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- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
-
- #include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
- #include <assert.h>
- #include <limits.h>
- #include <string.h>
-
- #include <openssl/buf.h>
- #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/mem.h>
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
- #include <openssl/nid.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include <openssl/sha.h>
-
- #include "../crypto/internal.h"
- #include "internal.h"
-
-
- namespace bssl {
-
- static bool add_record_to_flight(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type,
- Span<const uint8_t> in) {
- // The caller should have flushed |pending_hs_data| first.
- assert(!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data);
- // We'll never add a flight while in the process of writing it out.
- assert(ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset == 0);
-
- if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
- ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
- if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
- return false;
- }
- }
-
- size_t max_out = in.size() + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
- size_t new_cap = ssl->s3->pending_flight->length + max_out;
- if (max_out < in.size() || new_cap < max_out) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
- return false;
- }
-
- size_t len;
- if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->pending_flight.get(), new_cap) ||
- !tls_seal_record(ssl,
- (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->pending_flight->data +
- ssl->s3->pending_flight->length,
- &len, max_out, type, in.data(), in.size())) {
- return false;
- }
-
- ssl->s3->pending_flight->length += len;
- return true;
- }
-
- bool ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
- // Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls.
- if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||
- !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- CBB_cleanup(cbb);
- return false;
- }
-
- return true;
- }
-
- bool ssl3_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg) {
- return CBBFinishArray(cbb, out_msg);
- }
-
- bool ssl3_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg) {
- // Pack handshake data into the minimal number of records. This avoids
- // unnecessary encryption overhead, notably in TLS 1.3 where we send several
- // encrypted messages in a row. For now, we do not do this for the null
- // cipher. The benefit is smaller and there is a risk of breaking buggy
- // implementations. Additionally, we tie this to draft-28 as a sanity check,
- // on the off chance middleboxes have fixated on sizes.
- //
- // TODO(davidben): See if we can do this uniformly.
- Span<const uint8_t> rest = msg;
- if (ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher() ||
- ssl->version == TLS1_3_DRAFT23_VERSION) {
- while (!rest.empty()) {
- Span<const uint8_t> chunk = rest.subspan(0, ssl->max_send_fragment);
- rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size());
-
- if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, chunk)) {
- return false;
- }
- }
- } else {
- while (!rest.empty()) {
- // Flush if |pending_hs_data| is full.
- if (ssl->s3->pending_hs_data &&
- ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length >= ssl->max_send_fragment &&
- !tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
- return false;
- }
-
- size_t pending_len =
- ssl->s3->pending_hs_data ? ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length : 0;
- Span<const uint8_t> chunk =
- rest.subspan(0, ssl->max_send_fragment - pending_len);
- assert(!chunk.empty());
- rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size());
-
- if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data) {
- ssl->s3->pending_hs_data.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
- }
- if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data ||
- !BUF_MEM_append(ssl->s3->pending_hs_data.get(), chunk.data(),
- chunk.size())) {
- return false;
- }
- }
- }
-
- ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, msg);
- // TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript on
- // hs.
- if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL &&
- !ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(msg)) {
- return false;
- }
- return true;
- }
-
- bool tls_flush_pending_hs_data(SSL *ssl) {
- if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data || ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length == 0) {
- return true;
- }
-
- UniquePtr<BUF_MEM> pending_hs_data = std::move(ssl->s3->pending_hs_data);
- return add_record_to_flight(
- ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- MakeConstSpan(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(pending_hs_data->data),
- pending_hs_data->length));
- }
-
- bool ssl3_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
- static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
-
- if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl) ||
- !add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
- kChangeCipherSpec)) {
- return false;
- }
-
- ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
- kChangeCipherSpec);
- return true;
- }
-
- bool ssl3_add_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t level, uint8_t desc) {
- uint8_t alert[2] = {level, desc};
- if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl) ||
- !add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert)) {
- return false;
- }
-
- ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert);
- ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, ((int)level << 8) | desc);
- return true;
- }
-
- int ssl3_flush_flight(SSL *ssl) {
- if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
- return -1;
- }
-
- static_assert(INT_MAX <= 0xffffffff, "int is larger than 32 bits");
- if (ssl->s3->pending_flight->length > INT_MAX) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- // If there is pending data in the write buffer, it must be flushed out before
- // any new data in pending_flight.
- if (!ssl->s3->write_buffer.empty()) {
- int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- return ret;
- }
- }
-
- // Write the pending flight.
- while (ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset < ssl->s3->pending_flight->length) {
- int ret = BIO_write(
- ssl->wbio,
- ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset,
- ssl->s3->pending_flight->length - ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- return ret;
- }
-
- ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset += ret;
- }
-
- if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio) <= 0) {
- ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- return -1;
- }
-
- ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset();
- ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0;
- return 1;
- }
-
- static ssl_open_record_t read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
- Span<const uint8_t> in) {
- *out_consumed = 0;
- assert(in.size() >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
- // Determine the length of the V2ClientHello.
- size_t msg_length = ((in[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | in[1];
- if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
- if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) {
- // Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
- // |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an
- // (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that.
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
-
- // Ask for the remainder of the V2ClientHello.
- if (in.size() < 2 + msg_length) {
- *out_consumed = 2 + msg_length;
- return ssl_open_record_partial;
- }
-
- CBS v2_client_hello = CBS(ssl->s3->read_buffer.span().subspan(2, msg_length));
- // The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
- // hash. This is only ever called at the start of the handshake, so hs is
- // guaranteed to be non-NULL.
- if (!ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(v2_client_hello)) {
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
-
- ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, 0 /* V2ClientHello */,
- v2_client_hello);
-
- uint8_t msg_type;
- uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
- CBS cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
- if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) ||
- !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) ||
- !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) ||
- !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) ||
- !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) ||
- !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) ||
- !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
- CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
-
- // msg_type has already been checked.
- assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
-
- // The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or left-pad with
- // zeros as needed.
- size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
- if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
- rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- }
- uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
- OPENSSL_memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- OPENSSL_memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
- rand_len);
-
- // Write out an equivalent TLS ClientHello.
- size_t max_v3_client_hello = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 /* version */ +
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 /* session ID length */ +
- 2 /* cipher list length */ +
- CBS_len(&cipher_specs) / 3 * 2 +
- 1 /* compression length */ + 1 /* compression */;
- ScopedCBB client_hello;
- CBB hello_body, cipher_suites;
- if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), max_v3_client_hello) ||
- !CBB_init_fixed(client_hello.get(), (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->hs_buf->data,
- ssl->s3->hs_buf->max) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(client_hello.get(), SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
- !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(client_hello.get(), &hello_body) ||
- !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- // No session id.
- !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
-
- // Copy the cipher suites.
- while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
- uint32_t cipher_spec;
- if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
-
- // Skip SSLv2 ciphers.
- if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
- continue;
- }
- if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
- }
-
- // Add the null compression scheme and finish.
- if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
- !CBB_finish(client_hello.get(), NULL, &ssl->s3->hs_buf->length)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
-
- *out_consumed = 2 + msg_length;
- ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = true;
- return ssl_open_record_success;
- }
-
- static bool parse_message(const SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out,
- size_t *out_bytes_needed) {
- if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
- *out_bytes_needed = 4;
- return false;
- }
-
- CBS cbs;
- uint32_t len;
- CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data),
- ssl->s3->hs_buf->length);
- if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &out->type) ||
- !CBS_get_u24(&cbs, &len)) {
- *out_bytes_needed = 4;
- return false;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &out->body, len)) {
- *out_bytes_needed = 4 + len;
- return false;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&out->raw, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data),
- 4 + len);
- out->is_v2_hello = ssl->s3->is_v2_hello;
- return true;
- }
-
- bool ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out) {
- size_t unused;
- if (!parse_message(ssl, out, &unused)) {
- return false;
- }
- if (!ssl->s3->has_message) {
- if (!out->is_v2_hello) {
- ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, out->raw);
- }
- ssl->s3->has_message = true;
- }
- return true;
- }
-
- bool tls_can_accept_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert) {
- // If there is a complete message, the caller must have consumed it first.
- SSLMessage msg;
- size_t bytes_needed;
- if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &bytes_needed)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return false;
- }
-
- // Enforce the limit so the peer cannot force us to buffer 16MB.
- if (bytes_needed > 4 + ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return false;
- }
-
- return true;
- }
-
- bool tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl) {
- size_t msg_len = 0;
- if (ssl->s3->has_message) {
- SSLMessage msg;
- size_t unused;
- if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &unused)) {
- msg_len = CBS_len(&msg.raw);
- }
- }
-
- return ssl->s3->hs_buf && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length > msg_len;
- }
-
- ssl_open_record_t ssl3_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
- uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) {
- *out_consumed = 0;
- // Re-create the handshake buffer if needed.
- if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
- ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
- if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
- }
-
- // Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello.
- if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) {
- // Ask for the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
- // sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read
- // beyond the first record.
- if (in.size() < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- *out_consumed = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- return ssl_open_record_partial;
- }
-
- // Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application
- // wish to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with
- // ClientHello or V2ClientHello.)
- const char *str = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(in.data());
- if (strncmp("GET ", str, 4) == 0 ||
- strncmp("POST ", str, 5) == 0 ||
- strncmp("HEAD ", str, 5) == 0 ||
- strncmp("PUT ", str, 4) == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
- *out_alert = 0;
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
- if (strncmp("CONNE", str, 5) == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
- *out_alert = 0;
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
-
- // Check for a V2ClientHello.
- if ((in[0] & 0x80) != 0 && in[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO &&
- in[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
- auto ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl, out_consumed, in);
- if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) {
- *out_alert = 0;
- } else if (ret == ssl_open_record_success) {
- ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true;
- }
- return ret;
- }
-
- ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true;
- }
-
- uint8_t type;
- Span<uint8_t> body;
- auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
- if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- // WatchGuard's TLS 1.3 interference bug is very distinctive: they drop the
- // ServerHello and send the remaining encrypted application data records
- // as-is. This manifests as an application data record when we expect
- // handshake. Report a dedicated error code for this case.
- if (!ssl->server && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
- ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_INSTEAD_OF_HANDSHAKE);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
-
- if (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
-
- // Append the entire handshake record to the buffer.
- if (!BUF_MEM_append(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), body.data(), body.size())) {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return ssl_open_record_error;
- }
-
- return ssl_open_record_success;
- }
-
- void ssl3_next_message(SSL *ssl) {
- SSLMessage msg;
- if (!ssl3_get_message(ssl, &msg) ||
- !ssl->s3->hs_buf ||
- ssl->s3->hs_buf->length < CBS_len(&msg.raw)) {
- assert(0);
- return;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data,
- ssl->s3->hs_buf->data + CBS_len(&msg.raw),
- ssl->s3->hs_buf->length - CBS_len(&msg.raw));
- ssl->s3->hs_buf->length -= CBS_len(&msg.raw);
- ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = false;
- ssl->s3->has_message = false;
-
- // Post-handshake messages are rare, so release the buffer after every
- // message. During the handshake, |on_handshake_complete| will release it.
- if (!SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length == 0) {
- ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset();
- }
- }
-
- } // namespace bssl
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