kris/boringssl
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Wiki Activity
aa80ff50bf
boringssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
Steven Valdez bbd43b5e90 Renaming SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET to SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET. 
This keeps the naming convention in line with the actual spec.

Change-Id: I34673f78dbc29c1659b4da0e49677ebe9b79636b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8090
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-06-01 15:58:53 +00:00

2040 lines
63 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
int ssl3_connect(SSL *ssl) {
BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL;
int ret = -1;
int new_state, state, skip = 0;
assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_connect);
assert(!ssl->server);
assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl));
ERR_clear_system_error();
if (ssl->info_callback != NULL) {
cb = ssl->info_callback;
} else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
}
for (;;) {
state = ssl->state;
switch (ssl->state) {
case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
if (cb != NULL) {
cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
}
if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
buf = BUF_MEM_new();
if (buf == NULL ||
!BUF_MEM_reserve(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
ssl->init_buf = buf;
buf = NULL;
}
ssl->init_num = 0;
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(ssl)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!ssl3_init_handshake_buffer(ssl)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
if (ssl->hit) {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
/* receive renewed session ticket */
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
}
} else {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
if (ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
} else {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT;
}
} else {
skip = 1;
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT:
ret = ssl3_verify_server_cert(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
} else {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
ret = ssl3_get_server_done(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
if (ssl->s3->tmp.cert_req) {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
} else {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
* of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
if (ssl->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
} else {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C:
ret = ssl3_send_cert_verify(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(ssl, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
}
if (ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
}
if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
} else {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B:
ret = ssl3_send_channel_id(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
ret = ssl3_send_finished(ssl, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
if (ssl->hit) {
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
} else {
/* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then
* record the handshake hashes at this point in the session so that
* any resumption of this session with ChannelID can sign those
* hashes. */
ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
if ((SSL_get_mode(ssl) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) &&
ssl3_can_false_start(ssl) &&
/* No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state
* machine). */
!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_FALSE_START;
} else {
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
} else {
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
}
}
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE:
ret = ssl->method->ssl_read_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
ret = ssl3_get_finished(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
if (ssl->hit) {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
} else {
ssl->state = SSL_ST_OK;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio) <= 0) {
ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
ssl->state = ssl->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_FALSE_START:
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
} else {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
}
ssl->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 1;
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl);
ret = 1;
goto end;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(ssl);
BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf);
ssl->init_buf = NULL;
ssl->init_num = 0;
/* Remove write buffering now. */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl);
const int is_initial_handshake = !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete;
ssl->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 0;
ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1;
if (is_initial_handshake) {
/* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */
ssl_update_cache(ssl, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
}
ret = 1;
/* ssl->server=0; */
if (cb != NULL) {
cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
}
goto end;
default:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
if (cb != NULL && ssl->state != state) {
new_state = ssl->state;
ssl->state = state;
cb(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
ssl->state = new_state;
}
}
skip = 0;
}
end:
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
if (cb != NULL) {
cb(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
}
return ret;
}
static int ssl3_write_client_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) {
/* Prepare disabled cipher masks. */
ssl_set_client_disabled(ssl);
CBB child;
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &child)) {
return 0;
}
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
int any_enabled = 0;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
/* Skip disabled ciphers */
if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & ssl->cert->mask_k) ||
(cipher->algorithm_auth & ssl->cert->mask_a)) {
continue;
}
if (SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) >
ssl3_version_from_wire(ssl, ssl->client_version)) {
continue;
}
any_enabled = 1;
if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_cipher_get_value(cipher))) {
return 0;
}
}
/* If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller. */
if (!any_enabled) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
return 0;
}
/* For SSLv3, the SCSV is added. Otherwise the renegotiation extension is
* added. */
if (ssl->client_version == SSL3_VERSION &&
!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
return 0;
}
/* The renegotiation extension is required to be at index zero. */
ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.sent |= (1u << 0);
}
if ((ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) &&
!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
return 0;
}
return CBB_flush(out);
}
int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B) {
return ssl_do_write(ssl);
}
/* In DTLS, reset the handshake buffer each time a new ClientHello is
* assembled. We may send multiple if we receive HelloVerifyRequest. */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) && !ssl3_init_handshake_buffer(ssl)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
CBB cbb;
CBB_zero(&cbb);
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A);
if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
uint16_t max_version = ssl3_get_max_client_version(ssl);
/* Disabling all versions is silly: return an error. */
if (max_version == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
goto err;
}
ssl->version = max_version;
/* Only set |ssl->client_version| on the initial handshake. Renegotiations,
* although locked to a version, reuse the value. When using the plain RSA
* key exchange, the ClientHello version is checked in the premaster secret.
* Some servers fail when this value changes. */
ssl->client_version = max_version;
}
/* If the configured session has expired or was created at a disabled
* version, drop it. */
if (ssl->session != NULL &&
(ssl->session->session_id_length == 0 || ssl->session->not_resumable ||
ssl->session->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ssl->session->time) ||
!ssl3_is_version_enabled(ssl, ssl->session->ssl_version))) {
SSL_set_session(ssl, NULL);
}
/* If resending the ClientHello in DTLS after a HelloVerifyRequest, don't
* renegerate the client_random. The random must be reused. */
if ((!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) || !ssl->d1->send_cookie) &&
!ssl_fill_hello_random(ssl->s3->client_random,
sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random), 0 /* client */)) {
goto err;
}
/* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */
int has_session = ssl->session != NULL &&
!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete;
CBB child;
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl),
ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) ||
!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, ssl->client_version) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
(has_session &&
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->session->session_id,
ssl->session->session_id_length))) {
goto err;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->d1->cookie, ssl->d1->cookie_len)) {
goto err;
}
}
size_t length;
if (!ssl3_write_client_cipher_list(ssl, &cbb) ||
!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 1 /* one compression method */) ||
!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0 /* null compression */) ||
!ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(ssl, &cbb,
CBB_len(&cbb) + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) ||
!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, length)) {
goto err;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
return ssl_do_write(ssl);
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return -1;
}
int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *ssl) {
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
CERT *ct = ssl->cert;
int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
long n;
CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id;
uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite;
uint8_t compression_method;
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, ssl_hash_message,
&ok);
if (!ok) {
uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL &&
ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) {
/* Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure alert
* in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client behavior and
* gives a better error on a (probable) failure to negotiate initial
* parameters. Note: this error code comes after the original one.
*
* See https://crbug.com/446505. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO);
}
return n;
}
CBS_init(&server_hello, ssl->init_msg, n);
if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_version) ||
!CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) ||
CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) ||
!CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
assert(ssl->s3->have_version == ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
if (!ssl3_is_version_enabled(ssl, server_version)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
ssl->version = server_version;
/* Mark the version as fixed so the record-layer version is not clamped
* to TLS 1.0. */
ssl->s3->have_version = 1;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
ssl->version = server_version;
ssl->s3->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(server_version);
assert(ssl->s3->enc_method != NULL);
/* At this point, the connection's version is known and ssl->version is
* fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
ssl->s3->have_version = 1;
} else if (server_version != ssl->version) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
/* Copy over the server random. */
memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
assert(ssl->session == NULL || ssl->session->session_id_length > 0);
if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && ssl->session != NULL &&
CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id,
ssl->session->session_id_length)) {
if (ssl->sid_ctx_length != ssl->session->sid_ctx_length ||
memcmp(ssl->session->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length)) {
/* actually a client application bug */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL,
SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
ssl->hit = 1;
} else {
/* The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to
* fill out. */
ssl->hit = 0;
if (!ssl_get_new_session(ssl, 0 /* client */)) {
goto f_err;
}
/* Note: session_id could be empty. */
ssl->session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
memcpy(ssl->session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id),
CBS_len(&session_id));
}
c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
if (c == NULL) {
/* unknown cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* If the cipher is disabled then we didn't sent it in the ClientHello, so if
* the server selected it, it's an error. */
if ((c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k) || (c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a) ||
SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) > ssl3_protocol_version(ssl)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(ssl);
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, NULL, c)) {
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
if (ssl->hit) {
if (ssl->session->cipher != c) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
} else {
ssl->session->cipher = c;
}
ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
/* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash. */
if (!ssl3_init_handshake_hash(ssl)) {
goto f_err;
}
/* If doing a full handshake with TLS 1.2, the server may request a client
* certificate which requires hashing the handshake transcript under a
* different hash. Otherwise, the handshake buffer may be released. */
if (ssl->hit || ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION ||
!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl);
}
/* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */
if (compression_method != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* TLS extensions */
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(ssl, &server_hello)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
/* There should be nothing left over in the record. */
if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) {
/* wrong packet length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (ssl->hit &&
ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret !=
ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
if (ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
} else {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION);
}
goto f_err;
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return -1;
}
/* ssl3_check_leaf_certificate returns one if |leaf| is a suitable leaf server
* certificate for |ssl|. Otherwise, it returns zero and pushes an error on the
* error queue. */
static int ssl3_check_leaf_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *leaf) {
int ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(leaf);
if (pkey == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
int expected_type = ssl_cipher_get_key_type(cipher);
assert(expected_type != EVP_PKEY_NONE);
if (pkey->type != expected_type) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) {
/* TODO(davidben): This behavior is preserved from upstream. Should key
* usages be checked in other cases as well? */
/* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
X509_check_purpose(leaf, -1, 0);
if ((leaf->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
!(leaf->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
goto err;
}
if (!tls1_check_ec_cert(ssl, leaf)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto err;
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
}
int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *ssl) {
int al, ok, ret = -1;
unsigned long n;
X509 *x = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
CBS cbs, certificate_list;
const uint8_t *data;
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, ssl_hash_message,
&ok);
if (!ok) {
return n;
}
CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, n);
sk = sk_X509_new_null();
if (sk == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_list) ||
CBS_len(&certificate_list) == 0 ||
CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
CBS certificate;
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* A u24 length cannot overflow a long. */
data = CBS_data(&certificate);
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&certificate));
if (x == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
if (!ssl3_check_leaf_certificate(ssl, leaf)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto f_err;
}
/* NOTE: Unlike the server half, the client's copy of |cert_chain| includes
* the leaf. */
sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->session->cert_chain, X509_free);
ssl->session->cert_chain = sk;
sk = NULL;
X509_free(ssl->session->peer);
ssl->session->peer = X509_up_ref(leaf);
ssl->session->verify_result = ssl->verify_result;
ret = 1;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
}
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return ret;
}
int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) {
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
int al, ok;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
DH *dh = NULL;
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
long n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message, &ok);
if (!ok) {
return n;
}
if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return -1;
}
/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange may be omitted to send no
* identity hint. */
if (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) {
/* TODO(davidben): This should be reset in one place with the rest of the
* handshake state. */
OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint);
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return 1;
}
/* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature over. */
CBS server_key_exchange;
CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, n);
CBS server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange;
uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
CBS psk_identity_hint;
/* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint. */
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange,
&psk_identity_hint)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
* ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of a PSK
* identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK identity.
* Also do not allow NULL characters; identities are saved as C strings.
*
* TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than
* a specific identity. */
if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
/* Save the identity hint as a C string. */
if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
CBS dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_p) ||
CBS_len(&dh_p) == 0 ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_g) ||
CBS_len(&dh_g) == 0 ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_Ys) ||
CBS_len(&dh_Ys) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
dh = DH_new();
if (dh == NULL) {
goto err;
}
dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_p), CBS_len(&dh_p), NULL);
dh->g = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_g), CBS_len(&dh_g), NULL);
if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) {
goto err;
}
ssl->session->key_exchange_info = DH_num_bits(dh);
if (ssl->session->key_exchange_info < 1024) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto err;
} else if (ssl->session->key_exchange_info > 4096) {
/* Overly large DHE groups are prohibitively expensive, so enforce a limit
* to prevent a server from causing us to perform too expensive of a
* computation. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DH_P_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_dhe(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, dh);
dh = NULL;
/* Save the peer public key for later. */
size_t peer_key_len;
if (!CBS_stow(&dh_Ys, &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key, &peer_key_len)) {
goto err;
}
/* |dh_Ys| was initialized with CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed, so peer_key_len
* fits in a uint16_t. */
assert(sizeof(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len) == 2 && peer_key_len <= 0xffff);
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len = (uint16_t)peer_key_len;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
/* Parse the server parameters. */
uint8_t group_type;
uint16_t group_id;
CBS point;
if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &group_type) ||
group_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE ||
!CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &group_id) ||
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
ssl->session->key_exchange_info = group_id;
/* Ensure the group is consistent with preferences. */
if (!tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
goto f_err;
}
/* Initialize ECDH and save the peer public key for later. */
size_t peer_key_len;
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, group_id) ||
!CBS_stow(&point, &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key, &peer_key_len)) {
goto err;
}
/* |point| was initialized with CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed, so peer_key_len
* fits in a uint16_t. */
assert(sizeof(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len) == 2 && peer_key_len <= 0xffff);
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len = (uint16_t)peer_key_len;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kCECPQ1) {
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, SSL_GROUP_CECPQ1)) {
goto err;
}
CBS key;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &key)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
size_t peer_key_len;
if (!CBS_stow(&key, &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key, &peer_key_len)) {
goto err;
}
/* |key| was initialized with CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed, so peer_key_len
* fits in a uint16_t. */
assert(sizeof(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len) == 2 && peer_key_len <= 0xffff);
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len = (uint16_t)peer_key_len;
} else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
/* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while
* |server_key_exchange_orig| contains the entire message. From that, derive
* a CBS containing just the parameter. */
CBS parameter;
CBS_init(&parameter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig),
CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange));
/* ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key. */
if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ssl->session->peer);
if (pkey == NULL) {
goto err;
}
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
uint8_t hash, signature;
if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &hash) ||
!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &signature)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &md, &al, hash, signature, pkey)) {
goto f_err;
}
ssl->s3->tmp.server_key_exchange_hash = hash;
} else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
md = EVP_md5_sha1();
} else {
md = EVP_sha1();
}
/* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature. */
CBS signature;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) ||
CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
int sig_ok = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) &&
EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->client_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) &&
EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) &&
EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&parameter),
CBS_len(&parameter)) &&
EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature),
CBS_len(&signature));
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
sig_ok = 1;
ERR_clear_error();
#endif
if (!sig_ok) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else {
/* PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers. */
assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK);
if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
DH_free(dh);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return -1;
}
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) {
return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
}
int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *ssl) {
int ok, ret = 0;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
long n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message, &ok);
if (!ok) {
return n;
}
ssl->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
/* If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing
* client auth. */
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl);
return 1;
}
if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, n);
ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
if (ca_sk == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* get the certificate types */
CBS certificate_types;
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types, &ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_types,
&ssl->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
!tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(ssl, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
CBS certificate_authorities;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_authorities)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
while (CBS_len(&certificate_authorities) > 0) {
CBS distinguished_name;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_authorities,
&distinguished_name)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&distinguished_name);
/* A u16 length cannot overflow a long. */
xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&distinguished_name));
if (xn == NULL ||
data != CBS_data(&distinguished_name) + CBS_len(&distinguished_name)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
xn = NULL;
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
ssl->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ssl->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
ssl->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
ca_sk = NULL;
ret = 1;
err:
X509_NAME_free(xn);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return ret;
}
int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl) {
int ok, al;
long n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
ssl_hash_message, &ok);
if (!ok) {
return n;
}
CBS new_session_ticket, ticket;
uint32_t ticket_lifetime_hint;
CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, ssl->init_msg, n);
if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, &ticket_lifetime_hint) ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) ||
CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (CBS_len(&ticket) == 0) {
/* RFC 5077 allows a server to change its mind and send no ticket after
* negotiating the extension. The value of |tlsext_ticket_expected| is
* checked in |ssl_update_cache| so is cleared here to avoid an unnecessary
* update. */
ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
return 1;
}
if (ssl->hit) {
/* The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are
* immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the
* existing session. */
uint8_t *bytes;
size_t bytes_len;
if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(ssl->session, &bytes, &bytes_len)) {
goto err;
}
SSL_SESSION *new_session = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(bytes, bytes_len);
OPENSSL_free(bytes);
if (new_session == NULL) {
/* This should never happen. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session);
ssl->session = new_session;
}
if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &ssl->session->tlsext_tick,
&ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ssl->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
/* Generate a session ID for this session based on the session ticket. We use
* the session ID mechanism for detecting ticket resumption. This also fits in
* with assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL.*/
if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), ssl->session->session_id,
&ssl->session->session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
goto err;
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return -1;
}
int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *ssl) {
int ok, al;
long n;
CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response;
uint8_t status_type;
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message, &ok);
if (!ok) {
return n;
}
if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
/* A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change
* its mind about sending CertificateStatus. */
ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return 1;
}
CBS_init(&certificate_status, ssl->init_msg, n);
if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) ||
status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp ||
!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) ||
CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 ||
CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &ssl->session->ocsp_response,
&ssl->session->ocsp_response_length)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return -1;
}
int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *ssl) {
int ok;
long n;
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, ssl_hash_message,
&ok);
if (!ok) {
return n;
}
if (n > 0) {
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return -1;
}
return 1;
}
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) >= sizeof(unsigned),
SIZE_T_IS_SMALLER_THAN_UNSIGNED);
int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B) {
return ssl_do_write(ssl);
}
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A);
uint8_t *pms = NULL;
size_t pms_len = 0;
CBB cbb;
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl),
ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl))) {
goto err;
}
uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */
unsigned psk_len = 0;
uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
goto err;
}
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
psk_len = ssl->psk_client_callback(
ssl, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint, identity, sizeof(identity),
psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psk_len == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
assert(psk_len <= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN);
OPENSSL_free(ssl->session->psk_identity);
ssl->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
if (ssl->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Write out psk_identity. */
CBB child;
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)identity,
OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity))) ||
!CBB_flush(&cbb)) {
goto err;
}
}
/* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms| and |pms_len|. */
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
pms_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len);
if (pms == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ssl->session->peer);
if (pkey == NULL) {
goto err;
}
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
if (rsa == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
goto err;
}
ssl->session->key_exchange_info = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pms[0] = ssl->client_version >> 8;
pms[1] = ssl->client_version & 0xff;
if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) {
goto err;
}
CBB child, *enc_pms = &cbb;
size_t enc_pms_len;
/* In TLS, there is a length prefix. */
if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child)) {
goto err;
}
enc_pms = &child;
}
uint8_t *ptr;
if (!CBB_reserve(enc_pms, &ptr, RSA_size(rsa)) ||
!RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, ptr, RSA_size(rsa), pms, pms_len,
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) ||
/* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(ssl, ptr, enc_pms_len, pms, pms_len) ||
!CBB_did_write(enc_pms, enc_pms_len) ||
!CBB_flush(&cbb)) {
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kDHE|SSL_kCECPQ1)) {
/* Generate a keypair and serialize the public half. */
CBB child;
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_add_key(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &cbb, &child)) {
goto err;
}
/* Compute the premaster. */
uint8_t alert;
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_accept(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &child, &pms, &pms_len,
&alert, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key,
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_flush(&cbb)) {
goto err;
}
/* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */
SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key);
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key = NULL;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
/* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as
* the pre-shared key. */
pms_len = psk_len;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len);
if (pms == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
memset(pms, 0, pms_len);
} else {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared
* key. */
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
CBB pms_cbb, child;
uint8_t *new_pms;
size_t new_pms_len;
CBB_zero(&pms_cbb);
if (!CBB_init(&pms_cbb, 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms_len) ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms, pms_len) ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
!CBB_finish(&pms_cbb, &new_pms, &new_pms_len)) {
CBB_cleanup(&pms_cbb);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len);
OPENSSL_free(pms);
pms = new_pms;
pms_len = new_pms_len;
}
/* The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the
* master secret. */
size_t length;
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) ||
!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, length)) {
goto err;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
ssl->session->master_key_length =
tls1_generate_master_secret(ssl, ssl->session->master_key, pms, pms_len);
if (ssl->session->master_key_length == 0) {
goto err;
}
ssl->session->extended_master_secret = ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret;
OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len);
OPENSSL_free(pms);
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
return ssl_do_write(ssl);
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
if (pms != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len);
OPENSSL_free(pms);
}
return -1;
}
int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C) {
return ssl_do_write(ssl);
}
CBB cbb, child;
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl),
ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl))) {
goto err;
}
assert(ssl_has_private_key(ssl));
const size_t max_sig_len = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl);
size_t sig_len;
enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result;
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
/* Select and write out the digest type in TLS 1.2. */
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(ssl);
if (!tls12_add_sigandhash(ssl, &cbb, md)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
/* Compute the digest. In TLS 1.1 and below, the digest type is also
* selected here. */
uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t digest_len;
if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(ssl, digest, &digest_len, &md,
ssl_private_key_type(ssl))) {
goto err;
}
/* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary. */
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl);
/* Sign the digest. */
uint8_t *ptr;
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
!CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
goto err;
}
sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len, md,
digest, digest_len);
} else {
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B);
/* Skip over the already written signature algorithm and retry the
* signature. */
uint8_t *ptr;
if ((ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
!CBB_did_write(&cbb, 2)) ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
!CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
goto err;
}
sign_result =
ssl_private_key_sign_complete(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len);
}
switch (sign_result) {
case ssl_private_key_success:
break;
case ssl_private_key_failure:
goto err;
case ssl_private_key_retry:
ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
goto err;
}
size_t length;
if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) ||
!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, length)) {
goto err;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C;
return ssl_do_write(ssl);
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return -1;
}
/* ssl3_has_client_certificate returns true if a client certificate is
* configured. */
static int ssl3_has_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) {
return ssl->cert && ssl->cert->x509 && ssl_has_private_key(ssl);
}
int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
/* Call cert_cb to update the certificate. */
if (ssl->cert->cert_cb) {
int ret = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (ret < 0) {
ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return -1;
}
if (ret == 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
}
if (ssl3_has_client_certificate(ssl)) {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
} else {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
}
}
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
/* Call client_cert_cb to update the certificate. */
X509 *x509 = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int ret = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(ssl, &x509, &pkey);
if (ret < 0) {
ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return -1;
}
int setup_error = ret == 1 && (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509) ||
!SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey));
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (setup_error) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
}
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
if (!ssl3_has_client_certificate(ssl)) {
/* Without a client certificate, the handshake buffer may be released. */
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl);
if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
/* In SSL 3.0, send no certificate by skipping both messages. */
ssl->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
return 1;
}
/* In TLS, send an empty Certificate message. */
ssl->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
uint8_t *p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
l2n3(0, p);
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, 3)) {
return -1;
}
} else if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) {
return -1;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
}
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D);
return ssl_do_write(ssl);
}
int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B) {
return ssl_do_write(ssl);
}
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A);
static const uint8_t kZero[32] = {0};
size_t padding_len = 32 - ((ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len + 2) % 32);
CBB cbb, child;
size_t length;
CBB_zero(&cbb);
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl),
ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) ||
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated,
ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len) ||
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, kZero, padding_len) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) ||
!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, length)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return -1;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
return ssl_do_write(ssl);
}
int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B) {
return ssl_do_write(ssl);
}
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A);
if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private == NULL &&
ssl->ctx->channel_id_cb != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
ssl->ctx->channel_id_cb(ssl, &key);
if (key != NULL &&
!SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(ssl, key)) {
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
return -1;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
}
if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private == NULL) {
ssl->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
return -1;
}
EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private);
if (ec_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
int ret = -1;
BIGNUM *x = BN_new();
BIGNUM *y = BN_new();
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
if (x == NULL || y == NULL ||
!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec_key),
x, y, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t digest_len;
if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(ssl, digest, &digest_len)) {
goto err;
}
sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, digest_len, ec_key);
if (sig == NULL) {
goto err;
}
CBB cbb, child;
size_t length;
CBB_zero(&cbb);
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl),
ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) ||
!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, x) ||
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, y) ||
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, sig->r) ||
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, sig->s) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) ||
!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
length)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
goto err;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B;
ret = ssl_do_write(ssl);
err:
BN_free(x);
BN_free(y);
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
return ret;
}
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, X509 **out_x509, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) {
if (ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb == NULL) {
return 0;
}
int ret = ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb(ssl, out_x509, out_pkey);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
assert(*out_x509 != NULL);
assert(*out_pkey != NULL);
return 1;
}
int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL *ssl) {
int ret = ssl_verify_cert_chain(ssl, ssl->session->cert_chain);
if (ssl->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && ret <= 0) {
int al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(ssl->verify_result);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
} else {
ret = 1;
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep ssl->verify_result */
}
return ret;
}
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink