6df6540766
TLS 1.3 includes a server-random-based anti-downgrade signal, as a workaround for TLS 1.2's ServerKeyExchange signature failing to cover the entire handshake. However, because TLS 1.3 draft versions are each doomed to die, we cannot deploy it until the final RFC. (Suppose a draft-TLS-1.3 client checked the signal and spoke to a final-TLS-1.3 server. The server would correctly negotiate TLS 1.2 and send the signal. But the client would then break. An anologous situation exists with reversed roles.) However, it appears that Cisco devices have non-compliant TLS 1.2 implementations[1] and copy over another server's server-random when acting as a TLS terminator (client and server back-to-back). Hopefully they are the only ones doing this. Implement a measurement-only version with a different value. This sentinel must not be enforced, but it will tell us whether enforcing it will cause problems. [1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25168.html Bug: 226 Change-Id: I976880bdb2ef26f51592b2f6b3b97664342679c8 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24284 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
560 lines
18 KiB
C++
560 lines
18 KiB
C++
/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <utility>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/stack.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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namespace bssl {
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// kMaxKeyUpdates is the number of consecutive KeyUpdates that will be
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// processed. Without this limit an attacker could force unbounded processing
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// without being able to return application data.
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static const uint8_t kMaxKeyUpdates = 32;
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const uint8_t kHelloRetryRequest[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = {
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0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c,
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0x02, 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb,
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0x8c, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c,
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};
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// This value was selected by truncating the SHA-256 hash of "Draft TLS 1.3
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// Downgrade" to 8 bytes:
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//
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// echo -n 'Draft TLS 1.3 Downgrade' | sha256sum | head -c 16
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const uint8_t kDraftDowngradeRandom[8] = {0x95, 0xb9, 0x9f, 0x87,
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0x22, 0xfe, 0x9b, 0x64};
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bool tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(
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SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Array<uint8_t> *out,
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enum ssl_cert_verify_context_t cert_verify_context) {
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ScopedCBB cbb;
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if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 64 + 33 + 1 + 2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return false;
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
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if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), 0x20)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return false;
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}
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}
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Span<const char> context;
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if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_server) {
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static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
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context = kContext;
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} else if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_client) {
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static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
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context = kContext;
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} else if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_channel_id) {
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static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, Channel ID";
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context = kContext;
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} else {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return false;
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}
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// Note |context| includes the NUL byte separator.
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if (!CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(),
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reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(context.data()),
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context.size())) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return false;
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}
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uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t context_hash_len;
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if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), context_hash, context_hash_len) ||
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!CBBFinishArray(cbb.get(), out)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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int tls13_process_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg,
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int allow_anonymous) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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CBS body = msg.body, context, certificate_list;
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if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &context) ||
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CBS_len(&context) != 0 ||
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!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &certificate_list) ||
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CBS_len(&body) != 0) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> certs(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null());
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if (!certs) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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const bool retain_sha256 =
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ssl->server && ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs;
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UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey;
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while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
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CBS certificate, extensions;
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if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate) ||
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!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &extensions) ||
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CBS_len(&certificate) == 0) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
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return 0;
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}
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if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 0) {
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pkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&certificate);
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if (!pkey) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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// TLS 1.3 always uses certificate keys for signing thus the correct
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// keyUsage is enforced.
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if (!ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&certificate)) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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if (retain_sha256) {
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// Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested.
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SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate),
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hs->new_session->peer_sha256);
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}
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}
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UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf(
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&certificate, ssl->ctx->pool));
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if (!buf ||
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!PushToStack(certs.get(), std::move(buf))) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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// Parse out the extensions.
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bool have_status_request = false, have_sct = false;
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CBS status_request, sct;
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const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = {
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{TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, &have_status_request, &status_request},
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{TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp, &have_sct, &sct},
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};
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uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types,
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OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ext_types),
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0 /* reject unknown */)) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
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return 0;
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}
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// All Certificate extensions are parsed, but only the leaf extensions are
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// stored.
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if (have_status_request) {
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if (ssl->server || !ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
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return 0;
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}
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uint8_t status_type;
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CBS ocsp_response;
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if (!CBS_get_u8(&status_request, &status_type) ||
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status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp ||
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!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&status_request, &ocsp_response) ||
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CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 ||
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CBS_len(&status_request) != 0) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 1) {
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(hs->new_session->ocsp_response);
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hs->new_session->ocsp_response =
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->pool);
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if (hs->new_session->ocsp_response == nullptr) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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}
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if (have_sct) {
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if (ssl->server || !ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!ssl_is_sct_list_valid(&sct)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 1) {
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
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hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list =
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&sct, ssl->ctx->pool);
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if (hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list == nullptr) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// Store a null certificate list rather than an empty one if the peer didn't
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// send certificates.
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if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 0) {
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certs.reset();
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}
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hs->peer_pubkey = std::move(pkey);
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sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
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hs->new_session->certs = certs.release();
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if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session.get())) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0) {
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if (!allow_anonymous) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED);
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return 0;
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}
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// OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is
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// classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX.
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hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
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// No certificate, so nothing more to do.
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return 1;
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}
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hs->new_session->peer_sha256_valid = retain_sha256;
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_process_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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if (hs->peer_pubkey == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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CBS body = msg.body, signature;
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uint16_t signature_algorithm;
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if (!CBS_get_u16(&body, &signature_algorithm) ||
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!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &signature) ||
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CBS_len(&body) != 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &alert, signature_algorithm)) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
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return 0;
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}
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hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
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Array<uint8_t> input;
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if (!tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(
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hs, &input,
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ssl->server ? ssl_cert_verify_client : ssl_cert_verify_server)) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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bool sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
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hs->peer_pubkey.get(), input);
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#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
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sig_ok = true;
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ERR_clear_error();
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#endif
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if (!sig_ok) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_process_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg,
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int use_saved_value) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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uint8_t verify_data_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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const uint8_t *verify_data;
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size_t verify_data_len;
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if (use_saved_value) {
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assert(ssl->server);
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verify_data = hs->expected_client_finished;
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verify_data_len = hs->hash_len;
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} else {
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if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, verify_data_buf, &verify_data_len,
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!ssl->server)) {
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return 0;
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}
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verify_data = verify_data_buf;
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}
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int finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, verify_data, verify_data_len);
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#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
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finished_ok = 1;
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#endif
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if (!finished_ok) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int tls13_add_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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ScopedCBB cbb;
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CBB body, certificate_list;
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if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
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// The request context is always empty in the handshake.
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!CBB_add_u8(&body, 0) ||
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!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &certificate_list)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
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return ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get());
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}
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CERT *cert = ssl->cert;
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CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf_buf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0);
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CBB leaf, extensions;
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if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &leaf) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&leaf, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(leaf_buf),
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(leaf_buf)) ||
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!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &extensions)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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if (hs->scts_requested && ssl->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL) {
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CBB contents;
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if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) ||
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!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &contents) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(
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&contents,
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(ssl->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list),
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(ssl->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list)) ||
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!CBB_flush(&extensions)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (hs->ocsp_stapling_requested &&
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ssl->cert->ocsp_response != NULL) {
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CBB contents, ocsp_response;
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if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) ||
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!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &contents) ||
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!CBB_add_u8(&contents, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
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!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&contents, &ocsp_response) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response,
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(ssl->cert->ocsp_response),
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(ssl->cert->ocsp_response)) ||
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!CBB_flush(&extensions)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(cert->chain); i++) {
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CRYPTO_BUFFER *cert_buf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, i);
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CBB child;
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if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &child) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_buf),
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_buf)) ||
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!CBB_add_u16(&certificate_list, 0 /* no extensions */)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enum ssl_private_key_result_t tls13_add_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
uint16_t signature_algorithm;
|
|
if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
|
|
return ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ScopedCBB cbb;
|
|
CBB body;
|
|
if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
|
|
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Sign the digest.
|
|
CBB child;
|
|
const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey.get());
|
|
uint8_t *sig;
|
|
size_t sig_len;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
|
|
!CBB_reserve(&child, &sig, max_sig_len)) {
|
|
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Array<uint8_t> msg;
|
|
if (!tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(
|
|
hs, &msg,
|
|
ssl->server ? ssl_cert_verify_server : ssl_cert_verify_client)) {
|
|
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(
|
|
hs, sig, &sig_len, max_sig_len, signature_algorithm, msg);
|
|
if (sign_result != ssl_private_key_success) {
|
|
return sign_result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) ||
|
|
!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
|
|
return ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ssl_private_key_success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls13_add_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
size_t verify_data_len;
|
|
uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, verify_data, &verify_data_len, ssl->server)) {
|
|
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ScopedCBB cbb;
|
|
CBB body;
|
|
if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&body, verify_data, verify_data_len) ||
|
|
!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls13_receive_key_update(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) {
|
|
CBS body = msg.body;
|
|
uint8_t key_update_request;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8(&body, &key_update_request) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&body) != 0 ||
|
|
(key_update_request != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED &&
|
|
key_update_request != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_open)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Acknowledge the KeyUpdate
|
|
if (key_update_request == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED &&
|
|
!ssl->s3->key_update_pending) {
|
|
ScopedCBB cbb;
|
|
CBB body_cbb;
|
|
if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body_cbb,
|
|
SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&body_cbb, SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED) ||
|
|
!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get()) ||
|
|
!tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Suppress KeyUpdate acknowledgments until this change is written to the
|
|
// wire. This prevents us from accumulating write obligations when read and
|
|
// write progress at different rates. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, section
|
|
// 4.5.3.
|
|
ssl->s3->key_update_pending = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls13_post_handshake(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) {
|
|
if (msg.type == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
|
|
ssl->s3->key_update_count++;
|
|
if (ssl->s3->key_update_count > kMaxKeyUpdates) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
|
|
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return tls13_receive_key_update(ssl, msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->key_update_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (msg.type == SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET && !ssl->server) {
|
|
return tls13_process_new_session_ticket(ssl, msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // namespace bssl
|