81f030b106
Although we are derived from 1.0.2, we mimic 1.1.0 in some ways around our FOO_up_ref functions and opaque libssl types. This causes some difficulties when porting third-party code as any OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER checks for 1.1.0 APIs we have will be wrong. Moreover, adding accessors without changing OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER can break external projects. It is common to implement a compatibility version of an accessor under #ifdef as a static function. This then conflicts with our headers if we, unlike OpenSSL 1.0.2, have this function. This change switches OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to 1.1.0 and atomically adds enough accessors for software with 1.1.0 support already. The hope is this will unblock hiding SSL_CTX and SSL_SESSION, which will be especially useful with C++-ficiation. The cost is we will hit some growing pains as more 1.1.0 consumers enter the ecosystem and we converge on the right set of APIs to import from upstream. It does not remove any 1.0.2 APIs, so we will not require that all projects support 1.1.0. The exception is APIs which changed in 1.1.0 but did not change the function signature. Those are breaking changes. Specifically: - SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb is now const-correct. - X509_get0_signature is now const-correct. For C++ consumers only, this change temporarily includes an overload hack for SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb that keeps the old callback working. This is a workaround for Node not yet supporting OpenSSL 1.1.0. The version number is set at (the as yet unreleased) 1.1.0g to denote that this change includes https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4384. Bug: 91 Change-Id: I5eeb27448a6db4c25c244afac37f9604d9608a76 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10340 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
856 lines
23 KiB
C
856 lines
23 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/nid.h>
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#include <openssl/sha.h>
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#include <openssl/thread.h>
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#include "../bn/internal.h"
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#include "../delocate.h"
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#include "../../internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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DEFINE_STATIC_EX_DATA_CLASS(g_rsa_ex_data_class);
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RSA *RSA_new(void) { return RSA_new_method(NULL); }
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RSA *RSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
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RSA *rsa = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA));
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if (rsa == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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OPENSSL_memset(rsa, 0, sizeof(RSA));
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if (engine) {
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rsa->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA_method(engine);
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}
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if (rsa->meth == NULL) {
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rsa->meth = (RSA_METHOD *) RSA_default_method();
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}
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METHOD_ref(rsa->meth);
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rsa->references = 1;
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rsa->flags = rsa->meth->flags;
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&rsa->lock);
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CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data);
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if (rsa->meth->init && !rsa->meth->init(rsa)) {
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_rsa_ex_data_class_bss_get(), rsa, &rsa->ex_data);
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&rsa->lock);
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METHOD_unref(rsa->meth);
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OPENSSL_free(rsa);
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return NULL;
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}
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return rsa;
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}
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void RSA_free(RSA *rsa) {
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unsigned u;
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if (rsa == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&rsa->references)) {
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return;
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}
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if (rsa->meth->finish) {
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rsa->meth->finish(rsa);
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}
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METHOD_unref(rsa->meth);
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_rsa_ex_data_class_bss_get(), rsa, &rsa->ex_data);
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BN_clear_free(rsa->n);
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BN_clear_free(rsa->e);
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BN_clear_free(rsa->d);
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BN_clear_free(rsa->p);
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BN_clear_free(rsa->q);
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BN_clear_free(rsa->dmp1);
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BN_clear_free(rsa->dmq1);
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BN_clear_free(rsa->iqmp);
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_n);
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_p);
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_q);
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for (u = 0; u < rsa->num_blindings; u++) {
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BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blindings[u]);
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}
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OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings);
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OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings_inuse);
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&rsa->lock);
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OPENSSL_free(rsa);
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}
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int RSA_up_ref(RSA *rsa) {
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CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&rsa->references);
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return 1;
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}
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void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_n, const BIGNUM **out_e,
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const BIGNUM **out_d) {
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if (out_n != NULL) {
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*out_n = rsa->n;
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}
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if (out_e != NULL) {
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*out_e = rsa->e;
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}
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if (out_d != NULL) {
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*out_d = rsa->d;
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}
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}
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void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_p,
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const BIGNUM **out_q) {
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if (out_p != NULL) {
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*out_p = rsa->p;
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}
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if (out_q != NULL) {
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*out_q = rsa->q;
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}
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}
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void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_dmp1,
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const BIGNUM **out_dmq1, const BIGNUM **out_iqmp) {
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if (out_dmp1 != NULL) {
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*out_dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
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}
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if (out_dmq1 != NULL) {
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*out_dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
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}
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if (out_iqmp != NULL) {
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*out_iqmp = rsa->iqmp;
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}
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}
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int RSA_set0_key(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) {
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if ((rsa->n == NULL && n == NULL) ||
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(rsa->e == NULL && e == NULL)) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (n != NULL) {
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BN_free(rsa->n);
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rsa->n = n;
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}
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if (e != NULL) {
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BN_free(rsa->e);
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rsa->e = e;
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}
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if (d != NULL) {
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BN_free(rsa->d);
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rsa->d = d;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) {
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if ((rsa->p == NULL && p == NULL) ||
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(rsa->q == NULL && q == NULL)) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (p != NULL) {
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BN_free(rsa->p);
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rsa->p = p;
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}
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if (q != NULL) {
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BN_free(rsa->q);
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rsa->q = q;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) {
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if ((rsa->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) ||
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(rsa->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) ||
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(rsa->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (dmp1 != NULL) {
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BN_free(rsa->dmp1);
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rsa->dmp1 = dmp1;
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}
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if (dmq1 != NULL) {
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BN_free(rsa->dmq1);
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rsa->dmq1 = dmq1;
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}
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if (iqmp != NULL) {
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BN_free(rsa->iqmp);
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rsa->iqmp = iqmp;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int RSA_public_encrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
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int padding) {
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size_t out_len;
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if (!RSA_encrypt(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
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return -1;
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}
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if (out_len > INT_MAX) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return -1;
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}
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return out_len;
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}
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int RSA_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
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if (rsa->meth->sign_raw) {
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return rsa->meth->sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
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}
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return rsa_default_sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
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}
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int RSA_private_encrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
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int padding) {
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size_t out_len;
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if (!RSA_sign_raw(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
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return -1;
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}
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if (out_len > INT_MAX) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return -1;
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}
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return out_len;
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}
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int RSA_decrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
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if (rsa->meth->decrypt) {
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return rsa->meth->decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
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}
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return rsa_default_decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
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}
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int RSA_private_decrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
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int padding) {
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size_t out_len;
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if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
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return -1;
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}
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if (out_len > INT_MAX) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return -1;
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}
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return out_len;
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}
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int RSA_public_decrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
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int padding) {
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size_t out_len;
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if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
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return -1;
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}
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if (out_len > INT_MAX) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return -1;
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}
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return out_len;
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}
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unsigned RSA_size(const RSA *rsa) {
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if (rsa->meth->size) {
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return rsa->meth->size(rsa);
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}
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return rsa_default_size(rsa);
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}
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int RSA_is_opaque(const RSA *rsa) {
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return rsa->meth && (rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_OPAQUE);
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}
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int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
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CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
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int index;
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if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(g_rsa_ex_data_class_bss_get(), &index, argl,
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argp, free_func)) {
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return -1;
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}
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return index;
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}
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int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *rsa, int idx, void *arg) {
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return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data, idx, arg);
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}
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void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *rsa, int idx) {
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return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data, idx);
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}
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// SSL_SIG_LENGTH is the size of an SSL/TLS (prior to TLS 1.2) signature: it's
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// the length of an MD5 and SHA1 hash.
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static const unsigned SSL_SIG_LENGTH = 36;
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// pkcs1_sig_prefix contains the ASN.1, DER encoded prefix for a hash that is
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// to be signed with PKCS#1.
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struct pkcs1_sig_prefix {
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// nid identifies the hash function.
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int nid;
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// hash_len is the expected length of the hash function.
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uint8_t hash_len;
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// len is the number of bytes of |bytes| which are valid.
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uint8_t len;
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// bytes contains the DER bytes.
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uint8_t bytes[19];
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};
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// kPKCS1SigPrefixes contains the ASN.1 prefixes for PKCS#1 signatures with
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// different hash functions.
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static const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix kPKCS1SigPrefixes[] = {
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{
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NID_md5,
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MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
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18,
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{0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
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0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10},
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},
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{
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NID_sha1,
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SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
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15,
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{0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05,
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0x00, 0x04, 0x14},
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},
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{
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NID_sha224,
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SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
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19,
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{0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
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0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c},
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},
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{
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NID_sha256,
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SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
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19,
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{0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
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0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20},
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},
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{
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NID_sha384,
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SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
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19,
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{0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
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0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30},
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},
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{
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NID_sha512,
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SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
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19,
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{0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
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0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40},
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},
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{
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NID_undef, 0, 0, {0},
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},
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};
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int RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(uint8_t **out_msg, size_t *out_msg_len,
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int *is_alloced, int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg,
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size_t msg_len) {
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unsigned i;
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if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1) {
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// Special case: SSL signature, just check the length.
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if (msg_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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|
|
*out_msg = (uint8_t*) msg;
|
|
*out_msg_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
|
|
*is_alloced = 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i].nid != NID_undef; i++) {
|
|
const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix *sig_prefix = &kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i];
|
|
if (sig_prefix->nid != hash_nid) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (msg_len != sig_prefix->hash_len) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t* prefix = sig_prefix->bytes;
|
|
unsigned prefix_len = sig_prefix->len;
|
|
unsigned signed_msg_len;
|
|
uint8_t *signed_msg;
|
|
|
|
signed_msg_len = prefix_len + msg_len;
|
|
if (signed_msg_len < prefix_len) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
signed_msg = OPENSSL_malloc(signed_msg_len);
|
|
if (!signed_msg) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(signed_msg, prefix, prefix_len);
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(signed_msg + prefix_len, msg, msg_len);
|
|
|
|
*out_msg = signed_msg;
|
|
*out_msg_len = signed_msg_len;
|
|
*is_alloced = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_sign(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, uint8_t *out,
|
|
unsigned *out_len, RSA *rsa) {
|
|
const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
uint8_t *signed_msg = NULL;
|
|
size_t signed_msg_len = 0;
|
|
int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0;
|
|
size_t size_t_out_len;
|
|
|
|
if (rsa->meth->sign) {
|
|
return rsa->meth->sign(hash_nid, in, in_len, out, out_len, rsa);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len,
|
|
&signed_msg_is_alloced, hash_nid, in, in_len) ||
|
|
!RSA_sign_raw(rsa, &size_t_out_len, out, rsa_size, signed_msg,
|
|
signed_msg_len, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_len = size_t_out_len;
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (signed_msg_is_alloced) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(signed_msg);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_sign_pss_mgf1(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const EVP_MD *md,
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1_md, int salt_len) {
|
|
if (in_len != EVP_MD_size(md)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t padded_len = RSA_size(rsa);
|
|
uint8_t *padded = OPENSSL_malloc(padded_len);
|
|
if (padded == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ret =
|
|
RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, padded, in, md, mgf1_md, salt_len) &&
|
|
RSA_sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, padded, padded_len,
|
|
RSA_NO_PADDING);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(padded);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_verify(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa) {
|
|
if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const size_t rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
|
|
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
uint8_t *signed_msg = NULL;
|
|
size_t signed_msg_len = 0, len;
|
|
int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1 && msg_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
|
|
if (!buf) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &len, buf, rsa_size, sig, sig_len,
|
|
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) {
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len,
|
|
&signed_msg_is_alloced, hash_nid, msg, msg_len)) {
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that no other information follows the hash value (FIPS 186-4 Section
|
|
// 5.5) and it matches the expected hash.
|
|
if (len != signed_msg_len || OPENSSL_memcmp(buf, signed_msg, len) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(buf);
|
|
if (signed_msg_is_alloced) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(signed_msg);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_verify_pss_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
|
|
const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1_md, int salt_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len) {
|
|
if (msg_len != EVP_MD_size(md)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t em_len = RSA_size(rsa);
|
|
uint8_t *em = OPENSSL_malloc(em_len);
|
|
if (em == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &em_len, em, em_len, sig, sig_len, RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (em_len != RSA_size(rsa)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, msg, md, mgf1_md, em, salt_len);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(em);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
|
|
BIGNUM n, pm1, qm1, lcm, gcd, de, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp_times_q;
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx;
|
|
int ok = 0, has_crt_values;
|
|
|
|
if (RSA_is_opaque(key)) {
|
|
// Opaque keys can't be checked.
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((key->p != NULL) != (key->q != NULL)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ONLY_ONE_OF_P_Q_GIVEN);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!key->n || !key->e) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!key->d || !key->p) {
|
|
// For a public key, or without p and q, there's nothing that can be
|
|
// checked.
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BN_init(&n);
|
|
BN_init(&pm1);
|
|
BN_init(&qm1);
|
|
BN_init(&lcm);
|
|
BN_init(&gcd);
|
|
BN_init(&de);
|
|
BN_init(&dmp1);
|
|
BN_init(&dmq1);
|
|
BN_init(&iqmp_times_q);
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_mul(&n, key->p, key->q, ctx) ||
|
|
// lcm = lcm(p, q)
|
|
!BN_sub(&pm1, key->p, BN_value_one()) ||
|
|
!BN_sub(&qm1, key->q, BN_value_one()) ||
|
|
!BN_mul(&lcm, &pm1, &qm1, ctx) ||
|
|
!BN_gcd(&gcd, &pm1, &qm1, ctx)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_div(&lcm, NULL, &lcm, &gcd, ctx) ||
|
|
!BN_gcd(&gcd, &pm1, &qm1, ctx) ||
|
|
// de = d*e mod lcm(p, q).
|
|
!BN_mod_mul(&de, key->d, key->e, &lcm, ctx)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (BN_cmp(&n, key->n) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_is_one(&de)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
has_crt_values = key->dmp1 != NULL;
|
|
if (has_crt_values != (key->dmq1 != NULL) ||
|
|
has_crt_values != (key->iqmp != NULL)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INCONSISTENT_SET_OF_CRT_VALUES);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (has_crt_values) {
|
|
if (// dmp1 = d mod (p-1)
|
|
!BN_mod(&dmp1, key->d, &pm1, ctx) ||
|
|
// dmq1 = d mod (q-1)
|
|
!BN_mod(&dmq1, key->d, &qm1, ctx) ||
|
|
// iqmp = q^-1 mod p
|
|
!BN_mod_mul(&iqmp_times_q, key->iqmp, key->q, key->p, ctx)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (BN_cmp(&dmp1, key->dmp1) != 0 ||
|
|
BN_cmp(&dmq1, key->dmq1) != 0 ||
|
|
BN_cmp(key->iqmp, key->p) >= 0 ||
|
|
!BN_is_one(&iqmp_times_q)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_CRT_VALUES_INCORRECT);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
BN_free(&n);
|
|
BN_free(&pm1);
|
|
BN_free(&qm1);
|
|
BN_free(&lcm);
|
|
BN_free(&gcd);
|
|
BN_free(&de);
|
|
BN_free(&dmp1);
|
|
BN_free(&dmq1);
|
|
BN_free(&iqmp_times_q);
|
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// This is the product of the 132 smallest odd primes, from 3 to 751.
|
|
static const BN_ULONG kSmallFactorsLimbs[] = {
|
|
TOBN(0xc4309333, 0x3ef4e3e1), TOBN(0x71161eb6, 0xcd2d655f),
|
|
TOBN(0x95e2238c, 0x0bf94862), TOBN(0x3eb233d3, 0x24f7912b),
|
|
TOBN(0x6b55514b, 0xbf26c483), TOBN(0x0a84d817, 0x5a144871),
|
|
TOBN(0x77d12fee, 0x9b82210a), TOBN(0xdb5b93c2, 0x97f050b3),
|
|
TOBN(0x4acad6b9, 0x4d6c026b), TOBN(0xeb7751f3, 0x54aec893),
|
|
TOBN(0xdba53368, 0x36bc85c4), TOBN(0xd85a1b28, 0x7f5ec78e),
|
|
TOBN(0x2eb072d8, 0x6b322244), TOBN(0xbba51112, 0x5e2b3aea),
|
|
TOBN(0x36ed1a6c, 0x0e2486bf), TOBN(0x5f270460, 0xec0c5727),
|
|
0x000017b1
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(BIGNUM, g_small_factors) {
|
|
out->d = (BN_ULONG *) kSmallFactorsLimbs;
|
|
out->top = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kSmallFactorsLimbs);
|
|
out->dmax = out->top;
|
|
out->neg = 0;
|
|
out->flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_check_fips(RSA *key) {
|
|
if (RSA_is_opaque(key)) {
|
|
// Opaque keys can't be checked.
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PUBLIC_KEY_VALIDATION_FAILED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!RSA_check_key(key)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM small_gcd;
|
|
BN_init(&small_gcd);
|
|
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
// Perform partial public key validation of RSA keys (SP 800-89 5.3.3).
|
|
enum bn_primality_result_t primality_result;
|
|
if (BN_num_bits(key->e) <= 16 ||
|
|
BN_num_bits(key->e) > 256 ||
|
|
!BN_is_odd(key->n) ||
|
|
!BN_is_odd(key->e) ||
|
|
!BN_gcd(&small_gcd, key->n, g_small_factors(), ctx) ||
|
|
!BN_is_one(&small_gcd) ||
|
|
!BN_enhanced_miller_rabin_primality_test(&primality_result, key->n,
|
|
BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL) ||
|
|
primality_result != bn_non_prime_power_composite) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PUBLIC_KEY_VALIDATION_FAILED);
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BN_free(&small_gcd);
|
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!ret || key->d == NULL || key->p == NULL) {
|
|
// On a failure or on only a public key, there's nothing else can be
|
|
// checked.
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// FIPS pairwise consistency test (FIPS 140-2 4.9.2). Per FIPS 140-2 IG,
|
|
// section 9.9, it is not known whether |rsa| will be used for signing or
|
|
// encryption, so either pair-wise consistency self-test is acceptable. We
|
|
// perform a signing test.
|
|
uint8_t data[32] = {0};
|
|
unsigned sig_len = RSA_size(key);
|
|
uint8_t *sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len);
|
|
if (sig == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, data, sizeof(data), sig, &sig_len, key)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_RSA_PWCT)
|
|
data[0] = ~data[0];
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, data, sizeof(data), sig, sig_len, key)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(sig);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
|
|
size_t len) {
|
|
if (rsa->meth->private_transform) {
|
|
return rsa->meth->private_transform(rsa, out, in, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rsa_default_private_transform(rsa, out, in, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|