|
- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE. */
-
- #include <assert.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <string.h>
-
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/buf.h>
- #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
- #include <openssl/cipher.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/ec.h>
- #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/hmac.h>
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
- #include <openssl/mem.h>
- #include <openssl/obj.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include <openssl/sha.h>
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
-
- #include "internal.h"
- #include "../crypto/internal.h"
- #include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
-
-
- /* INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE is the number of bytes read in the initial sniff
- * buffer. */
- #define INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE 8
-
- int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) {
- BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
- uint32_t alg_a;
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
- int new_state, state, skip = 0;
-
- assert(s->handshake_func == ssl3_accept);
- assert(s->server);
- assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(s));
-
- ERR_clear_error();
- ERR_clear_system_error();
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
- cb = s->info_callback;
- } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
- }
-
- s->in_handshake++;
-
- if (s->cert == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
- return -1;
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- state = s->state;
-
- switch (s->state) {
- case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
- if (cb != NULL) {
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
- }
-
- if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
- buf = BUF_MEM_new();
- if (!buf || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_buf = buf;
- buf = NULL;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /* Enable a write buffer. This groups handshake messages within a flight
- * into a single write. */
- if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!s->s3->have_version) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES:
- ret = ssl3_get_initial_bytes(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- /* ssl3_get_initial_bytes sets s->state to one of
- * SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO or SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A on success. */
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO:
- ret = ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
- s->shutdown = 0;
- ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- if (s->hit) {
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- }
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
- if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
- } else {
- skip = 1;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- /* Send a ServerKeyExchange message if:
- * - The key exchange is ephemeral or anonymous
- * Diffie-Hellman.
- * - There is a PSK identity hint.
- *
- * TODO(davidben): This logic is currently duplicated in d1_srvr.c. Fix
- * this. In the meantime, keep them in sync. */
- if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ||
- ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && s->psk_identity_hint)) {
- ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- } else {
- skip = 1;
- }
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
- ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- } else {
- skip = 1;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
- /* This code originally checked to see if any data was pending using
- * BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as documented
- * in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
- * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead
- * we just flush unconditionally. */
- s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-
- s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
- ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE: {
- char next_proto_neg = 0;
- char channel_id = 0;
- next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
- channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid;
-
- /* At this point, the next message must be entirely behind a
- * ChangeCipherSpec. */
- if (!ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- if (next_proto_neg) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- } else if (channel_id) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- }
- break;
- }
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_channel_id(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- ret =
- ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (s->hit) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- }
- /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the hashshake
- * hashes in |s->session| in case we need them to verify a ChannelID
- * signature on a resumption of this session in the future. */
- if (!s->hit) {
- ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
- SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- if (!s->enc_method->change_cipher_state(
- s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
- ret =
- ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
- s->enc_method->server_finished_label,
- s->enc_method->server_finished_label_len);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- if (s->hit) {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- } else {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf = NULL;
-
- /* remove buffering on output */
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it
- * now. */
- if (s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer = NULL;
- }
-
- s->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1;
-
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- if (cb != NULL) {
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
- }
-
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
-
- default:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip && cb != NULL && s->state != state) {
- new_state = s->state;
- s->state = state;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
- s->state = new_state;
- }
- skip = 0;
- }
-
- end:
- s->in_handshake--;
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- if (cb != NULL) {
- cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
- }
- return ret;
- }
-
- static int ssl3_read_sniff_buffer(SSL *s, size_t n) {
- if (s->s3->sniff_buffer == NULL) {
- s->s3->sniff_buffer = BUF_MEM_new();
- }
- if (s->s3->sniff_buffer == NULL || !BUF_MEM_grow(s->s3->sniff_buffer, n)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- while (s->s3->sniff_buffer_len < n) {
- int ret;
-
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, s->s3->sniff_buffer->data + s->s3->sniff_buffer_len,
- n - s->s3->sniff_buffer_len);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- s->s3->sniff_buffer_len += ret;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_initial_bytes(SSL *s) {
- int ret;
- const uint8_t *p;
-
- /* Read the first 8 bytes. To recognize a ClientHello or V2ClientHello only
- * needs the first 6 bytes, but 8 is needed to recognize CONNECT below. */
- ret = ssl3_read_sniff_buffer(s, INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
- }
- assert(s->s3->sniff_buffer_len >= INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE);
- p = (const uint8_t *)s->s3->sniff_buffer->data;
-
- /* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish
- * to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or
- * V2ClientHello.) */
- if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 ||
- strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
- strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
- strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
- return -1;
- }
- if (strncmp("CONNECT ", (const char *)p, 8) == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Determine if this is a ClientHello or V2ClientHello. */
- if ((p[0] & 0x80) && p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO &&
- p[3] >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
- /* This is a V2ClientHello. */
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO;
- return 1;
- }
- if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && p[1] >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
- p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
- /* This is a ClientHello. Initialize the record layer with the already
- * consumed data and continue the handshake. */
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
- return -1;
- }
- assert(s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
- /* There cannot have already been data in the record layer. */
- assert(s->s3->rbuf.left == 0);
- memcpy(s->s3->rbuf.buf, p, s->s3->sniff_buffer_len);
- s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
- s->s3->rbuf.left = s->s3->sniff_buffer_len;
- s->packet_length = 0;
-
- BUF_MEM_free(s->s3->sniff_buffer);
- s->s3->sniff_buffer = NULL;
- s->s3->sniff_buffer_len = 0;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- return 1;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
- return -1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(SSL *s) {
- const uint8_t *p;
- int ret;
- CBS v2_client_hello, cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
- size_t msg_length, rand_len, len;
- uint8_t msg_type;
- uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
- CBB client_hello, hello_body, cipher_suites;
- uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
-
- /* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. We have previously read 8 bytes
- * in ssl3_get_initial_bytes. */
- assert(s->s3->sniff_buffer_len >= INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE);
- p = (const uint8_t *)s->s3->sniff_buffer->data;
- msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
- if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
- return -1;
- }
- if (msg_length < INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE - 2) {
- /* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read 8 bytes,
- * so we should not attempt to process an (invalid) V2ClientHello which
- * would be shorter than that. */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- return -1;
- }
-
- ret = ssl3_read_sniff_buffer(s, msg_length + 2);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
- }
- assert(s->s3->sniff_buffer_len == msg_length + 2);
- CBS_init(&v2_client_hello, (const uint8_t *)s->s3->sniff_buffer->data + 2,
- msg_length);
-
- /* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the Finished
- * hash. */
- if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
- CBS_len(&v2_client_hello))) {
- return -1;
- }
- if (s->msg_callback) {
- s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
- CBS_len(&v2_client_hello), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) ||
- !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) ||
- !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) ||
- !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) ||
- !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) ||
- !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) ||
- !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
- CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* msg_type has already been checked. */
- assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
-
- /* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or
- * left-pad with zeros as needed. */
- memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
- if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
- rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- }
- memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
- rand_len);
-
- /* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */
- CBB_zero(&client_hello);
- if (!CBB_init_fixed(&client_hello, (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data,
- s->init_buf->max) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(&client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
- !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &hello_body) ||
- !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- /* No session id. */
- !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
- CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Copy the cipher suites. */
- while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
- uint32_t cipher_spec;
- if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
- CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */
- if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
- continue;
- }
- if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
- CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */
- if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
- !CBB_finish(&client_hello, NULL, &len)) {
- CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Mark the message for "re"-use by the version-specific method. */
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- s->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
- /* The handshake message header is 4 bytes. */
- s->s3->tmp.message_size = len - 4;
-
- /* Drop the sniff buffer. */
- BUF_MEM_free(s->s3->sniff_buffer);
- s->s3->sniff_buffer = NULL;
- s->s3->sniff_buffer_len = 0;
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) {
- int ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
- long n;
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
- struct ssl_early_callback_ctx early_ctx;
- CBS client_hello;
- uint16_t client_version;
- CBS client_random, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods;
- SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
-
- /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are TLSv1
- * and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down switching should
- * be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we will respond with
- * SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. */
- switch (s->state) {
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(
- s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
- SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
- ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
- }
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
- /* fallthrough */
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
- /* We have previously parsed the ClientHello message, and can't call
- * ssl_get_message again without hashing the message into the Finished
- * digest again. */
- n = s->init_num;
-
- memset(&early_ctx, 0, sizeof(early_ctx));
- early_ctx.ssl = s;
- early_ctx.client_hello = s->init_msg;
- early_ctx.client_hello_len = n;
- if (!ssl_early_callback_init(&early_ctx)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C &&
- s->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
- switch (s->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&early_ctx)) {
- case 0:
- s->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
- goto err;
-
- case -1:
- /* Connection rejected. */
- al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
- goto f_err;
-
- default:
- /* fallthrough */;
- }
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
- break;
-
- default:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&client_hello, s->init_msg, n);
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &client_version) ||
- !CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
- CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may differ:
- * see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
- s->client_version = client_version;
-
- /* Load the client random. */
- memcpy(s->s3->client_random, CBS_data(&client_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- CBS cookie;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) ||
- CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Note: This codepath may run twice if |ssl_get_prev_session| completes
- * asynchronously.
- *
- * TODO(davidben): Clean up the order of events around ClientHello
- * processing. */
- if (!s->s3->have_version) {
- /* Select version to use */
- uint16_t version = ssl3_get_mutual_version(s, client_version);
- if (version == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
- s->version = s->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->version = version;
- s->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(version);
- assert(s->enc_method != NULL);
- /* At this point, the connection's version is known and |s->version| is
- * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
- s->s3->have_version = 1;
- } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version)
- : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- s->hit = 0;
- int send_new_ticket = 0;
- switch (ssl_get_prev_session(s, &session, &send_new_ticket, &early_ctx)) {
- case ssl_session_success:
- break;
- case ssl_session_error:
- goto err;
- case ssl_session_retry:
- s->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
- goto err;
- }
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = send_new_ticket;
-
- /* The EMS state is needed when making the resumption decision, but
- * extensions are not normally parsed until later. This detects the EMS
- * extension for the resumption decision and it's checked against the result
- * of the normal parse later in this function. */
- const uint8_t *ems_data;
- size_t ems_len;
- int have_extended_master_secret =
- s->version != SSL3_VERSION &&
- SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(&early_ctx,
- TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
- &ems_data, &ems_len) &&
- ems_len == 0;
-
- if (session != NULL) {
- if (session->extended_master_secret &&
- !have_extended_master_secret) {
- /* A ClientHello without EMS that attempts to resume a session with EMS
- * is fatal to the connection. */
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- s->hit =
- /* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated version:
- * most clients do not accept a mismatch. */
- s->version == session->ssl_version &&
- /* If the client offers the EMS extension, but the previous session
- * didn't use it, then negotiate a new session. */
- have_extended_master_secret == session->extended_master_secret;
- }
-
- if (s->hit) {
- /* Use the new session. */
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session = session;
- session = NULL;
-
- s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
- } else if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (s->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL && s->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&early_ctx) == 0) {
- /* Connection rejected for DOS reasons. */
- al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
- CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 ||
- CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0 ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
- CBS_len(&compression_methods) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites);
- if (ciphers == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. */
- if (s->hit) {
- size_t j;
- int found_cipher = 0;
- uint32_t id = s->session->cipher->id;
-
- for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); j++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j);
- if (c->id == id) {
- found_cipher = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (!found_cipher) {
- /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked to reuse
- * it */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Only null compression is supported. */
- if (memchr(CBS_data(&compression_methods), 0,
- CBS_len(&compression_methods)) == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* TLS extensions. */
- if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
- !ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &client_hello)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */
- if (CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) {
- /* wrong packet length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (have_extended_master_secret != s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EMS_STATE_INCONSISTENT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Given ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (ciphers == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
- if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
- int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
- if (rv == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (rv < 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- goto err;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- }
- c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(s));
-
- if (c == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
-
- /* Determine whether to request a client certificate. */
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = !!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER);
- /* Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated. */
- if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
- }
- /* Plain PSK forbids Certificate and CertificateRequest. */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
- }
- } else {
- /* Session-id reuse */
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
- }
-
- /* In TLS 1.2, client authentication requires hashing the handshake transcript
- * under a different hash. Otherwise, release the handshake buffer. */
- if ((!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !s->s3->tmp.cert_request) &&
- !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* we now have the following setup;
- * client_random
- * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
- * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
- * compression - basically ignored right now
- * ssl version is set - sslv3
- * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
- * s->hit - session reuse flag
- * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. */
-
- if (ret < 0) {
- ret = -ret;
- }
-
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- }
-
- err:
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- SSL_SESSION_free(session);
- return ret;
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) {
- uint8_t *buf;
- uint8_t *p, *d;
- int sl;
- unsigned long l;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
- /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order to avoid a
- * known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) == 0) {
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
- }
-
- /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't support
- * ChannelID then we didn't record the original handshake hashes in the
- * session and so cannot resume with ChannelIDs. */
- if (s->hit && s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
- }
-
- buf = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data;
- /* Do the message type and length last */
- d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
-
- *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
-
- /* Random stuff */
- if (!ssl_fill_hello_random(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- 1 /* server */)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
- * back in the server hello:
- * - For session reuse from the session cache, we send back the old session
- * ID.
- * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) is successful, we
- * send back the client's "session ID" (which doesn't actually identify
- * the session).
- * - If it is a new session, we send back the new session ID.
- * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, we send back a
- * 0-length session ID.
- * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, so the following
- * won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed to send back. */
- if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) && !s->hit) {
- s->session->session_id_length = 0;
- }
-
- sl = s->session->session_id_length;
- if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- *(p++) = sl;
- memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
- p += sl;
-
- /* put the cipher */
- s2n(ssl_cipher_get_value(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), p);
-
- /* put the compression method */
- *(p++) = 0;
- if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return -1;
- }
- p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
- if (p == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* do the header */
- l = (p - d);
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
- return -1;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) {
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
- return -1;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) {
- DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
- EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
- uint8_t *encodedPoint = NULL;
- int encodedlen = 0;
- uint16_t curve_id = 0;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
- const char *psk_identity_hint = NULL;
- size_t psk_identity_hint_len = 0;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- uint8_t *p, *d;
- int al, i;
- uint32_t alg_k;
- uint32_t alg_a;
- int n;
- CERT *cert;
- BIGNUM *r[4];
- int nr[4], kn;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- cert = s->cert;
-
- buf = s->init_buf;
-
- r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
- n = 0;
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
- /* size for PSK identity hint */
- psk_identity_hint = s->psk_identity_hint;
- if (psk_identity_hint) {
- psk_identity_hint_len = strlen(psk_identity_hint);
- } else {
- psk_identity_hint_len = 0;
- }
- n += 2 + psk_identity_hint_len;
- }
-
- if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
- dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
- if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) {
- dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
- }
- if (dhp == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- dh = DHparams_dup(dhp);
- if (dh == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
-
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- r[0] = dh->p;
- r[1] = dh->g;
- r[2] = dh->pub_key;
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
- /* Determine the curve to use. */
- int nid = NID_undef;
- if (cert->ecdh_nid != NID_undef) {
- nid = cert->ecdh_nid;
- } else if (cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL) {
- /* Note: |ecdh_tmp_cb| does NOT pass ownership of the result
- * to the caller. */
- EC_KEY *template = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
- if (template != NULL && EC_KEY_get0_group(template) != NULL) {
- nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(template));
- }
- } else {
- nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s);
- }
- if (nid == NID_undef) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
- if (ecdh == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
-
- if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* We only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named (not generic) curves. */
- const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
- if (!tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(&curve_id, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and allocate
- * memory accordingly. */
- encodedlen =
- EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- encodedPoint = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(uint8_t));
- bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (encodedPoint == NULL || bn_ctx == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
-
- if (encodedlen == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- bn_ctx = NULL;
-
- /* We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
- * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to encode
- * the entire ServerECDHParams structure. */
- n += 4 + encodedlen;
-
- /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we can set
- * these to NULLs */
- r[0] = NULL;
- r[1] = NULL;
- r[2] = NULL;
- r[3] = NULL;
- } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
- nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
- n += 2 + nr[i];
- }
-
- if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- pkey = s->cert->privatekey;
- if (pkey == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- } else {
- pkey = NULL;
- kn = 0;
- }
-
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_LIB_BUF);
- goto err;
- }
- d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
-
- for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
- s2n(nr[i], p);
- BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
- p += nr[i];
- }
-
- /* Note: ECDHE PSK ciphersuites use SSL_kECDHE and SSL_aPSK. When one of
- * them is used, the server key exchange record needs to have both the
- * psk_identity_hint and the ServerECDHParams. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
- /* copy PSK identity hint (if provided) */
- s2n(psk_identity_hint_len, p);
- if (psk_identity_hint_len > 0) {
- memcpy(p, psk_identity_hint, psk_identity_hint_len);
- p += psk_identity_hint_len;
- }
- }
-
- if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
- /* We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
- * serverKeyExchange message has:
- * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
- * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
- * the actual encoded point itself. */
- *(p++) = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
- *(p++) = (uint8_t)(curve_id >> 8);
- *(p++) = (uint8_t)(curve_id & 0xff);
- *(p++) = encodedlen;
- memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
- p += encodedlen;
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- encodedPoint = NULL;
- }
-
- /* not anonymous */
- if (pkey != NULL) {
- /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p points to
- * the space at the end. */
- const EVP_MD *md;
- size_t sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-
- /* Determine signature algorithm. */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(s);
- if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(s, p, md)) {
- /* Should never happen */
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p += 2;
- } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- md = EVP_md5_sha1();
- } else {
- md = EVP_sha1();
- }
-
- if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) ||
- !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) ||
- !EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, &p[2], &sig_len)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_LIB_EVP);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s2n(sig_len, p);
- n += sig_len + 2;
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- n += 2;
- }
- }
-
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return ssl_do_write(s);
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return -1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) {
- uint8_t *p, *d;
- size_t i;
- int j, nl, off, n;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
- X509_NAME *name;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
- buf = s->init_buf;
-
- d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
-
- /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
- p++;
- n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
- d[0] = n;
- p += n;
- n++;
-
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- const uint8_t *psigs;
- nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
- s2n(nl, p);
- memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
- p += nl;
- n += nl + 2;
- }
-
- off = n;
- p += 2;
- n += 2;
-
- sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
- nl = 0;
- if (sk != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
- name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
- j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
- s2n(j, p);
- i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
- n += 2 + j;
- nl += 2 + j;
- }
- }
-
- /* else no CA names */
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
- s2n(nl, p);
-
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
- goto err;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
-
- err:
- return -1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) {
- int al, ok;
- long n;
- CBS client_key_exchange;
- uint32_t alg_k;
- uint32_t alg_a;
- uint8_t *premaster_secret = NULL;
- size_t premaster_secret_len = 0;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- uint8_t *decrypt_buf = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
- DH *dh_srvr;
-
- EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
- EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
- unsigned int psk_len = 0;
- uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
- SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, /* ??? */
- ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&client_key_exchange, s->init_msg, n);
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
- CBS psk_identity;
-
- /* If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a psk_identity. If PSK,
- * then this is the only field in the message. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) ||
- ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
- CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Look up the key for the identity. */
- psk_len =
- s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, psk, sizeof(psk));
- if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- } else if (psk_len == 0) {
- /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and
- * |premaster_secret_len|. */
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- CBS encrypted_premaster_secret;
- uint8_t rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- uint8_t good;
- size_t rsa_size, decrypt_len, premaster_index, j;
-
- pkey = s->cert->privatekey;
- if (pkey == NULL || pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA || pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
-
- /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
- CBS copy = client_key_exchange;
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange,
- &encrypted_premaster_secret) ||
- CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
- goto f_err;
- } else {
- encrypted_premaster_secret = copy;
- }
- }
- } else {
- encrypted_premaster_secret = client_key_exchange;
- }
-
- /* Reject overly short RSA keys because we want to be sure that the buffer
- * size makes it safe to iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
- * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The actual expected size is larger due to
- * RSA padding, but the bound is sufficient to be safe. */
- rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
- if (rsa_size < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
- * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
- * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
- * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt fails.
- * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
- if (!RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret))) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption. */
- decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
- if (decrypt_buf == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of the
- * timing-sensitive code below. */
- if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &decrypt_len, decrypt_buf, rsa_size,
- CBS_data(&encrypted_premaster_secret),
- CBS_len(&encrypted_premaster_secret), RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
- goto err;
- }
- if (decrypt_len != rsa_size) {
- /* This should never happen, but do a check so we do not read
- * uninitialized memory. */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Remove the PKCS#1 padding and adjust |decrypt_len| as appropriate.
- * |good| will be 0xff if the premaster is acceptable and zero otherwise.
- * */
- good =
- constant_time_eq_int_8(RSA_message_index_PKCS1_type_2(
- decrypt_buf, decrypt_len, &premaster_index),
- 1);
- decrypt_len = decrypt_len - premaster_index;
-
- /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. */
- good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
-
- /* Copy over the unpadded premaster. Whatever the value of
- * |decrypt_good_mask|, copy as if the premaster were the right length. It
- * is important the memory access pattern be constant. */
- premaster_secret =
- BUF_memdup(decrypt_buf + (rsa_size - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH),
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
- if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
- decrypt_buf = NULL;
-
- /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
- * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
- * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
- * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number check as
- * a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in constant time
- * and are treated like any other decryption error. */
- good &= constant_time_eq_8(premaster_secret[0],
- (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
- good &= constant_time_eq_8(premaster_secret[1],
- (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
-
- /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over premaster_secret using
- * decrypt_good_mask. */
- for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
- premaster_secret[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, premaster_secret[j],
- rand_premaster_secret[j]);
- }
-
- premaster_secret_len = sizeof(rand_premaster_secret);
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
- CBS dh_Yc;
- int dh_len;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &dh_Yc) ||
- CBS_len(&dh_Yc) == 0 || CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
- al = SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
-
- pub = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL);
- if (pub == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Allocate a buffer for the premaster secret. */
- premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dh_srvr));
- if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- BN_clear_free(pub);
- goto err;
- }
-
- dh_len = DH_compute_key(premaster_secret, pub, dh_srvr);
- if (dh_len <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- BN_clear_free(pub);
- goto err;
- }
-
- DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
- s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
- BN_clear_free(pub);
- pub = NULL;
-
- premaster_secret_len = dh_len;
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
- int field_size = 0, ecdh_len;
- const EC_KEY *tkey;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- const BIGNUM *priv_key;
- CBS ecdh_Yc;
-
- /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
- srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new();
- if (srvr_ecdh == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the ServerKeyExchange
- * msg. */
- tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
-
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
- priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
-
- if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
- !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Let's get client's public key */
- clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group);
- if (clnt_ecpoint == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Get client's public key from encoded point in the ClientKeyExchange
- * message. */
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &ecdh_Yc) ||
- CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (bn_ctx == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, CBS_data(&ecdh_Yc),
- CBS_len(&ecdh_Yc), bn_ctx)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Allocate a buffer for both the secret and the PSK. */
- field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
- if (field_size <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ecdh_len = (field_size + 7) / 8;
- premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(ecdh_len);
- if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
- ecdh_len = ECDH_compute_key(premaster_secret, ecdh_len, clnt_ecpoint,
- srvr_ecdh, NULL);
- if (ecdh_len <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
- clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
- EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- srvr_ecdh = NULL;
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- bn_ctx = NULL;
- EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
-
- premaster_secret_len = ecdh_len;
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as the
- * pre-shared key. */
- premaster_secret_len = psk_len;
- premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
- if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- memset(premaster_secret, 0, premaster_secret_len);
- } else {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with the
- * pre-shared key. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
- CBB new_premaster, child;
- uint8_t *new_data;
- size_t new_len;
-
- CBB_zero(&new_premaster);
- if (!CBB_init(&new_premaster, 2 + psk_len + 2 + premaster_secret_len) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&child, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
- !CBB_finish(&new_premaster, &new_data, &new_len)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- CBB_cleanup(&new_premaster);
- goto err;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
- premaster_secret = new_data;
- premaster_secret_len = new_len;
- }
-
- /* Compute the master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length = s->enc_method->generate_master_secret(
- s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- if (s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
- goto err;
- }
- s->session->extended_master_secret = s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret;
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
- return 1;
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- if (premaster_secret) {
- if (premaster_secret_len) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- }
- OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
- }
- OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
- EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
- EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-
- return -1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) {
- int al, ok, ret = 0;
- long n;
- CBS certificate_verify, signature;
- X509 *peer = s->session->peer;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t digest_length;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
-
- /* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
- * CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a client certificate.
- * */
- if (peer == NULL) {
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
- !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
- return -1;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(
- s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
- ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
- }
-
- /* Filter out unsupported certificate types. */
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
- if (pkey == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
- if (!(X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey) & EVP_PKT_SIGN) ||
- (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&certificate_verify, s->init_msg, n);
-
- /* Determine the digest type if needbe. */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
- !tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, &al, s, &certificate_verify, pkey)) {
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Compute the digest. */
- if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(s, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey->type)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current
- * message.*/
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
- !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
- goto err;
- }
- if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(s)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Parse and verify the signature. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) ||
- CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- if (pctx == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) ||
- !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) ||
- !EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), digest,
- digest_length)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- }
-
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
- return ret;
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) {
- int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- unsigned long n;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
- SHA256_CTX sha256;
- CBS certificate_msg, certificate_list;
- int is_first_certificate = 1;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1,
- (long)s->max_cert_list, ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL,
- SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&certificate_msg, s->init_msg, n);
-
- sk = sk_X509_new_null();
- if (sk == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_msg, &certificate_list) ||
- CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
- CBS certificate;
- const uint8_t *data;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (is_first_certificate && s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
- /* If this is the first certificate, and we don't want to keep peer
- * certificates in memory, then we hash it right away. */
- SHA256_Init(&sha256);
- SHA256_Update(&sha256, CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate));
- SHA256_Final(s->session->peer_sha256, &sha256);
- s->session->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
- }
- is_first_certificate = 0;
-
- data = CBS_data(&certificate);
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&certificate));
- if (x == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- x = NULL;
- }
-
- if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
- /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
- else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
- !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else {
- i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
- if (i <= 0) {
- al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
- s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
-
- /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
- * arrive here. */
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
- s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
- /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
- * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
-
- sk = NULL;
-
- ret = 1;
-
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- }
-
- err:
- X509_free(x);
- sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
- return ret;
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) {
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
- if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s)) {
- return 0;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- }
-
- /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
- int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) {
- int ret = -1;
- uint8_t *session = NULL;
- size_t session_len;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
- uint8_t *p, *macstart;
- int len;
- unsigned int hlen;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- uint8_t key_name[16];
- /* The maximum overhead of encrypting the session is 16 (key name) + IV +
- * one block of encryption overhead + HMAC. */
- const size_t max_ticket_overhead =
- 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
-
- /* Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket. */
- if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(s->session, &session, &session_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than abort the
- * connection. */
- if (session_len > 0xFFFF - max_ticket_overhead) {
- static const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE";
- const size_t placeholder_len = strlen(kTicketPlaceholder);
-
- OPENSSL_free(session);
- session = NULL;
-
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- /* Emit ticket_lifetime_hint. */
- l2n(0, p);
- /* Emit ticket. */
- s2n(placeholder_len, p);
- memcpy(p, kTicketPlaceholder, placeholder_len);
- p += placeholder_len;
-
- len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- }
-
- /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as follows:
- * handshake_header_length + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
- * max_ticket_overhead + * session_length */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 +
- max_ticket_overhead + session_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the
- * work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx,
- 1 /* encrypt */) < 0) {
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) ||
- !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv) ||
- !HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(),
- NULL)) {
- goto err;
- }
- memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
- }
-
- /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified for
- * resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
- * sessions will live as long as their sessions. */
- l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
-
- /* Skip ticket length for now */
- p += 2;
- /* Output key name */
- macstart = p;
- memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
- p += 16;
- /* output IV */
- memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
- p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- /* Encrypt session data */
- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, session, session_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- p += len;
- if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- p += len;
-
- if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart) ||
- !HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- p += hlen;
- /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
- /* Total length */
- len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
- /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
- s2n(len - 6, p);
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
- ret = ssl_do_write(s);
-
- err:
- OPENSSL_free(session);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
- * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
- int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) {
- int ok;
- long n;
- CBS next_protocol, selected_protocol, padding;
-
- /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the extension
- * in their ClientHello */
- if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
- return -1;
- }
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
- 514, /* See the payload format below */
- ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
- }
-
- /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
- * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
- * ssl3_get_finished).
- *
- * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with
- * SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
- return -1;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&next_protocol, s->init_msg, n);
-
- /* The payload looks like:
- * uint8 proto_len;
- * uint8 proto[proto_len];
- * uint8 padding_len;
- * uint8 padding[padding_len]; */
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) ||
- CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0 ||
- !CBS_stow(&selected_protocol, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
- &s->next_proto_negotiated_len)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
- int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s) {
- int ret = -1, ok;
- long n;
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- uint8_t channel_id_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned int channel_id_hash_len;
- const uint8_t *p;
- uint16_t extension_type;
- EC_GROUP *p256 = NULL;
- EC_KEY *key = NULL;
- EC_POINT *point = NULL;
- ECDSA_SIG sig;
- BIGNUM x, y;
- CBS encrypted_extensions, extension;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(
- s, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B,
- SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE,
- ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
- }
-
- /* Before incorporating the EncryptedExtensions message to the handshake
- * hash, compute the hash that should have been signed. */
- channel_id_hash_len = sizeof(channel_id_hash);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL) ||
- !tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s) ||
- !EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, channel_id_hash, &channel_id_hash_len)) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return -1;
- }
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- assert(channel_id_hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-
- if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(s)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
- * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
- * ssl3_get_finished).
- *
- * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS);
- return -1;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&encrypted_extensions, s->init_msg, n);
-
- /* EncryptedExtensions could include multiple extensions, but the only
- * extension that could be negotiated is ChannelID, so there can only be one
- * entry.
- *
- * The payload looks like:
- * uint16 extension_type
- * uint16 extension_len;
- * uint8 x[32];
- * uint8 y[32];
- * uint8 r[32];
- * uint8 s[32]; */
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&encrypted_extensions, &extension_type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&encrypted_extensions, &extension) ||
- CBS_len(&encrypted_extensions) != 0 ||
- extension_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
- if (!p256) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);
- return -1;
- }
-
- BN_init(&x);
- BN_init(&y);
- sig.r = BN_new();
- sig.s = BN_new();
- if (sig.r == NULL || sig.s == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- p = CBS_data(&extension);
- if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL ||
- BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL ||
- BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL ||
- BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- point = EC_POINT_new(p256);
- if (!point || !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- key = EC_KEY_new();
- if (!key || !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) ||
- !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time that we
- * were called. */
- if (!ECDSA_do_verify(channel_id_hash, channel_id_hash_len, &sig, key)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
- goto err;
- }
-
- memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64);
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- BN_free(&x);
- BN_free(&y);
- BN_free(sig.r);
- BN_free(sig.s);
- EC_KEY_free(key);
- EC_POINT_free(point);
- EC_GROUP_free(p256);
- return ret;
- }
|