9b16066654
Until we've gotten it fully working, we should not mint any of these SSL_SESSIONs, to avoid constraining future versions of our client code. Notably, if any of our TLS 1.3 clients today serialized sessions, we would need to rev the serialization format. Without opting into 0-RTT, a TLS 1.3 client will create SSL_SESSIONs tagged as 0-RTT-capable but missing important fields (ALPN, etc.). When that serialized session makes its way to a future version of our client code, it would disagree with the server about the ALPN value stored in the ticket and cause interop failures. I believe the only client code enabling TLS 1.3 right now is Chrome, and the window is small, so it should be fine. But fix this now before it becomes a problem. Change-Id: Ie2b109f8d158017a6f3b4cb6169050d38a66b31c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13342 CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> |
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.. | ||
test | ||
CMakeLists.txt | ||
custom_extensions.c | ||
d1_both.c | ||
d1_lib.c | ||
d1_pkt.c | ||
d1_srtp.c | ||
dtls_method.c | ||
dtls_record.c | ||
handshake_client.c | ||
handshake_server.c | ||
internal.h | ||
s3_both.c | ||
s3_enc.c | ||
s3_lib.c | ||
s3_pkt.c | ||
ssl_aead_ctx.c | ||
ssl_asn1.c | ||
ssl_buffer.c | ||
ssl_cert.c | ||
ssl_cipher.c | ||
ssl_ecdh.c | ||
ssl_file.c | ||
ssl_lib.c | ||
ssl_rsa_cc.cc | ||
ssl_rsa.c | ||
ssl_session.c | ||
ssl_stat.c | ||
ssl_test.cc | ||
ssl_x509.c | ||
t1_enc.c | ||
t1_lib.c | ||
tls13_both.c | ||
tls13_client.c | ||
tls13_enc.c | ||
tls13_server.c | ||
tls_method.c | ||
tls_record.c |