96a16cd10e
All external callers should be resolved now. BUG=89 Change-Id: I6055450e8202c59cca49e4a824be3ec11c32a15a Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10285 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
3003 lines
84 KiB
C
3003 lines
84 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE. */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/dh.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/lhash.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
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#include <sys/timeb.h>
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#else
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/time.h>
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#endif
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/* |SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL| is no longer emitted, but continue to define it
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* to avoid downstream churn. */
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OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL)
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/* Some error codes are special. Ensure the make_errors.go script never
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* regresses this. */
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OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION ==
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SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION + SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET,
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ssl_alert_reason_code_mismatch);
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/* kMaxHandshakeSize is the maximum size, in bytes, of a handshake message. */
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static const size_t kMaxHandshakeSize = (1u << 24) - 1;
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static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl =
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CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
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static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx =
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CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
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int SSL_library_init(void) {
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CRYPTO_library_init();
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return 1;
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}
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static uint32_t ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *sess) {
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const uint8_t *session_id = sess->session_id;
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uint8_t tmp_storage[sizeof(uint32_t)];
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if (sess->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) {
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memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage));
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memcpy(tmp_storage, sess->session_id, sess->session_id_length);
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session_id = tmp_storage;
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}
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uint32_t hash =
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((uint32_t)session_id[0]) |
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((uint32_t)session_id[1] << 8) |
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((uint32_t)session_id[2] << 16) |
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((uint32_t)session_id[3] << 24);
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return hash;
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}
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/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
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* coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
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* SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
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* able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
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* with a matching session ID. */
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static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) {
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if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) {
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return 1;
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}
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if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) {
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return 1;
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}
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return memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length);
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}
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SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method) {
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SSL_CTX *ret = NULL;
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if (method == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
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return NULL;
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}
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if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
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goto err;
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}
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ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
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if (ret == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX));
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ret->method = method->method;
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock);
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ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
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ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
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/* We take the system default */
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ret->session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
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ret->references = 1;
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ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
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ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
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ret->cert = ssl_cert_new();
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if (ret->cert == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp);
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if (ret->sessions == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
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if (ret->cert_store == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, &ret->cipher_list,
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&ret->cipher_list_by_id, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
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if (ret->cipher_list == NULL ||
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sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list->ciphers) <= 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
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goto err2;
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}
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ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
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if (!ret->param) {
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goto err;
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}
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ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
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if (ret->client_CA == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data);
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ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
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|
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/* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
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if (!RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) ||
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!RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) ||
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!RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16)) {
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ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
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}
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ret->min_version = ret->method->min_version;
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ret->max_version = ret->method->max_version;
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|
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/* Lock the SSL_CTX to the specified version, for compatibility with legacy
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* uses of SSL_METHOD. */
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if (method->version != 0) {
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SSL_CTX_set_max_version(ret, method->version);
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SSL_CTX_set_min_version(ret, method->version);
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} else if (!method->method->is_dtls) {
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/* TODO(svaldez): Enable TLS 1.3 by default once fully implemented. */
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SSL_CTX_set_max_version(ret, TLS1_2_VERSION);
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}
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return ret;
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err:
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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err2:
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SSL_CTX_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
|
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|
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int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
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CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references);
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return 1;
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}
|
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void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
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if (ctx == NULL ||
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!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&ctx->references)) {
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return;
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}
|
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
|
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|
|
/* Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference the
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* ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed after the
|
|
* sessions were flushed. As the ex_data handling routines might also touch
|
|
* the session cache, the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the
|
|
* cache, then free ex_data, then finally free the cache. (See ticket
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|
* [openssl.org #212].) */
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SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, 0);
|
|
|
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
|
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|
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&ctx->lock);
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lh_SSL_SESSION_free(ctx->sessions);
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X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
|
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ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list);
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
|
|
ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list_tls10);
|
|
ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list_tls11);
|
|
ssl_cert_free(ctx->cert);
|
|
sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->client_custom_extensions,
|
|
SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free);
|
|
sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->server_custom_extensions,
|
|
SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free);
|
|
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ctx->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
|
|
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ctx->srtp_profiles);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx->supported_group_list);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx->ocsp_response);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->method == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL *ssl = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
|
|
if (ssl == NULL) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
memset(ssl, 0, sizeof(SSL));
|
|
|
|
ssl->min_version = ctx->min_version;
|
|
ssl->max_version = ctx->max_version;
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 6347 states that implementations SHOULD use an initial timer value of
|
|
* 1 second. */
|
|
ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms = 1000;
|
|
|
|
ssl->options = ctx->options;
|
|
ssl->mode = ctx->mode;
|
|
ssl->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
|
|
|
|
ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
|
|
if (ssl->cert == NULL) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback;
|
|
ssl->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg;
|
|
ssl->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode;
|
|
ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
|
|
assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof ssl->sid_ctx);
|
|
memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
|
|
ssl->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
|
|
|
|
ssl->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
|
|
if (!ssl->param) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ssl->param, ctx->param);
|
|
ssl->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
|
|
ssl->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references);
|
|
ssl->ctx = ctx;
|
|
CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references);
|
|
ssl->initial_ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->supported_group_list) {
|
|
ssl->supported_group_list =
|
|
BUF_memdup(ctx->supported_group_list,
|
|
ctx->supported_group_list_len * 2);
|
|
if (!ssl->supported_group_list) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->supported_group_list_len = ctx->supported_group_list_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) {
|
|
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(
|
|
ssl->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, ssl->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
|
|
if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = ssl->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
|
|
ssl->method = ctx->method;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
ssl->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
|
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint) {
|
|
ssl->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
if (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback;
|
|
ssl->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback;
|
|
|
|
ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled;
|
|
if (ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private) {
|
|
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
|
|
ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private = ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled =
|
|
ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled;
|
|
ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = ssl->ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled;
|
|
|
|
return ssl;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
SSL_free(ssl);
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_free(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl == NULL) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ssl->param);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, ssl, &ssl->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl);
|
|
assert(ssl->bbio == NULL);
|
|
|
|
BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio);
|
|
BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio);
|
|
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf);
|
|
|
|
/* add extra stuff */
|
|
ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ssl->cipher_list);
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ssl->cipher_list_by_id);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session);
|
|
|
|
ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname);
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->initial_ctx);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->supported_group_list);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ssl->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
|
|
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ssl->srtp_profiles);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->method != NULL) {
|
|
ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->server = 0;
|
|
ssl->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
|
|
ssl->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->server = 1;
|
|
ssl->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
|
|
ssl->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio) {
|
|
BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio);
|
|
ssl->rbio = rbio;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *wbio) {
|
|
/* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it. */
|
|
if (ssl->bbio != NULL) {
|
|
ssl->wbio = BIO_pop(ssl->wbio);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio);
|
|
ssl->wbio = wbio;
|
|
|
|
/* Re-attach |bbio| to the new |wbio|. */
|
|
if (ssl->bbio != NULL) {
|
|
ssl->wbio = BIO_push(ssl->bbio, ssl->wbio);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_bio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) {
|
|
/* For historical reasons, this function has many different cases in ownership
|
|
* handling. */
|
|
|
|
/* If nothing has changed, do nothing */
|
|
if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(ssl) && wbio == SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the two arguments are equal, one fewer reference is granted than
|
|
* taken. */
|
|
if (rbio != NULL && rbio == wbio) {
|
|
BIO_up_ref(rbio);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If only the wbio is changed, adopt only one reference. */
|
|
if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(ssl)) {
|
|
SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, wbio);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* There is an asymmetry here for historical reasons. If only the rbio is
|
|
* changed AND the rbio and wbio were originally different, then we only adopt
|
|
* one reference. */
|
|
if (wbio == SSL_get_wbio(ssl) && SSL_get_rbio(ssl) != SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) {
|
|
SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, rbio);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise, adopt both references. */
|
|
SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, rbio);
|
|
SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, wbio);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->rbio; }
|
|
|
|
BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl->bbio != NULL) {
|
|
/* If |bbio| is active, the true caller-configured BIO is its |next_bio|. */
|
|
assert(ssl->bbio == ssl->wbio);
|
|
return ssl->bbio->next_bio;
|
|
}
|
|
return ssl->wbio;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
/* Functions which use SSL_get_error must clear the error queue on entry. */
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
ERR_clear_system_error();
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->handshake_func == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ssl->handshake_func(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl->handshake_func == NULL) {
|
|
/* Not properly initialized yet */
|
|
SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl->handshake_func == NULL) {
|
|
/* Not properly initialized yet */
|
|
SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_do_renegotiate(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
/* We do not accept renegotiations as a server. */
|
|
if (ssl->server) {
|
|
goto no_renegotiation;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST ||
|
|
ssl->init_num != 0) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (ssl->renegotiate_mode) {
|
|
case ssl_renegotiate_ignore:
|
|
/* Ignore the HelloRequest. */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case ssl_renegotiate_once:
|
|
if (ssl->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) {
|
|
goto no_renegotiation;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ssl_renegotiate_never:
|
|
goto no_renegotiation;
|
|
|
|
case ssl_renegotiate_freely:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Renegotiation is only supported at quiescent points in the application
|
|
* protocol, namely in HTTPS, just before reading the HTTP response. Require
|
|
* the record-layer be idle and avoid complexities of sending a handshake
|
|
* record while an application_data record is being written. */
|
|
if (ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(ssl)) {
|
|
goto no_renegotiation;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Begin a new handshake. */
|
|
ssl->s3->total_renegotiations++;
|
|
ssl->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
no_renegotiation:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_do_post_handshake(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return ssl_do_renegotiate(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return tls13_post_handshake(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_read_impl(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num, int peek) {
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
/* Functions which use SSL_get_error must clear the error queue on entry. */
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
ERR_clear_system_error();
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->handshake_func == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
/* Complete the current handshake, if any. False Start will cause
|
|
* |SSL_do_handshake| to return mid-handshake, so this may require multiple
|
|
* iterations. */
|
|
while (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
|
|
int ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int got_handshake;
|
|
int ret = ssl->method->read_app_data(ssl, &got_handshake, buf, num, peek);
|
|
if (ret > 0 || !got_handshake) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Handle the post-handshake message and try again. */
|
|
if (!ssl_do_post_handshake(ssl)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->method->release_current_message(ssl, 1 /* free buffer */);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) {
|
|
return ssl_read_impl(ssl, buf, num, 0 /* consume bytes */);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) {
|
|
return ssl_read_impl(ssl, buf, num, 1 /* peek */);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num) {
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
/* Functions which use SSL_get_error must clear the error queue on entry. */
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
ERR_clear_system_error();
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->handshake_func == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->send_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If necessary, complete the handshake implicitly. */
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && !SSL_in_false_start(ssl)) {
|
|
int ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ssl->method->write_app_data(ssl, buf, num);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_shutdown(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
/* Functions which use SSL_get_error must clear the error queue on entry. */
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
ERR_clear_system_error();
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->handshake_func == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We can't shutdown properly if we are in the middle of a handshake. */
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->quiet_shutdown) {
|
|
/* Do nothing if configured not to send a close_notify. */
|
|
ssl->s3->send_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
|
|
ssl->s3->recv_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This function completes in two stages. It sends a close_notify and then it
|
|
* waits for a close_notify to come in. Perform exactly one action and return
|
|
* whether or not it succeeds. */
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->send_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
|
|
/* Send a close_notify. */
|
|
if (ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) <= 0) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) {
|
|
/* Finish sending the close_notify. */
|
|
if (ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl) <= 0) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (ssl->s3->recv_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
|
|
/* Wait for the peer's close_notify. */
|
|
ssl->method->read_close_notify(ssl);
|
|
if (ssl->s3->recv_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return 0 for unidirectional shutdown and 1 for bidirectional shutdown. */
|
|
return ssl->s3->recv_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_send_fatal_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t alert) {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] != SSL3_AL_FATAL ||
|
|
ssl->s3->send_alert[1] != alert) {
|
|
/* We are already attempting to write a different alert. */
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_error(const SSL *ssl, int ret_code) {
|
|
int reason;
|
|
uint32_t err;
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
|
|
if (ret_code > 0) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc,
|
|
* where we do encode the error */
|
|
err = ERR_peek_error();
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
|
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SYS) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
|
|
}
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_SSL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret_code == 0) {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->recv_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN;
|
|
}
|
|
/* An EOF was observed which violates the protocol, and the underlying
|
|
* transport does not participate in the error queue. Bubble up to the
|
|
* caller. */
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_want_session(ssl)) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_want_certificate(ssl)) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_want_read(ssl)) {
|
|
bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
|
|
if (BIO_should_read(bio)) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_should_write(bio)) {
|
|
/* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write to the
|
|
* rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio are separate
|
|
* couldn't even know what it should wait for. However if we ever set
|
|
* ssl->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have SSL_want_read(ssl) instead of
|
|
* SSL_want_write(ssl)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same, this test works
|
|
* around that bug; so it might be safer to keep it. */
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
|
|
reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
|
|
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; /* unknown */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_want_write(ssl)) {
|
|
bio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl);
|
|
if (BIO_should_write(bio)) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_should_read(bio)) {
|
|
/* See above (SSL_want_read(ssl) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
|
|
reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
|
|
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_want_x509_lookup(ssl)) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(ssl)) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_want_private_key_operation(ssl)) {
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_min_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) {
|
|
ctx->min_version = ctx->method->version_from_wire(version);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_max_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) {
|
|
ctx->max_version = ctx->method->version_from_wire(version);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_min_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) {
|
|
ssl->min_version = ssl->method->version_from_wire(version);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_max_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) {
|
|
ssl->max_version = ssl->method->version_from_wire(version);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_fallback_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) {
|
|
ssl->fallback_version = ssl->method->version_from_wire(version);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) {
|
|
ctx->options |= options;
|
|
return ctx->options;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) {
|
|
ctx->options &= ~options;
|
|
return ctx->options;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->options; }
|
|
|
|
uint32_t SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) {
|
|
ssl->options |= options;
|
|
return ssl->options;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) {
|
|
ssl->options &= ~options;
|
|
return ssl->options;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t SSL_get_options(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->options; }
|
|
|
|
uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) {
|
|
ctx->mode |= mode;
|
|
return ctx->mode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) {
|
|
ctx->mode &= ~mode;
|
|
return ctx->mode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->mode; }
|
|
|
|
uint32_t SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) {
|
|
ssl->mode |= mode;
|
|
return ssl->mode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t SSL_clear_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) {
|
|
ssl->mode &= ~mode;
|
|
return ssl->mode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t SSL_get_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->mode; }
|
|
|
|
X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
|
|
if (session == NULL || session->peer == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
X509_up_ref(session->peer);
|
|
return session->peer;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
|
|
if (session == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return session->cert_chain;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_tls_unique(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
|
|
size_t max_out) {
|
|
/* The tls-unique value is the first Finished message in the handshake, which
|
|
* is the client's in a full handshake and the server's for a resumption. See
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-3.1. */
|
|
const uint8_t *finished = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished;
|
|
size_t finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
|
|
if (ssl->session != NULL) {
|
|
/* tls-unique is broken for resumed sessions unless EMS is used. */
|
|
if (!ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
finished = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished;
|
|
finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
|
|
ssl->version < TLS1_VERSION) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_len = finished_len;
|
|
if (finished_len > max_out) {
|
|
*out_len = max_out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(out, finished, *out_len);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
*out_len = 0;
|
|
memset(out, 0, max_out);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
|
|
unsigned sid_ctx_len) {
|
|
if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(ctx->sid_ctx)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
|
|
memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
|
|
unsigned sid_ctx_len) {
|
|
if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
|
|
memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *ctx, int purpose) {
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, purpose);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *ssl, int purpose) {
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ssl->param, purpose);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *ctx, int trust) {
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ctx->param, trust);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_trust(SSL *ssl, int trust) {
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ssl->param, trust);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, param);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, param);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(
|
|
struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list) {
|
|
if (cipher_list == NULL) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list->ciphers);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(cipher_list->in_group_flags);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(cipher_list);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; }
|
|
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl) { return ssl->param; }
|
|
|
|
void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *ssl) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(ssl->cert); }
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *ssl) { return SSL_get_rfd(ssl); }
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
BIO *b = BIO_find_type(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
|
|
if (b != NULL) {
|
|
BIO_get_fd(b, &ret);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
BIO *b = BIO_find_type(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
|
|
if (b != NULL) {
|
|
BIO_get_fd(b, &ret);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_fd(SSL *ssl, int fd) {
|
|
BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
|
|
if (bio == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
|
|
SSL_set_bio(ssl, bio, bio);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *ssl, int fd) {
|
|
BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
|
|
if (rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET ||
|
|
BIO_get_fd(rbio, NULL) != fd) {
|
|
BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
|
|
if (bio == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
|
|
SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, bio);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Copy the rbio over to the wbio. */
|
|
BIO_up_ref(rbio);
|
|
SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, rbio);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *ssl, int fd) {
|
|
BIO *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl);
|
|
if (wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET ||
|
|
BIO_get_fd(wbio, NULL) != fd) {
|
|
BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
|
|
if (bio == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
|
|
SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, bio);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Copy the wbio over to the rbio. */
|
|
BIO_up_ref(wbio);
|
|
SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, wbio);
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, size_t count) {
|
|
size_t ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3 != NULL) {
|
|
ret = ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
|
|
if (count > ret) {
|
|
count = ret;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(buf, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, size_t count) {
|
|
size_t ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3 != NULL) {
|
|
ret = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
|
|
if (count > ret) {
|
|
count = ret;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(buf, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->verify_mode; }
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ssl->param);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_extms_support(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret == 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *ssl))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
|
|
return ssl->verify_callback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->verify_mode; }
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(
|
|
int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->default_verify_callback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_verify(SSL *ssl, int mode,
|
|
int (*callback)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx)) {
|
|
ssl->verify_mode = mode;
|
|
if (callback != NULL) {
|
|
ssl->verify_callback = callback;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *ssl, int depth) {
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ssl->param, depth);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *ssl) { return 0; }
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx, int yes) { }
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *ssl, int yes) { }
|
|
|
|
int SSL_pending(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->rrec.type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return ssl->s3->rrec.length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
|
|
int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
if (ctx->cert->x509 == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->cert->privatekey == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->x509, ctx->cert->privatekey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
|
|
int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl->cert->x509 == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->cert->privatekey == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->x509, ssl->cert->privatekey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
/* Caller-initiated renegotiation is not supported. */
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_total_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return ssl->s3->total_renegotiations;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->max_cert_list;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_cert_list) {
|
|
if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) {
|
|
max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t SSL_get_max_cert_list(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return ssl->max_cert_list;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_max_cert_list(SSL *ssl, size_t max_cert_list) {
|
|
if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) {
|
|
max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_send_fragment) {
|
|
if (max_send_fragment < 512) {
|
|
max_send_fragment = 512;
|
|
}
|
|
if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
|
|
max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_max_send_fragment(SSL *ssl, size_t max_send_fragment) {
|
|
if (max_send_fragment < 512) {
|
|
max_send_fragment = 512;
|
|
}
|
|
if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
|
|
max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_mtu(SSL *ssl, unsigned mtu) {
|
|
if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->d1->mtu = mtu;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return ssl->s3->send_connection_binding;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->sessions; }
|
|
|
|
size_t SSL_CTX_sess_number(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long size) {
|
|
unsigned long ret = ctx->session_cache_size;
|
|
ctx->session_cache_size = size;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->session_cache_size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) {
|
|
int ret = ctx->session_cache_mode;
|
|
ctx->session_cache_mode = mode;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->session_cache_mode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *out, size_t len) {
|
|
if (out == NULL) {
|
|
return 48;
|
|
}
|
|
if (len != 48) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
uint8_t *out_bytes = out;
|
|
memcpy(out_bytes, ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
|
|
memcpy(out_bytes + 16, ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16);
|
|
memcpy(out_bytes + 32, ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t len) {
|
|
if (in == NULL) {
|
|
return 48;
|
|
}
|
|
if (len != 48) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
const uint8_t *in_bytes = in;
|
|
memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, in_bytes, 16);
|
|
memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, in_bytes + 16, 16);
|
|
memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, in_bytes + 32, 16);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *key_name, uint8_t *iv,
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx,
|
|
int encrypt)) {
|
|
ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb = callback;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set1_curves(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *curves, size_t curves_len) {
|
|
return tls1_set_curves(&ctx->supported_group_list,
|
|
&ctx->supported_group_list_len, curves,
|
|
curves_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set1_curves(SSL *ssl, const int *curves, size_t curves_len) {
|
|
return tls1_set_curves(&ssl->supported_group_list,
|
|
&ssl->supported_group_list_len, curves,
|
|
curves_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint16_t SSL_get_curve_id(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
/* TODO(davidben): This checks the wrong session if there is a renegotiation in
|
|
* progress. */
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
|
|
if (session == NULL ||
|
|
session->cipher == NULL ||
|
|
!SSL_CIPHER_is_ECDHE(session->cipher)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (uint16_t)session->key_exchange_info;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const DH *dh) {
|
|
DH_free(ctx->cert->dh_tmp);
|
|
ctx->cert->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(dh);
|
|
if (ctx->cert->dh_tmp == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, const DH *dh) {
|
|
DH_free(ssl->cert->dh_tmp);
|
|
ssl->cert->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(dh);
|
|
if (ssl->cert->dh_tmp == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->cipher_list != NULL) {
|
|
return ssl->cipher_list->ciphers;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION && ssl->ctx->cipher_list_tls11 != NULL) {
|
|
return ssl->ctx->cipher_list_tls11->ciphers;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->version >= TLS1_VERSION && ssl->ctx->cipher_list_tls10 != NULL) {
|
|
return ssl->ctx->cipher_list_tls10->ciphers;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->cipher_list != NULL) {
|
|
return ssl->ctx->cipher_list->ciphers;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
|
|
* algorithm id */
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) {
|
|
return ssl->cipher_list_by_id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) {
|
|
return ssl->ctx->cipher_list_by_id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl, int n) {
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sk = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
|
|
if (sk == NULL || n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk)) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n);
|
|
if (c == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return c->name;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) {
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list = ssl_create_cipher_list(
|
|
ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str);
|
|
if (cipher_list == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* |ssl_create_cipher_list| may succeed but return an empty cipher list. */
|
|
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list) == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls10(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) {
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list = ssl_create_cipher_list(
|
|
ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list_tls10, NULL, str);
|
|
if (cipher_list == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* |ssl_create_cipher_list| may succeed but return an empty cipher list. */
|
|
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list) == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls11(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) {
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list = ssl_create_cipher_list(
|
|
ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list_tls11, NULL, str);
|
|
if (cipher_list == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* |ssl_create_cipher_list| may succeed but return an empty cipher list. */
|
|
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list) == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str) {
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list = ssl_create_cipher_list(
|
|
ssl->ctx->method, &ssl->cipher_list, &ssl->cipher_list_by_id, str);
|
|
if (cipher_list == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* |ssl_create_cipher_list| may succeed but return an empty cipher list. */
|
|
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list) == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *
|
|
ssl_parse_client_cipher_list(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) {
|
|
CBS cipher_suites;
|
|
CBS_init(&cipher_suites, ctx->cipher_suites, ctx->cipher_suites_len);
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
|
|
if (sk == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
|
|
uint16_t cipher_suite;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
|
|
if (c != NULL && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return sk;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *ssl, const int type) {
|
|
if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Historically, |SSL_get_servername| was also the configuration getter
|
|
* corresponding to |SSL_set_tlsext_host_name|. */
|
|
if (ssl->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
|
|
return ssl->tlsext_hostname;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
|
|
if (session == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return session->tlsext_hostname;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
|
|
if (session == NULL || session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
|
|
size_t *out_len) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
|
|
|
|
*out_len = 0;
|
|
*out = NULL;
|
|
if (ssl->server || !session || !session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out = session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list;
|
|
*out_len = session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
|
|
size_t *out_len) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
|
|
|
|
*out_len = 0;
|
|
*out = NULL;
|
|
if (ssl->server || !session || !session->ocsp_response) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
*out = session->ocsp_response;
|
|
*out_len = session->ocsp_response_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *list,
|
|
size_t list_len) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
|
|
ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list = BUF_memdup(list, list_len);
|
|
if (ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length = list_len;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *response,
|
|
size_t response_len) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx->ocsp_response);
|
|
ctx->ocsp_response_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->ocsp_response = BUF_memdup(response, response_len);
|
|
if (ctx->ocsp_response == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->ocsp_response_length = response_len;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(SSL *ssl, const char *name) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname);
|
|
ssl->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (name == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t len = strlen(name);
|
|
if (len == 0 || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(name);
|
|
if (ssl->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, int *out_alert, void *arg)) {
|
|
ctx->tlsext_servername_callback = callback;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
|
|
ctx->tlsext_servername_arg = arg;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_select_next_proto(uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *server, unsigned server_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *client, unsigned client_len) {
|
|
unsigned int i, j;
|
|
const uint8_t *result;
|
|
int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
|
|
|
|
/* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
|
|
for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
|
|
if (server[i] == client[j] &&
|
|
memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
|
|
/* We found a match */
|
|
result = &server[i];
|
|
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
|
|
goto found;
|
|
}
|
|
j += client[j];
|
|
j++;
|
|
}
|
|
i += server[i];
|
|
i++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
|
|
result = client;
|
|
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
|
|
|
|
found:
|
|
*out = (uint8_t *)result + 1;
|
|
*out_len = result[0];
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data,
|
|
unsigned *out_len) {
|
|
*out_data = ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated;
|
|
if (*out_data == NULL) {
|
|
*out_len = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*out_len = ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, unsigned *out_len, void *arg),
|
|
void *arg) {
|
|
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
|
|
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, void *arg),
|
|
void *arg) {
|
|
ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
|
|
ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *protos,
|
|
unsigned protos_len) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
|
|
ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len);
|
|
if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *protos, unsigned protos_len) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
|
|
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len);
|
|
if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
|
|
uint8_t *out_len, const uint8_t *in,
|
|
unsigned in_len, void *arg),
|
|
void *arg) {
|
|
ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb;
|
|
ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data,
|
|
unsigned *out_len) {
|
|
*out_data = NULL;
|
|
if (ssl->s3) {
|
|
*out_data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected;
|
|
}
|
|
if (*out_data == NULL) {
|
|
*out_len = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*out_len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int is_p256_key(EVP_PKEY *private_key) {
|
|
const EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(private_key);
|
|
return ec_key != NULL &&
|
|
EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) ==
|
|
NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *private_key) {
|
|
if (!is_p256_key(private_key)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(private_key);
|
|
ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private = private_key;
|
|
ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *private_key) {
|
|
if (!is_p256_key(private_key)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(private_key);
|
|
ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private = private_key;
|
|
ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t SSL_get_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) {
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(out, ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id, (max_out < 64) ? max_out : 64);
|
|
return 64;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx,
|
|
void *arg),
|
|
void *arg) {
|
|
ctx->app_verify_callback = cb;
|
|
ctx->app_verify_arg = arg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
|
|
int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) {
|
|
ctx->verify_mode = mode;
|
|
ctx->default_verify_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) {
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg),
|
|
void *arg) {
|
|
ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ctx->cert, cb, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) {
|
|
ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ssl->cert, cb, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t SSL_get0_certificate_types(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_types) {
|
|
if (ssl->server) {
|
|
*out_types = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
*out_types = ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_types;
|
|
return ssl->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL *ssl, uint32_t *out_mask_k,
|
|
uint32_t *out_mask_a) {
|
|
uint32_t mask_k = 0;
|
|
uint32_t mask_a = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->cert->x509 != NULL && ssl_has_private_key(ssl)) {
|
|
int type = ssl_private_key_type(ssl);
|
|
if (type == NID_rsaEncryption) {
|
|
mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
|
|
mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
|
|
} else if (ssl_is_ecdsa_key_type(type)) {
|
|
/* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDSA cipher suites depending on
|
|
* the key usage extension and on the client's group preferences. */
|
|
X509 *x = ssl->cert->x509;
|
|
/* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags). */
|
|
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
|
|
int ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
|
|
? (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)
|
|
: 1;
|
|
if (ecdsa_ok && tls1_check_ec_cert(ssl, x)) {
|
|
mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->cert->dh_tmp != NULL || ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) {
|
|
mask_k |= SSL_kDHE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check for a shared group to consider ECDHE ciphers. */
|
|
uint16_t unused;
|
|
if (tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &unused)) {
|
|
mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* CECPQ1 ciphers are always acceptable if supported by both sides. */
|
|
mask_k |= SSL_kCECPQ1;
|
|
|
|
/* PSK requires a server callback. */
|
|
if (ssl->psk_server_callback != NULL) {
|
|
mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
|
|
mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_mask_k = mask_k;
|
|
*out_mask_a = mask_a;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_update_cache(SSL *ssl, int mode) {
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
|
|
/* Never cache sessions with empty session IDs. */
|
|
if (ssl->s3->established_session->session_id_length == 0 ||
|
|
(ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) != mode) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Clients never use the internal session cache. */
|
|
int use_internal_cache = ssl->server && !(ctx->session_cache_mode &
|
|
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE);
|
|
|
|
/* A client may see new sessions on abbreviated handshakes if the server
|
|
* decides to renew the ticket. Once the handshake is completed, it should be
|
|
* inserted into the cache. */
|
|
if (ssl->s3->established_session != ssl->session ||
|
|
(!ssl->server && ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected)) {
|
|
if (use_internal_cache) {
|
|
SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx, ssl->s3->established_session);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->new_session_cb != NULL) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->s3->established_session);
|
|
if (!ctx->new_session_cb(ssl, ssl->s3->established_session)) {
|
|
/* |new_session_cb|'s return value signals whether it took ownership. */
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (use_internal_cache &&
|
|
!(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) {
|
|
/* Automatically flush the internal session cache every 255 connections. */
|
|
int flush_cache = 0;
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
|
|
ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush++;
|
|
if (ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush >= 255) {
|
|
flush_cache = 1;
|
|
ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (flush_cache) {
|
|
struct timeval now;
|
|
ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
|
|
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, (long)now.tv_sec);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const char *ssl_get_version(int version) {
|
|
switch (version) {
|
|
case TLS1_3_VERSION:
|
|
return "TLSv1.3";
|
|
|
|
case TLS1_2_VERSION:
|
|
return "TLSv1.2";
|
|
|
|
case TLS1_1_VERSION:
|
|
return "TLSv1.1";
|
|
|
|
case TLS1_VERSION:
|
|
return "TLSv1";
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_VERSION:
|
|
return "SSLv3";
|
|
|
|
case DTLS1_VERSION:
|
|
return "DTLSv1";
|
|
|
|
case DTLS1_2_VERSION:
|
|
return "DTLSv1.2";
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return "unknown";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return ssl_get_version(ssl->version);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
return ssl_get_version(session->ssl_version);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl->cert != NULL) {
|
|
return ssl->cert->x509;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl->cert != NULL) {
|
|
return ssl->cert->privatekey;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
|
|
return ctx->cert->x509;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
|
|
return ctx->cert->privatekey;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_session_reused(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return ssl->session != NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *ssl) { return NULL; }
|
|
|
|
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *ssl) { return NULL; }
|
|
|
|
int *SSL_get_server_tmp_key(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **out_key) { return 0; }
|
|
|
|
int ssl_is_wbio_buffered(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return ssl->bbio != NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl->bbio != NULL) {
|
|
/* Already buffered. */
|
|
assert(ssl->bbio == ssl->wbio);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO *bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
|
|
if (bbio == NULL ||
|
|
!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) {
|
|
BIO_free(bbio);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->bbio = bbio;
|
|
ssl->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, ssl->wbio);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl->bbio == NULL) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(ssl->bbio == ssl->wbio);
|
|
|
|
ssl->wbio = BIO_pop(ssl->wbio);
|
|
BIO_free(ssl->bbio);
|
|
ssl->bbio = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) {
|
|
ctx->quiet_shutdown = (mode != 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->quiet_shutdown;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode) {
|
|
ssl->quiet_shutdown = (mode != 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->quiet_shutdown; }
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode) {
|
|
/* It is an error to clear any bits that have already been set. (We can't try
|
|
* to get a second close_notify or send two.) */
|
|
assert((SSL_get_shutdown(ssl) & mode) == SSL_get_shutdown(ssl));
|
|
|
|
if (mode & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN &&
|
|
ssl->s3->recv_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) {
|
|
ssl->s3->recv_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mode & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN &&
|
|
ssl->s3->send_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) {
|
|
ssl->s3->send_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
if (ssl->s3->recv_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
|
|
/* Historically, OpenSSL set |SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN| on both close_notify
|
|
* and fatal alert. */
|
|
ret |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl->s3->send_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
|
|
/* Historically, OpenSSL set |SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN| on only close_notify. */
|
|
ret |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->version; }
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->ctx; }
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
if (ssl->ctx == ctx) {
|
|
return ssl->ctx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
|
ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
|
|
ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references);
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
|
|
ssl->ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
|
|
assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
|
|
memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
|
|
|
|
return ssl->ctx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *ca_file,
|
|
const char *ca_dir) {
|
|
return X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, ca_file, ca_dir);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
|
|
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value)) {
|
|
ssl->info_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl, int type,
|
|
int value) {
|
|
return ssl->info_callback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->state; }
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) { }
|
|
|
|
char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int len) {
|
|
if (len <= 0) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
buf[0] = '\0';
|
|
return buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long result) {
|
|
ssl->verify_result = result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->verify_result; }
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
|
|
int index;
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, &index, argl, argp,
|
|
dup_func, free_func)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return index;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *arg) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
|
|
int index;
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, &index, argl, argp,
|
|
dup_func, free_func)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return index;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *arg) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->cert_store;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) {
|
|
X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
|
|
ctx->cert_store = store;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_want(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->rwstate; }
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
|
|
int keylength)) {
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
|
|
int keylength)) {
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
DH *(*callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
|
|
int keylength)) {
|
|
ctx->cert->dh_tmp_cb = callback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
|
|
int keylength)) {
|
|
ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb = callback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned SSL_get_dhe_group_size(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
/* TODO(davidben): This checks the wrong session if there is a renegotiation in
|
|
* progress. */
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
|
|
if (session == NULL ||
|
|
session->cipher == NULL ||
|
|
!SSL_CIPHER_is_DHE(session->cipher)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return session->key_exchange_info;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) {
|
|
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
|
|
if (identity_hint != NULL) {
|
|
ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
|
|
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *ssl, const char *identity_hint) {
|
|
if (ssl == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Clear currently configured hint, if any. */
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ssl->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
ssl->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (identity_hint != NULL) {
|
|
ssl->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
|
|
if (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return ssl->psk_identity_hint;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
|
|
if (session == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return session->psk_identity;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(
|
|
SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
|
|
unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk,
|
|
unsigned max_psk_len)) {
|
|
ssl->psk_client_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
|
|
unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk,
|
|
unsigned max_psk_len)) {
|
|
ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(
|
|
SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk,
|
|
unsigned max_psk_len)) {
|
|
ssl->psk_server_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
|
|
uint8_t *psk, unsigned max_psk_len)) {
|
|
ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
void (*cb)(int write_p, int version,
|
|
int content_type, const void *buf,
|
|
size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) {
|
|
ctx->msg_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
|
|
ctx->msg_callback_arg = arg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
|
|
void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
|
|
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
|
|
void *arg)) {
|
|
ssl->msg_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg) {
|
|
ssl->msg_callback_arg = arg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)) {
|
|
ctx->keylog_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,
|
|
struct timeval *out_clock)) {
|
|
ctx->current_time_cb = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int cbb_add_hex(CBB *cbb, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef";
|
|
uint8_t *out;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &out, in_len * 2)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
|
|
*(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] >> 4];
|
|
*(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] & 0xf];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(const SSL *ssl,
|
|
const uint8_t *encrypted_premaster,
|
|
size_t encrypted_premaster_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *premaster,
|
|
size_t premaster_len) {
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->keylog_callback == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (encrypted_premaster_len < 8) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB cbb;
|
|
uint8_t *out;
|
|
size_t out_len;
|
|
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 4 + 16 + 1 + premaster_len * 2 + 1) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)"RSA ", 4) ||
|
|
/* Only the first 8 bytes of the encrypted premaster secret are
|
|
* logged. */
|
|
!cbb_add_hex(&cbb, encrypted_premaster, 8) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) ||
|
|
!cbb_add_hex(&cbb, premaster, premaster_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0 /* NUL */) ||
|
|
!CBB_finish(&cbb, &out, &out_len)) {
|
|
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->ctx->keylog_callback(ssl, (const char *)out);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(out);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_log_secret(const SSL *ssl, const char *label, const uint8_t *secret,
|
|
size_t secret_len) {
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->keylog_callback == NULL) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB cbb;
|
|
uint8_t *out;
|
|
size_t out_len;
|
|
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, strlen(label) + 1 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2 + 1 +
|
|
secret_len * 2 + 1) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)label, strlen(label)) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) ||
|
|
!cbb_add_hex(&cbb, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) ||
|
|
!cbb_add_hex(&cbb, secret, secret_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0 /* NUL */) ||
|
|
!CBB_finish(&cbb, &out, &out_len)) {
|
|
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->ctx->keylog_callback(ssl, (const char *)out);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(out);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_is_init_finished(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return ssl->state == SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_in_init(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return (ssl->state & SSL_ST_INIT) != 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_in_false_start(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return ssl->s3->tmp.in_false_start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return SSL_in_false_start(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_get_structure_sizes(size_t *ssl_size, size_t *ssl_ctx_size,
|
|
size_t *ssl_session_size) {
|
|
*ssl_size = sizeof(SSL);
|
|
*ssl_ctx_size = sizeof(SSL_CTX);
|
|
*ssl_session_size = sizeof(SSL_SESSION);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_can_false_start(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *const cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
|
|
|
|
/* False Start only for TLS 1.2 with an ECDHE+AEAD cipher and ALPN or NPN. */
|
|
return !SSL_is_dtls(ssl) &&
|
|
SSL_version(ssl) == TLS1_2_VERSION &&
|
|
(ssl->s3->alpn_selected || ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) &&
|
|
cipher != NULL &&
|
|
(cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHE ||
|
|
cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kCECPQ1) &&
|
|
cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const SSL3_ENC_METHOD *ssl3_get_enc_method(uint16_t version) {
|
|
switch (version) {
|
|
case SSL3_VERSION:
|
|
return &SSLv3_enc_data;
|
|
|
|
case TLS1_VERSION:
|
|
case TLS1_1_VERSION:
|
|
case TLS1_2_VERSION:
|
|
case TLS1_3_VERSION:
|
|
return &TLSv1_enc_data;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const struct {
|
|
uint16_t version;
|
|
uint32_t flag;
|
|
} kVersions[] = {
|
|
{SSL3_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3},
|
|
{TLS1_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1},
|
|
{TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1},
|
|
{TLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2},
|
|
{TLS1_3_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const size_t kVersionsLen = sizeof(kVersions) / sizeof(kVersions[0]);
|
|
|
|
int ssl_get_full_version_range(const SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out_min_version,
|
|
uint16_t *out_fallback_version,
|
|
uint16_t *out_max_version) {
|
|
/* For historical reasons, |SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1| aliases |SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|, but
|
|
* DTLS 1.0 should be mapped to TLS 1.1. */
|
|
uint32_t options = ssl->options;
|
|
if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
options &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
|
|
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
|
|
options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint16_t min_version = ssl->min_version;
|
|
uint16_t max_version = ssl->max_version;
|
|
|
|
/* Bound the range to only those implemented in this protocol. */
|
|
if (min_version < ssl->method->min_version) {
|
|
min_version = ssl->method->min_version;
|
|
}
|
|
if (max_version > ssl->method->max_version) {
|
|
max_version = ssl->method->max_version;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* OpenSSL's API for controlling versions entails blacklisting individual
|
|
* protocols. This has two problems. First, on the client, the protocol can
|
|
* only express a contiguous range of versions. Second, a library consumer
|
|
* trying to set a maximum version cannot disable protocol versions that get
|
|
* added in a future version of the library.
|
|
*
|
|
* To account for both of these, OpenSSL interprets the client-side bitmask
|
|
* as a min/max range by picking the lowest contiguous non-empty range of
|
|
* enabled protocols. Note that this means it is impossible to set a maximum
|
|
* version of the higest supported TLS version in a future-proof way. */
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
int any_enabled = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < kVersionsLen; i++) {
|
|
/* Only look at the versions already enabled. */
|
|
if (min_version > kVersions[i].version) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (max_version < kVersions[i].version) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(options & kVersions[i].flag)) {
|
|
/* The minimum version is the first enabled version. */
|
|
if (!any_enabled) {
|
|
any_enabled = 1;
|
|
min_version = kVersions[i].version;
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If there is a disabled version after the first enabled one, all versions
|
|
* after it are implicitly disabled. */
|
|
if (any_enabled) {
|
|
max_version = kVersions[i-1].version;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint16_t fallback_version = max_version;
|
|
if (ssl->fallback_version != 0 && ssl->fallback_version < fallback_version) {
|
|
fallback_version = ssl->fallback_version;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!any_enabled || fallback_version < min_version) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_min_version = min_version;
|
|
*out_fallback_version = fallback_version;
|
|
*out_max_version = max_version;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_get_version_range(const SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out_min_version,
|
|
uint16_t *out_effective_max_version) {
|
|
/* This function returns the effective maximum version and not the fallback
|
|
* version. */
|
|
uint16_t real_max_version_unused;
|
|
return ssl_get_full_version_range(ssl, out_min_version,
|
|
out_effective_max_version,
|
|
&real_max_version_unused);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint16_t ssl3_protocol_version(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
assert(ssl->s3->have_version);
|
|
return ssl->method->version_from_wire(ssl->version);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_is_server(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->server; }
|
|
|
|
int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->method->is_dtls; }
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb(
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *)) {
|
|
ctx->select_certificate_cb = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_dos_protection_cb(
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *)) {
|
|
ctx->dos_protection_cb = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_renegotiate_mode_t mode) {
|
|
ssl->renegotiate_mode = mode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_reject_peer_renegotiations(SSL *ssl, int reject) {
|
|
SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(
|
|
ssl, reject ? ssl_renegotiate_never : ssl_renegotiate_freely);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_rc4_state(const SSL *ssl, const RC4_KEY **read_key,
|
|
const RC4_KEY **write_key) {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx == NULL || ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_rc4_state(&ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->ctx, read_key) &&
|
|
EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_rc4_state(&ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ctx, write_key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_ivs(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_read_iv,
|
|
const uint8_t **out_write_iv, size_t *out_iv_len) {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx == NULL || ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t write_iv_len;
|
|
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_iv(&ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->ctx, out_read_iv,
|
|
out_iv_len) ||
|
|
!EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_iv(&ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ctx, out_write_iv,
|
|
&write_iv_len) ||
|
|
*out_iv_len != write_iv_len) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint64_t be_to_u64(const uint8_t in[8]) {
|
|
return (((uint64_t)in[0]) << 56) | (((uint64_t)in[1]) << 48) |
|
|
(((uint64_t)in[2]) << 40) | (((uint64_t)in[3]) << 32) |
|
|
(((uint64_t)in[4]) << 24) | (((uint64_t)in[5]) << 16) |
|
|
(((uint64_t)in[6]) << 8) | ((uint64_t)in[7]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint64_t SSL_get_read_sequence(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
/* TODO(davidben): Internally represent sequence numbers as uint64_t. */
|
|
if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
/* max_seq_num already includes the epoch. */
|
|
assert(ssl->d1->r_epoch == (ssl->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num >> 48));
|
|
return ssl->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num;
|
|
}
|
|
return be_to_u64(ssl->s3->read_sequence);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint64_t SSL_get_write_sequence(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
uint64_t ret = be_to_u64(ssl->s3->write_sequence);
|
|
if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
assert((ret >> 48) == 0);
|
|
ret |= ((uint64_t)ssl->d1->w_epoch) << 48;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint16_t SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return ssl->s3->tmp.peer_signature_algorithm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) {
|
|
if (max_out == 0) {
|
|
return sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random);
|
|
}
|
|
if (max_out > sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random)) {
|
|
max_out = sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random);
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(out, ssl->s3->client_random, max_out);
|
|
return max_out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) {
|
|
if (max_out == 0) {
|
|
return sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random);
|
|
}
|
|
if (max_out > sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random)) {
|
|
max_out = sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random);
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(out, ssl->s3->server_random, max_out);
|
|
return max_out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_pending_cipher(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (!SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
|
|
ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs = !!enabled;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
if (ssl->method == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_clear may be called before or after the |ssl| is initialized in either
|
|
* accept or connect state. In the latter case, SSL_clear should preserve the
|
|
* half and reset |ssl->state| accordingly. */
|
|
if (ssl->handshake_func != NULL) {
|
|
if (ssl->server) {
|
|
SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
assert(ssl->state == 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TODO(davidben): Some state on |ssl| is reset both in |SSL_new| and
|
|
* |SSL_clear| because it is per-connection state rather than configuration
|
|
* state. Per-connection state should be on |ssl->s3| and |ssl->d1| so it is
|
|
* naturally reset at the right points between |SSL_new|, |SSL_clear|, and
|
|
* |ssl3_new|. */
|
|
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf);
|
|
ssl->init_buf = NULL;
|
|
ssl->init_msg = NULL;
|
|
ssl->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* The ssl->d1->mtu is simultaneously configuration (preserved across
|
|
* clear) and connection-specific state (gets reset).
|
|
*
|
|
* TODO(davidben): Avoid this. */
|
|
unsigned mtu = 0;
|
|
if (ssl->d1 != NULL) {
|
|
mtu = ssl->d1->mtu;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl);
|
|
if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl) && (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
|
|
ssl->d1->mtu = mtu;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->client_version = ssl->version;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_do_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) {
|
|
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL;
|
|
if (ssl->info_callback != NULL) {
|
|
cb = ssl->info_callback;
|
|
} else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
|
|
cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) {
|
|
cb(ssl, type, value);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_do_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, int is_write, int version, int content_type,
|
|
const void *buf, size_t len) {
|
|
if (ssl->msg_callback != NULL) {
|
|
ssl->msg_callback(is_write, version, content_type, buf, len, ssl,
|
|
ssl->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_sess_connect(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
|
|
int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
|
|
int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
|
|
int SSL_CTX_sess_accept(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
|
|
int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
|
|
int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
|
|
int SSL_CTX_sess_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
|
|
int SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
|
|
int SSL_CTX_sess_misses(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
|
|
int SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
|
|
int SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
|
|
|
|
int SSL_num_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
|
|
int SSL_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL *ssl) { return 0; }
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(SSL_CTX *ctx, const RSA *rsa) { return 1; }
|
|
int SSL_set_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl, const RSA *rsa) { return 1; }
|
|
void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void) {}
|
|
void SSL_load_error_strings(void) {}
|
|
int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *ssl) { return SSL_session_reused(ssl); }
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *ec_key) {
|
|
if (ec_key == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key) == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key));
|
|
return SSL_CTX_set1_curves(ctx, &nid, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL *ssl, const EC_KEY *ec_key) {
|
|
if (ec_key == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key) == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key));
|
|
return SSL_set1_curves(ssl, &nid, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_get_current_time(const SSL *ssl, struct timeval *out_clock) {
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->current_time_cb != NULL) {
|
|
ssl->ctx->current_time_cb(ssl, out_clock);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
|
|
struct _timeb time;
|
|
_ftime(&time);
|
|
out_clock->tv_sec = time.time;
|
|
out_clock->tv_usec = time.millitm * 1000;
|
|
#else
|
|
gettimeofday(out_clock, NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|