4c5ddb8047
We reset it to SSL_NOTHING at the start of ever SSL_get_error-using operation. Then we only set it to a non-NOTHING value in the rest of the stack on error paths. Currently, ssl->rwstate is set all over the place. Sometimes the pattern is: ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_write(...) <= 0) { goto err; } ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; Sometimes we only set it to the non-NOTHING value on error. if (BIO_write(...) <= 0) { ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; } ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; Sometimes we just set it to SSL_NOTHING far from any callback in random places. The third case is arbitrary and clearly should be removed. But, in the second case, we sometimes forget to undo it afterwards. This is largely harmless since an error in the error queue overrides rwstate, but we don't always put something in the error queue (falling back to SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL for "I'm not sure why it failed. Perhaps it was one of your callbacks? Check your errno equivalent."), but in that case a stray rwstate value will cause it to be wrong. We could fix the cases where we fail to set SSL_NOTHING on success cases, but this doesn't account for there being multiple SSL_get_error operations. The consumer may have an SSL_read and an SSL_write running concurrently. Instead, it seems the best option is to lift the SSL_NOTHING reset to the operations and set SSL_WRITING and friends as in the second case. (Someday hopefully we can fix this to just be an enum that is internally returned. It can convert to something stateful at the API layer.) Change-Id: I54665ec066a64eb0e48a06e2fcd0d2681a42df7f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7453 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
540 lines
18 KiB
C
540 lines
18 KiB
C
/* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
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* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/buf.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *buf,
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unsigned int len, enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch);
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/* dtls1_get_record reads a new input record. On success, it places it in
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* |ssl->s3->rrec| and returns one. Otherwise it returns <= 0 on error or if
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* more data is needed. */
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static int dtls1_get_record(SSL *ssl) {
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again:
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/* Read a new packet if there is no unconsumed one. */
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if (ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) == 0) {
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int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 0 /* unused */);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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return ret;
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}
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}
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assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) > 0);
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/* Ensure the packet is large enough to decrypt in-place. */
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if (ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) < ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl)) {
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ssl_read_buffer_clear(ssl);
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goto again;
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}
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uint8_t *out = ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl);
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size_t max_out = ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) - ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl);
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uint8_t type, alert;
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size_t len, consumed;
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switch (dtls_open_record(ssl, &type, out, &len, &consumed, &alert, max_out,
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ssl_read_buffer(ssl), ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl))) {
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case ssl_open_record_success:
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ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, consumed);
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if (len > 0xffff) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return -1;
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}
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SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
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rr->type = type;
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rr->length = (uint16_t)len;
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rr->data = out;
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return 1;
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case ssl_open_record_discard:
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ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, consumed);
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goto again;
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case ssl_open_record_error:
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
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return -1;
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case ssl_open_record_partial:
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/* Impossible in DTLS. */
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break;
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}
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assert(0);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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int dtls1_read_app_data(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *buf, int len, int peek) {
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assert(!SSL_in_init(ssl));
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return dtls1_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len, peek);
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}
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int dtls1_read_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
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uint8_t byte;
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int ret = dtls1_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, &byte,
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1 /* len */, 0 /* no peek */);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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return ret;
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}
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assert(ret == 1);
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if (ssl->s3->rrec.length != 0 || byte != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
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return -1;
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}
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if (ssl->msg_callback != NULL) {
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ssl->msg_callback(0, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, &byte, 1,
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ssl, ssl->msg_callback_arg);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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void dtls1_read_close_notify(SSL *ssl) {
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/* Bidirectional shutdown doesn't make sense for an unordered transport. DTLS
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* alerts also aren't delivered reliably, so we may even time out because the
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* peer never received our close_notify. Report to the caller that the channel
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* has fully shut down. */
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ssl->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
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}
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/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
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* 'type' is one of the following:
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*
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* - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when dtls1_get_message calls us)
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* - SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC (when dtls1_read_change_cipher_spec calls us)
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* - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when dtls1_read_app_data calls us)
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*
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* If we don't have stored data to work from, read a DTLS record first (possibly
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* multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
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*
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* This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
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* Alert records (e.g. close_notify) and out of records. */
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int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *ssl, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) {
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int al, ret;
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unsigned int n;
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SSL3_RECORD *rr;
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void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL;
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if ((type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
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type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) ||
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(peek && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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start:
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/* ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
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* ssl->s3->rrec.data - data
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* ssl->s3->rrec.off - offset into 'data' for next read
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* ssl->s3->rrec.length - number of bytes. */
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rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
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/* Check for timeout */
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if (DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) > 0) {
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goto start;
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}
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/* get new packet if necessary */
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if (rr->length == 0) {
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ret = dtls1_get_record(ssl);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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ret = dtls1_read_failed(ssl, ret);
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/* anything other than a timeout is an error */
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if (ret <= 0) {
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return ret;
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} else {
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goto start;
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}
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}
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}
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/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
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/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
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* 'peek' mode) */
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if (ssl->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
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rr->length = 0;
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return 0;
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}
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if (type == rr->type) {
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/* Make sure that we are not getting application data when we
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* are doing a handshake for the first time. */
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if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
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(ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx == NULL)) {
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/* TODO(davidben): Is this check redundant with the handshake_func
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* check? */
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al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
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goto f_err;
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}
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/* Discard empty records. */
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if (rr->length == 0) {
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goto start;
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}
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if (len <= 0) {
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return len;
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}
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if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) {
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n = rr->length;
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} else {
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n = (unsigned int)len;
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}
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memcpy(buf, rr->data, n);
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if (!peek) {
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rr->length -= n;
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rr->data += n;
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if (rr->length == 0) {
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/* The record has been consumed, so we may now clear the buffer. */
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ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
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}
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}
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return n;
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}
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/* If we get here, then type != rr->type. */
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/* If an alert record, process the alert. */
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if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
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/* Alerts records may not contain fragmented or multiple alerts. */
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if (rr->length != 2) {
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al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT);
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goto f_err;
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}
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if (ssl->msg_callback) {
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ssl->msg_callback(0, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, rr->data, 2, ssl,
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ssl->msg_callback_arg);
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}
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const uint8_t alert_level = rr->data[0];
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const uint8_t alert_descr = rr->data[1];
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rr->length -= 2;
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rr->data += 2;
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if (ssl->info_callback != NULL) {
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cb = ssl->info_callback;
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} else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
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cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
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}
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if (cb != NULL) {
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uint16_t alert = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
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cb(ssl, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, alert);
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}
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if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
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if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
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ssl->s3->clean_shutdown = 1;
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ssl->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
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return 0;
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}
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} else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
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char tmp[16];
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
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BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
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ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
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ssl->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
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SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssl->ctx, ssl->session);
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return 0;
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} else {
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al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
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goto f_err;
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}
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goto start;
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}
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/* Cross-epoch records are discarded, but we may receive out-of-order
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* application data between ChangeCipherSpec and Finished or a ChangeCipherSpec
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* before the appropriate point in the handshake. Those must be silently
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* discarded.
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*
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* However, only allow the out-of-order records in the correct epoch.
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* Application data must come in the encrypted epoch, and ChangeCipherSpec in
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* the unencrypted epoch (we never renegotiate). Other cases fall through and
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* fail with a fatal error. */
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if ((rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
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ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx != NULL) ||
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(rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
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ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx == NULL)) {
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rr->length = 0;
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goto start;
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}
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|
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if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
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if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
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/* Out-of-order handshake record while looking for ChangeCipherSpec. Drop
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* it silently. */
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assert(type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
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rr->length = 0;
|
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goto start;
|
|
}
|
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|
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/* Parse the first fragment header to determine if this is a pre-CCS or
|
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* post-CCS handshake record. DTLS resets handshake message numbers on each
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* handshake, so renegotiations and retransmissions are ambiguous. */
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if (rr->length < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
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al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD);
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goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
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struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
|
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dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
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|
|
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if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
|
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if (msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) {
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|
/* Retransmit our last flight of messages. If the peer sends the second
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|
* Finished, they may not have received ours. Only do this for the
|
|
* first fragment, in case the Finished was fragmented. */
|
|
if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(ssl) < 0) {
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|
return -1;
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}
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|
|
|
dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(ssl);
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|
}
|
|
|
|
rr->length = 0;
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|
goto start;
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|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise, this is a pre-CCS handshake message from an unsupported
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* renegotiation attempt. Fall through to the error path. */
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|
}
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al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
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f_err:
|
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
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return -1;
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}
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|
|
int dtls1_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, const void *buf_, int len) {
|
|
assert(!SSL_in_init(ssl));
|
|
|
|
if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return dtls1_write_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf_, len,
|
|
dtls1_use_current_epoch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if not
|
|
* all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */
|
|
int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *ssl, int type, const void *buf, int len,
|
|
enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch) {
|
|
assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
|
|
return do_dtls1_write(ssl, type, buf, len, use_epoch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *buf,
|
|
unsigned int len, enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch) {
|
|
/* There should never be a pending write buffer in DTLS. One can't write half
|
|
* a datagram, so the write buffer is always dropped in
|
|
* |ssl_write_buffer_flush|. */
|
|
assert(!ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(ssl));
|
|
|
|
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
|
|
if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) {
|
|
int ret = ssl->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t max_out = len + ssl_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
|
|
uint8_t *out;
|
|
size_t ciphertext_len;
|
|
if (!ssl_write_buffer_init(ssl, &out, max_out) ||
|
|
!dtls_seal_record(ssl, out, &ciphertext_len, max_out, type, buf, len,
|
|
use_epoch)) {
|
|
ssl_write_buffer_clear(ssl);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_write_buffer_set_len(ssl, ciphertext_len);
|
|
|
|
int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
return (int)len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *ssl) {
|
|
ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
|
|
int ret = do_dtls1_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &ssl->s3->send_alert[0], 2,
|
|
dtls1_use_current_epoch);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the alert is fatal, flush the BIO now. */
|
|
if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
|
|
BIO_flush(ssl->wbio);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->msg_callback != NULL) {
|
|
ssl->msg_callback(1 /* write */, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
|
|
ssl->s3->send_alert, 2, ssl, ssl->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL;
|
|
if (ssl->info_callback != NULL) {
|
|
cb = ssl->info_callback;
|
|
} else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
|
|
cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) {
|
|
int alert = (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | ssl->s3->send_alert[1];
|
|
cb(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, alert);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|