de620d9c87
This change can probably be ported over to upstream crypto/tls. The current Go TLS implementation ignores the signature and hash algorithm lists in CertificateVerify and CertificateRequest. Take these into account so that our tests assert OpenSSL fills them out correctly. Also fix a bug in the original code where 'err' within the switch block get shadowed. Change-Id: I5d9c0b31ebb4662ecc767ed885a20707f0e86216 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1253 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
621 lines
17 KiB
Go
621 lines
17 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package main
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/asn1"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"math/big"
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"net"
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"strconv"
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)
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type clientHandshakeState struct {
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c *Conn
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serverHello *serverHelloMsg
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hello *clientHelloMsg
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suite *cipherSuite
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finishedHash finishedHash
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masterSecret []byte
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session *ClientSessionState
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}
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func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
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if c.config == nil {
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c.config = defaultConfig()
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}
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if len(c.config.ServerName) == 0 && !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
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return errors.New("tls: either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify must be specified in the tls.Config")
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}
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hello := &clientHelloMsg{
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vers: c.config.maxVersion(),
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compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
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random: make([]byte, 32),
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ocspStapling: true,
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serverName: c.config.ServerName,
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supportedCurves: c.config.curvePreferences(),
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supportedPoints: []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed},
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nextProtoNeg: len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0,
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secureRenegotiation: true,
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duplicateExtension: c.config.Bugs.DuplicateExtension,
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}
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possibleCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites()
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hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(possibleCipherSuites))
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NextCipherSuite:
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for _, suiteId := range possibleCipherSuites {
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for _, suite := range cipherSuites {
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if suite.id != suiteId {
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continue
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}
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// Don't advertise TLS 1.2-only cipher suites unless
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// we're attempting TLS 1.2.
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if hello.vers < VersionTLS12 && suite.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
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continue
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}
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hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId)
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continue NextCipherSuite
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}
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}
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_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.random)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
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}
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if hello.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
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hello.signatureAndHashes = supportedSKXSignatureAlgorithms
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}
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var session *ClientSessionState
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var cacheKey string
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sessionCache := c.config.ClientSessionCache
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if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
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sessionCache = nil
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}
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if sessionCache != nil {
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hello.ticketSupported = true
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// Try to resume a previously negotiated TLS session, if
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// available.
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cacheKey = clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
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candidateSession, ok := sessionCache.Get(cacheKey)
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if ok {
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// Check that the ciphersuite/version used for the
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// previous session are still valid.
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cipherSuiteOk := false
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for _, id := range hello.cipherSuites {
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if id == candidateSession.cipherSuite {
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cipherSuiteOk = true
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break
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}
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}
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versOk := candidateSession.vers >= c.config.minVersion() &&
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candidateSession.vers <= c.config.maxVersion()
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if versOk && cipherSuiteOk {
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session = candidateSession
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}
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}
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}
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if session != nil {
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hello.sessionTicket = session.sessionTicket
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// A random session ID is used to detect when the
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// server accepted the ticket and is resuming a session
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// (see RFC 5077).
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hello.sessionId = make([]byte, 16)
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.sessionId); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
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}
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}
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal())
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg)
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}
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vers, ok := c.config.mutualVersion(serverHello.vers)
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if !ok || vers < VersionTLS10 {
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// TLS 1.0 is the minimum version supported as a client.
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c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected unsupported protocol version %x", serverHello.vers)
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}
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c.vers = vers
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c.haveVers = true
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suite := mutualCipherSuite(c.config.cipherSuites(), serverHello.cipherSuite)
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if suite == nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected an unsupported cipher suite")
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}
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hs := &clientHandshakeState{
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c: c,
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serverHello: serverHello,
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hello: hello,
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suite: suite,
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finishedHash: newFinishedHash(c.vers, suite),
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session: session,
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
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isResume, err := hs.processServerHello()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if isResume {
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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} else {
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if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if sessionCache != nil && hs.session != nil && session != hs.session {
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sessionCache.Put(cacheKey, hs.session)
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}
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c.didResume = isResume
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c.handshakeComplete = true
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c.cipherSuite = suite.id
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
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if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
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for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
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cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error())
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}
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certs[i] = cert
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}
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if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
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opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
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Roots: c.config.RootCAs,
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CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
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DNSName: c.config.ServerName,
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Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
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}
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for i, cert := range certs {
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if i == 0 {
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continue
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}
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opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
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}
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c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return err
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}
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}
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switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
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case *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey:
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break
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default:
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c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: server's certificate contains an unsupported type of public key: %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
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}
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c.peerCertificates = certs
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if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling {
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(cs, msg)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal())
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if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP {
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c.ocspResponse = cs.response
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}
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
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skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
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if ok {
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hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
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err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, certs[0], skx)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return err
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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var chainToSend *Certificate
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var certRequested bool
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certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg)
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if ok {
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certRequested = true
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// RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field:
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// A list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate
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// authorities. These distinguished names may specify a desired
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// distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA;
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// thus, this message can be used to describe both known roots
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// and a desired authorization space. If the
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// certificate_authorities list is empty then the client MAY
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// send any certificate of the appropriate
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// ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external
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// arrangement to the contrary.
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
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var rsaAvail, ecdsaAvail bool
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for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes {
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switch certType {
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case CertTypeRSASign:
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rsaAvail = true
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case CertTypeECDSASign:
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ecdsaAvail = true
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}
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}
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// We need to search our list of client certs for one
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// where SignatureAlgorithm is RSA and the Issuer is in
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// certReq.certificateAuthorities
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findCert:
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for i, chain := range c.config.Certificates {
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if !rsaAvail && !ecdsaAvail {
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continue
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}
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for j, cert := range chain.Certificate {
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x509Cert := chain.Leaf
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// parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf
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// node, or if chain.Leaf was nil
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if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil {
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if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate #" + strconv.Itoa(i) + ": " + err.Error())
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}
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}
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switch {
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case rsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA:
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case ecdsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA:
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default:
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continue findCert
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}
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if len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 {
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// they gave us an empty list, so just take the
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// first RSA cert from c.config.Certificates
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chainToSend = &chain
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break findCert
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}
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for _, ca := range certReq.certificateAuthorities {
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if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) {
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chainToSend = &chain
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break findCert
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}
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}
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}
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal())
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// If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a
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// Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a
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// certificate to send.
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if certRequested {
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certMsg = new(certificateMsg)
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if chainToSend != nil {
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certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
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}
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preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, certs[0])
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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if ckx != nil {
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hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal())
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}
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if chainToSend != nil {
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var signed []byte
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certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{
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hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12,
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}
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switch key := c.config.Certificates[0].PrivateKey.(type) {
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case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
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certVerify.signatureAndHash, err = hs.finishedHash.selectClientCertSignatureAlgorithm(certReq.signatureAndHashes, signatureECDSA)
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if err != nil {
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break
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}
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var digest []byte
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digest, _, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(certVerify.signatureAndHash)
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if err != nil {
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break
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}
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var r, s *big.Int
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r, s, err = ecdsa.Sign(c.config.rand(), key, digest)
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if err == nil {
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signed, err = asn1.Marshal(ecdsaSignature{r, s})
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}
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case *rsa.PrivateKey:
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certVerify.signatureAndHash, err = hs.finishedHash.selectClientCertSignatureAlgorithm(certReq.signatureAndHashes, signatureRSA)
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if err != nil {
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break
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}
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var digest []byte
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var hashFunc crypto.Hash
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digest, hashFunc, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(certVerify.signatureAndHash)
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if err != nil {
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break
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}
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signed, err = rsa.SignPKCS1v15(c.config.rand(), key, hashFunc, digest)
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default:
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err = errors.New("unknown private key type")
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}
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake with client certificate: " + err.Error())
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}
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certVerify.signature = signed
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal())
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}
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hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random)
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
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c := hs.c
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clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
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keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
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var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
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var clientHash, serverHash macFunction
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if hs.suite.cipher != nil {
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clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */)
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clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
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serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */)
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serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
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} else {
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clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
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serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
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}
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|
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c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
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c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
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return nil
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}
|
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|
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) serverResumedSession() bool {
|
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// If the server responded with the same sessionId then it means the
|
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// sessionTicket is being used to resume a TLS session.
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return hs.session != nil && hs.hello.sessionId != nil &&
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bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.sessionId, hs.hello.sessionId)
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}
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|
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) processServerHello() (bool, error) {
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c := hs.c
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|
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if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
|
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return false, errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format")
|
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}
|
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|
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if !hs.hello.nextProtoNeg && hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
|
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return false, errors.New("server advertised unrequested NPN extension")
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}
|
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|
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if hs.serverResumedSession() {
|
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// Restore masterSecret and peerCerts from previous state
|
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hs.masterSecret = hs.session.masterSecret
|
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c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
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return true, nil
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}
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return false, nil
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}
|
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|
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished() error {
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c := hs.c
|
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|
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c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
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if err := c.in.error(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
|
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|
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
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return err
|
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}
|
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serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(serverFinished, msg)
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}
|
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|
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verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) ||
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subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect")
|
|
}
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal())
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error {
|
|
if !hs.serverHello.ticketSupported {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
sessionTicketMsg, ok := msg.(*newSessionTicketMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(sessionTicketMsg.marshal())
|
|
|
|
hs.session = &ClientSessionState{
|
|
sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket,
|
|
vers: c.vers,
|
|
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
|
|
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
|
|
serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished() error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
if !c.config.Bugs.SkipChangeCipherSpec {
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
|
|
}
|
|
if hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
|
|
nextProto := new(nextProtoMsg)
|
|
proto, fallback := mutualProtocol(c.config.NextProtos, hs.serverHello.nextProtos)
|
|
nextProto.proto = proto
|
|
c.clientProtocol = proto
|
|
c.clientProtocolFallback = fallback
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, nextProto.marshal())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finished := new(finishedMsg)
|
|
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal())
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// clientSessionCacheKey returns a key used to cache sessionTickets that could
|
|
// be used to resume previously negotiated TLS sessions with a server.
|
|
func clientSessionCacheKey(serverAddr net.Addr, config *Config) string {
|
|
if len(config.ServerName) > 0 {
|
|
return config.ServerName
|
|
}
|
|
return serverAddr.String()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mutualProtocol finds the mutual Next Protocol Negotiation protocol given the
|
|
// set of client and server supported protocols. The set of client supported
|
|
// protocols must not be empty. It returns the resulting protocol and flag
|
|
// indicating if the fallback case was reached.
|
|
func mutualProtocol(clientProtos, serverProtos []string) (string, bool) {
|
|
for _, s := range serverProtos {
|
|
for _, c := range clientProtos {
|
|
if s == c {
|
|
return s, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return clientProtos[0], true
|
|
}
|