x = NULL;
- }
-
- if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
- {
- /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
- else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
- s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
-
- /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
- * when we arrive here. */
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
- {
- s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
- s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
- /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
- * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
-
- sk=NULL;
-
- ret=1;
- if (0)
- {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- }
- err:
- if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
- if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
- return(ret);
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
- {
- CERT_PKEY *cpk;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
- {
- cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
- if (cpk == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_certificate, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return(0);
- }
-
- ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- }
-
- /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
- int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
- {
- uint8_t *session;
- size_t session_len;
- uint8_t *p, *macstart;
- int len;
- unsigned int hlen;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char key_name[16];
- /* The maximum overhead of encrypting the session is 16 (key
- * name) + IV + one block of encryption overhead + HMAC. */
- const size_t max_ticket_overhead = 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
- EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
-
- /* Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket. */
- if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(s->session, &session,
- &session_len))
- {
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than
- * abort the connection. */
- if (session_len > 0xFFFF - max_ticket_overhead)
- {
- const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE";
- size_t placeholder_len = strlen(kTicketPlaceholder);
-
- OPENSSL_free(session);
-
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- /* Emit ticket_lifetime_hint. */
- l2n(0, p);
- /* Emit ticket. */
- s2n(placeholder_len, p);
- memcpy(p, kTicketPlaceholder, placeholder_len);
- p += placeholder_len;
-
- len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- }
-
- /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
- * follows: handshake_header_length +
- * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
- * max_ticket_overhead + * session_length */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
- SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 +
- max_ticket_overhead + session_len))
- {
- OPENSSL_free(session);
- return -1;
- }
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
- /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
- * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
- * from parent ctx.
- */
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
- {
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
- &hctx, 1) < 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(session);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv) ||
- !HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
- {
- OPENSSL_free(session);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- return -1;
- }
- memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
- }
-
- /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
- * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
- * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
- * as their sessions. */
- l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
-
- /* Skip ticket length for now */
- p += 2;
- /* Output key name */
- macstart = p;
- memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
- p += 16;
- /* output IV */
- memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
- p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- /* Encrypt session data */
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, session, session_len);
- p += len;
- EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len);
- p += len;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
- HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-
- p += hlen;
- /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
- /* Total length */
- len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
- /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
- s2n(len - 6, p);
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
- OPENSSL_free(session);
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- }
-
- #if 0
- int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
- /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
- * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
- * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
- * + (ocsp response)
- */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
- return -1;
-
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- /* do the header */
- *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
- /* message length */
- l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
- /* status type */
- *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
- /* length of OCSP response */
- l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
- /* actual response */
- memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- }
- #endif
-
- /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
- * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
- int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
- {
- int ok;
- long n;
- CBS next_protocol, selected_protocol, padding;
-
- /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
- * extension in their ClientHello */
- if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_next_proto, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
- return -1;
- }
-
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
- SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
- 514, /* See the payload format below */
- SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
- &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return((int)n);
-
- /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
- * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
- * by ssl3_get_finished).
- * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with
- * SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_next_proto, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
- return -1;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&next_protocol, s->init_msg, n);
-
- /* The payload looks like:
- * uint8 proto_len;
- * uint8 proto[proto_len];
- * uint8 padding_len;
- * uint8 padding[padding_len];
- */
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) ||
- CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0)
- return 0;
-
- if (!CBS_stow(&selected_protocol,
- &s->next_proto_negotiated,
- &s->next_proto_negotiated_len))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
- int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s)
- {
- int ret = -1, ok;
- long n;
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- uint8_t channel_id_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned int channel_id_hash_len;
- const uint8_t *p;
- uint16_t extension_type, expected_extension_type;
- EC_GROUP* p256 = NULL;
- EC_KEY* key = NULL;
- EC_POINT* point = NULL;
- ECDSA_SIG sig;
- BIGNUM x, y;
- CBS encrypted_extensions, extension;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B,
- SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
- 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE,
- SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE,
- &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return((int)n);
-
- /* Before incorporating the EncryptedExtensions message to the
- * handshake hash, compute the hash that should have been signed. */
- channel_id_hash_len = sizeof(channel_id_hash);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL) ||
- !tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s) ||
- !EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, channel_id_hash, &channel_id_hash_len))
- {
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return -1;
- }
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- assert(channel_id_hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-
- ssl3_hash_current_message(s);
-
- /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
- * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
- * by ssl3_get_finished).
- * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with
- * SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS);
- return -1;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&encrypted_extensions, s->init_msg, n);
-
- /* EncryptedExtensions could include multiple extensions, but
- * the only extension that could be negotiated is ChannelID,
- * so there can only be one entry.
- *
- * The payload looks like:
- * uint16 extension_type
- * uint16 extension_len;
- * uint8 x[32];
- * uint8 y[32];
- * uint8 r[32];
- * uint8 s[32];
- */
- expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id;
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
- expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&encrypted_extensions, &extension_type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&encrypted_extensions, &extension) ||
- CBS_len(&encrypted_extensions) != 0 ||
- extension_type != expected_extension_type ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
- if (!p256)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);
- return -1;
- }
-
- BN_init(&x);
- BN_init(&y);
- sig.r = BN_new();
- sig.s = BN_new();
-
- p = CBS_data(&extension);
- if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL ||
- BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL ||
- BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL ||
- BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- point = EC_POINT_new(p256);
- if (!point ||
- !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- key = EC_KEY_new();
- if (!key ||
- !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) ||
- !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
- goto err;
-
- /* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time
- * that we were called. */
- if (!ECDSA_do_verify(channel_id_hash, channel_id_hash_len, &sig, key))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
- goto err;
- }
-
- memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64);
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- BN_free(&x);
- BN_free(&y);
- BN_free(sig.r);
- BN_free(sig.s);
- if (key)
- EC_KEY_free(key);
- if (point)
- EC_POINT_free(point);
- if (p256)
- EC_GROUP_free(p256);
- return ret;
- }
|