boringssl/crypto/cmac/cmac.c
David Benjamin 17cf2cb1d2 Work around language and compiler bug in memcpy, etc.
Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html

Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.

BUG=23

Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-12-21 20:34:47 +00:00

242 lines
7.4 KiB
C

/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2010 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ==================================================================== */
#include <openssl/cmac.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/cipher.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include "../internal.h"
struct cmac_ctx_st {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
/* k1 and k2 are the CMAC subkeys. See
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4493#section-2.3 */
uint8_t k1[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t k2[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* Last (possibly partial) scratch */
uint8_t block[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* block_used contains the number of valid bytes in |block|. */
unsigned block_used;
};
static void CMAC_CTX_init(CMAC_CTX *ctx) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
}
static void CMAC_CTX_cleanup(CMAC_CTX *ctx) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->k1, sizeof(ctx->k1));
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->k2, sizeof(ctx->k2));
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->block, sizeof(ctx->block));
}
int AES_CMAC(uint8_t out[16], const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
switch (key_len) {
case 16:
cipher = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
break;
case 32:
cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
break;
default:
return 0;
}
size_t scratch_out_len;
CMAC_CTX ctx;
CMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
const int ok = CMAC_Init(&ctx, key, key_len, cipher, NULL /* engine */) &&
CMAC_Update(&ctx, in, in_len) &&
CMAC_Final(&ctx, out, &scratch_out_len);
CMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return ok;
}
CMAC_CTX *CMAC_CTX_new(void) {
CMAC_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx != NULL) {
CMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
}
return ctx;
}
void CMAC_CTX_free(CMAC_CTX *ctx) {
if (ctx == NULL) {
return;
}
CMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
/* binary_field_mul_x treats the 128 bits at |in| as an element of GF(2¹²⁸)
* with a hard-coded reduction polynomial and sets |out| as x times the
* input.
*
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4493#section-2.3 */
static void binary_field_mul_x(uint8_t out[16], const uint8_t in[16]) {
unsigned i;
/* Shift |in| to left, including carry. */
for (i = 0; i < 15; i++) {
out[i] = (in[i] << 1) | (in[i+1] >> 7);
}
/* If MSB set fixup with R. */
const uint8_t carry = in[0] >> 7;
out[i] = (in[i] << 1) ^ ((0 - carry) & 0x87);
}
static const uint8_t kZeroIV[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {0};
int CMAC_Init(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t key_len,
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *engine) {
uint8_t scratch[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher) != AES_BLOCK_SIZE ||
EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) != key_len ||
!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, kZeroIV) ||
!EVP_Cipher(&ctx->cipher_ctx, scratch, kZeroIV, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ||
/* Reset context again ready for first data. */
!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, kZeroIV)) {
return 0;
}
binary_field_mul_x(ctx->k1, scratch);
binary_field_mul_x(ctx->k2, ctx->k1);
ctx->block_used = 0;
return 1;
}
int CMAC_Reset(CMAC_CTX *ctx) {
ctx->block_used = 0;
return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, kZeroIV);
}
int CMAC_Update(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
uint8_t scratch[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (ctx->block_used > 0) {
size_t todo = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - ctx->block_used;
if (in_len < todo) {
todo = in_len;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->block + ctx->block_used, in, todo);
in += todo;
in_len -= todo;
ctx->block_used += todo;
/* If |in_len| is zero then either |ctx->block_used| is less than
* |AES_BLOCK_SIZE|, in which case we can stop here, or |ctx->block_used|
* is exactly |AES_BLOCK_SIZE| but there's no more data to process. In the
* latter case we don't want to process this block now because it might be
* the last block and that block is treated specially. */
if (in_len == 0) {
return 1;
}
assert(ctx->block_used == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (!EVP_Cipher(&ctx->cipher_ctx, scratch, ctx->block, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
return 0;
}
}
/* Encrypt all but one of the remaining blocks. */
while (in_len > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
if (!EVP_Cipher(&ctx->cipher_ctx, scratch, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
return 0;
}
in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
in_len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->block, in, in_len);
ctx->block_used = in_len;
return 1;
}
int CMAC_Final(CMAC_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) {
*out_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
if (out == NULL) {
return 1;
}
const uint8_t *mask = ctx->k1;
if (ctx->block_used != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
/* If the last block is incomplete, terminate it with a single 'one' bit
* followed by zeros. */
ctx->block[ctx->block_used] = 0x80;
OPENSSL_memset(ctx->block + ctx->block_used + 1, 0,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (ctx->block_used + 1));
mask = ctx->k2;
}
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) {
out[i] = ctx->block[i] ^ mask[i];
}
return EVP_Cipher(&ctx->cipher_ctx, out, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}